If we take philosophy literally and at face value, we are not putting it in contrast to the rest of the tradition, nor questioning why he has chosen this method, why he needs certainty. — Antony Nickles

You seem to be arguing that we should not take what he says literally, but you go on to object to the idea that there is a rhetorical aspect. From the beginning I have set his work both within and against the tradition. I have also said why he chose this method. Why does he need certainty? Because, as I also said, he is looking to established a foundation. If, as he said, he is to:

... establish anything in the sciences that was stable and likely to last ...

Now there are problems with the idea of foundationalism, but if we are to understand him, we should not begin by rejecting what he sets out to do.

The fact that Descartes “withdraws from the practical concerns of daily life” is not only the cause of the abstraction, — Antony Nickles

It is the deliberate act of abstraction. These meditations could not take place while dealing with the demands of life outside his closed room.

to be apart from our human life, its uncertainty. — Antony Nickles

It is not in order to be apart from uncertainty. It is just the opposite. It is done in order to give free rein to it.

So I do not take anything as “rhetorical” but take it seriously enough to attribute reasons for everything, implications, assumptions, motivations, blind spots, frameworks, analogies, etc. — Antony Nickles

These are not mutually exclusive alternatives. As Aristotle said, rhetoric is as counterpart to dialectic. They are closely related. It is rhetoric that takes into consideration assumptions, motivations, blind spots, frameworks, etc.

Descartes says that there yes, but I'm skeptical if he believes that as quoted, given other textual evidence.

The senses are the spark. But it's a bit obscure to me to argue that senses think, they (seem to me) to just act in accordance to relevant stimuli.

What I'm not clear on, nor do I see it with the rationalists (nor the empiricists frankly) is if one can make a case that a person "thinks" with the senses in any way.

Again, it's a particular difficulty I've been thinking about for a bit. I'm inclined to say "no", but am not fully convinced yet, it could be a wrong view.

The crux of what I see is that Descartes is demonizing the inherent fallibility of our human condition. — Antony Nickles

I don't think this captures the significance of Descartes using the motif of an evil demon during his experiment upon himself. In a time when people were executed for witchcraft, demanding that a 'good' god would not deliberately deceive us separates the realm of the created from the problem of sin.

On one hand, Descartes is couching his argument in a way to avoid the fate of Galileo. On the other hand, he is challenging the Christian appropriation of the cosmos as performed by Augustine, Aquinas, and the like.

That part is more like Kant arguing against superstition than Hume musing about causes between billiard games.

The senses are the spark. But it's a bit obscure to me to argue that senses think, they (seem to me) to just act in accordance to relevant stimuli. — Manuel

I tend to think with Kant that the senses without concepts would be "blind", but I don't think that entails that without language there are no concepts. After all 'higher' animals seem to navigate the world very effectively without language, a fact which convinces me that they see things as things (although perhaps not self-reflectively if that entails language), just as we do.

So, I think that the simplest organisms (and machines) operate with just stimulus and response, then the next step up is perception (which entails conception) and then on top of that there is self-reflection.

That part is more like Kant arguing against superstition than Hume musing about causes between billiard games. — Paine

:up:

I agree, but then we enter into difficult terrain, I think it wouldn't be too crazy to speculate (based on the evidence we have, in part) that they have intellect. So, a mammal that gets shocked touching a ball, say, will avoid it after a few interactions.

But then they have some kind of (poor in relation to us) intellect.

The real muddle is when we consider a case in which we see an organism which we intuit has NO intellect, maybe a Starfish, or "below" that, a plant. They react to sensations as if they had intellect.

That is, we cannot tell the difference in behavior between and intellectual response to sensation, and a reflexive one...

Descartes assumed, more often than not (again, some inconsistency here) that animals were kind of like machines. But that claim would no longer be supported by most these days...

You seem to be arguing that we should not take what he says literally, but you go on to object to the idea that there is a rhetorical aspect. — Fooloso4

Literally was the wrong word. When I said we should not read him simply at face-value, I meant we should not just take him to be making explicit everything we can learn.

