1. No.
2. Yes.
3. No. Yes.

Elaborate please

When I ask whether consciousness is fundamental or not, I start from a very simplistic logical model. — Eugen

A philosophical "starting point" would be to define "Consciousness". I generally agree with your reasoning, except I understand that Human Consciousness probably evolved from something even more Fundamental, such as Generic Information : the power to enform ; to create. :smile:

It might be useful to parse out computational aspects from sensory aspects. There is a difference between:

1. *sensing* blue
and
2. a single cell is attracted to a molecule because of the properties of the outside molecules interacting with the organism's molecules to cause the organism to move towards the outside molecule.

2 can be fully reducible and 1 seems ever elusive.

You start adding in "illusions" then you have the classic "mind" / "body" problem (the sensation of blue being the illusion which is mind apparently). Then THIS has to be explained, infinitum (homuncular fallacy).

Some thoughts:

You've left terms undefined or at least not clearly defined, e.g. consciousness, emergence, fundamental.

I. Consciousness is or is not fundamental - 100% of the possibilities — Eugen

If consciousness is somehow fundamental, it still clearly requires physical, biological, neurological processes to manifest. As far as I know, we don't have any evidence of a conscious entity without a nervous system.

A. It is 100% reducible to the fundamental properties of reality - weak emergence.
B. It is not 100% reducible to the fundamental properties of reality - strong emergence. — Eugen

This is a misrepresentation of the meaning of "emergence." Emergence applies to processes at one scale or level of organization that are manifestations of processes at a smaller scale or lower level. All emergent processes are "reducible to fundamental processes of reality" if by that you mean consistent with the laws of physics. The difference between what you call weak vs. strong emergence is that while both are reducible to physical processes, strongly emergent processes can not be derived, predicted, from those lower level processes. Here's a link to a famous paper - "More is Different" by P.W. Anderson that explains the difference.

https://www.tkm.kit.edu/downloads/TKM1_2011_more_is_different_PWA.pdf

This model looks like this:

I. Consciousness is or is not fundamental - 100% of the possibilities

II. If it is not fundamental, then:
A. It is 100% reducible to the fundamental properties of reality - weak emergence.
B. It is not 100% reducible to the fundamental properties of reality - strong emergence.
A + B = 100% of the possibilities

I + II = 100% of all possibilities — Eugen

This model could be applied to any phenomenon. It really doesn't have any explanatory power.

I didn't try to explain anything. I think you got me wrong. I'm not trying to explain consciousness. You know what? Replace the word consciousness with ''absolutely anything you could think of". All I'm saying is:

I. ''absolutely anything you could think of":
A. is fundamental
or
B. isn't fundamental

II. If B is true (''absolutely anything you could think of" isn't fundamental):
C. its properties are fully reducible to the properties of the fundamental reality
D. its properties aren't fully reducible to the properties of the fundamental reality

For me personally, this is almost tautology. But for it isn't.
He believes ''absolutely anything you could think of" can be non-fundamental, but at the same time, neither falls into C and D categories. I personally cannot see how this could work, so I'm waiting for his explanation.

This is a misrepresentation of the meaning of "emergence." Emergence applies to processes at one scale or level of organization that are manifestations of processes at a smaller scale or lower level. All emergent processes are "reducible to fundamental processes of reality" if by that you mean consistent with the laws of physics. The difference between what you call weak vs. strong emergence is that while both are reducible to physical processes, strongly emergent processes can not be derived, predicted, from those lower level processes. — T Clark

I was totally clear on that: if you don't agree with my notion of ''emergence", ignore it and focus on ''reduction".

It really doesn't have any explanatory power. — T Clark

It's not about its explanatory power. It's the place where we begin a debate. It's what we're trying to find out, i.e. is ''absolutely anything you could think of" fundamental or not? If not, is ''absolutely anything you could think of" 100% reducible to its parts or not?

How would we go about determining whether it is fundamental or emergent?

By reasoning, obtaining empirical evidence, etc. But this is not relevant to me. To me, it is relevant if we could find something outside this model.
For example, a model where something is
a. not fundamental
b. its properties are 100% reducible to the properties of the fundamental reality
c. not irreducible to the properties of the fundamental reality

Maybe a reality where nothing is fundamental, or maybe a reality where something is both fundamental and emergent.
For example, thinks that's the case. I'm not sure how because he doesn't give more details.

Maybe a reality where nothing is fundamental, or maybe a reality where something is both fundamental and emergent. — Eugen

Don't some forms of idealism work like this? Consciousness or will is fundamental (universal mind) and instantiations of conscious creatures, are dissociated, evolving alters, emerging from this instinctive, striving will? Hence we have the voyage towards metacognition, aeons in the making, as consciousness begins to know itself. At least that's the story I have heard (Bernardo Kastrup argues a version of this).

By reasoning, obtaining empirical evidence, etc. — Eugen

There's a Nobel Prize awaiting for anyone who can crack the puzzle - if it is one. I am not confident we'll get there. I certainly won't.

Is there any particular reason why the question matters to you personally?

