Not sure how to answer your query on oughts let alone imperative oughts. Actually I’m not even sure what you’re asking.

Moral behaviour is defined as performing bad actions only if they cannot be avoided, such as theft or murder.

If I understand you correctly, an ought is an action irrespective of illegality such as stealing food to feed yourself or murder as self defence.

Is this what you’re getting at ?

What I am getting at is how conditional oughts can be helpful in defining moral systems.

"Moral behaviour is defined as performing bad actions only if they cannot be avoided,"
How do you define bad? The claim just passes the explanatory burden.

How do you define bad? The claim just passes the explanatory burden. — Mark S

Bad is someone smacking you in the face rather than giving you a 20 dollar bill.

Would you be happy to define good or bad in terms of such actions?

Bad is defined as an unpreferred action upon oneself, such as being robbed of your money, life, legs etc.

Would someone smacking you in the face be a good thing or a bad thing?

It could be a good thing if you were experiencing migraine and a good smack cured you of it.

But what if you didn’t have a migraine, what explanatory burden would you give to the smack given to you ?

I’d like to hear

Moral imperatives are already conditional. For example, "theft is wrong" seems absolute, but what is and isn't theft is an integral part of a moral system and legal system. "Oppression" is wrong but generally, one won't describe something as oppression unless they think it's wrong. Someone who views the employer/employee relationship as immoral might label it "oppressive", but someone who thinks it's a good idea won't describe it that way.

Also, moral systems are complex, and an act can often be interpreted as morally complex. For example, "killing" is wrong, but whether that makes abortion wrong is unclear. "Killing" is wrong, but all kinds of mitigating factors could be invoked. While on the surface moral systems can seem rigid and absolute, because they are complex, and rely on interpretation, ultimately, it's very difficult for a moral system to be rigid, and in the real world, I don't think any such moral system exists.

In your OP, you describe a "well-educated, rational person" but you're not even attempting to hide your bias here. It's not that a well-educated, rational person will share your views on the purpose of morality, it's that people who share your views on morality might get to be considered well-educated and rational. That's how language is, one's feelings are embedded into how one interprets, emphasises, characterises and selects words, and it works that way in morality just like everything else.

What if we define a moral ought as something like “What all well informed, rational, people would advocate”? — Mark S

This has the same issues as your previous formulations. For a start, the notions "well-informed" and "rational" are normative. You have embedded prior moral judgements in you definition of "moral".

All it might be saying is "A moral ought is what people like me say it is".

Then there is the naturalistic fallacy involved in claiming that the way we have evolved to behave is the way we ought behave.

And then there are the previously discussed difficulties with claiming that cooperation is a virtue - folk cooperate on immoral acts.

In all I don't see any progress since your previous threads.

:up:

I'm gonna be off topic so I'll understand if you ignore my comment, but it would interesting to see if you can just draft an argument clarifying how the idea that morality is about solving cooperative problems can actually help in addressing the moral case for supporting or denying support to the Ukrainians against the Russians.

What does your claim that "well-informed and rational are normative” mean to you? I can make no sense of it.

That may be partly due to my background in science and engineering. I am using well-informed and rational in the conventional sense I would in science and engineering. I look at data and the hypotheses that explain it. I cannot make sense of being well-informed and rational about this data and the hypotheses explaining it as “normative”.

Perhaps “well-informed and rational” are used differently in philosophy?

But my usage seems consistent with Gert’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defining morality, so that seems unlikely. If you think well-informed and rational are used differently in philosophy than in science and engineering, please explain how they are used differently.

The naturalistic fallacy is a warning about imperative oughts. I claim no imperative oughts. That the function (the principal reason they exist) of cultural moral norms and our moral sense is solving cooperation problems has no innate moral bindingness even if it is objective truth. The naturalistic fallacy is irrelevant.

And of course, people cooperate for immoral goals. How is that relevant to moral ‘means’? Judging only by your comment, you appear unable to distinguish between the morality of means and ends.

‘Means’ and ‘ends’ are different categories of thing. Perhaps your embedded prior moral judgements and definition of morality are rendering you unable to think coherently about morality – unable to understand that moral means (unselfish cooperation) and immoral ends are distinct categories of things.

Empirically, past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgments and motivations are parts of cooperation strategies. Whatever your embedded concept of morality is, it seems to be causing a bizarre rejection of consideration of the possible relevance of this remarkable claimed result.

