I have nothing against them as long as they don't appeal to obscuratism. "Make your point loud and clear!" That's my opinion.

I completely agree. This was Einsteins principle. If you cannot explain it to other people you don't understand it yourself.

I have this intuition as well. @180 Proof doesn't understand himself. It looks like he has a strong bias and he created this alambicated web of notions (he's got rich vocabulary, or it seems that way) in order to protect his biased view. My style of is super-direct and not leaving much space for bs. It's not that my OPs militate for a view, they're just questions, curiosities. But for some reason, he finds my questions threatening, I am sure of that, because there's a pattern here. And he's the only guy thinking they're nonsense. So I definitely touch a soft spot, so he dismisses my question altogether and always keeping his real options hidden. He uses his vocabulary to create fog. That's my opinion.

The questions are:

1. Is the logic of the model correct?
2. There is an alternative to this model, i.e. a model in which ''absolutely anything you could think of" is not fundamental, but it is neither 100% reducible nor strongly emergent?
3. Does this model apply to any type of reality? I mean, if instead of matter we assume that the most fundamental thing is an immaterial computer or information, does this change have any impact on the model? — Eugen

The problem with this OP is that the 'model' is not well expressed. The phrase "absolutely anything you could think of" is a place-holder for "whatever you think consciousness to be" - but you might just use the word "consciousness". So you're really just asking, is consciousness (whatever you consider that to be) fundamental, or is it not?

You then bring in weak and strong emergence. These can be summarised as:

Weak emergence refers to the idea that mental properties or states can be explained by the underlying physical processes, but grants that the explanation is complex and cannot be reduced to the physical processes alone. In other words, the mental properties or states are emergent in the sense that they are not predictable solely from knowledge of the physical processes, but they can be ultimately reduced to physical processes, by means as yet unknown.

Strong emergence refers to the idea that mental properties or states cannot be explained by the underlying physical processes because they are ontologically distinct from them. In this view, mental properties or states are not simply the result of physical processes, but arise from some other, presumably non-physical source.

The debate between weak and strong emergence is an aspect of the broader mind-body debate, which concerns the relationship between mental states and physical or neuro-physical processes. While weak emergence is more widely accepted among philosophers of mind, others say that strong emergence is necessary to account for the subjective nature of conscious experience. The counter to that is that strong emergence is incompatible with scientific explanations of the mind, and that weak emergence is a more plausible account of mental properties and states.

Yet others reject the idea of emergence altogether, saying that a physicalist account of subjective experience can never describe or capture "what it is like" to be the subject of experience (e.g. David Chalmers). In Mortal Questions, Thomas Nagel criticizes the idea of 'emergence' because of the impossibility of specifying the relationship of conscious states with the supposed physical constituents that are supposed to cause them. Do they supervene on those processes, or are they independent of them? How can we explain the causal relationship between mental and physical states if they are ontologically distinct (i.e. of basically different kinds)? It is easy to assume that neurochemical interactions cause thought, but demonstrating the nature of that causal relationship remains elusive.

That out of the way, hereunder is my basic stance on the question. Consciousness is fundamental not as a constituent of objects, but as the ground of cognition. And as all objects appear within cognition, objects (and their relations) appear for us. The million-dollar question is whether those objects are real independently of our cognition of them, or whether their reality is imputed to them, by us, on the basis of our experience of them. That is the vital point to understand, because in my view, the idealist argument is not that objects are composed from some mysterious mind-stuff as a constituent, but that whatever reality we impute to objects is dependent on our cognition of them. See the difference?

The view that the reality of objects is 'constructed' or 'constituted' by our cognitive acts is now quite commonplace amongst cognitive scientists and philosophers. One example that has been discussed here recently is the cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman (see here and here), but there are many others with different attitudes and interpretations. But all of them, at least, acknowledge the constructive role of consciousness.

