Yeah, but there was no such discovery for bachelors.

Yeah, but there was no such discovery for bachelors. — Jamal

Yes I was actually going to point that out regarding the difference between "A triangle is 180 degree, three sided polygon" and "Bachelors are unmarried males". Kant may have said that the triangle is in some sense "a priori" whereas the bachelor is always a posteriori true. However, I think this distinction is muddled as there doesn't seem to be any clear distinction.

Triangles are abstractions.
Bachelors are abstractions.

Triangles are abstractions of observations, found in both nature and human-made instances.
Bachelorhood is only found in human-made instances (or conventions if you like) but are nevertheless abstractions.

Both are derived from some initial observation and passed on as definitions.

Further, Kripke might say something like:

I guess you can say that if there are a world without bachelors, then bachelors wouldn't exist and therefore a posteriori and contingently true. However in all possible worlds, X is NOT not X, and therefore is necessarily true or something of this nature.

Hm, not sure about all that.

But I’ll leave it there for now. I have enough mental plates to juggle. :smile:

Hm, not sure about all that.

But I’ll leave it there for now. I have enough mental plates to juggle. — Jamal

You can't do that! Leaving me hanging! :smile:

That is to say, a triangle necessitates it being three sides in all possible worlds. However, the discovery of this truth is in some way synthetic when first discovered. The passing on of this discovery as a convention that we learn very early on, makes it "analytic", but this is only the way we discover the information. — schopenhauer1

In the beginning, someone discovered something that had three sides and it had no name. They didn't discover a "triangle", they discovered something that had three sides. The statement "triangles have three sides" would have been meaningless, as the word "triangle" didn't exist.

They named this something with three sides "a triangle", though they could equally well have named it "a circle".

Once named, as the statement "triangles have three sides" is true by virtue of the meanings of the words alone, it is therefore an analytic statement.

IE, when the statement "triangles have three sides" first occurred, it was already an analytic statement.

In the beginning, someone discovered something that had three sides and it had no name. They didn't discover a "triangle", they discovered something that had three sides. The statement "triangles have three sides" would have been meaningless, as the word "triangle" didn't exist. — RussellA

They named this something with three sides "a triangle", though they could equally well have named it "a circle".

Once named, as the statement "triangles have three sides" is true by virtue of the meanings of the words alone, it is therefore an analytic statement.

IE, when the statement "triangles have three sides" first occurred, it was already an analytic statement. — RussellA

Right, but the key idea here is they discovered something about the concept first. I guess it's two different questions:

1. The name is attached to the concept thus given a label to that concept.

2. The way that the concept is derived is still synthetic, as it is observed (This is synthetic by way of observation). How would you know that some things have three-sided shapes without observing the world first in some empirical way?

Once the labels are in place it becomes analytic, sure. But that still relies on the initial understanding of the concept which is synthetic. Also, even the dubbing of the name "triangle" is synthetic (if by this we mean some event in the world needed to happen first). (nevermind, this is a posteriori)

Right, but the key idea here is they discovered something about the concept first. — schopenhauer1

Many parts are observed in the world

But from any set of parts, numerous mereological wholes can be discovered

For example, from the 15 parts shown - thousands of possible wholes may be discovered - for example -
ACHN - BFGM - AB - ABG - etc

It is true, the observer discovers a triangle, CKO


But why discover one particular shape, rather than any of the other thousand possibilities.

Presumably, because the observer knows a priori that the triangle is a shape important in their interaction with the world.

1) Therefore, a priori, the observer knows that the triangle is a shape important in their interaction with the world.
2) It is a necessary truth that the triangle is a shape important in their interaction with the world.
3) The statement "triangles are important in their interaction with the world" is analytic, because it is known a priori that triangles are important in their interaction with the world.

I would suppose Kant would say something like triangles are discovered yet true by our faculties that observe this so a priori synthetic perhaps?

The sky is blue is synthetic a posteriori because it is discovered but true only by way of the content we pick out and not by way of how our faculties must operate.

An X is NOT not X is analytic a priori as not only is it true by our faculties but the very terms don’t need to be discovered but are true immediately based on how logic operates a priori.

Hey man good to see you writing about these kinds of things for a change! :smile:

A Batchelor was long a young knight, not yet displaying his own banner, but that of a senior knight. Later did it become used for one who had completed but their first degree, and for unmarried men, "who have often pain and woe" (Chaucer).

