Primitive innate concepts such as the colour red is one thing, but Chomsky weirdly argued for more complex innate concepts such as carburettors, Knowing that a carburettor is a device for mixing air and fuel means knowing the analytic fact that a carburettor is a device. — RussellA

Well there is a difference between:
carburetor is a device for mixing air and fuel and
carburettor is a device

No?

Objects have properties seems pretty embedded, no?

Also, is identity ever proposed as an innate mechanism? "This is that" is that learned or is that just a priori a part of human cognition? Mind you, I don't mean the content of the logic, just that kind of identity logic. If that is the case, I-language and analyticity can have a connection. If not, then it is just the way E-languages operate once labels are in place. That is to say, it is all convention, all the way down. But again, my whole theme here is that even "convention" or "habits" or anything that is processed through our brains, is still processed by some mechanism.

Just like your quote of mine from direct/indirect.. Whether something is direct/sensory only or indirect/representation, the brain is doing something.

I like you drawing out the conclusions -- and I agree with these conclusions. My feeble attempt with nonsense was to show how an E-language can give sense to nonsense, and make an analytic statement in spite of the nonsense.

Hopefully suggesting that sense-making, at least, isn't I-langauge dependent. If we can make sense of nonsense words with "not-adjective noun is un-adjectived noun" then the I-language must do something else other than "make sense of things" -- this is a total nonsense phrase but we can understand the temptation to call it analytic from the grammar of English.

EDIT: Which basically goes to agree withyour point here.

I agree, sentient life must evolve through interaction with the world in which it exists, which is why it has taken 3.7 billion years for life to have evolved to its current form. — RussellA

That does take the long view of what 'development' involves. I suppose the development of children has to be seen in the context of that larger one. In regard to language, it prompts me to question the clean separation between the 'innate' and the 'environment' as put forward by Chomsky.

Beyond the specific theory put forward by Vygotsky, I think the issue needs to include his observation, "From this point of view, learning is not development."

I think you'd like Tomasello's view here:

Then it's hard to see what an I-language could be.

seems to have avoided this conclusion by enlarging the notion of innate concepts to include everything, at least up to carburettors. One is left to ponder what concepts are not innate. If all concepts are innate then why bother making the distinction? would both eat the cake that all sentences are true by convention while keeping the cake that some sentences are true by the meaning of their terms.

Today, "unmarried man" may be defined as "a man who is not living in a relationship with another person". Therefore, a bachelor is a man not living in a relationship with another person. — RussellA

Yes, I understand that there are possible nuances, and that's why I brought it up; it shows that the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is not analytic, because it is not definitively and unambiguously true.

So, you say a bachelor is a man not living in a relationship with another person. I take it you mean a sexual relationship, because surely a man could have housemates and still be counted a bachelor? But then what if the man has sex with his housemate? Does he then cease to be a bachelor? Or as I said before what if a man lives with his sexual partner three or four days a week?

Yes, I understand that there are possible nuances, and that's why I brought it up; it shows that the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is not analytic, because it is not definitively and unambiguously true.

So, you say a bachelor is a man not living in a relationship with another person. I take it you mean a sexual relationship, because surely a man could have housemates and still be counted a bachelor? But then what if the man has sex with his housemate? Does he then cease to be a bachelor? Or as I said before what if a man lives with his sexual partner three or four days a week? — Janus

Yes these are points I was trying to present between the difference of the statement X is not not X and bachelors are unmarried males.

One is conventional and relies on a ton of contingencies, including definitions of marriage, being a precise thing, and people meeting that criteria. The other is defined by the way logic just operates. One can be prone to change and one, seemingly at least cannot. Someone might say something like “unmarried males is simply not a good enough rigid designator, in all possible worlds.” However, that begs the question: “Would there ever be a designator that would be good enough for a convention-based statement with ambiguous contingencies?

:up: I don't buy the idea that designators can ever function adequately without reliance on descriptions anyway.

I do think there is a case for rigid designators for specific objects and entities though. There is a causal link of a name and a person that transfers so that that person is designated by that name in all possible worlds. But as to statements about conventions, harder to prove as the very entity itself is unclear and relies on contingencies.

There is a causal link of a name and a person that transfers so that that person is designated by that name in all possible worlds. — schopenhauer1

The problem with names for persons and places is that more than one may have the same name, and that is where descriptions may need to come in to determine who is being referred to.

The name 'bachelor' seems to be non-functional without any description (definition), and the name itself is inherently tied to description anyway. The problem there is, as you point out, that the defining descriptions cannot be adequately disambiguated.

