if we replace matter with another substance, e.g. information, — Eugen

‘Information’ is not a substance (in the philosophical sense.) The word has no meaning without specifying what information is being referred to.

Ok, but it was just an example. It could be anything else.

if we replace matter with another substance, e.g. information, then the problem disappears because information can create consciousness. Personally, I don't understand exactly how it can work. — Eugen

Information requires both energy (communication) and matter (storage).

So information as a substance certainly does as you say dissolve the matter-centric hard problem of consciousness. As matter cannot be taken in isolation as the source of awareness (collections of information). It is only part of a larger dynamic that confers these abilities.

So after all, the problem does not reside in the gap between non-subjective experience and subjective experience. Information, in your opinion, has the right properties to give rise to subjective experience even if information itself isn't conscious.

Ok, but it was just an example. It could be anything else. — Eugen

When you get down to 'fundamental constituents of existence', what are the choices? Any suggestions?

Anything that is not consciousness or conscious.

1. If there really is a problem of consciousness, is this a matter-specific problem? — Eugen

No, the hard problem exists if we start with something (anything) that isn't consciousness, and try to explain consciousness in terms of that. Depending on what we start with, the 'hard problem' might be more, or less, difficult.

2. If we replace matter with another fundamental substance (except consciousness itself) can something change? — Eugen

I haven't heard anything so far that changes the situation. You get things like 'panprotopsychism' but that's basically just importing consciousness into substance. There's @Apokrisis 'pansemeiosis' which puts meaning as fundamental, or near-fundamental, and then, by stages, as complex systems evolve, they gain more of the constituents of consciousness (attention, predictive ability, some other stuff (can't remember)) until eventually we have a creature that can be said to be fully conscious. Personally I don't think that touches the hard problem, but it's an interesting approach nonetheless and may well be a good way to explain some mental functions if not consciousness.

''Meaning" is kind of consciousness....experience... it's vague

No, the hard problem exists if we start with something (anything) that isn't consciousness, and try to explain consciousness in terms of that. — bert1

I think without a clear, precise conception (or theory) of "consciousness", saying "isn't consciousness" doesn't actually say anything; ergo, at best, the so-called "hard problem" is underdetermined.

:up:

If we replace matter (….) can something change? — Eugen

Yep. Our sensory apparatus wouldn’t work.

If we replace matter with another fundamental substance (….) can something change? — Eugen

Yep. Every experience ever by anybody. Then our heads will surely explode.

Guy looks at a picture, sees what used to be a dump truck, back before matter was replaced.

But wait….when matter is replaced, pictures and dump trucks disappear, along with eyes and humans and….

“…..To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the danger—not to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it—of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) “milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve.”….”
(CPR A58/B83)

Just sayin’…..

↪Benj96 So after all, the problem does not reside in the gap between non-subjective experience and subjective experience. Information, in your opinion, has the right properties to give rise to subjective experience even if information itself isn't conscious — Eugen

Information is brought about by "difference". And difference require at the very minimum 2 separate or distinct things or states. There is no "difference" in a singular existant. A "singularity." It is 1. There is no 2nd entity to be different from 1 (oneness). Thus no information.

Now, in order to have 2 separate states and thus information, we require relativity. As to be "relative" to something means you are separate from it. You are something else. Distinct in quality/characterisation.

This is described by Einsteins equation E=mc2. Where we see relativity in action: a departure of Matter from Energy. 2 separate states of being and thus information between them (relativity).

The information brought about by this separation of energy from matter is "space-time". As energy doesn't occupy space nor time, whilst matter occupies both space and time. Matter is at a different "rate" of existance (distance/time, or spacetime) or "speed" relative to energy.

Matter can thus come into a steady or consistent relationship with other matter (gravity) in a now freshly minted "4 dimensional" system. Energy, time and space now having becoming distinct separate entities relative to it.

This is the process of emergence of new properties and phenomena as a direct result of the previous.

Where does consciousness come into play? Well, information is stored in a stable way (primitive memory) in matter and the system naturally emerges or evolves into new phenomenon and relationships, and by natural selection the matter becomes more complex (thus the memories become more complex) and thus the ability to perceive becomes more complex and agency emerges.

I don't believe there is a discrete line between living things and non living chemical changes. It is a spectrum of small changes, with awareness and perception becoming more and more sophisticated in the process.

If we replace matter with another fundamental substance (except consciousness itself) can something change? — Eugen

I won't clutter up your thread with my somewhat idiosyncratic views beyond saying this - The idea of "fundamental substance" is a metaphysical one, not a scientific one. It's a way of thinking, not a matter of fact.

Nuff said.

I can resonate with that.

So, in your opinion, only science can tell us what is and isn't a ''fact"? I'm not going to debate that, I want to understand you.

