The section you quoted does not support your claim that the author’s goal is to “prove” that we each have an undeniable, given self. The fact that we have phenomenal consciousness is simply a given. — Luke

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What I should have said is the need to explain or have knowledge of the purpose of “phenomenal consciousness” is to desire to solidify it, make it certain, understandable, important. To make it “factual”, say, as we feel the theory of evolution is.

I realize this is not the point of the article; I’m just trying to put its philosophical descriptions and claims in the context of the greater sphere of analytical philosophy. I’m saying that the assumption that we have “consciousness” is a misconception based on a desire to be certain that we matter. This, of course, is a broader discussion. I can let it be for another time.

I think something like that is true. Occasionally you'll get some scientists say that we don't really understand what gravity is, while many other say that we do know what it is, because it is what it does. The latter explanation is misleading, I think.

But yes, some new phenomena or discovery comes to light that sheds some light into what was already deemed extremely problematic centuries ago, like the hard problem, or machines thinking.

I’m saying that the assumption that we have “consciousness” is a misconception based on a desire to be certain that we matter. — Antony Nickles

It’s a misconception that we have consciousness? And no more than an assumption? You aren’t really aware of your feelings or sensations?

You aren’t really aware of your feelings or sensations? — Luke

The trick is right in the space between feeling something, being aware of it (rather than suppressing it) and just before the jump to the conclusion that we have “consciousness”, more than “are conscious of”: as if it were pointed out, or we’re embarrassed into acknowledging it, or are touching something with a purpose, or suddenly notice the faint yet unmistakeable smell of bleach, or can’t seem to reach our grief. Part of it is the sense that these feelings, thoughts, sensations, must be “ours”, as if no one has ever been this heartbroken before; the fear that they are trivial, that the other can feel the same; as if I won’t “have” anything. Part of it is having the security that there is something of mine that I cannot be separated from, that knowing myself is at my fingertips (ugh), that, as you say, this at least is “given”.

Back to Humprey: “…what would be missing from your life if you lacked phenomenal consciousness? If you had blindsight, blind-touch, blind-hearing, blind-everything? Pace Fodor, I’m sure there’s an obvious answer, and it’s the one we touched on when discussing blindsight. It’s that what would be missing would be nothing less than you, your conscious self… imagine if you were to lack qualia of any kind at all, and to find that none of your sensory experience was owned by you? I’m sure your self would disappear.”

The stakes are certainly very high. As Descartes found, if we rely on anything else to build our sense of self, it can be taken away. Only if we “own” what is special about me (keep it inside) can I be ensured that my culture won’t minimize me, that others’ won’t define what is acceptable for me to be, that my actions won’t be judged to include implications I had not thought about, that I won’t just be identified by my suffering. As Wittgenstein’s nemesis says: “But surely another person can't have THIS pain!” (PI, #253) as if “this” were to mean: the same pain, the identical (unique) pain, when it is merely true because there are two bodies; this body and that one. In our case, he would put it that there is a difference in the criteria for the ownership of a self.

I call the article by Nicholas Humphrey pop philosophy.

This is the question that the article proposes to address:

Why is there any such thing as what philosophers call ‘phenomenal experience’ or qualia – our subjective, personal sense of interacting with stimuli arriving via our sense organs? Not only in the case of vision, but across all sense modalities: the redness of red; the saltiness of salt; the paininess of pain – what does this extra dimension of experience amount to? What’s it for? — Nicholas Humphries

Isn't it rather a strange question?

Isn't it rather a strange question? — Wayfarer

I kind of feel that way too; as a philosophical orientation it looks odd. However, taken as an object of science it makes sense to puzzle over phenomenal consciousness. And perhaps unlike you, I don't see any reason in principle why it shouldn't be an object of science.

So in philosophical mode my question in place of Humphrey's would be something like, "what is it about a scientific view that makes phenomenal experience look so puzzling?"

That said, I like his answer.

This is the question that the article proposes to address:

Why is there any such thing as what philosophers call ‘phenomenal experience’ or qualia – our subjective, personal sense of interacting with stimuli arriving via our sense organs? Not only in the case of vision, but across all sense modalities: the redness of red; the saltiness of salt; the paininess of pain – what does this extra dimension of experience amount to? What’s it for?
— Nicholas Humphries

Isn't it rather a strange question? — Wayfarer

The syntax, I grant you, is inelegant and wordy, but it doesn't seem an especially strange series of questions, given variations of questions just like it come up constantly, here and elsewhere.

