It's indisputable, because there is nothing in it to dispute: it's not a claim; it's a definition. — Vera Mont

The original designation of three-sided polygons as "triangles" has no truth value, since it was an act, but It is true that a triangle has three sides because, by definition, a triangle is a shape with three sides. You could view it as a contraction of "within English, a triangle is a shape with three sides" which anyone would who speaks English would agree is true. Without that English would cease to function as a language. Another example would be that the creation of the rules of chess had no truth value, but that, for example, you can't move your pawns backwards is a rule in chess, there is a truth value, and if there wasn't, then there would be no rules in chess at all.

Another example would be that the creation of the rules of chess had no truth value, — Judaka

Correct

but that, for example, you can't move your pawns backwards is a rule in chess, there is a truth value

Of course. As a claim, it can be disputed, tested, verified and proven....
.... within the confines of its context.
Obviously, you can move a pawn backwards; it's just that the rules of chess forbid you do it during a game. If anyone doubts that - and they can - you show them the rule book.

Of course. As a claim, it can be disputed, tested, verified and proven....
.... within the confines of its context.
Obviously, you can move a pawn backwards; it's just that the rules of chess forbid you do it during a game. If anyone doubts that - and they can - you show them the rule book — Vera Mont

Of course. I was saying that truth is determined by rules and conventions and can be contested by ignoring those rules and conventions. There is a clear difference between the rules of chess and the way in which we establish mathematical or scientific truths and a difference between the truth value of pawns being unable to move backwards and that 2 +2 = 4. However, each truth value is indisputable. I think this is because of the relationship between the rules and conventions with the claim, as well as the cultural attitude towards these rules and conventions. Do you agree? I'm not saying the laws of mathematics and the rules of chess are on the same level, but as far as truth is concerned, it's not about that.

I think this is because of the relationship between the rules and conventions with the claim, as well as the cultural attitude towards these rules and conventions. Do you agree? I'm not saying the laws of mathematics and the rules of chess are on the same level, but as far as truth is concerned, it's not about that. — Judaka

I partially agree. I don't consider the definition of a word "a claim" that is verifiably true or false: it is, indeed, established by conventional usage. Nor do I consider the laws of mathematics to be "claims"; I assume, without expert knowledge, that they have been adequately tested for a high enough degree of probability that if a bridge falls down, I'm more likely to doubt the authenticity of the steel than the equations.
As to the cultural aspect, no. I don't agree that the truth of a claim regarding reality is in any way dependent on the attitude of any group of people.
The rules of games come into neither category: they're unreal; anything can be true.

In what way do you agree? It seems that you are unwilling to label things as true when they're true by convention or manmade rules. If I name my dog Mark, is it true that his name is Mark? Anyway, I do appreciate that the context is essential, and while we may disagree on why it is that laws of mathematics are different from the rules of chess, I think our conclusions are the same.

In what way do you agree? It seems that you are unwilling to label things as true when they're true by convention or manmade rules. — Judaka

I agree that the definition of words is established by convention.
I don't agree that facts are controlled by public opinion.

If I name my dog Mark, is it true that his name is Mark? — Judaka

It is true within provision constraints, by reason of cause (you named him) and effect (he answers to it). The provisional constraints are: if the ownership of dogs and the convention of naming are accepted by claimant and questioner, and no other claimant has previously given the same dog a different name, and the dog complies by answering to the name.
It is not true in any universal or eternal sense.

we may disagree on why it is that laws of mathematics are different from the rules of chess — Judaka

You mean in that one is a global constant, rigorously testable and verifiable, while the other is ephemeral fancy, subject to change from place to place and time to time? Yes, we might.

I think our conclusions are the same. — Judaka

There is another statement I find disputable, but won't dispute further.

I made a thread about skepticism and said that we cannot coherently deny that language transmits meaning because by understanding this sentence you have proven that language transmits meaning. — Andrew4Handel

In a way. Language is more of a placeholder for concepts and meaning than a reliable transmitter of it. If I say "No, don't throw it away" without proper enunciation or linguistic pauses one could easily hear "No, don't. Throw it away." For example. Famous example being "Pardon Impossible. To be sent to Siberia." A legal aspect of this is "the Letter of the Law versus the Spirit of it".

We simply have societal constructs and "common sense" contexts to determine what the meaning of words (or lack thereof) are.

That said, people value that which is useful. Even if said usefulness is but a myopic illusion. False dilemmas control society and individuals wholesale. "You're a bad person" = "you can never become a better person". Or the inverse "you're a good person" = "you can never commit an atrocity".

I don't agree that facts are controlled by public opinion. — Vera Mont

Well it is. For example. the world was indeed flat until people decided it wasn't, and their decision was what bent the Earth into the shape of a sphere. I can send you a 100-page document I wrote about it proving this to be the case if you're interested.