When you say, “You have embedded prior moral judgements in your definition of ‘moral’”, I am puzzled how you imagine my prior moral judgments affect 1) empirical data about cultural moral norms and our moral sense and 2) the game theory of cooperation developed in the last 50 years or so that explain it.

Every criticism you mentioned is irrelevant.

That is OK with me because of your gift. The gift is the explanation of the reason for your thought processes - “You have embedded prior moral judgements in your definition of ‘moral’.” Thanks. I have thought along these same lines for years, but never expressed it so well. I love the word embedded – it’s just the thing.

Really? Perhaps you could comment on my reply to Banno.

All well-informed, rational people will have shared goals and ideas about how to morally accomplish them. — Mark S

Your ideal of well-informed, rational people with shared goals and ideas is nowhere to be found. The standards that might apply to science and technology do not apply to ethics and politics because there is nothing resembling an objective standpoint. Opinion and self-interest play an essential role.

Well-informed rational people agree that an embryo is a fertilized egg, but there is no information, no evidence, and no reason that leads to general agreement as to the moral status of an embryo.

Well-informed, rational people may agree that global warming is a serious problem, but there is no information or reason that leads to general agreement about what should be done. No information that leads to a general agreement on how to balance competing needs and interests.

You cite moral norms as part of the solution but moral norms are often part of the problem. For most of our history slavery was a moral norm. Gender inequality is still a moral norm. Prioritizing corporate profit over the health of people is still a moral norm.

In your other thread you claimed:

I propose that all past and present moral norms can be explained as parts of cooperation strategy explanations.

The "cooperative strategy" more often than not has always been and continues to be that those in power make the rules and those who are not "cooperate" by submitting to their power or suffer the consequences.

@Fooloso4 sums it up well. Plenty of well-informed and rational people disagree with you, it's that simple, and labelling anyone who disagrees with you as misinformed or irrational isn't helpful.

Your conditional ought just serves to exclude the opinions of those who don't agree with your point of view. I think it's better to be open-minded and inclusive, try to understand the perspective of others, and aim to minimise the destructive politics and tribalism that are guaranteed to occur.

Are well informed rational people better than ill-informed irrational people?

Within an ingroup (Singer's circle of moral concern), all are morally equal. Some are more rational and better informed at knowing how to solve cooperation problems - how to act morally.

But being rational and well-informed about how to act morally does not imply such individuals will actually act morally because there are no generally accepted imperative moral oughts.

An irrational and poorly informed individual can choose to act more morally than a rational and well-informed one.

Your ideal of well-informed, rational people with shared goals and ideas is nowhere to be found. The standards that might apply to science and technology do not apply to ethics and politics because there is nothing resembling an objective standpoint. — Fooloso4

The idea that what is normative is what all rational people would advocate is Bernard Gert’s (see SEP’s morality entry of the last 20 years or so), not mine. I leave it to Gert to defend. I find it a helpful perspective within mainstream moral philosophy.

My main point has been that there is an objective standpoint about the function of human morality. The evidence is that past and present cultural moral norms and the judgments of our moral sense are all parts of cooperation strategies. If this is true, then how would you argue there is not an objective standpoint about the function of human morality?

When you answer, remember this function (solving cooperation problems) has no innate, imperative oughtness connected to it. I am happy to agree there is no objective standpoint regarding imperative oughts - the main focus of traditional moral philosophy.

Regarding your counter-examples:

Well-informed rational people agree that an embryo is a fertilized egg, but there is no information, no evidence, and no reason that leads to general agreement as to the moral status of an embryo. — Fooloso4

Right. The moral status of an embryo is a function of the goals of a society (preserve life at all cost?), a subject that morality as cooperation is silent on. Just because human morality has a function does not mean that understanding that function can answer all our moral questions.

The "cooperative strategy" more often than not has always been and continues to be that those in power make the rules and those who are not "cooperate" by submitting to their power or suffer the consequences. — Fooloso4

Again, right. You describe an ingroup cooperating (using moral ‘means’) to gain the benefits of exploiting an outgroup (an immoral end). So what?

Neither of your counterexamples contradicts the function of human morality being to solve cooperation problems. Both are more about the morality of 'ends', a subject the function of human morality is largely silent on.

I understand why thinking of human morality in terms of its function (the principal reason it exists) rather than in terms of its imperative oughts (the traditional perspective) can be initially confusing.

The idea that what is normative is what all rational people would advocate is Bernard Gert’s (see SEP’s morality entry of the last 20 years or so), not mine. I leave it to Gert to defend. — Mark S

If you bring it up then it is up to you to defend it, not leave it up to someone who is not here to defend.

