X is a moral intuition because most people believe X. — schopenhauer1

I can't think of a situation where it is a valid statement, but maybe you can change my mind.

If I had to define moral behavior on the fly, its defining charateristic seems that it is always linked to contributing to the genuine long-term well-being of all its participants.

Sometimes the two coincide, i.e. a behavior that contributes to long-term well-being is also believed my most people to indeed to be moral, but the "most people" part would not carry much relevance.

When and how do you determine if a cultural convention (most people do or hold a belief about something in a society) is an indicator of a moral intuition? — schopenhauer1

I agree with you on this. I don't think really moral behaviors are matters of convention. By "really moral" I mean behavior that reflects our common humanity and capacity for empathy. As I see it, "conventional morality" is a form of social control meant to enforce homogeneity and the smooth running of society. It's a police function.

Many times I see this fallacy start when people defend themselves by saying, "Most people". Now, sometimes this can be called for, and sometimes it cannot. When and how should this be parsed out?

“X is a moral intuition because most people believe X. — schopenhauer1

Yes, it's an interesting question and apologies for the rambling response. I guess it depends on what we think morality is. I am not convinced that there are moral facts and I generally think that the kind of putative 'moral truths' we believe humans hold - that we ought to protect children, say, are based on our 'shared subjectivity' and enculturation, which form intrinsic foundational values held by most people.

This is no small matter. Humans also tend to share a view that we ought to prevent or minimise suffering. Is this a product of evolution - our status as a social species whose strength and survivability seems to come about though nurturing and cooperation? Some of course see this as evidence of transcendence of some kind.

Seems to me that there are intrinsic or essential values most humans subscribe to and which may now be a part of our nature, and may even be hard wired. But is this old school essentialism? This also seems to be a kind of 'most people' argument. It's also the case that how shared values are instantiated around the world is highly variable.

It seems clear that popularity doesn't make a moral choice right. If it did then mass killing all people aged over 40 because the majority of people are in favor of it would make this justifiable moral action. But at the same time, morality does seem to revolve around what most people think is appropriate behaviour - community standards, etc. What is the difference between a community standard which holds gay people are an abomination, or one which holds children should be protected from harm?

What makes one value seemingly immutable and another transitory or negotiable?

I can't think of a situation where it is a valid statement, but maybe you can change my mind. — Tzeentch

It's hard to really. I think a lot of this comes down to thinking in terms of armchair evolutionary psychology. We think that if a particular belief at a particular time is held by so many, it must be an indication of a deeper psychological mechanism in humans. This faulty thinking is even more tempting if the belief persists over many eras of history.

If I had to define moral behavior on the fly, its defining charateristic seems that it is always linked to contributing to the genuine long-term well-being of all its participants.

Sometimes the two coincide, i.e. a behavior that contributes to long-term well-being is also believed my most people to indeed to be moral, but the "most people" part would not carry much relevance. — Tzeentch

I'm more of the understanding that a moral indicator is easiest to determine when you are doing something that is against your preference. Now mind you, I don't think that just because you are doing something against your preference, you are thus doing something moral, rather, it is simply a stronger indicator when this does happen. For example, if you really like to eat meat, but you believe eating meat is wrong for X reasons, then when you don't eat meat, you are doing something contrary to your initial preference. Again, this doesn't mean the ethic of not eating meat is thus right, but it might indicate that you are doing something for at least what you perceive to be a moral reason rather than a general preference.

Moral intuition thus might be a sense of self-domestication whereby if your preference is incongruent with an ethic, then it is an indicator of "acting out of morality". However, this is more contingencies then essential nature of what is moral by intuition. But perhaps it still has relevance for the content too, because maybe we generally "all" or "most" have built in notions of "fairness" (justice) or "empathy", but it is the temperance of these with our self-interest that is how the intuition becomes manifested as "morality".

I agree with you on this. I don't think really moral behaviors are matters of convention. By "really moral" I mean behavior that reflects our common humanity and capacity for empathy. As I see it, "conventional morality" is a form of social control meant to enforce homogeneity and the smooth running of society. It's a police function. — T Clark

Conventional morality, if taken to mean "what most people believe" can be a form of social control in that it can be used to shut down arguments because it's meant to be presented as an indicator of what is truly moral (because most people believe it). If the argument doesn't go beyond this, it is simply a tool to advance ones preference that other views should not be considered. And mind you, because no other deeper analysis is usually made in these arguments, it isn't necessarily that the outside view is "wrong" because it is not moral, but simply because it is not the current norm. It very heavily relies on the evidence of "most people believe X" to be the case that X is true. Of course, if scrutinized for instances the other side might do many summersaults to get out of it such as "appeals to grey" (X happened in history, but no one really believed X).

Conventional morality, if taken to mean "what most people believe" can be a form of social control in that it can be used to shut down arguments because it's meant to be presented as an indicator of what is truly moral (because most people believe it). If the argument doesn't go beyond this, it is simply a tool to advance ones preference that other views should not be considered. — schopenhauer1

I see conventional morality as a social phenomenon - it's imposed by a community, not by an individual - and not to shut down arguments but to control behavior. Otherwise, as I noted, I think we are in agreement.