A word on the cultural sensitivities of the hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmer's 1996 essay on that topic touched a nerve, because it had the gall to suggest there was something fundamental about consciousness which could not be explained in scientific terms as a matter of principle. Not because we didn't have the instruments, or we didn't have the concepts, but because of the very nature of subjective experience, of 'what it is like to be...'. The obvious foil for this argument was prominent materialist philosopher of mind, Daniel Dennett, who refuses to acknowledge that there can be anything about human nature which is beyond the purview of science. Dennett, you see, is an exponent of 'scientism', which is the view that the scientific method is the only reliable way to acquire knowledge about the world and that any knowledge that cannot be obtained through the scientific method is either trivial or not worth knowing. So there's a 'culture war' going on here, between those who suggest 'dualism' or some sense in which the mind is spookily not amenable to guys in white coats, and the guys in white coats.

That out of the way, hereunder is my basic stance on the question. Consciousness is fundamental not as a constituent of objects, but as the ground of cognition. And as all objects appear within cognition, objects (and their relations) appear for us. The million-dollar question is whether those objects are real independently of our cognition of them, or whether their reality is imputed to them, by us, on the basis of our experience of them. That is the vital point to understand, because in my view, the idealist argument is not that objects are composed from some mysterious mind-stuff as a constituent, but that whatever reality we impute to objects is dependent on our cognition of them. See the difference? — Wayfarer

There is no doubt, to the existence of such objects irrespective of cognition/consciousness itself.

In fact you can carry out an easy and cheap experiment to confirm this.

Set up a camera and let it focus on any object in the room and hit record. Now leave the room and come back after some time. Look at the footage

Does it not demonstrate what you’re arguing against this soft version of idealism?

I think the idea that some things are eternal is nerve wracking. Infinities are intimidating. Infinite space. Infinite time. Infinite divisibility.

It seems that reality is either infinite or came to exist with dispositions at some arbitrary point.

Maybe some explanations we seek in whatever domain are to reduce anxiety.

I don't find anything problematic with reincarnation and the idea that the mind interacts with bodies/matter but can inhabit different bodies or domains at different times.

On the question of whether consciousness is emergent or fundamental.

By fundamental you’d grant it the eternalism aspect that you’d grant the stuff that matter is made of such as energy reduced in vibration and represented in elementary particles such as quarks (yet to be observed).

Matter is transformational in nature, you cannot create it nor destroy it.

Thus always being an existent it still poses the question if it gave rise to consciousness, as consciousness is not something physical in nature (cannot be touched) then it must have existed eternally with matter/energy or as matter/energy and not built up on it.

Thank you for your complex and articulate answer! I actually resonate with you, but my question was different :lol:
Let me put it this way. I am not trying to find out if consciousness is fundamental or emergent. What I'm asking is if consciousness can be other than: a. Fundamental b. Emergent (weak or strong)

I think my answer just above your post should suffice as explanation. It takes care of the emergence/fundamental dichotomy that you’ve posed.

I agree with you, but my question is not if consciousness is fundamental or emergent. That's a different debate.

I am not trying to find out if consciousness is fundamental or emergent. What I'm asking is if consciousness can be other than: a. Fundamental b. Emergent (weak or strong) — Eugen

That’s a lot simpler question than the original, isn’t it? Before, you asked for one or the other. Here you’re asking if something other than one or the other.

Metaphysically, consciousness can’t be other than fundamental or not fundamental.
Scientifically, consciousness can’t be other than strongly or weakly emergent.
Logically, consciousness could be nothing at all, which is other than fundamental or emergent.

Before, you asked for one or the other. Here you’re asking if something other than one or the other. — Mww

No, I didn't.

1. Is the logic of the model correct?
2. There is an alternative to this model, i.e. a model in which ''absolutely anything you could think of" is not fundamental, but it is neither 100% reducible nor strongly emergent?
3. Does this model apply to any type of reality? I mean, if instead of matter we assume that the most fundamental thing is an immaterial computer or information, does this change have any impact on the model? — Eugen

So you want to know if everything is fundamental?

Cats for example are not, energy would be …
Tractors are not fundamental, fish are not fundamental either.