So in philosophical mode my question in place of Humphrey's would be something like, "what is it about a scientific view that makes phenomenal experience look so puzzling?" — Jamal

Fair. It certainly benefits from sharpening.

But yes, some new phenomena or discovery comes to light that sheds some light into what was already deemed extremely problematic centuries ago, like the hard problem, or machines thinking. — Manuel

I agree, the truly "hard problems" are the ones which get put aside and neglected for the longest periods of time, hundreds or even thousands of years. They tend to be fundamental, basic ontological issues, so that the work-around is basic and foundational to the ensuing conceptual structure which develops from it. A good example is the interaction problem of dualism, which is very closely related to the hard problem of consciousness.

If we take the hard problem as most basic, fundamental, and therefore most ancient, we can see that the classical work-around for this problem has been dualism. But in ancient Greek philosophy, the incompatibility between the material world of becoming, and the logical world of being and not being, was exposed. Since the logical world was apprehended as consisting of ideas which were considered to be immutable eternal truths, the interaction problem developed because it was impossible to show how this realm of immutable "objects" could interact with an ever changing material world.

The work-around for the interaction problem was initiated by Plato, as "the good", and developed by Aristotle as final causation, later blossoming into free will and intention. The modern day "hard problem" is just a form of extreme ontological skepticism, which rejects all of the significant metaphysical work-arounds produced over the past millennia, to bring us right back to the basic, fundamental problem, and have another go at that problem from a new perspective. The "new perspective" is the one currently obtained from all the gained experience and new knowledge developed over that time period.

It appears to be a near-universal intuition that mind is somehow different and separate from matter, a form of thinking that sticks with us and appears all over the place. I think we by now have sufficient evidence to show that mind and matter are not distinct (different) ontological categories, but instead should be considered part of the same phenomena, matter, which we do not understand well at all.

However, within matter, the aspect we are most confident about is our conscious experience, so that specific aspect of matter is less obscure.

And if what I'm formulating is roughly on the right track, as I believe it is, it's no wonder some people think of this as a "hard problem", the only issue is that the problem should be reversed. What we don't understand is matter absent consciousness- we study its structural characteristics only - and we do not understand what 95% of the universe even is, though we must assume it's a variation of physical stuff.

Compared to that picture of matter, consciousness shouldn't be as problematic as discussed in the literature. Of course, there's a whole lot we don't know about it, but to think that it's this massive problem is quite misleading, for the given reasons.

Does the article have anything to say about machine consciousness?

The stakes are certainly very high. As Descartes found, if we rely on anything else to build our sense of self, it can be taken away. Only if we “own” what is special about me (keep it inside) can I be ensured that my culture won’t minimize me, that others’ won’t define what is acceptable for me to be, that my actions won’t be judged to include implications I had not thought about, that I won’t just be identified by my suffering. — Antony Nickles

I believe this misses the main crux of the article. It is not about “building” a sense of self, but about having one; it is not about “owning” something special about me, but about having any sense of personhood at all. What I take to be the main crux of the article is that the combination of different qualia create a sense of personhood; create me, my conscious self.

The example of blindsight demonstrates one aspect of this; that, although the person functions as a sighted person, without the qualia of sight, it doesn’t feel to them that those sighted functions belong to them. It was instead just some qualia-less physical processing that the person was unaware of, like their liver function.

If the same applied to all qualia, then there would be no sense of personhood.

So in philosophical mode my question in place of Humphrey's would be something like, "what is it about a scientific view that makes phenomenal experience look so puzzling?" — Jamal

Is it a scientific view that makes it look puzzling, or just the commonsense view of matter as being "inanimate", not to mention insentient and insapient?

I think this is right; we have a commonsense picture of matter, and a scientific notion of its equivalence with energy, and related formulations of information in terms of entropy, which is itself understood in terms of dissipation of energy, so I think the latter scientific ideas are, if anything, more conducive to seeing consciousness as being compatible with matter than the bare commonsense view.

I think we by now have sufficient evidence to show that mind and matter are not distinct (different) ontological categories, but instead should be considered part of the same phenomena, matter, which we do not understand well at all. — Manuel

I disagree with this. I don't see how "matter" could ever be defined in a way to reconcile the two distinct categories. There would be too much contradiction and incoherency. What you say, i.e. that we do not understand matter, is evidence of this.

If we define a term for the sake of supporting some ontological position, when we do not really understand the thing referred to by that term, as you propose with "matter", then unless the ontological position is absolutely correct (which is extremely improbable), when we use that term in application, contradiction will be inevitable.