It is true within provision constraints, by reason of cause (you named him) and effect (he answers to it). — Vera Mont

No, it's true by convention. Your opinion and your argument about the dog needing to comply to the owner calling its name is just something you made up. I'm not saying you can't have your own opinion, and your view seems reasonable to me. It's not just the definition of words that is defined by convention, but a lot of things. I will leave it there though since you seem uninterested in the semantics.

No, it's true by convention. Your opinion and your argument about the dog needing to comply to the owner calling its name is just something you made up. — Judaka

Really? In that case, I name you Ruby Tuesday, and from this day forward, that is your name, by the conventions of naming and ownership -- oh, by the way, I just bought you for 300 shekels. You'd better be worth it!

It's not just the definition of words that is defined by convention, but but a lot of things. — Judaka

A lot of things may be. But the Earth was never flat, and late-comer apes, however many conventions they invent, or wilful ignorance, or self-delusion can't turn an uniformed guess into a fact.

Really? In that case, I name you Ruby Tuesday, and from this day forward, that is your name, by the conventions of naming and ownership -- oh, by the way, I just bought you for 300 shekels. You'd better be worth it! — Vera Mont

Thanks for buying me and giving me a sweet name, though I am arguing the exact opposite of this. It's because the rules and conventions for naming exist that we can't just make up whatever rules we want. You or I or anyone can technically invent their own rules for naming and ownership and have them be equally valid in so far as neither are "in accordance with reality" since these are just made-up rules. However, the standard rules and conventions have legal authority, and cultural recognition, are socially enforced, are part of the language, and are embraced by the vast majority of people.

A lot of things may be. But the Earth was never flat, and late-comer apes, however many conventions they invent, or wilful ignorance, or self-delusion can't turn an uniformed guess into a fact. — Vera Mont

Of course. My feelings about the word "truth" aren't representative of my views about reality, I am only talking about semantics, concepts, and convention. Honestly, I don't know if you really interpreted our discussion to always be set in the context of scientific facts, especially considering this thread is about relativism and skepticism, but I didn't.

In so far as accurately describing reality is concerned, and staying within the confines of a reasonable and scientific view of reality, and in so far as truth pertains only to "the state of being in accordance with reality" to the exclusion of manmade concepts, then convention is meaningless. Anyway, somehow this became a discussion where I'm trying to convince someone I'm not crazy, I hope I got through but I'll end my involvement in this thread here.

Thanks for buying me and giving me a sweet name, though I am arguing the exact opposite of this. It's because the rules and conventions for naming exist that we can't just make up whatever rules we want. — Judaka

Exactly:

It [that the dog's name is Mark] is true within provision constraints, by reason of cause (you named him) and effect (he answers to it). The provisional constraints are:if the ownership of dogs and the convention of naming are accepted by claimant and questioner, and no other claimant has previously given the same dog a different name, and the dog complies by answering to the name.
It is not true in any universal or eternal sense. — Vera Mont

If any of the provisions are missing, then the facts are more correctly stated as: "I call my dog Mark." If he doesn't answer to Mark, then it is not his name.

Three pages of lies. And nobody cares.

Three pages of lies — unenlightened

Proveit!

Not really responsive to the body of the OP, but responsive to the question posted:

In politicians, voters consider truthfulness the highest valued trait:

https://www.google.com/amp/s/theconversation.com/amp/voters-value-honesty-in-their-politicians-above-all-else-new-study-175589

However, lying is more successful than truthfulness in getting one elected:

https://www.google.com/amp/s/sports.yahoo.com/amphtml/politician-liar-reelected-160719974.html

So, we want truth, but do love us a good lie.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/george-santos-lies-republicans-resign-b2264739.html

So, we want truth, but do love us a good lie. — Hanover

That's the key. We so much want some things to be true, and some things to be untrue, that we're prepared to accept whatever we want to hear, whether it's true or not.

Proveit! — Vera Mont

Why? Do you value truth or something?

Do you value truth or something? — unenlightened

Not for its own sake, particularly. But I do resent baseless accusations.

But I do resent baseless accusations. — Vera Mont

So you don't value truth, but you resent falsehood?

That seems a bit negative...

So you don't value truth, but you resent falsehood? — unenlightened

I don't value truth for its own sake, but resent baseless accusations.

That seems a bit negative... — unenlightened

The first part is negative; the second, positive.

Do people value truth? — Andrew4Handel

Do cripples value crutches? :chin:

Morality has failed ... — Andrew4Handel

I suppose history and math have failed too ... When does it ever make sense, Andrew, to blame a tool because fools neglect or misuse it? :roll:

You could look at it like this.

Every moment or so we are faced with information in our experiences and have to decide what to do with it.

So the requirement for truth in this scenario is to be able to act on some basis, to be motivated to make reasoned decisions.
But we don't have to question everything all at once to act. We probably have a distinct manageable set of input to assess the truth of.