My main point has been that there is an objective standpoint about the function of human morality. The evidence is that past and present cultural moral norms and the judgments of our moral sense are all parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S

What is the relationship between morality and cooperative strategies? They are not, as you assume, one and the same. Cooperative strategies to achieve immoral goals are immoral cooperative strategies.

In addition an appeal to cultural moral norms is an appeal to moral relativism. The exact opposite of an objective standpoint.

Neither of your counterexamples contradicts the function of human morality being to solve cooperation problems. Both are more about the morality of 'ends', a subject the function of human morality is largely silent on. — Mark S

If the function of human morality is to solve cooperation problems, then this a "morality of 'ends'".

If human morality is largely silent on the morality of ends then whatever means or strategies are employed to solve cooperation problems would be moral. This would include coercion, imprisonment, and public execution in order to achieve cooperation.

I understand why thinking of human morality in terms of its function (the principal reason it exists) rather than in terms of its imperative oughts (the traditional perspective) can be initially confusing. — Mark S

It is what you do not understand that has led not simply to your initial but to your persistent confusion. A rejection of deontology may be part of a more promising path of moral deliberation but is not a solution. Deontology is not "the traditional perspective" but one traditional perspective. There are others.

Others have beat me to the punch, sir. I can't improve on their remarks in addition to @Banno's:

... how the idea that morality is about solving cooperative problems can actually help in addressing the moral case for supporting or denying support to the Ukrainians against the Russians. — neomac

Your ideal of well-informed, rational people with shared goals and ideas is nowhere to be found. — Fooloso4

What is the relationship between morality and cooperative strategies? They are not, as you assume, one and the same. Cooperative strategies to achieve immoral goals are immoral cooperative strategies.

Deontology is not "the traditional perspective" but one traditional perspective. There are others. — Fooloso4

I'd be interested briefly to understand why you are exploring this subject? Are you hoping to change how humans understand morality, or is this an academic exercise, a hobby?

In other words, what's your end game?

180Proof, Thanks for assembling salient issues. From my side, it is not always clear which are the most important points to respond to. I appreciate the help.

I have responded to banno’s points but not yet seen his response. I doubt that means he is now in agreement.

Responding to the non-banno points in your list:

• "... how the idea that morality is about solving cooperative problems can actually help in addressing the moral case for supporting or denying support to the Ukrainians against the Russians.— neomac"

Understanding morality as cooperation cannot magically answer all our moral dilemmas. It may be of limited help in resolving the moral case for supporting or denying support to the Ukrainians against the Russians.

Morality as cooperation only tells us the function of human morality (to solve cooperation problems). Its applicability is limited since it is 1) largely silent about what the goals of this cooperation ought to be (which will be important in the Ukraine situation) and 2) has no innate imperative bindingness.

That said, if nations wish to interact with each other morally, there is an objective reference defining that moral interaction as solving cooperation problems. I have often heard the contrary view that interactions between nations can ‘morally’ be based on each nation looking out only for its own interests. That is incorrect.

Modest but still culturally useful examples of where morality as cooperation is useful include: 1) understanding that the Golden Rule initiates reciprocity strategies, 2) masturbation and eating shrimp being immoral are marker strategies of membership and commitment to an ingroup, and 3) women must be submissive to men is a descriptively moral norm that exploits an outgroup to benefit an ingroup. Understanding this is a fact of the matter sheds new light, enabling people to make more coherent moral decisions and resolve more arguments.

• Your ideal of well-informed, rational people with shared goals and ideas is nowhere to be found.— Fooloso4

Well-informed, rational people are a hypothetical idealization that Bernard Gert created as part of his definition of normative. The fact that no such idealized beings exist is irrelevant to the definition.

Due to our evolutionary origins, we share some needs and preferences that are generated by our genes. To the extent we share genes, we share at least some needs and preferences. Assumed shared needs and preferences are the basis of the ideas that the goals of moral behavior should be increasing "well-being" or flourishing.

• What is the relationship between morality and cooperative strategies? They are not, as you assume, one and the same. Cooperative strategies to achieve immoral goals are immoral cooperative strategies.

Cooperation strategies define moral ‘means’. Moral ‘means’ and moral ‘ends’ are different categories of thing. They are not necessarily connected.

Assume a soldier falls on a grenade to save his fellow soldiers. By morality as cooperation, the soldier has acted morally since he acted to solve a cooperation problem. Why would you think which side he was on in a war would change the morality of that act?