The example of blindsight demonstrates one aspect of this; that, although the person functions as a sighted person, without the qualia of sight, it doesn’t feel to them that those sighted functions belong to them. It was instead just some qualia-less physical processing that the person was unaware of, like their liver function.

If the same applied to all qualia, then there would be no sense of personhood. — Luke

:up: Thanks for linking this.

I follow Strawson here, everything is physical, and that means everything. It's a terminological choice, but a coherent metaphysical one, which focuses on the nature of the world.

Within the physical (or material) we understand the conscious aspects of it better than anything by far. But there remains a lot of the physical we understand poorly, which is the non-conscious aspects of the physical (or matter).

What's the incoherence in this view, if you could explain it a bit more?

Yes, in a sense modern QM at least, does once and for all demolish the once very popular, and still intuitive belief, of "dead and stupid matter" - we don't know enough about it to conclude this.

All I emphasize is that it's the scientific aspects, which we know much less well than personal experience, hence not knowing what 95% of the universe is, nor knowing how to connect QM with Relativity, heck, not even knowing what a particle is:

https://www.quantamagazine.org/what-is-a-particle-20201112/

If we have trouble with a particle, we have some issues in understanding matter as revealed by physics. Experience is by comparison, easier to us, we can empathize, use intuition, pass laws, read novels, tell jokes, read a room, etc. And we tend to do these things without much effort.

Still a whole lot to learn about experience by way of science, but, again, compared to physics, I think it's substantially less problematic, by quite a margin, I'd wager.

Is it a scientific view that makes it look puzzling, or just the commonsense view of matter as being "inanimate", not to mention insentient and insapient? — Janus

They’re the same thing. Or in other words, yes, but this is a particular commonsense view that we get from science, from the culture of a secular society in which science has been paramount for a few hundred years. Science, that is, of a particular kind—and here I hand wave in the direction of Descartes.

What I take to be the main crux of the article is that the combination of different qualia create a sense of personhood; create me, my conscious self.

The example of blindsight demonstrates one aspect of this; that, although the person functions as a sighted person, without the qualia of sight, it doesn’t feel to them that those sighted functions belong to them. It was instead just some qualia-less physical processing that the person was unaware of, like their liver function.

If the same applied to all qualia, then there would be no sense of personhood. — Luke

I’ll let it go after this because I agree my point is not a critique of the crux of the article (rather, I would say, of its premises). We are all aware (or unaware), sense the world (or are numb to it), feel anger and sadness (or repress it), but what I sense and feel is not unable to be possessed by others, for them to “have” them. We are interested, traumatized, exalted—me by one thing, you by something different, remembering different things, perhaps differently, but not always different.

But it is no mistake that the “sense of personhood” is a “sense”. We want the criteria for a self to be continuous, specific, knowable, so we take as evidence the one thing we feel we cannot not know, awareness of sensation—this self-evident pain I am pierced with, undeniably, unavoidably—and add to that our desire for uniqueness (and control) and you have the individual phenomenal self, backwards engineered from, coincidently, the criteria for truth that philosophy has desired from the beginning.

If we have trouble with a particle, we have some issues in understanding matter as revealed by physics. — Manuel

Yes, and we have even less intuitive sense of what a field is.

Still a whole lot to learn about experience by way of science, but, again, compared to physics, I think it's substantially less problematic, by quite a margin, I'd wager. — Manuel

I agree, with the caveat that what can be known phenomenologically is not coterminous with what can be known scientifically.

I tend to think the idea of the insentient nature of matter goes back at least as far as the ancient Greeks. Judaism and Christianity, but it's a nuanced issue to be sure, and I'm no expert.

I tend to think the idea of the insentient nature of matter goes back at least as far as the ancient Greeks. Judaism and Christianity, but it's a nuanced issue to be sure, and I'm no expert. — Janus

Yes, but to view people or animals as at bottom inanimate or as divided between animate and inanimate might be more recent.

:up:

:up: Thanks for linking this. — Janus

:up: I thought it was worth sharing.

I’ll let it go after this because I agree my point is not a critique of the crux of the article (rather, I would say, of its premises). We are all aware (or unaware), sense the world (or are numb to it), feel anger and sadness (or repress it), but what I sense and feel is not unable to be possessed by others, for them to “have” them. We are interested, traumatized, exalted—me by one thing, you by something different, remembering different things, perhaps differently, but not always different.

