How does 2 differ from 3? — Michael
If some X is TTWNGCBC, then X necessarily exists
God is an X.
Therefore, God (necessarily) exists. — Hallucinogen
1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. There exists something which is TTWNGCBC
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists.
But 3) is an empirical claim that needs to be shown. It's not something that's true a priori. — Michael
But I was assuming that by "If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC", you meant the same thing as "If some X is TTWNGCBC," in the arguments you gave when you were previously attacking it. — Hallucinogen
3 is not an axiom, just a definitional fact. 2. isn't necessary, I just left it there because you put it there. — Hallucinogen
It's still missing the premise that asserts that there exists something which is TTWNGCBC — Michael
1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. God is defined as TTWNGCBC — Michael
1. If there exists something which is the greatest conceivable vampire then this thing necessarily exists
2. Dracula is defined as the greatest conceivable vampire
3. Therefore, Dracula exists
The conclusion doesn't follow. I'd need as a premise that the greatest conceivable vampire exists. — Michael
It's a false analogy. Vampires aren't non-contingent entities. — Hallucinogen
The “victorious” modal ontological argument of Plantinga 1974 goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal greatness” if and only if it possesses maximal excellence in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally excellent. Then consider the following argument:
There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
(Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
Under suitable assumptions about the nature of accessibility relations between possible worlds, this argument is valid: from it is possible that it is necessary that p, one can infer that it is necessary that p. Setting aside the possibility that one might challenge this widely accepted modal principle, it seems that opponents of the argument are bound to challenge the acceptability of the premise.
I don’t know how accurate that website is at parsing modal logics — Michael
The second premise is true if the definition doesn't contain a contradiction, which I think is an easy condition to satisfy. — Michael
If the definition is "a something a greater than which cannot be conceived", I'm not convinced. There's the obvious comparison of "A number a larger than which cannot be conceived" - the idea is not coherent. — Banno
Why? Because if you add to the concept existing in reality you would still just have a concept existing in reality, not the being itself.
Finally, many find the argument dubious for other reasons, viz., trying to prove the existence of something from the concept alone, which others have pointed out in this thread, is very problematic to say the least. — Sam26
Goats eat everything; therefore there is something that eats everything. therefore It is possible that something eats everything.
So you have a proof of the Great Goat:
Either it is not possible that something eats everything or it is necessary that something eats everything.
It is possible that something eats everything.
Therefore it is necessary that something eats everything. — Banno
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.