Don't some forms of idealism work like this? — Tom Storm

- Hmmm, the way I phrased it... yes. But to me, in idealism, consciousness is fundamental, period. Indeed, I guess I wasn't very coherent.

Is there any particular reason why the question matters to you personally? — Tom Storm

Yes, there is. I want to be as rigorous as I can. I don't want to miss something from the picture. I want to know if there's a model where consciousness is not fundamental, but it doesn't fall in C or D either.

But to me, in idealism, consciousness is fundamental, period. Indeed, I guess I wasn't very coherent. — Eugen

You were fine. I'm just positing models. I think some forms of idealism hold to an account that suggests individual consciousness like yours and mine - with qualia and what-it's-like-to-be-youness - are emergent and more recent developments in the journey of consciousness. But I'm not a customer for this particular narrative.

Yes, there is. I want to be as rigorous as I can. I don't want to miss something from the picture. — Eugen

So what difference does it make, however? I have often argued that idealism, such as I have described above, would make no difference to how I live. I still am in a reality where ice cream and employment, war and relationships and eating and finding a parking space cannot be overcome. :wink:

Ohh... it's not about making a difference in the way I live more than having a clear image in regard to something. I agree the world won't change even if 100% of us would believe in idealism.

:up:

fyi – I "believe" only what I state I believe.

What I think, however, is that the OP doesn't make any sense.

To begin with, at it's heart, there is a false dichotomy of "either X is reducible or X is strongly emergent" (where X initially was "consciousness" and now it's any nondescript whatever). Also, I can't tell whether you're asking about ideas or how things are (or???) – philosophy or science (or???), respectively. The OP's vague notions – confusions – are opaque.

What I think, however, is that the OP doesn't make any sense. — 180 Proof

- I'm not surprised, you always find my OP's non-sensical even though you always find answers.

either X is reducible or X is strongly emergent" — 180 Proof

- Let me ask you this in a different way. Forget about ''emergence", you're too obsessed with attacking this notion. Is there a way in which something (a process for example, but you can think of anything you want) is:
a. not fundamental
b. not reducible to the fundamental properties of the reality
c. not irreducible to the fundamental properties of reality

Options (b) & (c) contradict each other – nonsense. And option (a) is an unwarranted assumption that there is something "fundamental". :roll:

an unwarranted assumption that there is something "fundamental". — 180 Proof

I'm non-native, so give me an alternative word or notion.

Options (b) & (c) contradict each other — 180 Proof

B. is not fundamental — Eugen

- Water is not fundamental.

C. Its properties are 100% reducible to the properties of the fundamental reality — Eugen

- Water can be 100% reduced to the fundamental properties of reality.

Where is the ''nonsense"?

Yeah I get it, but my point was to show an example of fully reducible (weak emergence) and something that is not known either way.

There are processes amenable to reducibility, and these are ones whereby interactions can form combinations like feedback loops, leading to larger processes (where everything can be mapped to prior processes that made it). Examples of this might include DNA sequences, cellular metabolism, atomic interactions, energy dissipation etc.

There are processes not amenable to reducibility, like qualia (sensing a color, hearing a sound, etc.), and "properties" in general (are properties "there" without a mind?.. separate question but related... the quality of soft/hard/wet/cold doesn't seem to be without a subject). These seem to just "emerge" into the picture (strong emergence) without prior mapping reducibility.

I think that strong emergence itself is a kind of place holder (similar to the homuncular fallacy) to just say "and it thus appears", which is to say, not an explanation at all. But a lot of words have been spilt in its defense. A lot of words in defense of something doesn't thus mean the concept is thus valid.

And as far as ideas related to strong emergence like "downward causation"- I don't know if this really answers the question because the very thing that is interacting with the lower levels still has to be explained. I get that there could be downward causation, but I don't get how this answers the question of how that initial downward causation occurred.

Perhaps it might be beneficial to identify the 'fundamentals,' being referred to.
How about from wiki:
In particle physics, an elementary particle or fundamental particle is a subatomic particle that is not composed of other particles. Particles currently thought to be elementary include electrons, the fundamental fermions (quarks, leptons, antiquarks, and antileptons, which generally are matter particles and antimatter particles), as well as the fundamental bosons (gauge bosons and the Higgs boson), which generally are force particles that mediate interactions among fermions. A particle containing two or more elementary particles is a composite particle.

We can of course describe each of these 'fundamentals' as field excitations, in accordance with QFT, or perhaps even string vibrations. We don't know the fundamentals of dark matter/energy, if such exists. Perhaps Roger Penrose's erebon will be one.

The human flesh of the human brain is material and made of quarks and electrons etc. SO, which of the fundamentals listed above do you think are candidate carriers of human consciousness and why would they qualify? If none of the above can be proved to be the required quanta, we are looking for then all we can say is, that we have no idea at all, regarding the quanta of human consciousness. But the possibility remains, that human consciousness may be quantisable.
So the search for new candidates/evidence continues.
Yeah, another of my 'no shit Sherlock,' statements.

But it seems to me that you're making my model even more powerful. Not only I don't miss anything, but my model has an extra thing that we could discard namely ''strong emergence". Right?