Most things aren’t, the parts that make them though are, that part of course being matter.

@Eugen

So where do I exactly try to do that? — Eugen

From your previous post:

I need your help on the following matter.
I am not trying to criticize anyone, but I need you to help me understand something. Every time I open an OP containing the words ''consciousness, emergent, fundamental", there's this weird pattern. Basically, ↪180 Proof comes and says ''This OP is nonsense." It's like this all the time. None of you or other people on my other OPs seem to have this issue except him. — Eugen

Well, if you like pain in the ass, go for it. I personally don't have this kind of fetish. — Eugen

I am not a patient person. One of the best things that's happened to me since I've been on the forum is learning how to navigate through a contentious bunch of people with strong opinions and still get my points across. It's not about liking other people's responses, it's about learning to argue effectively and constructively.

Who decides what's a "good, well supported" OP? — Eugen

I wasn't implying your OP in this thread wasn't a good one, I was just laying out the process I see as necessary.

I'm not trying to turn anyone (on)/or against anybody. As for the rest of your last reply ... :up:

Does ''anything you could think of" presuppose "ontic entity"? — Eugen

Anything you can think of, or simply put, imagination - is a demonstration of the malleability/plasticity of the brain, or the potency of the energy-matter (electro-chemical) dynamic of the brain, the information it possesses and processes, to be reformulated/permutated in any number of infinite configurations over time so long as it can exist as a brain.

However its impossible for the brain to imagine all possibilities simultaneously/in a singular moment (ultimate multi-tasking). Its also hard for a brain to truly think randomly. As "reformulation/creativity" is contingent on previous knowledge or information ie. What it is already aware of.

The only thing with such ability to encompass all possibilities is a singularity of potential. Time divides one state of configuration from the next. Hence potential (which doesnt require time) can be the only container of all possibilities simultaneously. A singularity. Omnipotency - the greatest degree of imagination of what could be.

Before, you asked for one or the other. Here you’re asking if something other than one or the other.
— Mww

No, I didn't. — Eugen

quote="Eugen;d14278"]I. ''absolutely anything you could think of":
A. is fundamental
B. is not fundamental[/quote]

Sorry. That was a supposition, not a query. Nevertheless, anyone perceiving that supposition is going to ask himself which he thinks is the case. Anyone holding with 1A will consider 1B moot, and anyone holding with 1B will deny 1A and then consider the merits of the logical argument which follows.

I was a 1A kinda guy, regarding consciousness anyway, even if not anything I can think, so….there ya go.

:up:

:chin:

Assuming that just as metabolizing is to an organism or as breathing is to lungs, minding (aka "consciousness") is to a brain-CNS; would you then agree with me that these involuntary activities are (1) not "entities" and therefore (2) neither "fundamental" nor "emergent" (objects / properties)? If you don't agree, I'd appreciate you (someone) pointing out where you (they) think my analogy goes wrong.

@T Clark @universeness @Wayfarer

Ok, now I totally get it hahaha! It's funny because all this time I thought it was something super-sophisticated that I couldn't understand when in fact it's such a banality. Breathing is a term used to describe the contact between lungs and air, aka atoms and atoms. Let's assume materialism is true. In this case, everything is reducible to matter, including the term ''breathing". It's precisely what materialism says, otherwise, it's not materialism.
Now I get why don't you like that - you realize this is kind of silly. So instead of saying ''breathing" is reducible, you start playing word games here and try to convince yourself that if we simply introduce a new mysterious "non-thing" like ''breathing" will solve the problem. Obscurantism.

Another perspective: the process of breathing is weakly emergent from matter - it's created by matter, exactly like a chair. There is no fundamental difference between breathing and chairs - they are both interactions of atoms, both are nothing more than descriptions, conventional language!

Finally, I deciphered you! After two f*&*(&g years! You ate my ''livers" (drove me nuts).
No, I definitely don't agree with you, but I have nothing personal with you in regard to your philosophical point of view. I think diversity is good and crucial in order to stimulate others.
With your way of dealing with things around here, I do have something against it. But that's another story.