• Deontology is not "the traditional perspective" but one traditional perspective. There are others.— Fooloso4

First, I agree. Second, deontology was not mentioned.

I was talking about imperative oughts being the traditional perspective. By imperative ought I mean “what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences”. It has been my reading of traditional moral philosophy that imperative oughts, not conditional ones, are what are being assumed in most proposed moral systems, not just Kant's categorical imperatives. Is that incorrect?

If not, how would you describe the kind of oughts commonly assumed in moral philosophy?

↪Mark S I'd be interested briefly to understand why you are exploring this subject? Are you hoping to change how humans understand morality, or is this an academic exercise, a hobby?

In other words, what's your end game? — Tom Storm

Thanks for the question.

Understanding morality started as a retirement hobby. I wanted to understand why morality existed.

Traditional moral philosophy was little help. Then I chanced across explanations of moral behaviors (behaviors advocated by cultural moral norms and motivated by our moral sense) as parts of cooperation strategies. I was surprised at how easy the relevant science is. However, explaining it can be devilishly difficult, as we see here.

What’s the dream?

That I can make a small contribution to making moral philosophy more culturally useful based on understanding human morality’s function is solving cooperation problems.

I don’t expect any big success. In any event, the many and varied ways that something so simple can be misunderstood keeps me entertained. And even if I decide to abandon my efforts, I expect that acceptance in mainstream moral philosophy of the science of morality as cooperation is inevitable. It will provide insights helpful in refining cultural moral norms that will better meet human needs and reduce suffering.

I post here looking for insights into how to present the science better and talk about its applications and implications.

What does your claim that "well-informed and rational are normative” mean to you? I can make no sense of it. — Mark S

That's apparent, and has been through the several threads you have started.

Un's joke captures the point most succinctly:

Are well informed rational people better than ill-informed irrational people? — unenlightened

But from your response it seems to have fallen flat. I don't think I'll try explaining it.

It seems, from multiple cases hereabouts, that engineering is poor preparation for doing philosophy.

Thanks Mark, that is interesting. I came on here with a similar but less scholarly goal. I was reasonably curious where morality sat in philosophy these days (as well as other subjects). Mostly I am interested to hear what others think and why. I stupidly present some of my own beliefs/judgements from time to time, which is fun, but no doubt superfluous to requirements.

That I can make a small contribution to making moral philosophy more culturally useful based on understanding human morality’s function is solving cooperation problems. — Mark S

I'm not sure I endorse this thinking for reasons others have written, but best of luck hashing something out. I wonder if you need to drill down and examine more closely your presuppositions of well informed and rational. Perhaps you haven't appreciated the extent to which this is perspectival?

Due to our evolutionary origins, we share some needs and preferences that are generated by our genes. To the extent we share genes, we share at least some needs and preferences. Assumed shared needs and preferences are the basis of the ideas that the goals of moral behavior should be increasing "well-being" or flourishing. — Mark S

I get where you are coming from. I am less convinced in a rational morality which can be rolled out consistently the way a factory manufactures a car. I'll continue to watch from the sidelines, but I am not a philosopher.

Have you read Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape, I forget if you have or not.

• I'm not sure I endorse this thinking for reasons others have written, but best of luck hashing something out. I wonder if you need to drill down and examine more closely your presuppositions of well informed and rational. Perhaps you haven't appreciated the extent to which this is perspectival?”

I may take the opposite approach and avoid mentioning Gert’s definition of normativity again. That might be possible and still convey the culturally useful essence of the relevant science.

• Have you read Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape, I forget if you have or not.

I have read Sam Harris and was disappointed.

Here is something I wrote several years ago for an evolutionary perspective online magazine:

https://thisviewoflife.com/mainstream-science-of-morality-contradicts-sam-harris-central-claim/

And another response by Scott Atran who works mostly in the evolutionary psychology of religion is also critical.

https://thisviewoflife.com/here-he-goes-again-sam-harriss-falsehoods/

I have read Sam Harris and was disappointed. — Mark S

Thanks. I was just curious. I was unable to get though it as it's quite dull.

Your point in the essay:

This contradicts Sam Harris’ claim that, as a matter of science, the goal of moral behavior is fixed as well-being.

Is this what Harris is arguing? I thought he was saying that wellbeing is generally what morality amounts to (no matter what the source) and this might be a better goal overall than pleasing gods? Looks to me like altruistic cooperation strategies are one potential expression of wellbeing in action. Cooperation being a stepping stone to a goal (wellbeing or flourishing), not the goal itself.