Why does he need certainty? Because, as I also said, he is looking to established a foundation. — Fooloso4

He is looking for a foundation in order to have the certainty he needs to conquer doubt. You’re assuming he’s a reliable narrator. What he’s telling you he’s doing is not the whole picture.

we are to understand him, we should not begin by rejecting what he sets out to do. — Fooloso4

But surely to understand a philosopher is not just to get to the point where we understand the words and the sentences and can follow along with what they say? I am not rejecting what he sets out to do; I’m analyzing how he gets lost along the way because of what he wants from it.

I meant we should not just take him to be making explicit everything we can learn. — Antony Nickles

Right, but does anyone?

He is looking for a foundation in order to have the certainty he needs to conquer doubt. — Antony Nickles

I don't think so.

You’re assuming he’s a reliable narrator. — Antony Nickles

It is because he is not a reliable narrator that I don't think that conquering doubt is as much a problem as you make it out to be.

As I pointed out on page one:

He took his motto from Ovid:

He who lived well hid himself well. (Bene qui latuit bene vixit) — Fooloso4

I also said:

Descartes dedication to the faculty of theology is both revealing and concealing. He tells them that once they understand the principle behind his undertaking they will protect it. This raises the question of what that principle is. — Fooloso4

The whole force of my argument has been that there is more here than meets the eye.

What he’s telling you he’s doing is not the whole picture. — Antony Nickles

That is right. Despite your claim, he has not said what the principle behind his undertaking is.

I’m analyzing how he gets lost along the way because of what he wants from it. — Antony Nickles

Descartes is a careful writer. He is a central figure in Western philosophy. He did not gain that reputation by getting lost. If someone is lost it is not him.

Is anything found that does not come, ultimately, from the senses? — Janus

Descartes skips over all our practices to ask whether we can trust our senses not because they are the birth (spark @Manuel says) of everything—imagine apologizing, or justice—but because we imagine we can’t be wrong about them. We think: If I am in pain, I must know it, and know it without a doubt. But we can repress it, and even to where it doesn’t register (now imagine anger, remorse, prurient curiosity—will we say we can’t be unaware now?) But the point is not that we can doubt it, but that he is looking around for something to hold that place.

He is looking for a foundation in order to have the certainty he needs to conquer doubt. — Antony Nickles

I don't think so. — Fooloso4

Well you seem to think you understand what I’m trying to say and just flatly disagree. I’d leave it at that, however,

Descartes is a careful writer. He is a central figure in Western philosophy. He did not gain that reputation by getting lost. If someone is lost it is not him. — Fooloso4

this is uncalled for in this kind of forum. If you want to believe Descartes or Plato or Kant never made a mistake, feel free, but there is no cause to mock me. I will accept an apology if you care to discuss any other subject.

That's fair. But I do think that if one takes into account his sometimes ridiculed account - which is severely underappreciated - of "common notions", I think such statements as his saying that all his (misleading or dubious) knowledge came from the senses, could be misleading as stated by him.

The issue I am highlighting is that it's not clear senses alone give us any knowledge, without an intellectual component.

Taking this into account, I think Descartes would surely agree that knowledge comes from the intellect, the problem is in the way we judge what the senses "say".

Put another way, it would be rather unreflective to consider the senses alone, they are way too poor to account for knowledge. And if this is the case, as I think Descartes would admit, then the senses provide "data", which is only such because of the intellect, otherwise, senses seem to lack mind.

It is in this specific context that senses are "sparks", as we will see when we get to Descartes observation about what literally hits the eye, as opposed to what we immediately interpret.

Again, this is my doubt.

The issue I am highlighting is that it's not clear senses alone give us any knowledge, without an intellectual component… the problem is in the way we judge what the senses "say"… provide "data", which is only such because of the intellect, otherwise, senses seem to lack mind.

It is in this specific context that senses are "sparks", as we will see when we get to Descartes observation about what literally hits the eye, as opposed to what we immediately interpret. — Manuel

Ah, I see. Or, I am unfamiliar enough with all that to retract characterizing your use of the word, nor to offer much help on what happens between sensation and anything else (although Wittgenstein does say we go too far in trying to get between our sensations and our expression of them, PI #245). I can only say that Descartes at this point appears to believe they do not fulfill the requirement he has set: to preclude doubt. If I would predict his next step, it would be that the separation of sensation from that-which-could-be-deceived (“intellect”) would only be to maintain the integrity of our senses while controlling the framework by which we are deceived, to structure our failing.