I don't think we have enough instincts to survive like an animal in the wild so we live in societies with ongoing shifting narratives, values and paradigms we need to assess.

In this scenario I think a philosophers quest for truth is somewhat dubious because it seems psychologically more likely that the philosopher is trying to either prop up some of societies pre-existing paradigms/values or advocate for his or her own ideology rather than being unbiased.

Pragmatism would again have us throw out the baby of truth along with the bath water of scepticism.

Trouble is, folk expect too much from truth. Saying what is true is just what we usually do with statements. Denying this quickly leads to the sort of absurdities already mentioned here by several posters, but which the pragmatists, in their enthusiasm, failed to notice.

It's actually quite an amusing read.

Do cripples value crutches? — 180 Proof

People value different things at different times. Most people are selective skeptics and ideologically motivated reasoners.

What leads to relativism isn't that there's no truth, it's that there's too much truth. The volume of truth is incomprehensibly immense. — Judaka

I was feeling like this yesterday. There is potential infinitude of facts and perspectives with different layers of truth.

But in my latest post I have decided that all we have to deal with is the truth of our current moment. That moment could contain profound truths however.

It seems like Philosophy's use of premises and conclusion is valuable. Are the premises valid and does the conclusion follow and that gives us a tool to respond to a lot of claims, ideas and information quickly.

In this scenario I think a philosophers quest for truth is somewhat dubious .... — Andrew4Handel

How about non-existent? I don't think philosophy is a quest for truth at all; it's more a search - quest is too romantic a word - for some modus vivendi that would yield the best results - best, that is, by the philosopher's reckoning, which is formed by his time and culture and experience and convictions.

the philosopher is trying to either prop up some of societies pre-existing paradigms/values or advocate for his or her own ideology rather than being unbiased — Andrew4Handel

Of course. Their function is to evaluate how well or badly their society is doing, as measured by their own standards, then try to figure out how it's failing or succeeding, then establish the principles by which it ought to operate. That does require the philosopher to believe some fundamental truths or even Truths - but these are not the same truths that scientists are searching for in the next room.

It takes about a thousand facts to add up to a truth, and a million to constitute a Truth. Facts may be comparable to fireflies, lightbulbs and stars with a commensurate lifespan.

I don't think philosophy is a quest for truth at all; it's more a search - quest is too romantic a word - for some modus vivendi that would yield the best results - best, that is, by the philosopher's reckoning, which is formed by his time and culture and experience and convictions. — Vera Mont

:100: :fire:

Do people value truth? In the sense of ideals, certainly. In application it's contextual.

If they are trying to dismantle a bomb then the truth of which wire to cut is very valuable. But, no one wants to sit through a movie listening to someone constantly remark about how it never happened and pointing out these are all just actors. So, evidently we are selective when it comes to whether the truth of things interests us. We like being right, I think. Which means confirmatory truths are pleasing. But I'd hesitate to say that's the same as valuing idealistic truth.

Or not.

People value that which confirms what they believe. They call this ‘truth’.

You could just as easily say "I live in a big white house with four columns supporting a portico on Pennsylvania Avenue," and people could find the house all right, yet the statement might still be untrue. — Vera Mont

Yes people can lie
but the point was that when verbal directions successfully get you somewhere you want to go then they must be transmitting truth. Words must transmit facts.

I can't work out what this entails exactly but it seems to mean we can represent facts in language. This may require a theory of what language or mental representations are.

I have a map of my home city and I could guide you without a map to the two houses I spent my childhood in. It seems my brain has stored loads of facts that I can use on a daily basis including the basic meanings of thousands of words. Some basic math facts and procedures. It could be similar to a computer's memory except a computer is not conscious of it's memories or their truth value.

I am just thinking aloud here but truth and falsity do seem to be evaluations we can make of mental states or properties available to consciousness and the act of consciously evaluating.

But it seems we actually have a large amount of verifiable facts available to our mind which I think serves a good foundation for forming further factual beliefs. Coming to think of it conscious states may be required for evaluations of truth.

Words must transmit facts. — Andrew4Handel

Word can transmit facts. Nothing compels or impels them to do so. They're just tools, to be used as the competent user intends, or unpredictably, if the user is incompetent.

I am just thinking aloud here but truth and falsity do seem to be evaluations we can make of mental states or properties available to consciousness and the act of consciously evaluating. — Andrew4Handel

We do. Not always accurately.

But it seems we actually have a large amount of verifiable facts available to our mind which I think serves a good foundation for forming further factual beliefs. — Andrew4Handel

Of course. That's what critical thinking is. The more actively aware you are of this, the more effective your thinking will be. The first and biggest hurdle to overcome is fear of questioning received wisdom. The second is learning to trust yourself.