But it is no mistake that the “sense of personhood” is a “sense”. We want the criteria for a self to be continuous, specific, knowable, so we take as evidence the one thing we feel we cannot not know, awareness of sensation—this self-evident pain I am pierced with, undeniably, unavoidably—and add to that our desire for uniqueness (and control) and you have the individual phenomenal self, backwards engineered from, coincidently, the criteria for truth that philosophy has desired from the beginning. — Antony Nickles

I don't see where you find that in the premises of the article, unless you are talking about the premises created within the history of philosophy that brought about the hard problem. The article itself seems to me to be suggesting the opposite view of that which you are attempting to impose upon it. The article does not mention anything about a "desire for uniqueness" of the individual phenomenal self. Instead, it suggests that the evolution of the phenomenal self may have been the genesis for social living and having empathy with others:

Whenever it happened, it’s bound to have been a psychological and social watershed. With this marvellous new phenomenon at the core of your being, you’ll start to matter to yourself in a new and deeper way. You’ll come to believe, as never before, in your own singular significance. What’s more, it will not just be you. For you’ll soon realise that other members of your species possess conscious selves like yours. You’ll be led to respect their individual worth as well.

‘I feel, therefore I am.’ ‘You feel, therefore you are too.’

To cap this, you’ll soon discover that when, by a leap of imagination you put yourself in your fellow creature’s place, you can model, in your self, what they are feeling. In short, phenomenal consciousness will become your ticket to living in what I’ve called ‘the society of selves’.

One small step for the brain, one giant leap for the mind.

:up:

I follow Strawson here, everything is physical, and that means everything. It's a terminological choice, but a coherent metaphysical one, which focuses on the nature of the world.

Within the physical (or material) we understand the conscious aspects of it better than anything by far. But there remains a lot of the physical we understand poorly, which is the non-conscious aspects of the physical (or matter).

What's the incoherence in this view, if you could explain it a bit more? — Manuel

The point is that when such a theory is applied, incoherencies inevitably arise. We can start with the one most obvious in physics, the so-called wave/particle duality. It is incoherent to say that the same energy, at the same time, moves from one place to another as both a particle and as a wave. The way that energy is transmitted through wave action is completely different from the way that energy moves as an object moving from A to B.

By saying that everything is physical you are saying that the way that physics represents reality is the way that things are. But physics represents reality in a way which is incoherent.

Our commonsense notions lead us astray in regard to the nature of the world. That something can be at the same time a particle and a wave in superposition is a fact about the world, it doesn't make sense to us, too bad, it's what we have.

Yeah, using Straswon's materialism is usually counter-intuitive, so it's hard to express. Materialism as is used today in philosophy means roughly, something like physicSalism, the view that everything can more or less be described by the terms of physics. That's incoherent, it's asking way, way too much of physics, way outside its purview too.

No, by physicalism I mean everything in the world is physical stuff - of the nature of the physical - this means that experience is a wholly physical phenomenon. But if it is true that experience is physical, and history is physical and everything that exists is physical, then clearly the physical goes way beyond what we usually attach to the meaning of the word.

It's a monist claim, usually not accepted because people think that materialism must be physicSalism, I don't think it follows, but I'm in a very small minority here.

I believe this misses the main crux of the article. It is not about “building” a sense of self, but about having one — Luke

What occurs to me, reading that article, is that what his model is describing is ego, the self's idea of itself. I don't think it addresses the aspect of the hard problem concerned with what it means to be.

No, by physicalism I mean everything in the world is physical stuff - of the nature of the physical - this means that experience is a wholly physical phenomenon. — Manuel

You could flip this perspective, you know. You're saying that, because we can't define the physical, due to the ambiguous wave-particle nature of matter and the other paradoxes of qm, that it could or must be the case that, if everything exists is physical then the physical must also include the mental. But what if we acknowledged that nothing is completely or only physical, on the grounds that what is physical can never be completely defined, and that what we experience as physical is instead the attribute of a class of cognitive experiences?

I don't see where you find that in the premises of the article, unless you are talking about the premises created within the history of philosophy that brought about the hard problem. — Luke

Yes, I am claiming that the article is working on (assuming) a certain framework that, yes, is trying to answer or overcome the conclusions of philosophical skepticism.

The article does not mention anything about a "desire for uniqueness" of the individual phenomenal self. — Luke

He does say: “With this marvelous new phenomenon at the core of your being, you’ll start to matter to yourself in a new and deeper way. You’ll come to believe, as never before, in your own singular significance”.

I wanted to say the same thing with “unique” as he is with “singular significance” though I take it as a fantasy created by our desire rather than a given state. I think I’ve made that as clear as I can.