The problem there is, as you point out, that the defining descriptions cannot be adequately disambiguated. — Janus

Agreed here but…

The problem with names for persons and places is that more than one may have the same name, and that is where descriptions may need to come in to determine who is being referred to. — Janus

Though I agree often a description is needed to differentiate people with same name, that the name is referring to that particular person is still the case. Mind you, even if the name itself changed over time, there is still a causal link.

The Tomasello lecture is excellent. His observations are noted in a larger challenge to Chomsky presented by Brian MacWhinney and Elizabeth Bates.

Though I agree often a description is needed to differentiate people with same name, that the name is referring to that particular person is still the case. — schopenhauer1

I agree, but that a person was baptized with a particular name entails that the name refers to that person seems to be a somewhat trivial truth; a truism. I don't see it as telling us anything much.

I agree, but that a person was baptized with a particular name entails that the name refers to that person seems to be a somewhat trivial truth; a truism. I don't see it as telling us anything much. — Janus

Yeah. Something about baptizing an object provides a causal link between name and object. You don’t need a description, just this link to make the name refer to a given object or referent.

, notice that "Batchelor" is not a proper name.

The word works, despite there never having been a baptism.

So on two accounts, the causal chain theory does not seem to apply here.

The word works, despite there never having been a baptism.

So on tow acounts, the causal chain theory does not seem to apply here. — Banno

I think I agree. What does TOW mean? Theory of Worlds?


Haha oh you mean two I think. In that case I agree.

Dyslexia lures.

Yeah. Something about baptizing an object provides a causal link between name and object. You don’t need a description, just this link to make the name refer to a given object or referent. — schopenhauer1

Right, but you need to be present when the name is first applied, or to be informed later that the name has been applied. I could say, for example, that my fridge is called 'Peter', then you would know what I meant when I said, "Peter's been running nicely, so I put the milk in him, and took out some carrots". On the other hand if I just uttered that sentence you might have no idea what I am referring to, and only a supplementary description (or in this case maybe clue-based guessing) would inform you of what "Peter" refers to in this context.

A mistake that’s apt for post on meaning and reference.

On the other hand if I just uttered that sentence you might have no idea what I am referring to, and only a supplementary description (or in this case maybe clue-based guessing) would inform you of what "Peter" refers to in this context. — Janus

Indeed, if a name is stated and no one else knows it’s referent, not sure. It’s still is a rigid designator I guess but weakly rigid. Ha

My friend Bruce ordered burgers for us yesterday, giving his name. It was misheard as "Chris", but despite that we managed to get the order.

The name is unimportant so long as you get what you want... meaning is use.

The name is unimportant so long as you get what you want... meaning is use. — Banno

Agreed as far as importance. Not sure if intended name has any real meaning if no one uses it. Not sure how causal link theory would respond other than the misheard name is part of the causal link. If no name is heard at all then perhaps a new baptism?

5. Four Models of Linguistic Reference.

1. On the descriptivist model, words refer in virtue of being associated with a specific descriptive content that serves to identify a particular object or individual as the referent.

2. On the causal model, words refer in virtue of being associated with chains of use leading back to an initiating use or ‘baptism’ of the referent.

3. On the character model, words refer in virtue of being associated with regular rules of reference. Paradigm rules of this sort will themselves allude to repeatable elements of the context, identifying which of these elements is the referent for which sort of term.

4. On the intentionalist model, words refer in virtue of being used, intentionally, to refer to particular objects. In other words, words refer in virtue of their being uttered as part of complex intentional acts which somehow target particular objects or individuals.

Interesting that these do not appear mutually exclusive... There's no obvious reason that all three could not be true in various circumstances... not reason we have to choose one as preeminent.

Also, is identity ever proposed as an innate mechanism? — schopenhauer1

I see my brother enter the room and immediately leave the room. There is no doubt in my mind that I have seen my brother enter and leave the room.

There is no doubt in my mind that the person entering and leaving the room are identical.

I would suppose that the brain's ability to know that it is the same object that moves through space and time is an innate mechanism that has developed over 3.7 billion years of evolution, rather than something that needs to be learnt.

After all, when we see a snooker ball roll over a snooker table, we don't think that every second the old snooker ball disappears and a new snooker ball appears. We know without doubt that it is the same snooker ball. We know without doubt the nature of identity.

In regard to language, it prompts me to question the clean separation between the 'innate' and the 'environment' as put forward by Chomsky. — Paine

I agree that it is very difficult to put a clean break between a person and their environment. Enactivism discusses this.

There are two aspects:

First, how an object can interact with its environment is a function of its physical form. For example, a kettle in having the physical form it has cannot play music, the horse having the physical form it has cannot enjoy the subtleties in a Cormac McCarthy novel and the human in having the physical form it has can probably never understand the nature of consciousness.

Second, an object's physical form has been determined by its environment.