So, in your opinion, only science can tell us what is and isn't a ''fact"? I'm not going to debate that, I want to understand you. — Eugen

This is the song I sing over and over. [laughably untrue statement]People love it when I do.[/laughably untrue statement] I learned it from R.G. Collingwood, who wrote "An Essay on Metaphysics." Metaphysical positions have no truth value. They are not true or false. Many people on the forum and elsewhere in philosophy don't agree.

Upshot - for me, the question of what, if anything, is fundamental is a matter of attitude, preference; not fact. As such, the question is not resolvable by logic - or science for that matter.

Let's leave it there and take it up in a different thread sometime.

Before we get anywhere, we have to resolve whether information is mind-dependent. Is there information in a universe with no minds? Does a book in a mindless universe contain any information?

I was ill-inspired to use the example of information. I should have written ''any fundamental substance", you can call it X. The only condition is that X is not consciousness/conscious. I have no idea how to define information, so I have no idea if it is mind-dependent. It sounds like it is, but I have no idea :lol:

Well, we never get anywhere in these consciousness threads. Absent scientific evidence, all we can do is bat around the same old theories.

You've made your point and I appreciate your sincerity. Thank you!

The idea of "fundamental substance" is a metaphysical one, not a scientific one. It's a way of thinking, not a matter of fact. — T Clark

:100:

As the OP makes clear, @Eugen is incorrigibly confused on this point.

The mystery here is not the basis for consciousness, it’s the framing of consciousness itself. We want “consciousness” to be a thing so we can feel that I am something specific and unique, instead of just individual (my body, not your body). We are conscious if we are aware; or awake. We do not need the certainty of tying ourselves to something “hard” to differentiate ourselves from others or expectations. If we do not, we, in a sense, aren’t an individual; I don’t exist as me (apart from anyone else I follow or mimic or quote, etc.).

I think without a clear, precise conception (or theory) of "consciousness", saying "isn't consciousness" doesn't actually say anything; ergo, at best, the so-called "hard problem" is underdetermined. — 180 Proof

Yes, we want “a clear, precise” concept of consciousness because it has been abstracted from its ordinary contexts in order to stand in the place of Descartes “I” and the doubt of our existence. “Undermining” is halfway there; I’m asking we consider not only why we want a “hard” solution, but why we need to have a fixed “me” as it were, our “consciousness”. You have an experience, say, a majestic fleeting moment of a sunset, maybe even something you can’t express in words; we want the picture of our entire human condition to be based on this occurrence (we always have our experience) so that we are by nature, as a given, unique and that that specialness dictates, for example: “our” meaning the things we say, our “subjectivity”, or being inscrutable to you, or that our expression is ensured, our actions always “intended” by us.

:up:

I'm trying to relate your comment with the OP. I can't.

As the OP makes clear, Eugen is incorrigibly confused on this point. — 180 Proof

As I noted in my response to @Eugen, this is a matter of disagreement among philosophers and those of us who pretend. I think you and I are in the minority.

The issue is not that simple.
Here's what the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy says about THPC:

"The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious experience, why conscious mental states “light up” and directly appear to the subject. The usual methods of science involve explanation of functional, dynamical, and structural properties—explanation of what a thing does, how it changes over time, and how it is put together. But even after we have explained the functional, dynamical, and structural properties of the conscious mind, we can still meaningfully ask the question, Why is it conscious? This suggests that an explanation of consciousness will have to go beyond the usual methods of science. Consciousness therefore presents a hard problem for science, or perhaps it marks the limits of what science can explain."

"The hard problem was so-named by David Chalmers in 1995. The problem is a major focus of research in contemporary philosophy of mind, and there is a considerable body of empirical research in psychology, neuroscience, and even quantum physics."

(See more at https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/

In a past comment of mine regarfing the subject, I mentioned that this problem actually sould belong to Science and not to Philosophy, in which the methods of exploring and studing life differ radically. This doe not happen in the Eastern philosophy who have kept their wisdom form their very long past. But in the West, Science has penetrated so deeply and infleunced so widely our world, that our Philosophy tends to become one with Science as in antiquity! (Re: science Greek philosophers).

Quantum mechanics, for instance, has penetrated the philosophical minds of a lot of sicentists-philosophers --i.e. who have PhDs in both fields-- of our time. Yet, QM is plenty of incertitudes. And trying to apply it to philosophical matters like life, mind and consciousness, is IMO walking on thin ice.
But evem so, it would be fine do do that, only that there should be a special branch of Philosophy for it. (I don't mean Philosophy of Science, but rather something like "Scientific Philosophy".)

