:up:

I see no issue redefining terms so long as the new definition is explicated and clear. Furthermore, I do not think physicality is a criterium for causality in any mainstream (philosophical or otherwise) definitions in the literature.

Interesting. "Causality", as far as I have heard it used in the literature, is the idea of how material objects interact with each other or how mind-independent parts explain one another. Depending on the flavor of idealism, causality may still exist (e.g., schopenhauer's epistemic dualist view allowed for causality as the extrinsic representation of mentality); however, the mentality itself has no causality: what are you referring to by 'causality' in idealistic metaphysics? I don't see what the causal relationships would be between mentality--it is all immaterial mind operations.

Bob

I don't see what the causal relationships would be between mentality--it is all immaterial mind operations. — Bob Ross

But whenever we apply the results of logic and rational inference to a practical outcome, isn't that an instance of mental causation, in some sense?

Have a look at this title - Rational Causation - I haven't yet read it myself but it was pointed out in another thread on a related topic.

Rational explanations do not reveal the same sorts of causal connections that explanations in the natural sciences do. Rather, rational causation draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings.

But whenever we apply the results of logic and rational inference to a practical outcome, isn't that an instance of mental causation, in some sense?

That's fair. The "mental causation" would be simply reasons that determined a choice (to some extent) whereas "physical causation" would be the interaction of either mind-independent parts or phenomenal objects. Thank you for sharing!

Bob