The second statement of A seems more of a response to the appeal to emotion of B and not necessarily a retreat of any sort. B is where the fallacy is.

I don’t think rephrasing an argument into terms that are less crippling for some brains is unwarranted. — NOS4A2

But A's second statement is not just a different way of putting the first statement. If A is fully aware of the issues, they know that the word "woman" is about gender, or about both sex and gender, or is at least ambiguous and controversial; whereas the second statement is explicitly about biological sex and thus represents a retreat. The first statement is a categorical proposition that relies on an equivocation and therefore cannot stand up to scrutiny.

But as @Mikie pointed out, (A) might not in fact be aware of all that. The reason I chose the example is precisely because under a certain light it's not crystal clear who is in the wrong and why.

Didn't Contrapoints do a bunch of work to show what the bailey was and what the motte was? I remember that they've previously shown that comment to be used by people who are almost assuredly transphobic, since they follow, reshare and post in transphobic communities (bailey). And those people also defend themselves in terms of the "biological definition" motte.

But as Mikie pointed out, (A) might not in fact be aware of all that. The reason I chose the example is precisely because under a certain light it's not crystal clear who is in the wrong and why. — Jamal

So when someone's vacillating, one of the determinants of their position will be the broader context their position comes from. Someone really could believe "trans women aren't women" if they understood "woman" to be identified entirely with "natal sex" - which I'm pretty sure they're factually wrong about, and I don't believe there's necessarily any bigotry associated with that position in isolation.

Nevertheless, the kind of person who makes that statement in the kind of context that it tends to arise is justifiably expected to be making a prejudiced comment and defending it disingenuously. If the person really really wanted to engage in the "what is gender identity" discussion in good faith, that's a bit different from the motte and bailey thing above. It might just highlight a gap in their understanding - or at least a lack of awareness of where the ideas can lead (and I think should lead).

So when someone's vacillating, one of the determinants of their position will be the broader context their position comes from — fdrake

Exactly. Richard O'Brian, who is non-binary, says trans women aren't real women. I know what he means. He's not suggesting their rights should be violated. He's just saying that we can't really dispense with the "trans" part. I think we all know that.

Didn't Contrapoints do a bunch of work to show what the bailey was and what the motte was? I remember that they've previously shown that comment to be used by people who are almost assuredly transphobic, since they follow, reshare and post in transphobic communities (bailey). And those people also defend themselves in terms of the "biological definition" motte. — fdrake

Yep.

Nevertheless, the kind of person who makes that statement in the kind of context that it tends to arise is justifiably expected to be making a prejudiced comment. If the person really really wanted to engage in the "what is gender identity" discussion in good faith, that's a bit different from the motte and bailey thing above. It might just highlight a gap in their understanding - or at least a lack of awareness of where the ideas can lead (and I think should lead). — fdrake

Totally. You might say it was irresponsible of me to so casually take it out of context and use it as an example, since without knowing about the context—the common situations that ContraPoints describes at length—one could look at the example and think that (A) is being reasonable or at least innocent of bigotry, which would make B look unreasonable.

In which case, your post functions as a necessary corrective. :up:

Totally. You might say it was irresponsible of me to so casually take it out of context and use it as an example, since without knowing about the context—the common situations that ContraPoints describes at length—one could look at the example and think that (A) is being reasonable or at least innocent of bigotry, which would make B look unreasonable. — Jamal

I don't think it was bad of you. This is a Philosophy Forum and you were clearly acting in good faith. I think it highlighted the context sensitivity. A discussion about how the motte and bailey is context dependent would be interesting in itself. I don't have any ideas about necessary and sufficient conditions for the context to be apt for ascription.

I think many arguments in favour of God do this. The claim is that something like the God of Christianity exists, and when asked to prove it they only provide an argument from something like an intelligent designer.