I'm trying to relate your comment with the OP. I can't. — Eugen

I am saying there is not a “problem of consciousness” in coming at the other end, which is to say we create the fantasy of the “subjective experience”; that consciousness is a construct to gain theoretical certainty. We make it an intellectual puzzle because we can’t handle our actual human condition of separation from others (and “ourselves”).

I'm not debating that. I said ''IF the hard-problem is real..."

Maybe? At least a lot of people seem to think so. Information theory is arguably the biggest paradigm shift in the sciences in centuries. Quantum mechanics and relativity rewrote how we think about the world, but for many fields they were largely irrelevant.

By contrast, information theory has had a huge impact on physics, biology, neuroscience, economics, etc. It's a paradigm that has allowed us to link together phenomena in the social sciences with phenomena in physics using not only a common formalism but a shared semantics (complexity studies does this too). And obviously the technology that theories of computation and information helped create have dramatically reshaped human society by giving us the internet, digital computers, etc.

My take is that it is too early to tell if "information" theories will end up radically transforming how we think of the natural world, or will simply fizzle out. Currently, it's widely accepted that definitions of information all have major problems, at least from a philosophical perspective, the formalisms have been amazingly useful.

There is a reason computational neuroscience is probably the biggest theory of consciousness right now or why many of the more well known physicists publishing popular science books today seen extremely excited about pancomputationalism and "it from bit," theories, even if they don't fully endorse them. That said, information is a notoriously vague concept. I feel like every paper on the philosophy of information starts by stating this fact, and so it's not always clear what this new vision actually is in a systemic sense.

Information theory ties into the hard problem by showing how signals in the enviornment, e.g. light waves bouncing off objects, can be picked up by the eyes and encoded in patterns of neuronal activation. It seems like a potential way across the objective/subjective gap, but such explanations are in no way close to being complete and rely on vaguely defined terms to do a lot of leg work.

Suprisingly, there hasn't been much philosophical work on "what is computation," (but Liebnitz actually has some interesting, very ahead of their times ideas of computation as logical entailments).Turing was thinking of human computers, people whose job was to run through computations, when he wrote his seminal paper on computation. He was thinking "what are the minimal instructions and inputs a person needs to receive to perform a computation and what are the minimal things they need to be able to do to carry it out." This is strange when you think of it. Computational theory of mind is a theory that says consciousness is caused by/reducible to, a formalism based on a conception of what conscious human beings do while performing mathematical calculations. It is, at least in its historical conceptualization, circular in this way.

I think digital physics, the idea that all reality can be reduced to 1s and 0s, that bits can be swapped in for fundemental particles in old corpuscular models, has been pretty well debunked. It's important not to conflate this with all information ontologies, something that seems to happen fairly often. Digital physics is sort of the strawman for attacking "it from bit," it seems.

IDK, I could write a lot about this but I figured many people might already be aware of these things or uninterested. If anyone wants some recs I have a sort of "information reading list," I've been collating. The Routledge Philosophy of Information Handbook is particularly good though for an in-depth conceptual look that also has specialized articles grounded in the philosophy of specific natural and social sciences.

I'm not debating that. I said ''IF the hard-problem is real..." — Eugen

You’re right, I missed that. What I’m claiming is that, in response to #1, there is not a problem of consciousness at all, hard or otherwise. Science isn’t missing something, though nor should it imagine it is solving what is a philosophically mis-conceptualized issue. Where philosophy used to need to catch up to the discoveries of science, now science needs to stop thinking in the terms of 16th century philosophy.

even after we have explained the functional, dynamical, and structural properties of the conscious mind, we can still meaningfully ask the question, Why is it conscious? — Alkis Piskas, quoting the interwebs

I would suggest that we have not examined how asking this question is meaningful. In what context? Why or when is there a further issue? Why do we need more?

I (and Wittgenstein) would claim that the formation of the picture of “consciousness” is manufactured to have something to solve in order to have certainty in ourselves and in relation to others. It is not physical things (sensations, feelings, etc.) that make up who “we” are; our having them is not special. You have a headache; hey, I do to. Yours is throbbing behind your left ear; wow, me too—that’s crazy that we have the same headache. Our relation to others (identifying pain, having the same experience, etc.) is not based on our biology, it’s a function of living with each other through the history of our human condition.

[Information theory] seems like a potential way across the objective/subjective gap — Count Timothy von Icarus

This “gap” is not the difference between individual experience and generalized certainty; I am separate from you. My knowledge of you has a limit (you may be faking, hiding, lying)—there is a real truth to the fears of skepticism. So it’s not knowledge we lack (from science or otherwise). I can’t be sure (know!,) that you are in pain, because the way it works is I react to your pain, I respond to or ignore it. Our feeling that we want something more is not a riddle, it comes from a need for control.

What exactly is the advantage of information over matter when it comes to explaining consciousness?