Guilty pleasures.

Cheers!

In that post, Gnomon makes a number of statements about mathematics qua mathematics. Attempting defintitions (thery're botched) and making claims. About mathematics. Yet Gnomon begrudges discussion of mathematics in relation to a topic couched by the original poster who him(or her)self mentioned mathematics and even explicitly as technical. But that's just typical poster hypocrisy and incoherence.

Sometimes all you can do is laugh and walk away. — Aristotle

↪TonesInDeepFreeze
Sometimes all you can do is laugh and walk away. — Aristotle — Banno

Amen!

I don't know what set Tones off on his "Gnomon said" rant. Gnomon didn't say or mean whatever knocked the chip off his shoulder. Maybe the chip fell off by itself. I certainly had no intention to insult him, or to debate the technicalities of higher math with him. But he seems to be determined to make it all about the numbers.

I was about to mention that he's gnawing on an imaginary bone, with no nutritional value. But such a light-hearted tongue-in-cheek remark might just throw more fuel on the "he said --- she said" flame. So, instead, since this thread long ago veered off-topic, I'll take your advice to just laugh quietly and walk away. Thanks for the Aristotle??? quote. :joke:

PS___Since he's bursting at the seems, I'll let Tones have the last word : fill-in the blank [ . . . . . . . ]

Laughter is not the involuntary response provoked here.

Famously, it's a given that sophistry, intellectual dishonesty, downright factual dishonesty and confusions born of ignorance are rampant on the Internet. But it's especially disconcerting that that would be the case on a forum about philosophy itself, and even more especially when mathematics is misrepresented, misconstrued and mangled in the discussions. I believe it is worthwhile to mention instances of that as they appear. And it is worthwhile to engage when posters dispute such mentions, as that serves to highlight the record of such posting, as illustration of the problem, and as elaboration in explaining specifics of the problem. Each instance is an object lesson. Unpacking is worthwhile.

And, in and of itself, posters should not feel obligated to desist in defending themselves nor to desist in flagging when posters post lies, falsehoods, misrepresentations, ignorance, confusion, fallacies, speciousness and other forms of intellectual dishonesty and intellectual irresponsibility.

And I believe it is worthwhile to resist the essentially censorious insistence that people should not follow up on certain aspects of a discussion. Discussions naturally go down subpaths that deserve discussion as components of a larger subject. So when mathematics is brought into a discussion it is eminently worthwhile to talk about whether a poster's presentation of mathematical aspects is coherent, informed or true.

In a discussion about political philosophy, if a poster makes certain claims and interpretations regarding the U.S. Constitution as part an argument toward a philosophical view, then it is eminently worthwhile to discuss whether those claims are true and those interpretations coherent and fair.

In a discussion about philosophy concerning cosmology, if claims and interpretations about general relativity are brought in, then of course there may be follow-ups.

In a discussion about first cause and infinite regress, if a poster makes certain claims and interpretations about mathematics, then of course there may be follow-ups. And that is poignantly true when a poster is spreading confusion, misunderstanding and falsehood on the subject of mathematics. It is definitely worthwhile to flag that, and, even better, to supply correct information and explanation.



That post is so densely, richly packed in error, speciousness and hypocrisy that a lot of unpacking awaits an ambitious unpacker.

But first, yes, a risible moment:

TonesInDeepFreeze
Sometimes all you can do is laugh and walk away. — Aristotle
— Banno
Amen! — Gnomon

Nice. Bannon suggests that Gnomon has been so laughable that it's best just to walk away from him (or her). Then Gnomon says, "Amen!"

I don't know what set Tones off on his "Gnomon said" rant. — Gnomon

(1) 'rant' is again argument by characterization. It might as well be paraphrased as "My posts are reasoned commentary; your posts are rants". It's an instance of a generalization of an insight George Carlin articulated so brilliantly in his wonderfully trenchant routine:

https://youtu.be/JLoge6QzcGY

[2:02 - 2:22 on the point, though the whole clip is quintessential comedy]

It's absurd and egregious for Gnomon to characterize my posts as "rants", presumably in contradistinction with his posts. Moreover, Gnomon's own posts included ad hominem claims, would be mind reading, about people's motives.

(2) Gnomon says he doesn't know what started the "Gnomon said" track. Thus, Gnomon lacks awareness even of what he(or she) said. The track started when Gnomon falsely and bizarrely claimed that I had added something to a quote. Of course it is reasonable for me to refute that false claim and then to continue to refute Gnomon's stubborn and incorrect insistence that I share fault with him (or her) anyway.