In other words, in the Theatetus Socrates first postulated that our senses gave us the criteria (measure) for knowledge, but abandoned that picture simply because our senses can be wrong, or not generalizable from person to person. Of course it remains to be seen how and thus why we need to posit an “intellect” rather than training our expression of, say, being cold, to language.

Well you seem to think you understand what I’m trying to say and just flatly disagree. — Antony Nickles

? When you say:

He is looking for a foundation in order to have the certainty he needs to conquer doubt. — Antony Nickles

I take it that is what you are saying.

this is uncalled for in this kind of forum. If you want to believe Descartes or Plato or Kant never made a mistake, feel free, but there is no cause to mock me. — Antony Nickles

First of all, he is a careful writer. Second, from that statement to claiming he never made a mistake is quite a leap. Third, if you think he made a mistake then either he did or you did.

I think it odd that you think that suggesting you rather than Descartes is lost is to mock you.

The issue I am highlighting is that it's not clear senses alone give us any knowledge, without an intellectual component. — Manuel

As I think you know, he will confirm this. This is, of course, a very old problem going back at least to Plato.

Descartes observation about what literally hits the eye — Manuel

His mechanistic view of optics allows that animals without mind can see, otherwise they would not be able to move around in the world.

Following his claim that:

Whatever I have accepted until now as most true has come to me through my senses.

he lists several things that come through the senses:

Yet although the senses sometimes deceive us about objects that are very small or distant, that doesn’t apply to my belief that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on. It seems to be quite impossible to doubt beliefs like these, which come from the senses.

... the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds ... no hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses ...

(First Meditation)

His mechanistic view of optics allows that animals without mind can see, otherwise they would not be able to move around in the world. — Fooloso4

I was referring to human beings in that example.

Sure, animals in his view, on today's terms would be mere reactive organisms.

he lists several things that come through the senses:

Yet although the senses sometimes deceive us about objects that are very small or distant, that doesn’t apply to my belief that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on. It seems to be quite impossible to doubt beliefs like these, which come from the senses.

... the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds ... no hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses ... — Fooloso4

Of course. No sane person could doubt this.

But "thinking with the senses" should be sharpened a little, to make it more coherent. Minor quibble though.

In other words, in the Theatetus Socrates first postulated that our senses gave us the criteria (measure) for knowledge, but abandoned that picture simply because our senses can be wrong, or not generalizable from person to person. Of course it remains to be seen how and thus why we need to posit an “intellect” rather than training our expression of cold to language. — Antony Nickles

Ah, you come from a later Wittgenstein angle, gotcha.

If I would predict his next step, it would be that the separation of sensation from that-which-could-be-deceived (“intellect”) would only be to maintain the integrity of our senses while controlling the framework by which we are deceived, to structure our failing. — Antony Nickles

Indeed, he does something like that. Aside from certain mathematical and logical formulations, the intellect too can deceive us, in ways that go beyond Descartes demon, because it applies to ordinary everyday life. Of course, we know much more about mental illness and self-bias and all that.

In general, however, I think Descartes is correct about highlighting the intellect, with small caveats.

I was referring to human beings in that example. — Manuel

The question was raised about the connection between the senses and the intellect. Since Descartes denies that animals have intellect we should consider what he allows the senses alone can accomplish. In the passages I cite these are beliefs that come from the senses. Are the senses alone sufficient? Given the connection between mind and body, which he will discuss, perhaps the problem arises only in abstraction, when mind and body are artificially separated and not treated as a union.

the intellect too can deceive us — Manuel

As we see with Zeno and the denial of motion. Does this fall under logical formulations?

Are the senses alone sufficient? Given the connection between mind and body, which he will discuss, perhaps the problem arises only in abstraction, when mind and body are artificially separated and not treated as a union. — Fooloso4

This sounds more plausible to me.

What do we do with edge cases, such as plants or oysters? Do we assume some minimal intellect here or is it all sense?

As we see with Zeno and the denial of motion. Does this fall under logical formulations? — Fooloso4

If I had to guess, I think Zeno's case arises when we confuse two different intellectual exercises, namely conflate what it possible in mathematics with what is possible in ordinary life. What's true of one does not necessarily follow of the other.

But that could be wrong too.

What do we do with edge cases, such as plants or oysters? Do we assume some minimal intellect here or is it all sense? — Manuel

Is having a sense of something and making sense of something two different senses of sense?