So did Robert of Gloucester know a priori that a Bachelor is but "Syre ȝong bacheler..þow art strong & corageus"? Was he mistaken, not knowing the real meaning of the word was to do with matrimony? Or is there more to the relation between a word and its meaning than is given in a cluster of synonyms?

And why did we drop the letters yogh and thorn?

The point was a simple one:

The value of this promise depends on how well we understand the supervenience relation itself. If it is a dangling, inexplicable, metaphysical fact that the Fs relate in this way to the Gs, then supervenience inherits rather than solves the problems of understanding the various areas. — supervenience

You may not believe me... — RussellA

Indeed, I do not. I think you understand that a child knows its mother, without the child being able to provide a definition. Especially since you went on to talk of a further instance of understanding a concept without being able to provide a definition, this time from Russell.

Again, it seems to me you have not grasped the gist of Quine's argument. Hence your odd insistence that you have solved "the gavagai problem", the inscrutability of reference, with a solution that doesn't appear to so much as address it.

Keep reading. It'll come.

I doubt he would, since existence is not bound to individual worlds.

Indeed, why take the triangle as being important? What rule was followed? And even if triangles are taken as primal, why not AME or AJK?

What counts as prime depends on the task in hand.

I doubt he would, since existence is not bound to individual worlds. — Banno

If you are referring to the bachelor- a world without marriage has no use for the term bachelor. Strictly speaking, bachelorhood might not obtain in all possible worlds because it is very much dependent on the contingent historical facts and convention of this world. It is very much context dependent.

Where I think Kripke's "innovation" was, was to point out that objects and individuals can obtain in all possible worlds, in relation to their name and in scientific kinds, their identities.

The name "mug" as identifier for "cup with handle" is context-dependent and contingent. This mug next to me, I will dub it, "BrownMug" somehow can make it through though as that name is some sort of essential identifier that is not context dependent on that particular mug.

Even if the world contained no notion of marriage, the notion of marriage would remain possible, and hence bachelors would still be possible. It gets complicated.

Even if the world contained no notion of marriage, the notion of marriage would remain possible, and hence bachelors would still be possible. It gets complicated. — Banno

I get that. It is a traditional notion. But, maybe not Kripke, but I can see there being a difference between X is NOT ~x and bachelors are unmarried males. That is to say, bachelors is possible but not necessary in all possible worlds. Bachelors seems to pick out something in this world that makes it true. It is not quite "the sky is blue" synthetic but it is not quite the law of non-contradiction level analyticity.

I might even say it is superficially analytic, using modal logic as its determination.

I might even say it is superficially analytic. — schopenhauer1

Quine's point is that all analytic statements are superficially so.

Quine's point is that all analytic statements are superficially so. — Banno

Yes, I agree with that. Hume might say the same. The law of non-contradiction was a kind of bone I was throwing out. It seems like something whereby the very definition is entailed in itself. This is NOT not this seems more foundational and necessary because it is our very way of seeing the world...

However, this is more getting to a priori than analyticity. I get that analyticity is about definitions, but if we agree that definitions start out synthetic first, then that is why Bachelors is synthetic and context dependent whereas law of non-contradiction very much shows its entailment in how we operate more than it is derived. Again, this is more akin to a priori.

The sky is blue is synthetic a posteriori because it is discovered but true only by way of the content we pick out and not by way of how our faculties must operate. An X is NOT not X is analytic a priori as not only is it true by our faculties but the very terms don’t need to be discovered but are true immediately based on how logic operates a priori. — schopenhauer1

Using the convention of "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, perhaps one could say:

"the sky is blue" is synthetic, the sky is blue is a posteriori, "an X is NOT not X" is analytic and an X is NOT not X is a priori.

"The sky is blue" being synthetic brings in the debate between Indirect and Direct Realism

As you wrote:
Direct realism seems to me, to posit that we "objectively" see the thing "as it is in itself". What is something "in itself" though? A tree is the tree you see as a perceiver when there is no perceiver? Mind you, I'm not saying the tree doesn't exist without a perceiver. If you answer, "Well, no the tree isn't what an average human 'sees' when observing a tree", you have your answer- and it doesn't indicate direct realism. Sense data, goes through other layers of the brain, and creates something we have called a tree. Even if you (oddly) posited just "sense data" and no other layers involved (whatever that might mean), then there is still something there as a barrier to what is the tree in itself. It is its own "indirect".

For the Direct Realist, the sky is objectively blue, in which case the statement "the sky is blue" is synthetic and refers to a world that is external to the mind.