And it is a worthwhile lesson highlighting brazen intellectual dishonesty, to the point of a poster trying to prevail in a claim even if it means denying a plain bald fact as to what the subject and predicate are in a simple sentence.

And the track originated in Gnomon declaring that jgill's comment was "Irrelevant!" when jgill's comment was not irrelevant; and generally presuming to say for other posters what aspects of the discussion they need to regard as not apropros, especially when Gnomon him(or her)self talked about those aspects before I even posted in the thread, and doubly especially as the original poster him(or her)self first introduced that aspect and later explicitly made challenges to other posters for exactness about that aspect.

(3) In greatest generality: If Poster P and Poster Q sequentially reply back and forth, then it is incorrect and unfair to say or to insinuate that just one of them is too persistent.

Gnomon didn't say or mean whatever knocked the chip off his shoulder. — Gnomon

(1) No chip here. On the other hand, it's tempting to say that there is probably a chip behind insisting that posters should not follow up on certain aspects of a conversation, and possibly behind categorically declaring "Irrelevant!" to a poster's report of his study rather than allowing that what one personally is interested in does not subsume all that is relevant, let alone possibly saying "Tell us more about those studies".

(2) I stated explicitly what I dispute in Gnomon's posts to me. For Gnomon to say he doesn't know is nuts. Suggesting that my dispute with him (or her) came out of nowhere as some kind of lashing out from having a chip on my shoulder is wrong.

(3) And it was Gnomon who first disputed me in this thread, not vice versa. Again, the hypocrisy.

I certainly had no intention to insult him, or to debate the technicalities of higher math with him. — Gnomon

I didn't claim Gnomon insulted me. But after I asked Gnomon to please indicate that bolding is added when he (or she) adds bolding to my quotes, Gnomon finally replied by childishly adding gratuitous bolding to that very quote of me asking him (or her) not to do that; as far as I can tell, his (or her) point was merely to scoff at my request, which was a reasonable request to respect a universal convention that one notes that emphases have been added to a quote. Gnomon was childishly insulting in that instance. He (or she) showed his (or her) stripes. Then he (or she) follows with the protestation, "Aw shucks; I ain't said nothing against Tones; I've just been minding my own business" [not a quote]. Like I said, laughter is is not the involuntary response provoked here.

I was about to mention that he's gnawing on an imaginary bone, with no nutritional value. But such a light-hearted tongue-in-cheek remark — Gnomon

Dig it when someone says "I'm not going to say X" thereby saying X. It's sophomorically sneaky. Politicians and lousy writers on politics especially like to do it.

I'll take [banno's] advice to just laugh quietly and walk away. [...] — Gnomon

That would be advice that Gnomon laugh at him(or her)self.

And it's delicious irony that Gnomon says he (or she) will walk away when he (or she) just then did NOT walk away. If banno's advice where actually taken to heart, then Gnomon would have indeed just walked away rather than posting more digs against his (or her) interlocuter.

PS___Since he's bursting at the seems — Gnomon

[italics original]

I don't know whether it was intended to spell 'seams' as 'seems', but as to 'bursting', I am thorough point by point; I provide ample explanations and adequate steps in my arguments, so that they are convincing and to evince that they are transparent; and I reiterate points, especially refutations, that dishonest posters try to pretend have not been made as they deploy the tactic of SKIPPING.

I'll let Tones have the last word : fill-in the blank [ . . . . . . . ] — Gnomon

I guarantee that that is not true. Fill in the blank [ . . . . . . . ]

What we have learned here is that will not accept correction. When he is shown to be wrong he will instead double down. It's not a good look.

By way of possibly dragging this thread back to the topic - causation...

The grain of coherence within Invicta's ridiculous OP might have been the old idea that while each element of an infinite causal chain has a cause, it is stil open to ask what caused the chain as a whole. From memory, it's found in the famous debate between Russell and Coplestone, where Russell points out that it makes sense to ask, of any particular human, who the mother is, but it does not make sense to ask who the mother of the human race as a whole is. As I alluded earlier, I share some of Russell's scepticism towards the notion of causation, so I'm reasonably happy with that argument.

If Invicta had had the wherewithal to put together an argument, they may have applied Coplestone's point to a circular causal sequence, by asking what it is that causes the circle as a totality. Invicta says, "asking where the circle came from is a valid question". To my eye that carries the visual analogue too far, since if we did have a circular causal chain every element of the chain would have a cause, and so no further explanation is needed.

Those who uncritically accept the notion of causation could have a field day with such an argument. It might garner some wider attention for this abortive thread. For my own part, I've already expressed scepticism towards causation. I don't think that a sufficiently coherent account of causes can be provided, nor is it necessary. Instead we may use something broader, the sort of thing we might call a model or a schema or a narrative.

Edit: Russell—Coplestone debate.

Interesting dialogue at that link.

Insufficient to save this thread, it seems.

As far as I see it neither a first cause nor infinite causes solve the problem of infinite causality, but visual aids help to a certain extent, in the end were left with a circle … asking where the circle came from is a valid question and it’s representation of circular logic in a way answers it. — invicta

, I can't apologize on behalf of the TPF forum. But personally, I'm sorry you got mired in the quicksand of the Literal Mind; of which there are several pits on this "meeting place of ideas". Personally, I saw some merit in your hypothetical, metaphorical, and symbolic approach to a "perennial" philosophical conundrum : "how did the observed chain of causation get started?". Or, in other words, "why is there something instead of nothing"?

Unlike Plato & Aristotle, some pseudo-philosopher posters are limited in their thinking to finite physical Reality : no place for metaphysical Ideality. Consequently, intimations of anything outside the physical/material system of Cause & Effect amounts to blasphemy against their personal belief system (their creed). As you've seen, they sometimes react with "furious anger and righteous indignation". (note -- don't look for links to the quotes, just take them literally, at face value)

Space-time Causation is obviously not a physical object in the real world. It is instead, an abstract idea conceived in the mind of observers to explain why one event is followed by another as-if by a transfer of momentum (conserved quantity of energy). But the energy itself is an idea (qualia), not a tangible substance (quanta) that could be poured into a bottle. Aristotle defined "Energy" (ergon) as a mysterious unseen "power" to act on objects. Modern physicists may have different terminology, but Causation is still an ideational attribution, not a tangible thing bounded by space-time.

The conventional symbol*1 for Infinity*2 is not a literal/physical example of a thing-without-beginning-or-end. Instead, it's a circle folded-over into a laid-over symbol of the number eight*3. Before that convention was adopted, some thinkers used the circle itself to represent something without beginning or end. Your Ouroboros image is another version of the same concept. Likewise, in modern times, we sometimes use a Mobius strip*4 to represent the imaginary concept of Infinity. But, literally & in reality, its just a finite strip of paper folded-over into a single surface topographic system, where you can draw a line, but never come to an edge. In another sense, the Mobius represents a seemingly impossible object, like a Klein Bottle*5.

I don't know about you, but I don't conceive of the postulated First Cause as a thing existing in space-time, and bound by the rules of Reality. Instead, it was imagined by the ancient philosophers as an Ideal solution to the seemingly impossible notion of Infinite Regress in a finite world. :smile:


*1. Symbol : a thing that represents or stands for something else, especially a material object representing something abstract.

*2. Infinity : a state or quality, not a specific quantity

*3. A FOLDED FIGURE EIGHT, representing a never-ending circle

*4. A FOLDED CIRCULAR STRIP, representing a single-edged geometric surface with only one side

*5. A FOLDED FOUR-DIMENSIONAL SURFACE, with no inside or outside

...the energy itself is an idea (qualia)... — Gnomon

I don't know about you, but I don't conceive of the postulated First Cause as a thing existing in space-time, and bound by the rules of Reality. — Gnomon

Still laughing.

some pseudo-philosopher posters are limited in their thinking to finite physical Reality : no place for metaphysical Ideality. Consequently, intimations of anything outside the physical/material system of Cause & Effect amounts to blasphemy against their personal belief system (their creed). — Gnomon

In this thread? Which posters do you claim are limited in their thinking to only physical reality? And what have they posted that allows you that claim, and to the extent that they have claimed that disagreement is anything like blasphemy?

Copleston seemed not to be familiar with the thinking behind Russell's point that he eschews 'necessary' and 'contingent' as adjectives to describe entities as opposed to propositions. But I am curious what Russell meant by "a logic that I reject".

Perhaps in reference to his interpretation of Leibniz Cosmological argument - see The Philosophy of Leibniz section 109, around p. 206. "But as the premiss is contingent, the conclusion also must be contingent."