The topic is not about finding a solution for consciousness. The topic is different.
Can something (anything you could think of):
1. be neither fundamental, nor emergent?
2. not fundamental, not 100% reducible and not 100% irreducible either?

Can we find something outside the fundamental-reducible/irreducible?

'absolutely anything you could think of". And I mean it in the most literal sense. Think of everything you want. — Eugen

Eugen, if you edit your post, let me suggest that you reduce the redundancy in all that.
- "abosulutely anything"
- "I mean it in the most literal sense"
- Think of everything you want

Actually, I think that you can replace all that with just "anything you could think of"!

Please do not consider my comment a didactic or critical one. It's only that I was quite overwhelmed by so much redundancy and found it quite annoying.

Fair enough. I can only offer you my own musings on what you are asking.
My attempt at answering your first question, would be, only that which can be confirmed as eternal could seem to fit imo. No such existent has been confirmed so the notion of 'eternal' remains 'imaginary' only, for now until overwhelming empirical evidence is found.

I think my answer to question 2 is the same as my answer to question 1 but I would suggest that that which was proved to be eternal in of itself, could not have 'parts' so would be 'irreducible.'

Can we find something outside the fundamental-reducible/irreducible? — Eugen

Not 'inside' this universe or even in a multiverse imo.
Theists would use this gap to employ an ontological argument for the necessity of a god plug.
I do not know of any law of thought, that demands such a necessity.

Thank you for your answer!
But it seems to me you cannot accept a thing that could be eternal and fundamental at the same time. Why?

I think my answer to question 2 is the same as my answer to question 1 but I would suggest that that which was proved to be eternal in of itself, could not have 'parts' so would be 'irreducible.' — universeness

I kind of agree. Actually, I think if we want to be monists, we should reduce everything to one part/property. I cannot think of something that has two fundamentally different properties.

Eugen, if you edit your post, let me suggest that you reduce the redundancy in all that.
- "abosulutely anything"
- "I mean it in the most literal sense"
- Think of everything you want

Actually, I think that you can replace all that with just "anything you could think of"!

Please do not consider my comment a didactic or critical one. It's only that I was quite overwhelmed by so much redundancy and found it quite annoying. — Alkis Piskas

Actually, I agree with you. Just bear in mind I'm not a native speaker. Your advice is perfect. Thank you!

But it seems to me that you're making my model even more powerful. Not only I don't miss anything, but my model has an extra thing that we could discard namely ''strong emergence". Right? — Eugen

Perhaps. I was suggesting that strong emergence is really just a synonym for the question at hand. Something like qualia is something that exists. It "appears" on the scene. There are physical substrates that correlate with it.

IF you are a naturalist of any variety, the physical correlates and the "appears on the scene" phenomenon needs to be thus tied together in some way.

Weak emergence would somehow have to account for the color blue by the substrates. But it doesn't thus far. It only accounts for the mechanisms of the color blue, not the actual sensation qua sensation. Wavelengths hitting retinas with rods and cones and optic nerve and pre-frontal cortex, and the layers of the cortex, etc. This kind of theory, of course, would also account for all the indirect/periphery embeddedness of space/time/environment/other bodily functions that need to be in place. In theory, this can be done. Yet "sensing blue" itself is not actually accounted for as to why it is this emergent phenomenon.

Mind you, this can still get you far! You can possibly account for hardware/software computation in the brain with weak emergence. However, once you get to things like qualia and subjective interiority of a person, it loses its power.

So I would say that it is possible to account for all the "physical" phenomena that is combined (computational/informational) without ever getting at the actual "sensing blue". This is akin to Chalmers' idea of p-zombies. We can account for p-zombies but not for actual people with sensations and interiority of a point of view.

That is the Gordian knot. To say "strong emergence" is thus to say, "yeah, and somehow sensing blue is thus appearing in correlation of this computational/informational aspect of physical correlates". That isn't helpful in answering the question.

So what other approaches are there at this impasse? It would take a change in metaphysical approach. Instead of discrete physical combinations, it would be questioning what it is to be an event. What does it mean for an event to be occurring anyways? Perspective seems to be an important point here.

Done! But now will come and say this is nonsense, because "anything" contains the word ''thing", and the fundamental reality is not a ''thing", and blah blah blah.
The point is I'm also overwhelmed.

But it seems to me you cannot accept a thing that could be eternal and fundamental at the same time. Why? — Eugen

To me, the concept of 'fundamental' allows for more than one to exist. Multiple eternals create too many 'omni' problems, such as omnipotent or omniscience. To be eternal you have to be indestructible. I cannot imagineer a purpose to more than one eternal, as I cannot imagineer what their relationship would be to each other. Of course, this might just be due to my lack of imagineering skill.

I cannot think of something that has two fundamentally different properties. — Eugen

Binary on/off is certainly two states but I agree they are 'states' of a single object.
The UNIverse either is or is not, but it's existence is the only notional 'eternal' I give any credence to.
That's why I like cyclical universe theories such as Roger Penrose's CCC.

o me, the concept of 'fundamental' allows for more than one to exist. — universeness

Allowing in principle is not the same with that being the case. It can be fundamental and eternal, thus not allowing for other eternals. Don't you agree?