Cooperation being a stepping stone to a goal (wellbeing or flourishing), not the goal itself. — Tom Storm

:up:

In addition an appeal to cultural moral norms is an appeal to moral relativism. The exact opposite of an objective standpoint. — Fooloso4

As an aside, do you think that a cultural moral norm (let's say a majority of people agree with something) means that something is thus a moral intuition (meta-ethically speaking)?

What makes distinguishes a moral intuition from an ad populum fallacy? Obviously cultural norms can be relative. Slavery was considered acceptable, now it's not. Killing off your foes and taking the women and children as part of your tribe/group was considered acceptable in warfare, human sacrifice, all of that stuff, doing horrible things in the name of religion, doing horrible things in the name of differences in culture, resources, belief, needing producers and consumers for your country or economy, physical characteristics, etc.

Many think that your proposal may fallaciously conflate normative and descriptive level of analysis, if not reduce the former to the latter. I'm not entirely sure if that's the case also because I have some doubts about how to understand "the naturalistic fallacy" per se.
Yet I doubt that your descriptive belief that moral norms are heuristics for solving cooperation problems has relevant analytic power for at least 2 reasons:
1 - if moral norms are “heuristics for solving cooperation problems”, one is capable of defining “cooperation problems” and their possible solutions INDEPENDENTLY from any specific society’s actual set of moral norms, but then morality is not about the cooperation problems that you defined independently from any specific society’s actual set of moral norms unless their moral norms perfectly match the way you formulated cooperative problems and solutions independently. On the other side if cooperative problems and solutions are defined as a function of specific societies’ actual set of moral norms, then the definition of “cooperation problems” and “solutions” varies depending on the society, so what is “cooperation problem” and “solution” to society X may not be such for society Y. In other words, X’s moral norms would not be about “cooperation problem” and “solutions” for Y.
2 - The meaningfulness of a concept is related to its semantically contrastive value. So when you claim that moral norms are “heuristics for solving cooperation problems”, since “cooperation” is the opposite of “competition”, I do wonder why morality can not be understood AS WELL in terms of “heuristics for solving competitive problems”. The previous point is indeed suggesting that different individuals and societies my compete also due to their different moral norms, if not inseparably from their different moral norms. So the moral space is contested as much as the domain of scarce resources for survival (the latter being common between humans and animals), and both can shape social competition/cooperation conditions.

It would be also useful if you clarified how you understand the notion of “heuristics”.

Thanks for the non-snarky reply.

Heuristics

Heuristics are usually reliable, but fallible, rules of thumb for doing something based on practical experience, not theory.

Cultural moral norms existed before moral theories. Moral norms exist because they have been selected for based on experience, specifically their ability to 1) produce the benefits of cooperation and 2) harmony with our moral sentiments (which, in turn, are heuristics for cooperation strategies encoded in our genes).

For example, versions of the Golden Rule advocate initiating indirect reciprocity, perhaps the most powerful known cooperation strategy. Versions of the Golden Rule are heuristics for initiating reciprocity. They are not moral absolutes. They are common around the world because they are highly effective at sustainably attaining the benefits of cooperation.

The ultimate source of cooperation problems

From an old essay of mine:

“In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.

All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal dilemma. This includes people and our ancestors.”

Human morality is our flawed set of heuristics for solving this cooperation/exploitation dilemma. This cooperation/exploitation problem is independent of culture or biology. The cooperation problems of a particular culture or biology do not change the primary function of their moral systems, just the implementation details.

The opposite of cooperation is exploitation, not competition. Competition is common between cooperative groups and, for individuals, within cooperative groups.

A moral norm against cheating in competition is fully in the domain of morality as cooperation strategies. There is nothing inherently immoral in competition.

Descriptive or Normative?

Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail. We ought (conditional) not follow the Golden Rule when “tastes differ” and in certain times of war and when dealing with criminals in order to not decrease the benefits of cooperation.

And we perhaps ought not (conditional) follow marker moral norms such as eating shrimp and masturbation are abominations once we understand their arbitrariness as markers of membership and commitment to ingroups. And understanding “women must be submissive to men” and “homosexuality is immoral” are norms about cooperating to exploit outgroups gives us reasons we ought not (conditional) follow them in order to achieve the goal of moral coherence.

Look! Still no normative claims. We only have conditional oughts, which, as the OP suggests, appears sufficient for a culture and even mind-independent moral system.