It's hard to see how the arguments there could be parsed in terms of boxes and diamonds in such a way as to overcome some considerable ambiguity, especially if we were to add Russell's explication of individual identify in terms of definite descriptions. Beyond my pay grade. We might write ∃x[(Kx & ∀y(Ky → y=x)) & Bx], but where to put the diamond that indicates the thing that is K only exists contingently?

I think Russell is saying that you don't put modal operators in front of terms, only in front of formulas. So you could have:

NEx(Kx & Ay(Ky -> y=x) & Bx)

or

PEx(Kx & Ay(Ky -> y=x) & Bx)

But he also requires that

NEx(Kx & Ay(Ky -> y=x) & Bx) holds only if Ex(Kx & Ay(Ky -> y=x) & Bx) is logically true.

/

where to put the diamond that indicates the thing that is K only exists contingently? — Banno

Be careful. The diamond ('P' in my notation above) says that the statement is possibly true, but it doesn't say that the statement is not necessarily true.

I think Russell is saying that you don't put modal operators in front of terms, only in front of formulas. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I thought the same thing, but could not quite see how to fit it together. Jan Dejnožka has argued that Russell had a quite sophisticated modal logic, and given that Russell was the authority on Leibniz this seems inevitable. Leibniz is after all the originator of possible worlds. Further, Russell's admonition of Leibniz is modal, that Leibniz did not follow the logic of modality to the (for Russell) inevitable conclusion of the world being necessarily as it is, even as Spinoza did. Speaking roughly, Russell held that necessity begets only necessity, and contingency begets only contingency, and hence if there are contingencies in the world then the world is contingent, and if god is necessary then all his creations are by that fact also necessary. But the academic discussion on the issue is bulky and indecisive.

A large part of the issue here is that the language of modality was understood less formally then - up to a hundred and twenty years ago - than now. This is I think the core of Russell's argument in Necessity and Possibility in whch he writes:

I conclude that, so far as appears, there is no one fundamental logical notion of necessity, nor consequently of possibility. If this conclusion is valid, the subject of modality ought to be banished from logic, since propositions are simply true or false, and there is no such comparative and superlative of truth as is implied by the notions of contingency and necessity.

Earlier he makes it clear that

Necessity and possibility, to begin with, must be primarily predicates of propositions. When we say (for example) "God is a necessary Being", we must be regarded as meaning "That God is is necessary". We must distinguish between a necessary proposition and a proposition which predicates necessity.

Russell puts much of the blame for the confusion down to Kant. In this, at least, he seems to be in agreement with Kripke.

ey — TonesInDeepFreeze

Good post. Interesting.

I'd need to read that essay, but meanwhile, what does he mean by "fundamental logical notion"? And why does he say there is not such a thing? As you mentioned, modal logic has come a long way since 1905, and the debate with Copleston was in 1948 by which time modal logic had been much better explicated but not nearly as robust as with Kripke semantics that came later. If Russell had kept up with such improvements (maybe he did? but I doubt it since, if I'm not mistaken, Russell's attention was generally turning to subjects other than logic or mathematics), then I wonder whether his views would have changed.

"We must distinguish between a necessary proposition and a proposition which predicates necessity" - Russell

Of course.

what does he mean by "fundamental logical notion" — TonesInDeepFreeze

Well, were diamonds and boxes used back then? Given that there was not at that stage even a standard notation for predicate calculus, I doubt there was much by way of agreement on how to parse modal operators.

What we tend to lose from our "post-formal" perspective is an understanding of the accomodations that have to take place in order to follow a particular formal approach to parsing sentences — although we get a reminder when dealing with initiates into logic, where even otherwise clever folk have difficulty in parsing simple sentences. That is, the development of a logical notation includes, usually implicitly, injunctions to only represent certain things in certain ways, and to reject other representations; these are injunctions to think about the sentences in a particular way, rejecting other options that are less amenable to the logical notation.

So developing a logical notation involves seeing sentences in a certain way, amenable to those logical notations. To be sure, I take this as a good thing, the removal of inept and inaccurate parsings.

And keep in mind that Russell was 76 in 1948.

And keep in mind that Russell was 76 in 1948 — Banno

Thus he was blessed with the Wisdom of the Ancients. Right? :cool:

Oh, indeed, just so. But he may not have been au fait with the young wiper-snappers and their fancy scribbles.

Kripke was 8.

I should describe the mathematical ideas associated with infinite causation chains and initial values (“first causes”) that a colleague and I developed over thirty years ago.