What is the minimum requirement for minimal intellect?

Is intellect a property limited to individual organisms?

There is some interesting work being done on trees and communication networks.

Wittgenstein points to "seeing as" and "seeing aspects".

I think so, making sense is something like "give it meaning", when I think of senses, I think about moving my quickly away from a hot object, or scratching my arm, or closing me eyes (if it's too bright).

Colors become an issue, I grant that.

I am slightly confused here, so I'm not trying to be too definitive about it (not that you are making any accusations). Just working it out a bit.

Wittgenstein, at least his latter work in relation to mind, can be quite misleading, imho.

Certainly Descartes would've disagreed with a good deal of that type of philosophy, with exceptions admitted about word-use (which he critiques the Scholastics for abusing, etc.).

That is, we cannot tell the difference in behavior between and intellectual response to sensation, and a reflexive one...

Descartes assumed, more often than not (again, some inconsistency here) that animals were kind of like machines. But that claim would no longer be supported by most these days... — Manuel

I think we can see that some animals have preferences, and so display intentional behavior. This might not be obvious in simple 'one-off' acts, but extended observation and testing I think would show the difference.

The idea that animals are machines and hence, for example, feel no pain seems absurd to me, and is abhorrent.

we imagine we can’t be wrong about them. We think: If I am in pain, I must know it, and know it without a doubt. But we can repress it, and even to where it doesn’t register. — Antony Nickles

We cannot be wrong about consciously feeling pain. We cannot be wrong about how things seem: say, for example I look at the far hill and I see an animal moving across it that looks like a sheep: I cannot be wrong about seeing something moving that looks to me like a sheep, but of course it may not be a sheep.

We cannot be wrong about consciously feeling pain. — Janus

And you say I must be right if I am conscious, which I take as not just conscious in the sense that I am awake, but “conscious of”, in that I am aware of the pain, which is a kind of knowing. But we can be suffering and not know it (be unaware), such as when we are in denial, but it is clear to our friends, or when I am cold but I focus on something else.

But it is exactly the feeling that we cannot be wrong—here importantly in the sense that I must know, and know with certainty (the version of know as: correctly)—that is why sensation was picked first by Descartes as foundational. And pain is the traditional example because of its stark, vibrant, seeming self-evidence; as: if I don’t know my pain, what do I know?

People tie themselves in knots with theories about the science of sensation and the brain, but, here, for Descartes, the actual mechanics and logic of sensation do not matter because it does not meet his requirement for certainty. I can either be incorrect that I sense something (“You’re not shot this time!” Or “It’s just a mirage!”) or mistaken in my judgment of what I sense (“You’re not angry, you’re jealous.” or “Whew, that felt like a spider!”), but, ultimately, I can deceive myself, be mistaken, or uncertain, and that will not do for Descartes as a foundation for our opinions. And, regardless, the doubt of our connection to the outside world (in the example of dreaming) eclipses what we feel or don’t or whether we are correct about it.

I think we can see that some animals have preferences, and so display intentional behavior. This might not be obvious in simple 'one-off' acts, but extended observation and testing I think would show the difference.

The idea that animals are machines and hence, for example, feel no pain seems absurd to me, and is abhorrent. — Janus

I agree and I do think animals (some of them at least) go beyond mere stimulus reaction, namely some presence of mind.

As to the animals being machines, surely disgusting and contemptible now. Much less so back then, which doesn't make it right, but should provide some context for judging people back then.

I don't think this [ that Descartes is demonizing the inherent fallibility of our human condition ] captures the significance of Descartes using the motif of an evil demon during his experiment upon himself. In a time when people were executed for witchcraft, demanding that a 'good' god would not deliberately deceive us separates the realm of the created from the problem of sin. — Paine

I take you as saying that Descartes is creating the role of the deceiver so that it won’t be thought he is speaking ill of God (if God was claimed to be the deceiver). And so, perhaps, our sin (doubt, uncertainty) does not blemish the perfection of God’s creation. I would add that the original sin is not deception but knowledge, it being thought to make us aware of, and able to address, everything in the world. But I also see the political point you are making about skirting the line between analyzing the theological-philosophical history without being accused of heresy.