….would you agree with me then that these activities are (1) not "entities”….. — 180 Proof

Half and half: I don’t hold with minding (aka consciousness), such minding activity I would stipulate as reason, but agree that none of those is an entity.

Conscious-NESS…..a quality, a condition of the state of being conscious.

….and therefore (2) that they are neither "fundamental" nor "emergent" (objects / properties)? — 180 Proof

Again, half and half: none of them are objects/properties, but consciousness and reason are both fundamental, as mandated by what is represented by them.

….point out where you think my thinking goes wrong. — 180 Proof

When push comes to shove, it must be admitted all your {as x is to y}’s are correct, the problem arises in the fact I can know the empirical cause/effect relation between the first two, but I cannot know the empirical cause/effect relation between minding/thinking/reason-CNS/brain. If I accept it on equal footing with the other two, there’s nothing left to discuss regarding it, because I just don’t know what to say because I don’t know how it works.

And you understand as well as I, that absent empirical knowledge, all that’s left to work with in the pursuit of that for which there is no possible empirical knowledge, is pure logic, which invites us to begin with something we do know, or, something the negation of which is contradictory, and theorize towards something that at least makes sense.

As well, you understand as well as I the rampant fallacy of reification of metaphysical conceptions, and the dreaded cum hoc ergo propter hoc rabbit hole pervading modern “vulgar”, re: common, philosophical thought.

You don't consider consciousness as being an entity because you see it as fundamental or there's another reason?
And by the way, who says something cannot be fundamental or emergent just because it is not an object like a chair? That's ridiculous.

I deny consciousness as an entity because it is not identifiable by a set of properties.

Still, consciousness, even if only a conception, could be said to emerge from that by which any conception emerges, if one wants to insist conceptions come from somewhere. But that kind of thinking invites infinite regress (where does the thing conceptions emerge from, emerge from) and by that the cancelation of any productive metaphysics. It’s much the more parsimonious to just let consciousness be fundamental, so to eliminate the need for determining stuff about it, which we couldn’t know apodeitically anyway.

I deny consciousness as an entity because it is not identifiable by a set of properties. — Mww

- how can it exist if it doesn't have properties? The property of being must be there at least. Being what it is is a property.

Still, consciousness, even if only a conception, could be said to emerge from that by which any conception emerges — Mww

- conceptions definitely emerge, I agree.

But that kind of thinking invites infinite regress (where does the thing conceptions emerge from, emerge from) — Mww

- that is the case if you consider noting being fundamental, I'd agree with that. I posted this question on another forum, and someone suggested that we could eliminate the fundamental. Still, we wouldn't get rid of emergence.

how can it exist if it doesn't have properties? — Eugen

In what sense can it….consciousness….be said to exist? If we don’t require that consciousness exists as do other things, then we don’t need to consider properties.

Which gets us to…..what do you think properties do?

conceptions definitely emerge, I agree. — Eugen

Fine. Where does that from which conceptions emerge, emerge from?

I define consciousness as awareness. It's a perspective and something that entails the self.

I am the subject of experiences from a unique perspective this is the self the experiencing subject.
Awareness is like access to experiences and awareness of existing in some form.

In a way consciousness is elusive when you try and pin it down to some material substrate or common sense notion or just focus closely on it.
But I think only conscious things can have a perspective or a self.

I think science is the attempt to explain our experiences. I don't see how we can access anything other than experiences. So in one sense consciousness may be fundamental is the substrate of our knowledge of some kind of reality.

But it has a complex relationship with the process of modelling and enquiry.

It can exist in a fundamental way, like being the foundation of reality, or it can exist like chairs, processes, or concepts, i.e. emergent from a material foundation.

I don't think consciousness being fundamental or emergent works but I can't over another view point.

It seems like it emerges from the brain without us having any kind of clear causal picture.

But it seems to me like we need a new paradigm not based on any of our current methodologies or paradigms.

But the question is: is it logically possible to have more than these options on the table?