However, for the Indirect Realist, as the sky is not objectively blue, but only subjectively blue, the statement "the sky is blue" is still synthetic but refers to a world that exists in the mind and not external to the mind.

Again, it seems to me you have not grasped the gist of Quine's argument — Banno

I'll keep reading.

Indeed, why take the triangle as being important? What rule was followed? And even if triangles are taken as primal, why not AME or AJK? What counts as prime depends on the task in hand. — Banno

True, language is use. Wittgenstein PI para 23 "Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."

Elaborating, I look at parts in the world, and these parts can combine into numerous mereological wholes.

In a sense, each mereological whole exists in the world, and each may be discovered in the world, although it would take an inordinate amount of time

It is therefore true that in the world there is something with three sides which can be named "triangle", but it is also true that every possible mereological whole could also be named, again taking an inordinate amount of time

As Wittgenstein said, language is part of an activity, a form of life

As it would take too much time to discover each possible shape in the world and then decide which I had a use for, in practice, I start with a task, and then discover in the world that shape that would be suitable for the task in hand.

My judgement that a particular shape is suitable to my task at hand is based on a predetermined requirement as to the suitability of any shape, and is therefore an a priori judgement

My judgement that there is something in the world that has three sides is synthetic, as I can only know that there is something with three sides by discovery.

IE, my judgement that there exists something in the world that has three sides and has the name "triangle" has been synthetic a priori.

For the Direct Realist, the sky is objectively blue, in which case the statement "the sky is blue" is synthetic and refers to a world that is external to the mind.

However, for the Indirect Realist, as the sky is not objectively blue, but only subjectively blue, the statement "the sky is blue" is still synthetic but refers to a world that exists in the mind and not external to the mind. — RussellA

Yes agreed. I guess bringing these two concepts together, the sky being blue is contingent on observation which accounts for its synthetic nature in both being directly perceived or indirectly represented. Indirect realism does have the notion that it is the faculties of mind that make "sky" and "blue" possible, but it is not about the faculties themselves (cause and effect, space, time, law of non-contradiction, etc.), but about the content that is passing through those faculties from observation and therefore still a posteriori for either one. That we see color or that we can pick out properties at all to me seems synthetic a priori.

Using the convention of "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, perhaps one could say:

"the sky is blue" is synthetic, the sky is blue is a posteriori, "an X is NOT not X" is analytic and an X is NOT not X is a priori.

"The sky is blue" being synthetic brings in the debate between Indirect and Direct Realism — RussellA

What?

, This muddled stuff about subject and object is, for my money, off-topic.

This muddled stuff about subject and object is, for my money, off-topic. — Banno

Actually it does have much relation and bearing to Chomsky. A prioricity and organization of the world is very much akin to I-language and the whole nativist camp in cog sci.

Seems to me bringing vague, muddled notions of objective and subjective into the discussion can only lead to it becoming vague and muddled.

Seems to me bringing vague, muddled notions of objective and subjective into the discussion can only lead to it becoming vague and muddled. — Banno

You want to talk about vague and muddled notions, both:
a) Chomsky's view on analyticity as described in your OP article is just that.
b) The article itself is kind of meandering and muddled touching a little of here and there

So that being said, I am actually surprised how fruitful this thread was from that start.

a) Chomsky's view on analyticity as described in your OP article is just that. — schopenhauer1

Well, yes. Hence the direct question to Chomsky.
:meh:

Seems to me bringing vague, muddled notions of objective and subjective into the discussion can only lead to it becoming vague and muddled. — Banno

The Wikipedia article Objectivity (philosophy) notes:
In philosophy, objectivity is the concept of truth independent from individual subjectivity (bias caused by one's perception, emotions, or imagination). A proposition is considered to have objective truth when its truth conditions are met without bias caused by the mind of a sentient being.

The SEP article Analyticity and Chomskyan Linguistics notes
He sharpens this distinction in his (1986, pp. 20–2) by distinguishing what he regards as essentially the ordinary, folk notion of external, what he calls “E-languages,” such as English, Mandarin, Swahili, ASL and other languages that are commonly taken to be spoken or signed by various social groups, vs. what he regards as the theoretically more interesting notion of an internal “I-language.” This is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain (or a stable final-state of that system) that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence

How can one know that within an I-language the thought that the sky is blue has an objective truth ( its truth conditions are met without bias caused by the mind of a sentient being) or a subjective truth (caused by one's perception, emotions, or imagination) without introducing the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity.