This [subjective] relegation of reason to a subordinate position is in sharp contrast to the ideas of the pioneers of bourgeois civilization, the spiritual and political representatives of the rising middle class, who were unanimous in declaring that reason plays a leading role in human behavior, perhaps even the predominant role. They defined a wise legislature as one whose laws conform to reason; national and international policies were judged according to whether they followed the lines of reason. Reason was supposed to regulate our preferences and our relations with other human beings and with nature. It was thought of as an entity, a spiritual power living in each man. This power was held to be the supreme arbiter—nay, more, the creative force behind the ideas and things to which we should devote our lives. — Horkheimer
I might agree, but materialism has no concept of telos. There is no possibility of intentionality outside the intentional actions of agents. — Wayfarer
if you want something with more scientific rigor behind it, then I vote for the conformal cyclic cosmology of Roger Penrose or > 3d superstring theory, or Mtheory with each universe being created by interacting 5D branes. These extra dimensions of the very small, that are 'wrapped around' every point in our 3d existence, are undetectable to us but are the reason why some posit nonsense such as 'something from nothing.' Quantum fluctuations are probably caused by these extra dimensions. The system is most likely (so for me, warrants a high credence level,) cyclical and eternal.
All of these similar 'cyclical and eternal' proposals are far far more likely and far far more rational that any theological posit (normally flavoured by some supernatural agency with intentionality) I have ever heard and any I am ever likely to hear about. — universeness
It was believed that the rational soul was immortal… — Wayfarer
….we know now, thanks to science, that the principle behind all our faculties (including reason) is successful adaption and procreation. — Wayfarer
Interesting comments. I'm not going to argue that you are wrong, but my take is that fear and our tendency towards dualistic thinking may lie behind most problems like this. People are frightened and are easily galvanized by scapegoating, quick fixes, sloganeering and appeals to tribal identity (white nationalism, etc). The notion that you are either for us or against us becomes a kind of touch stone for social discourse.
I should think that in times of uncertainty, where fear is brewing and readily activated as a motivating energy (largely thanks to Murdoch in the West) we see people embracing glib answers which promise deliverance and perverse forms of solidarity.
I'm not sure that philosophy as such plays a key role here, but certainly ideas do. — Tom Storm
Religion certainly served pragmatic functions in many societies. It can serve to legitimize the state (e.g., the deification of Roman emperors), it can act as a check on absolutist states (e.g., Saint Ambrose forcing Emperor Theodosius to wear penitent's robes and undergo chastisement after the massacre at Thessalonica), it can act as a legal arbiter (e.g., Saint Augustine mentions much of his time being sucked up by arbitrating property disputes, estates, etc.), it can help solve collective action problems when pushing for reforms (e.g., the central role of churches in the US Civil Rights Movement, and earlier, the Abolitionist movement), and it can help provide public goods in low capacity states (e.g., churches were the main source of welfare programs and education for the lower classes in Europe for over a millennia).
Civil society organizations and the state can also provide these goods. What makes religion and philosophy unique is their ability to give people a narrative about the meaning and purpose of life, an explanation of their inner lives and the natural world.
This is something religion aims at, but also philosophy, and the two can be quite close in this respect. A world view based on Nietzschean overcoming requires that the world be valueless and meaningless for the human to become great by triumphing over this apparent emptiness. A world where man is essentially evil and always on the verge of extinction is required for the somber rationalists to triumph over the immanent disasters by building a just structure in the world despite the opposition of the legions of the selfish. Marxism also is able to offer a religious-like, all encompassing vision of the purpose of human life, one which also ends in salvation.
This is ultimately where I think the instinct to hold on to and defend dogmas comes from. They become like blocks in an arch, kick them out and the edifice collapses. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I've mentally constructed a space in which the conflicted ideas are carefully evaluated and meditated on in a distance to me as a person. Because I'm fully aware of my biases I almost get a negative feeling when I'm straying too far from balanced reasoning. It helps me go through all the possible perspectives of a topic in order to examine it closer and it helps me listen better to other people and spot when they add a new perspective that I didn't have before, adding it to the internal process of reasoning. — Christoffer
Hmmmm. The principle behind our successful adaptation and procreation is instinct, but does it follow that all our faculties, including reason, are instinctive? Wasn’t that the manifest point of the Enlightenment, to prove the human beast is naturally equipped for considerations beyond the capacities of the lesser, merely instinctive, beast?
In fact, I almost used the word “anemic” in reply to Ciceronianus, the sensible no-nonsense pragmatist, but decided it was too rude. — Jamal
This isn't just a supposition of the Enlightenment, but a core component of ancient and medieval philosophy. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think the Enlightenment (…) failed to take a systems perspective of the logic of societies and failed to recognize the risks of not-yet-rational institutions havening sway over society. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Would you agree that these glib answers and simplified polarization out of fear can arise out of the lack of philosophical approaches? Aren't they the emerging traits of ignoring such a mental tool? And wouldn't such tools be a way out of these? — Christoffer
In my personal experience, this is how I approach daily life. I do not jump onto ideas and opinions lightly, I don't decide on anything before I have a somewhat objective reasoning surrounding it. — Christoffer
↪Ciceronianus That’s the spirit! — Jamal
Now that would be an "anemic" response, as in lacking substance — Ciceronianus
That's possibly a clue to his motivation: he sees "wokeism" as a civil religion, and since he questions it, he's questioning religion and is therefore a great philosopher. — Jamal
I will say that if it's true that philosophers cannot start from a neutral transcendent foundation, that their thinking is conditioned by their time, then it might help to be aware of it. — Jamal
Kant, for instance, though self-consciously critical and non-dogmatic, in some ways did not take his attack on metaphysics far enough, and ended up with his own elaborate system, dogmatically rationalist in its own way (not to mention quintessentially Enlightenment and bourgeois). — Jamal
I doubt that Hegel's notion of thinking one's time entails a view of historical moments as monolithic and pure, since the whole point of his philosophy is to see things in their dynamic, historical, conflictual context, rather than as fixed — Jamal
So for Horkheimer it’s not only traditional societies that had objective reason. In the Enlightenment, reason was still supposed to help us determine the right ends and not merely the means. The change comes with industrialization. — Jamal
Not picking a fight, honest. — Mww
Reason was supposed to regulate our preferences and our relations with other human beings and with nature. It was thought of as an entity, a spiritual power living in each man. This power was held to be the supreme arbiter — Horkheimer
For Aristotle, reason was what made the human being unique. In the same way the ideal horse is strong and fleet of foot, reason is key to the essence of man; the development of reason was our telos, ultimate purpose. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Theism cannot escape the 'who/what created god/intentionality,' question. — universeness
Couldn’t have chosen a better battleground than the suggestion that reason has been, or is being, eclipsed. In what world is that not a singularly foolish notion? — Mww
In his seminal 1973 paper, “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf presented a problem facing all accounts of mathematical truth and knowledge. Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible.
Mathematical objects are in many ways unlike ordinary physical objects such as trees and cars. We learn about ordinary objects, at least in part, by using our senses. It is not obvious that we learn about mathematical objects this way. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we could use our senses to learn about mathematical objects. We do not see integers, or hold sets. Even geometric figures are not the kinds of things that we can sense. .... Mathematical objects are not the kinds of things that we can see or touch, or smell, taste or hear. If we can not learn about mathematical objects by using our senses, a serious worry arises about how we can justify our mathematical beliefs.
[Rationalists] claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.
We may be sorrrounded by objects, but even while cognizing them, reason is the origin of something that is neither reducible to nor derives from them in any sense. In other words, reason generates a cognition, and a cognition regarding nature is above nature. In a cognition, reason transcends nature in one of two ways: by rising above our natural cognition and making, for example, universal and necessarily claims in theoretical and practical matters not determined b nature, or by assuming an impersonal objective perspective that remains irreducible to the individual 'I' — Alfredo Ferrarin, The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy
As a philosophical conception, Empiricism means a theory according to which there is no distinction of nature, but only of degree, between the senses and the intellect. As a result, human knowledge is simply sense-knowledge (or animal knowledge) more evolved and elaborated than in other mammals. And not only is human knowledge entirely encompassed in, and limited to, sense-experience ...; but to produce its achievements in the sphere of sense-experience human knowledge uses no other specific forces and means than the forces and means which are at play in sense-knowledge.
Now if it is true that reason differs specifically from senses, the paradox with which we are confronted is that Empiricism, in actual fact, uses reason while denying the power of reason, on the basis of a theory that reduces reason's knowledge and life, which are characteristic of man, to sense knowledge and life, which are characteristic of animals.
Hence, first, an inevitable confusion and inconsistency between what an Empiricist does -- he thinks as a man, he uses reason, a power superior in nature to senses -- and what he says -- he denies this very specificity of reason.
And second, an inevitable confusion and inconsistency even in what he says: for what the Empiricist speaks of and describes as sense-knowledge is not exactly sense-knowledge, but sense-knowledge plus unconsciously introduced intellective ingredients - sense-knowledge in which he has made room for reason without recognizing it. A confusion which comes about all the more easily as, on the one hand, the senses are, in actual fact, more or less permeated with reason in man, and, on the other, the merely sensory psychology of animals, especially of the higher vertebrates, goes very far in its own realm and imitates intellectual knowledge to a considerable extent. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism
In what world is that not a singularly foolish notion?
— Mww
It is writ large in today's world. — Wayfarer
….But, our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible…”
What are 'our best' theories, and why do they entail that such knowledge is possible? — Wayfarer
Your conclusion fails imo, as it requires an 'intentionality,' which itself would need to be cyclical. — universeness
The only path open to humans who exist 'within the notion of time,' is to suggest that the concept of 'eternal' has NO beginning in time. — universeness
My viewpoint in this makes me an atheist and my main challenge to your 'eternal intentionality,' is to either make it's existence and continuing presence/existence known, NOW, or else, I see no rational reason for YOU to maintain your position — universeness
The continued hiddenness of this eternal intentionality... — universeness
mired in primal fear of taking FULL ownership and responsibility for our own existence — universeness
I don't know about this; Kant's categories at least seem to ring true and space and time as the pure forms of intuition too. Are they no longer viable? Aristotle's categories? Goethe said “He who cannot draw on three thousand years is living from hand to mouth.” "The poverty of historicism" says Popper. — Janus
Right, though in saying "monolithic" I wasn't thinking of the dichotomy between fixed and dynamic, I was thinking more of the 'monistic/ pluralistic' dichotomy: meaning that I don't think historical moments have just one "zeitgeist" but are rather boiling cauldrons in which many geists grapple with one another for supremacy. From where I stand "the state" looks like a kind of monstrous fiction. — Janus
That's because, and pardon me for saying, your conception of God is anthropomorphic, based mainly on your stereotyped depiction of (and rejection of) religion. That's not something particular to yourself, by the way. — Wayfarer
Theism cannot escape the 'who/what created god/intentionality,' question.
— universeness — Wayfarer
as I am willing to envisage a god image…it's all the same woo woo BS to me….I don't see any particular value in this side alley — universeness
Intentionality isn't cyclical. That's the problem with the materialist/physicalist representation of it, it ends up being cyclical, when in reality there is nothing to indicate that it ought to be. Since the materialist representation shows time as flowing from past to future, instead of from future to past, the only way that it can accommodate intentionality which relies on a future to past flow of time for conception, is to allow for that looping aspect. This creates the cyclical representation of intention. In reality, time only flows one way, into the past. The future (May 13 for example) will become past as time flows into the past. So the materialist representation of time, which shows the past as prior to the future, and therefore things in the past as causing what will come to be in the future, is fundamentally wrong. And the only way that they can allow for the real flow of time to have an influence on the way that they understand and represent time, is through these loops, which inevitably become externalities, and infinite cycles. — Metaphysician Undercover
Which is why it fails, as such a notion is meaningless and irrational.The conventional Christian conception of "eternal" is "outside of time". — Metaphysician Undercover
What do you mean by 'real time' in the context you employ it?All real time, as measurable time, is in the past. But the true cause of what will be at the present, must be prior to the present, therefore in the future, so this cause must also be outside of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
This sentence makes no sense.But the true cause of what will be at the present, must be prior to the present, therefore in the future, so this cause must also be outside of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Thank goodness for that!There is another way to apprehend this. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ok!Imagine that there is a beginning to time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Not necessarily true, there may have been a previous Aeon. So the moment you describe here is a recalibration of a notion of a 'universal time,' reference frame.At the moment when time began there was necessarily no past time, — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see any use for the word 'necessarily' here but yes, the notion of future becomes valid at this point, due to spacetime inflation/expansion, NO intentionality required.yet there was necessarily future. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, the end of the previous cycle, NO intentionality required.And for time to begin, there must be a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why?Therefore, this cause was necessarily in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, the cause is the expansion of spacetime and it happens during every time unit/duration.For time to continue passing there must always be a cause, and this cause is always in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
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