Yeah, on the one hand it's a good example precisely because it highlights the context sensitivity--and I must admit I chose it for that reason, that it might be controversial because of the non-obvious role of context--but on the other hand it is a bit irresponsible since some people will conclude that the bigots are not really bigots.

On the third hand, those people can be countered here in a way that exposes their biases in a way that wouldn't come to light otherwise, at the same time as exploring context dependence.

Yes, I'm sure I've seen that on TPF even just recently.

Although I get the impression that it's not a tactical retreat to go from Christian God to original designer, but just that they didn't realize there was a difference--or it's just a step in their overarching argumentative project heading towards the proof of the Christian God. In neither case is it an example of motte-and-bailey, I don't think.

But A's second statement is not just a different way of putting the first statement. If A is fully aware of the issues, they know that the word "woman" is about gender, or about both sex and gender, or is at least ambiguous and controversial; whereas the second statement is explicitly about biological sex and thus represents a retreat. The first statement is a categorical proposition that relies on an equivocation and therefore cannot stand up to scrutiny.

But as @Mikie pointed out, (A) might not in fact be aware of all that. The reason I chose the example is precisely because under a certain light it's not crystal clear who is in the wrong and why.

They probably knew that the word “woman” is defined as “an adult female person”, which is about biological sex. The meaning is probably shifting these days due to misuse, so a little leeway ought to be expected, but B was insinuating that A was doing something wrong, namely bigotry. So I think A’s natural response is to be defensive because such accusations could mean ostracism and violence, and I don’t think he’s retreating as if B had the better argument.

I would say your motte-and-bailey example applies more to modernist critical theory than it does to postmodernist reasoning. The former grounds itself in moral truths of a dialectical sort, from which it draws the righteous correctness of its position, whereas the latter is not interested in truth per se but pragmatic effects of discursive relations.

Could be. The content of the example was not meant to relate in any way at all to the substance of Shackel’s criticism of postmodernism.

So I think A’s natural response is to be defensive because such accusations could mean ostracism and violence, and I don’t think he’s retreating as if B had the better argument. — NOS4A2

Even if that’s the case it doesn’t matter. It’s a retreat to a more defensible position.

It seems more of a push than a retreat, is all I’m saying, like he was being bullied into being politically correct rather than correct.

I think you’re committing the motte-and-bailey fallacy yourself. You started out with the claim that it was B who was fallacious and that A merely rephrased the first statement, and now you’ve retreated to a softer position.

(A) was pushed, yes, pushed into retreat.

So it looks like the phrase “all I’m saying” is the biggest clue to the presence of this fallacy.

You’ve simply reasserted the claim that his argument was a retreat, so I tried to phrase it another way that might be understandable. If that itself is a retreat then so be it. It’s retreats all the way down while the interlocutor stands firm.

it's not the motte-and-bailey image but rather the participants themselves who sometimes fail. Motte-and-baily identifies one way in which people fail in debate, and isn't that exactly what the identification of informal fallacies is meant to do — Jamal

What needs to be appreciated is that the concept of debate itself presupposes in principle accessible facts of the matter that can be separated from values, motives, affects and other sources of subjective ‘distortion’. This assumption leads to the application of the label of fallacy to a wide range of statements. This leads further to the question of to what extent the notion fallacy is an appropriate or useful way to describe the construction of arguments in a debate. For instance, there are a wide variety of rhetorical strategies that manifest responses to the realization that oneself and one’s opponent are talking past one another, that is, are conceiving the terms of the debate according to incommensurable schemes. Seen in this light, Motte-bailey can be a useful and necessary means for finding a bridge, a code of translation , between the two worlds.

It’s no coincidence that the OP mentions postmodern arguments as an inspiration for the motte-bailey fallacy , while posters on this thread mention right -wing climate change deniers. The polarizing nature of the ideas these positions represent lead many to blame the form of argument ( fallacious reasoning) and miss the real culprit , incommensurable worldviews.