Enter Bernard Gert’s claim from the SEP: “’Morality’ can be used…normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions (such as being well-informed), would be put forward by all rational people.”

In hindsight, normativity was a stinking red herring complexity I should have left out of the discussion in this forum.

I can make my case for the cultural utility of Morality as Cooperation Strategies based purely on conditional oughts – no spooky imperative oughts or even the normative power of agreement among rational people required.

Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail. — Mark S

How do you know that? Maybe cultural moral norms fail to solve cooperation problems indeed because they do NOT have such function.
Again, if the function of ALL cultural moral norms is defined externally or independently from such cultural moral norms, and according to such unique set of external/independent criteria you can establish if any cultural moral norms are right or wrong, then - one might argue - you are not describing what that culture moral norms are actually about. If you claimed that the function of culinary recipes is to nurture us in a healthy way, so the recipes which do not conform to such function are wrong, we may object that you have it backwards, culinary recipes may fail to make us eat healthy simply because that’s not their function. And if a description of the external function of cultural moral norms equates to establishing moral prescriptions (what ought to be done), then you can be accused of conflating what is with what ought to be, description and normativity, roughly as much as claiming that only recipes that make us eat healthy ought to be considered “legitimate” culinary recipes

We ought (conditional) not follow the Golden Rule when “tastes differ” and in certain times of war and when dealing with criminals in order to not decrease the benefits of cooperation. — Mark S

When we ought not to apply the golden rule, given that the golden rule is a cooperative heuristic strategy, what other heuristic strategy should we apply? An exploitative strategy? Criminals in jail ought to be exploited? Enemies in the battlefield ought to be exploited? If not exploited what else?

And we perhaps ought not (conditional) follow marker moral norms such as eating shrimp and masturbation are abominations once we understand their arbitrariness as markers of membership and commitment to ingroups. And understanding “women must be submissive to men” and “homosexuality is immoral” are norms about cooperating to exploit outgroups gives us reasons we ought not (conditional) follow them in order to achieve the goal of moral coherence. — Mark S

To me the relevant sense in which your “oughts” are conditional is wrt the function of morality which you defined as solving cooperation problems, not necessarily “moral coherence”. So “moral coherence” at best is an instrumental goal toward such ultimate moral end. And no matter how arbitrary “markers” norms are but if they actually preserve or boost cooperation, then they are morally legitimate.
Besides solving cooperation problems may be assessed wrt different dimensions: quantity (increasing the set of people joining the cooperation), quality (increasing the reliability of people cooperating), duration (increasing the stability of cooperation trends), resilience (increasing the recoverability of cooperation against external or internal shocks), etc. Now, if different cultural moral norms show different moral profiles wrt such dimensions, what may look as solving cooperation problems for one cultural system, it may look the opposite for another cultural system. In other words, “cooperative problems” and “solutions” would still look cultural-dependent, and not unique for all cultures, even when solving cooperation problems may be considered a likely effect (if not a function) of certain moral norms.

Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail.
— Mark S

How do you know that? — neomac

Because it is empirically true.

From a bottom-up perspective, all past and present cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment) can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies.

From a top-down perspective, we can understand that cooperation problems in our universe must be solved by all beings that form sustainably cooperative societies. Further, game theory shows that for these strategies for intelligent, independent agents to be successful, violators must be punished. Hence, just as predicted, cultural moral norms exist and can be identified as norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment.

Proposed counterexamples of moral norms that are not parts of cooperation strategies are always welcome.

Cooperation being a stepping stone to a goal (wellbeing or flourishing), not the goal itself.
— Tom Storm
:up: — 180 Proof

180 Proof and Tom,
I'd phrase it as "Cooperation being a 'means' to a goal (wellbeing or flourishing), not the goal itself", but that is essentially the same.

What I am arguing is the mind-independent core of morality is its 'means' - cooperation strategies. The objectively moral goals (end) of moral behavior require other arguments that I am not prepared to make.

People I respect say there are such arguments for objectively moral goals for moral behavior. My interest is not in arguing against the objectivity of moral goals, but rather to point out the direct utility of understanding what moral 'means' are, independent of what people are cooperating to do.

Also, when morality as cooperation is teamed with an objective goal, coherence seems to be increased. For example, most of simple Utilitarianism's "problems" vanish if the moral means of accomplishing that goal is limited to cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

I have not yet worked through the implications of accomplishing Negative-Utilitarianism's goals only by cooperation strategies that do not exploit others, but I expect those means and ends to be complimentary and reinforcing.