It seems clear that popularity doesn't make a moral choice right. If it did then mass killing all people aged over 40 because the majority of people are in favor of it would make this justifiable moral action. But at the same time, morality does seem to revolve around what most people think is appropriate behaviour - community standards, etc. What is the difference between a community standard which holds gay people are an abomination, or one which holds children should be protected from harm?

What makes one value seemingly immutable and another transitory or negotiable? — Tom Storm

Really good questions! I think this is a matter of just more empirical studies on cross-cultural societies and psychological experiments. However, intuition alone is simply a foundation perhaps, and not "morality qua morality" itself. That becomes hard to determine as to "what" is the locus of proper ethics. If it is the individual, the moral intuitions start looking like a sort of deontological ethics of "rights" and treating the individual with "dignity". If you determine the locus to be an aggregate, it starts looking more consequential or utilitarian. Certainly one would think "Justice" and "Empathy" could be a thing in both deontological and utilitarian contexts,

I see conventional morality as a social phenomenon - it's imposed by a community, not by an individual - and not to shut down arguments but to control behavior. Otherwise, as I noted, I think we are in agreement. — T Clark

Ok, but this thread is about using the appeals to popularity as an indicator of whether something is a moral intuition: “X is a moral intuition because most people believe X". When and how do we determine if this is in fact true or just being used as an ad populum fallacy of justification (X must be a deeper moral intuition or truth, most people believe it!).

Ok, but this thread is about using the appeals to popularity as an indicator of whether something is a moral intuition: “X is a moral intuition because most people believe X". When and how do we determine if this is in fact true or just being used as an ad populum fallacy of justification (X must be a deeper moral intuition or truth, most people believe it!). — schopenhauer1

In the OP, you wrote:

When and how do you determine if a cultural convention (most people do or hold a belief about something in a society) is an indicator of a moral intuition?

It seems to me that people often confuse the two and make the ad populum fallacy. — schopenhauer1

I was agreeing with you. Perhaps I've misunderstood what you mean by "moral intuition." I was taking it to mean:

behavior that reflects our common humanity and capacity for empathy. — T Clark

But at the same time, morality does seem to revolve around what most people think is appropriate behaviour - community standards, etc. What — Tom Storm

Yeah, this notion gets under fire often because it's cloaked in appeal to ad populum. But how else could one talk about a moral view without mentioning that most people also hold the same view? Most people do not want themselves or their families murdered, is this appeal to popularity?

Of course, if your only reason for defending a view is because "most people" hold it, then that's silly. Most people don't think of their trash as damaging to the environment so trash couldn't be that bad.

It seems clear that popularity doesn't make a moral choice right. If it did then mass killing all people aged over 40 because the majority of people are in favor of it would make this justifiable moral action. But at the same time, morality does seem to revolve around what most people think is appropriate behaviour - community standards, etc. What is the difference between a community standard which holds gay people are an abomination, or one which holds children should be protected from harm? — Tom Storm

This is something I think about whenever a discussion of morality takes place. It seems to me there is a fundamental difference between behaviors that arise out of my personal values and concern for the well-being of others and those that are intended for application to others, either by me or by the community at large. They certainly are connected, but then sometimes they are in conflict.

“X is a moral intuition because most people believe X. — schopenhauer1

Aren’t moral intuitions simply our intuitions about what is moral? Moral intuitions are personal; their existence does not depend on what other people believe. And moral intuitions are as diverse and contradictory as the cultural moral norms that shape them. So no, “X is a moral intuition because most people believe X” is false.

It seems clear that popularity doesn't make a moral choice right. — Tom Storm

That is correct of course.

But how can we judge moral systems (such as philosophical moral systems) other than by their coherence and our moral intuitions about the premises and the conclusions?

How about “well-considered moral intuitions” as a moral reference for judging moral premises or conclusions?

Well-considered moral intuitions are coherent with intuitions from all perspectives. Given the diversity and contradictions of cultural moral norms and the diversity of perspectives we can individually take on an action, finding such moral intuitions is not easy.

Past candidates for such well-considered moral intuitions include the ideas that the most ethical choice is the one that will:

• produce the greatest good (or happiness) for the greatest number – Utilitarianism or
• minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or minimize suffering and, secondarily, maximize the total happiness. - Negative-Utilitarianism

Different people will claim different intuitions are coherent with either their own or everyone’s perspectives.

Moral intuitions are personal; their existence does not depend on what other people believe. And moral intuitions are as diverse and contradictory as the cultural moral norms that shape them. So no, “X is a moral intuition because most people believe X” is false. — Mark S

Oh I get it and basically agree, but I present it because it is a common defense in arguments about morality to couch one's own morals with ad populum armor "You see my view is correct because it is representative of what most people think". Usually it starts out like, "Your idea is ridiculous, most people...". And of course, how can most people be wrong :roll:. Please read that with sarcasm.