I take you as saying that Descartes is creating the role of the deceiver so that it won’t be thought he is speaking ill of God (if God was claimed to be the deceiver). And so, perhaps, our sin (doubt, uncertainty) does not blemish the perfection of God’s creation — Antony Nickles

One twist in this narrative is how the good God has permitted demons to exist and some quantum of ecclesiastical authority comes from protecting the flock by kicking the bad sheep out. The correlation between what you believed and your personal outcome was closely linked. Overcoming trials of temptation by evil entities was interwoven into the fabric of every garment.

While this experience was built on Paul's view of a view of a world where the Kingdom of Heaven would replace the one expected to pass away, the early theologians drew from the Greek tradition to legitimize their view against a received understanding of nature and divinity. The breathless anticipation of Paul morphed into the two cities of Augustine. Aristotle eventually was integrated into an acceptable view of nature with the constant caveat that Revelation preceded anything it had to say.

But then you have Galileo being charged with being a heretic for challenging what was stolen from the candy store in the first place. The genius of Descartes is that he did not simply take away something of value but offered a replacement.

Well, I’ll continue on (if there is nothing else @frank?) As discussed previously, in Para. 2 of the Second Meditations Descartes accepts that nothing is certain, not our sensations. nor being awake; that everything is “fiction” and “illusion” (rather than accept how we ordinarily judge the correctness of our senses, or the different criteria for the judgments involving our sensations). Though some will continue to try to find a way in which our sensations or bodies are certain (@Janus), that could not avail us anyway, as there is no connection between how our senses (or any of science) could be the basis for true or certain customs and opinions anyway, which is the point of the Meditations. Descartes pushes forward in search of something that cannot be doubted, that is perfectly certain.

Taking Descartes’ advice that it is a placeholder—that we should “call [it] what [we] will”—I’ll skip over bringing up God and phrase what he says as a MacGuffin (as if it doesn’t matter what it is): “Isn’t there [something that] gives me the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I might myself be the author of these thoughts?” (@Paine might have an answer for this why.)

Setting aside for the moment his assumption (premise), taken generally, that there is a cause for my internal dialogue (outside or inside), he says “But then doesn’t it follow that I am, at least, something?” (interestingly, on par with that “something”—the cause—as it were: created in the “image” of God). When he says “doesn’t it follow” it makes me think of the necessity of a logical argument; this “follow” is a must with the force of certainty he is looking for: there is a cause; it can be internal; the thing that I am is that cause.

There is not only that logical necessity, but he takes his ability to secure doubt about everything as something certain. “So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain!” And his skeptical conviction becomes another basis of the self. ”if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.” And the conclusion is usually taken to be that I exist, but the point is clearly the “certainty” which I can have about this; put differently, he does not start to prove the existence of the self, but to “prove” anything, to be certain in any regard. He has merely retreated to here.

Thanks for moving ahead. I was working. :grin:

he does not start to prove the existence of the self, but to “prove” anything, to be certain in any regard. He has merely retreated to here. — Antony Nickles

I agree. It's not an argument. He's not trying to persuade anyone. An argument would be out of place because we launch arguments for propositions that are in doubt. That's the whole point of an argument.

Descartes isn't offering any justification or foundation for "I exist." This is indubitable.

But then he goes on to refine the "I" that must exist.

Given that I read what I was going to read concerning Descartes "Rules for the Direction of Mind", I'll instead go directly to the Meditations, so as to be able to contribute more directly, instead of relying on memory.

Was reading over your conversation with Antony, and it is very interesting, and very much echoes Chomsky's interpretation of Descartes, which is that The Meditations were written, in a sense, so his physics would be taken seriously.

On your point of him contradicting himself (or at least appearing inconsistent) as to physics being liable to doubt, in which case the soul is not immortal, or the opposite, that's very hard. You know Descartes far beyond me, so I can only guess based on what I am reading.

Although it is true that he is trying to not get into trouble with the church, it seems to me that Descartes was quite confident that we are thinking things, so I do not think he would let go of the notion of the immortality of the soul.

In other words, the physics are more problematic than the thinking thing, even if he says he bases this project on physics. It sounds more consistent given many other things he says. Edited: That is, I'd wager that if he discovered his physics was not true, he would still not doubt that he is a thinking thing. But, yes, these are quite connected, as he mentions.

Given your experience with the texts and Descartes, if you had to guess or even form a hypothesis, what interpretation would you lean in on?