There is feedback between the innate and the environment. The Wikipedia article on Feedback notes:

Simple causal reasoning about a feedback system is difficult because the first system influences the second and second system influences the first, leading to a circular argument. This makes reasoning based upon cause and effect tricky, and it is necessary to analyse the system as a whole. As provided by Webster, feedback in business is the transmission of evaluative or corrective information about an action, event, or process to the original or controlling source. Karl Johan Åström and Richard M.Murray, Feedback Systems: An Introduction for Scientists and Engineers.

it shows that the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is not analytic, because it is not definitively and unambiguously true. — Janus

There seems to be three types of statements: "a bachelor is a bachelor", "a bachelor is an unmarried man" and a "bachelor is always rich".

It seems that there is general agreement that "a bachelor is a bachelor" is analytic and "a bachelor is always rich" is synthetic, though there doesn't seem to be agreement as to whether the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic or synthetic.

My argument that "bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic because:

1) Before it can be decided whether "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic or synthetic, the meaning of the words in the statement must be known.

2) We know that the set of words "unmarried" and "man" have been named "bachelor".

3) So knowing that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named "bachelor", we know just by virtue of the meaning of the words alone that "bachelors are unmarried men" is an analytic statement.

Is there a flaw in my logic ?

RussellA seems to have avoided this conclusion by enlarging the notion of innate concepts to include everything, at least up to carburettors. — Banno

I limit innate concepts to primitive concepts, such as the colour red, pain, simple relationships such as to the left of, simple shapes such as a straight vertical line. Chomsky weirdly seems to extend innate concepts to carburettors.

Though I am pleased you are mixing me up with a major figure in analytic philosophy and one of the founders of the field of cognitive science.

RussellA would both eat the cake that all sentences are true by convention while keeping the cake that some sentences are true by the meaning of their terms. — Banno

All names are named by convention. It is by convention that the colour red has been named "red" rather than "sawdust", for example.

By convention, if a sentence is thought to correspond with the world it is named "true", otherwise it is named "false". For example, the sentence "the Eiffel Tower is in Paris" is true and the sentence "all unicorns live in Paris" is false. IE, some sentences are true by convention because the meaning of "true" has been agreed by convention.

Whether the statement "the Eiffel Tower is in Paris" is true or false can only be known by first knowing the meaning of its terms. IE, some sentences are true because the meaning of their terms has been agreed by convention.

Would the thing that we've named the "Eiffel Tower" be located in the place that we've named "Paris" if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?

I see my brother enter the room and immediately leave the room. There is no doubt in my mind that I have seen my brother enter and leave the room.

There is no doubt in my mind that the person entering and leaving the room are identical.

I would suppose that the brain's ability to know that it is the same object that moves through space and time is an innate mechanism that has developed over 3.7 billion years of evolution, rather than something that needs to be learnt.

After all, when we see a snooker ball roll over a snooker table, we don't think that every second the old snooker ball disappears and a new snooker ball appears. We know without doubt that it is the same snooker ball. We know without doubt the nature of identity. — RussellA

Yeah, the inferotemporal (IT) cortex has been demonstrated to be linked to object recognition (though the feature of "what" is being recognized to distinguish objects is still inconclusive).

Surely, this kind of distinguishing plays a role in how objects are given discrete identities that are the "tokenized sets" that might comprise concepts.

My point being that, the very fact of such mechanisms discounts convention-only theories of language acquisition. That is to say, if language relies on concepts, and concepts rely on specific brain regions devoted to things like object identity, then there is a clear path back to innate mechanisms necessary for language. This doesn't mean that behaviors don't take place, but to grab a certain @apokrisis common idea, there is the "downward causation" of the animal behavior acting upon the innate mechanisms of the brain, creating a semiotic feedback loop of sorts whereby both are necessary for this process of language, including the a priori mechanisms that may be needed to recognize meanings in concepts. However, I do understand that identification of objects and the meaning of objects are two different things. "That a ball is a ball" is one thing. That a ball is a round object and all other embedded ideas with it, is another. This needs some a posteriori knowledge, but the fact that things get "embedded" in a network of concepts is itself probably a mechanism. Certainly connectionist models of brain organization can (and do) account for this modelling on small scales. Thus, nativists and empiricists are both right.

Would the thing that we've named the "Eiffel Tower" be located in the place that we've named "Paris" if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out? — creativesoul

Yes.

We observe something in the world and then name it "The Eiffel Tower". This something existed before we named it. As this something existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

Similarly, we observe somewhere in the world and then name it "Paris". This somewhere existed before we named it. As this somewhere existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

As both the something that has been named "The Eiffel Tower" and the somewhere that has been named "Paris" can exist without a name, they can continue to exist even if there was no one around to name them.