Past candidates for such well-considered moral intuitions include the ideas that the most ethical choice is the one that will:

• produce the greatest good (or happiness) for the greatest number – Utilitarianism or
• minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or minimize suffering and, secondarily, maximize the total happiness. - Negative-Utilitarianism — Mark S

I'm no expert on morality and take no formal position on how to determine what is right other than an unsophisticated: minimize and/or end suffering position.

But couldn't enslaving 20% of the planet produce 1) the greatest happiness for most amount and minimize total suffering along with maximizing happiness? Such an approach could even be well considered.

How does one morally assess a moral system's methodology?

But couldn't enslaving 20% of the planet produce 1) the greatest happiness for most amount and minimize total suffering along with maximizing happiness? Such an approach could even be well considered. — Tom Storm

You point out the biggest flaw in simple Utilitarianism, that it does not prohibit immoral means of achieving that end. Utilitarianism's end, the goal, is moral by well-considered intuitions. Simple Utilitarianism is unfortunately silent on the morality of the 'means' to achieve this goal. Morality as Cooperation Strategies can come to Utilitarianism's rescue by limiting moral means to cooperation strategies that do not exploit others. This eliminates at least most traditional objections to Utilitarianism.

I'd also argue that Morality as Cooperation Strategies is also moral by well-considered moral intuitions. This would be true if, as I argue, our moral intuitions were shaped by morality as cooperation strategies.

A utilitarian might look to Hare's "two-level weak rule utilitarianism". That is to say, follow the general rule, but make exceptions for instances when this would go against greater overall benefit. I still don't see how that kind would overcome certain situations. What if doing the (seemingly wrong act) really does lead to greater overall happiness? So I think we have to ditch "overall happiness" and discuss minimizing suffering. But if that's the case then, it becomes awfully close to deontological ideas of "rights" as it becomes from a negative perspective (protect from and prevent the maximum worst case scenario). Deontology therefore, would focus on the inherent worth and dignity of people, and their right not to be used as cogs, which some consequentialism seems to lead to (overlook the individual and cause them harm or overlook their autonomy for some abstracted goal or aggregate). This especially becomes problematic even at the individual level (see my thread on burdens) when you cause burdens/stress/harm/suffering (unnecessarily) to see some "other" outcome (character building, even happiness itself).

I see your point.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies can come to Utilitarianism's rescue by limiting moral means to cooperation strategies that do not exploit others. This eliminates at least most traditional objections to Utilitarianism. — Mark S

Sorry Mark, I still haven't followed how we locate or arrive at corporation strategies that do not exploit others. Surely there are many potential cooperation strategies that can or do exploit others?

Sorry Mark, I still haven't followed how we locate or arrive at corporation strategies that do not exploit others. Surely there are many potential cooperation strategies that can or do exploit others? — Tom Storm

Tom,

Right, too often ingroups have cooperated to exploit outgroups.

What if I described the function of human morality as solving a cooperation/exploitation dilemma that is innate to our universe? Would this help clarify that exploitation is opposite the function of human morality and therefore objectively immoral if we choose the function of human morality as a moral reference? (Here, “human morality” refers to cultural moral norms and our moral sense and “function” refers to the principle reason human morality exists.)

As I said above to neomac,

Adapted from an old essay of mine about why this dilemma is innate to our universe:

“In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.
All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal cooperation/exploitation dilemma. This includes our ancestors.”

Which is the more revealing description of the function of human morality?

• “Human morality solves cooperation problems” (what I have been typically using) or
• “Human morality solves the cooperation/exploitation dilemma”

What if I described the function of human morality as solving a cooperation/exploitation dilemma that is innate to our universe? Would this help clarify that exploitation is opposite the function of human morality and therefore objectively immoral if we choose the function of human morality as a moral reference? — Mark S

As a layperson, I wonder if there is a clearer way to set this out? I'm beginning to see more plainly what your point is - that good morality may come through getting the fidelity of the model (cooperation strategies) right. Everything flows from this premise.

“In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.
All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal cooperation/exploitation dilemma. This includes our ancestors.”

Which is the more revealing description of the function of human morality?

• “Human morality solves cooperation problems” (what I have been typically using) or
• “Human morality solves the cooperation/exploitation dilemma” — Mark S

I'm not sure this is written as clearly as it needs to be for someone like myself.

If I read this you seem to be saying cooperation can be taken in bad directions and is therefore fraught and may not be helpful?

In relation to your two choices - my problem with these sentences is that they fail to sufficiently explain themselves. Perhaps you need to provide something more.

I'm not keen on the word 'solves' or 'dilemma' in the second choice.

Are you saying: The function of human morality is to facilitate cooperation in the mutual interests of all?

Tom,
While perhaps interesting to us, we have gone off-topic for schopenhauer1's thread Ad Populum Indicator of a Moral Intuition. Let's belay this conversation here. I'll consider the questions you have asked and create a fresh thread to address them.