Given that I read what I was going to read concerning Descartes "Rules for the Direction of Mind", I'll instead go directly to the Meditations, so as to be able to contribute more directly, instead of relying on memory. — Manuel

Cool. Looking forward to your comments.

And you say I must be right if I am conscious, which I take as not just conscious in the sense that I am awake, but “conscious of”, in that I am aware of the pain, which is a kind of knowing. But we can be suffering and not know it (be unaware), such as when we are in denial, but it is clear to our friends, or when I am cold but I focus on something else. — Antony Nickles

If you were cold and focusing on something else to the point of being unaware at all of being cold, then it would not seem appropriate to say that you were suffering being cold, unless the cold was great enough to be physically detrimental. But even then, that would be a different notion of suffering than the kind of suffering that in order to be counted as suffering entails being consciously aware of it.

People tie themselves in knots with theories about the science of sensation and the brain, but, here, for Descartes, the actual mechanics and logic of sensation do not matter because it does not meet his requirement for certainty. I can either be incorrect that I sense something (“You’re not shot this time!” Or “It’s just a mirage!”) or mistaken in my judgment of what I sense (“You’re not angry, you’re jealous.” or “Whew, that felt like a spider!”), but, ultimately, I can deceive myself, be mistaken, or uncertain, and that will not do for Descartes as a foundation for our opinions. — Antony Nickles

You can be incorrect that you sense something, but you cannot be incorrect that you seem to sense something; that was the only point I was making. This is really what Descartes means when he says that we can doubt, but that we cannot doubt that we are doubting (or think or feel, but not doubt that we are thinking or feeling). Pain and other sensations such as pleasure are unique in this context. If I feel pain or pleasure, it makes no sense to say that I doubt that I am feeling pain or pleasure; what could it even mean to say I doubt that I am feeling some sensation that I am feeling?

Though some will continue to try to find a way in which our sensations or bodies are certain (@Janus), that could not avail us anyway, as there is no connection between how our senses (or any of science) could be the basis for true or certain customs and opinions anyway, which is the point of the Meditations. — Antony Nickles

This is where you miss the point. I am not really saying that our sensations are certain; since they are not propositional, they are neither certain nor uncertain, they are merely sensations, although what we infer on the basis of them can be certain or uncertain. (That said, it would seem to be absurd to say that I doubt that I feel any sensations, so it seems that I can be certain that I feel sensations).

You might argue that it is not certain that we are embodied, but there can be no doubt that we seem to be embodied. Embodiment is not the same kind of case as feeling sensation; we certainly feel sensation, but it does not necessarily follow that we are embodied.

Was reading over your conversation with Antony, and it is very interesting, and very much echoes Chomsky's interpretation of Descartes, which is that The Meditations were written, in a sense, so his physics would be taken seriously. — Manuel

In the thread "Philosophy is for questioning religion" the topic of esoteric philosophical writing came up. I quoted something from Descartes. This one below is more relevant to his physics:

In a letter to Mersenne, Descartes reveals:

...there are many other things in them; and I tell you, between ourselves, that these
six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But that must not be
spread abroad, if you please; for those who follow Aristotle will find it more
difficult to approve them. I hope that [my readers] will accustom themselves
insensibly to my principles, and will come to recognize their truth, before
perceiving that they destroy those of Aristotle.
– René Descartes to Mersenne, January 28, 1641, Œuvres de Descartes,
3:297–98, quoted and translated by Hiram Caton in The Origin of
Subjectivity, 17

Quoted from here

it seems to me that Descartes was quite confident that we are thinking things, so I do not think he would let go of the notion of the immortality of the soul. — Manuel

The title of the first edition was " Meditations on First Philosophy in Which the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul Are Demonstrated". But the second edition, (the text cited in this thread) is "Meditations on First Philosophy in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul and the body". There is no mention of an immortal soul.

In the third meditation he says:

For a life-span can be divided into countless parts, each completely independent of the others, so that from my existing at one time it doesn’t follow that I exist at later times, unless some cause keeps me in existence – one might say that it creates me afresh at each moment.

In other words, the human soul is a created or contingent, or dependent substance. The continued existence of the soul depends on God.

Given your experience with the texts and Descartes, if you had to guess or even form a hypothesis, what interpretation would you lean in on? — Manuel

I am going to hold off on that until we have read more of the text.