That’s interesting. Do you mean that the actual occurrence of the fallacy is a means, within the debate, of finding a bridge; or do you mean that an awareness of the fallacy, that is, a real-time identification of it by an interlocutor, can be that means?

↪Joshs That’s interesting. Do you mean that the actual occurrence of the fallacy is a means, within the debate, of finding a bridge; or do you mean that an awareness of the fallacy, that is, a real-time identification of it by an interlocutor, can be that means — Jamal

I was thinking of Thomas Kuhn’s discussion of incommensurable scientific paradigms in his postscript to the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. There he clarified that this incommensurability doesn’t amount to a total breakdown in mutual understanding, because paradigms are islands of divergence surrounded by a sea of shared cultural understandings. We can draw from such shared notions (the bailey?) to bridge the disparity in our scientific conceptions ( the motte?).

Very nice and probably in harmony with what @apokrisis was saying.

The motte-and-bailey fallacy occurs when someone advances a controversial claim—one that's difficult to defend—and when challenged retreats to an uncontroversial claim. The bold claim is the bailey, the safe claim the motte.

A: Trans women are not women. [bailey]

B: That's a transparently bigoted comment, functioning as it does to directly negate the gender identities of trans people and thereby deny their claims to equal treatment.

A: Look, all I'm saying is that biological sex cannot be changed and that women's rights need to be protected. And you call me a bigot! [motte]

[This example is inspired by YouTuber ContraPoints, who uses the idea to criticize J.K. Rowling and her supporters in this video, which is worth watching if you're interested in that particular issue.]

The idea was coined by Nicholas Shackel in The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology (PDF). — Jamal

In his example, Shackel rebukes Foucault for “arbitrary redefinition” of “elementary but inherently equivocal terms such as ‘truth’ and ‘power’ in order to create the illusion of giving a profound but subtle analysis of a taken for a granted concept.” Yet, what does render the motte's discourse a kind of preponderance over the bailey's one? There is not a simple confusion or a deliberate misinterpretation of 'elementary but inherently equivocal terms' such as gender identities and bigotry. What is at stake are political claims of what to do with others in a complex society. The 'motte-and-bailey' discussions function to embed identity politics into consensus-building processes. So, Foucault’s redefinition of relations between truth and power is not the example of the erroneous rhetoric but the effective explanatory framework.

M&B

X asserts B and/or argues for B.
Y refutes either B or X's argument for B.
As if to pretend that neither B nor X's argument for B were refuted, X instead either asserts a more defensible M and/or argues for M.
X is dishonest not to concede that B and/or X's argument for B were refuted.

Strawman

Y asserts M and and/or argues for M.
As if to to refute either M or Y's argument for M, X instead refutes a B that is less defensible than M.
X is dishonest to pretend that either M or Y's argument for M were refuted.

Charity

X asserts a not very defensible B and/or argues for B.
Y does X the favor of addressing a more defensible M instead.

Siege

X asserts a not very defensible B and/or argues for B.
Y refutes B and/or X's argument for B, and Y does not do X the favor of instead addressing a more defensible M.

Steelman Variation
Y asserts B and/or argues for B.
X disagrees with B and/or Y's argument for B, but X provides an even better argument for B and then refutes even that argument.

/

If X resorts to M&B, I think Y's best reply is "I'll address M instead, as long as you are clear that B was refuted and that we're moved to talking about M instead, which is different from B." That is to say, "I'll extend Charity but you need to not resort to M&B."

/

In high-minded academic debates one expects that the participants don't commit M&B or Strawman. And that truly high-minded participants extend Charity, even Steelman Variation and don't commit Siege. To me, that is a mark of intellect and enlightenment

On the other hand, in a forum such as this, one can count on M&B and Strawman being posted ubiquitously. Sometimes Siege too. But Charity or Steelman Variation only rarely. In my opinion, cranks rarely deserve Charity or Steelman Variation.

It has been addressed by others well enough I think. It depends on whether you wanted to talk about transgenderism or Motte and Bailey in particular I guess. I assumed it was the latter.

And that truly high-minded participants extend Charity, even Steelman Variation and don't commit Siege. To me, that is a mark of intellect and enlightenment — TonesInDeepFreeze

In my opinion, cranks rarely deserve Charity or Steelman Variation. — TonesInDeepFreeze

There’s a tension here, don’t you think?

But maybe it’s like the problem of democracy: do we extend democratic rights to radical anti-democrats, e.g., fascists? Surely not, and this itself necessitates anti-democratic elements, like written constitutions. Similarly, precisely because we value the principle of charity we shouldn’t extend charity to irrational interlocutors, those who hold bigoted positions or, perhaps, those whose rhetorical tactics undermine the rationality of discussion, e.g., with motte-and-bailey, strawmanning, etc.

It depends on whether you wanted to talk about transgenderism or Motte and Bailey in particular I guess. I assumed it was the latter. — I like sushi

I’m interested in both the abstract and the concrete, and how they relate. So the answer is something like: the latter, and both, because we can only properly understand M&B in the light of concrete examples, whose content, I contend, cannot simply be put to one side. This itself is controversial, I suppose, but it’s at least interesting I hope.

Refraining from sophistry is a basic requirement. Charity and Steelman Variation are "going the extra mile".

do we extend democratic rights to radical anti-democrats, e.g., fascists? Surely not [...] — Jamal

I don't know why you say that. On the contrary, usually it is recognized that democratic rights extend even to people who advocate against democratic rights.

anti-democratic elements, like written constitutions — Jamal

I'm not familiar with the notion that constitutions are anti-democratic. On the contrary, usually it is recognized that democracies need to have constitutions.

because we value the principle of charity we shouldn’t extend charity to irrational interlocutors — Jamal

By Charity in this context I only mean the form of discourse. While Charity may be charitable in the general sense of 'charity', I don't think that's its main attraction, which is that Charity contributes to better enquiry as it may go more directly to finding of truth, as it is may be more informative to hear a refutation of a defensible claim than a refutation of a preposterous claim.
.

a preposterous claim — TonesInDeepFreeze

Your entire reply is preposterous, performatively contradicting your stated ideal debating behaviour of “high-minded participants.”

I’m interested in both the abstract and the concrete, and how they relate. — Jamal

In the concrete.

Typical lawsuit I deal with:

A sues B for B having crashed his car into hers. In her suit, A argues the herniated spinal disk found on her MRI was caused by the collision. The radiologist however presents testimony the herniation pre-existed the collision. A then argues the herniation might have preexisted the collision, but the pain is new, so the collision caused the herniation to be symptomatic. Prior medical records are then shown to reveal similar symptoms before the collision. A then argues there still are some decipherable distinctions between the pre and post collision symptoms.

The argument though always remains: "This collision damaged me terribly." Regardless of whether the stronger claims (the collision caused objective, measurable injury) to the weaker claims (the collision caused subjective vague change) prevail, she still fights from the motte position of having extreme compensable injury.

In a courtroom, this is easy enough to combat. You point out to Group C, the neutral jury, that A doesn't seek the truth (i.e. justice), but just seeks a preferred outcome regardless of the facts and is therefore not to be trusted.

In real life, we have very few Cs, but just have those cheering in either camp A or B. For that reason, when you hear disingenuous arguments where a Group A refuses to admit their stronger claim has failed and that their position is admittedly objectively weaker, there isn't the proper repercussion where a controlling Group C meaningfully condemns them. Instead, Group A just grows stronger, each member proud of their group's shameless advocacy of a desired outcome.

My observation here then is that this is less a fallacy than a strategy in getting a desired outcome.

First, I don't claim always to live up to the being a most high-minded discussant.

Second, I don't know what you think is low-minded about my saying:

it is may be more informative to hear a refutation of a defensible claim than a refutation of a preposterous claim. — TonesInDeepFreeze

And I don't know why you think my entire reply is preposterous.