Are one’s thoughts on the same constitutive footing as one’s qualia in terms of their sense of self or are one’s thoughts a step removed or a step “higher” than one’s qualia? Would I still have a sense of self without any qualia but with my thoughts? And is the role played by my thoughts any more important to, or constitutive of, my sense of self than the the role played by my qualia? — Luke

Interesting questions! If qualia are constituted by our awareness of experience, which we would have, presumably, even without language, are thoughts, or at least a certain class of thoughts, only possible in virtue of an added symbolic layer of experience and/ or judgement made possible by language?

I imagine that pre-linguistic humans and some animals have a sense of self and other, but no abstract general notion of 'self' and 'other'. Could we have the abstract notion of self, of entity and identity, without the more primordial sense of difference, leading to the sense of self and other(s)?

Some claim that we are in fact in such a situation, that we don't really experience anything at all but just have the illusion that we do. — Janus

An illusion needs a viewer. The waves of heat coming off the road on a hot day with strong sunshine give the illusion of water on the road. IF someone is there to see it. If nobody is there to see it, then there is no illusion. Same with a magician who makes a card disappear. There's no illusion if the seats are empty.

The idea that that which views illusions is, itself, an illusion makes no sense. The idea that an illusion is viewing itself makes no sense.

The idea that that which views illusions is, itself, an illusion makes no sense. The idea that an illusion is viewing itself makes no sense. — Patterner

The argument that consciousness and the self are illusory does not entail that we don't exist. As I understand it, it is more saying that we imagine consciousness and the self to be in some kind of way persistent entities, and that this is an illusion of reification.

Your 'mirage' example, the illusory appearance of water on a road or plain will "fool" a camera just as it may fool a human.

In any case I'm not arguing for the position I have (rightly or wrongly) imputed to Dennett; it doesn't make convincing sense to me. either, but I acknowledge that making sense is a subjective matter; meaning that what makes sense to me may not make sense to you.

The argument that consciousness and the self are illusory does not entail that we don't exist. As I understand it, it is more saying that we imagine consciousness and the self to be in some kind of way persistent entities, and that this is an illusion of reification. — Janus

I can't say I understand the argument in any way. Heh.

Your 'mirage' example, the illusory appearance of water on a road or plain will "fool" a camera just as it may fool a human. — Janus

The camera will only record what happens in a certain part of the spectrum. It will also record what the magician does with the cards. But it does not see the illusions. It is not amazed because it expected one thing and got another, despite not seeing how it could possibly have happened. Only we sees illusions.

In any case I'm not arguing for the position I have (rightly or wrongly) imputed to Dennett; it doesn't make convincing sense to me. either, but I acknowledge that making sense is a subjective matter; meaning that what makes sense to me may not make sense to you. — Janus

True enough.

I can't say I understand the argument in any way. — Patterner

Only we sees illusions. — Patterner

The camera records the illusion we call a mirage, which means the illusion is a real phenomenon. The idea that self and consciousness are illusions is the idea that they are real, but not what we naively think they are, just like the mirage. The illusion consists in thinking that something is something it is not.

I don't know what those who think it is an illusion think it is. Still working on it.

I don't know what those who think it is an illusion think it is. Still working on it. — Patterner

I believe they think it is a physical process, just like anything else. Of course, that begs the question as to what exactly "physical" denotes.

I don't know what those who think it is an illusion think it is. Still working on it.
— Patterner

I believe they think it is a physical process, just like anything else. Of course, that begs the question as to what exactly "physical" denotes. — Janus

Perhaps the answer to that will give the answer to, as Chalmers put it, Why is the physical "processing accompanied by conscious experience? Why does it feel like something from the inside? Why do we have this amazing inner movie going on in our minds all the time?"

Maybe the feeling, the seeing and the thinking are just physical processes, but not physical processes that we can understand in the "mechanical" way we understand some other physical processes. Perhaps it is our ability to understand some physical processes in a mechanical way that leads to the prejudice that all physical processes must be mechanical, and that therefore the experience of seeing, feeling and thinking cannot be physical because we cannot understand them in mechanical terms.

Are you suggesting properties of the physical that we have not yet discovered?

It's more that I am suggesting that there are aspects of the physical that we cannot understand in the customary mechanical ways that we understand the physical.

Any ideas? We understand the physical in physical ways. If an aspect of the physical is not accessible to our physical ways, what do we do?

We understand the physical in causal/ mechanical ways. If there are things we cannot understand in these ways, then we can either accept that we simply cannot understand such things, or we can deny that they are physical. If we deny that they are physical how will that help us understand them? I mean what other ways do we have for modeling things and understanding them?

I would not say mathematics is physical. Even if it began as counting physical things, it has certainly become something else. Yet we do not understand mathematics because of our senses, or any of the devices we've invented to enhance our senses.

Math, logic, ideas in general are not obviously physical, but doing math or logic or thinking in general is a physical process, in the sense that they all involve burning calories.

Well, sure. There's no doubt that the brain's functions are needed for consciousness.

Well, sure. There's no doubt that the brain's functions are needed for consciousness. — Patterner

Is ChatGPT conscious? What about a future version that passes the Turing Test?

I meant human consciousness. That's the kind we're talking about at the moment. Obviously, the human brain's functions wouldn't be necessary for non-human consciousnesses.

Oh, I know. I was just wondering what you thought about machine consciousness.

Ah. I'm sure it will happen. I don’t know if it has already. But there’s no explanation for our consciousness that would rule out machine consciousness. If it’s just physical processes, machines can do that. If it's panprotopsychism, then a machine's particles would also have that property.

I guess if we have souls, then a machine probably wouldn't. Although, if souls are attracted to, and enter arrangements of matter that have certain characteristics/abilities, then that would work. But not in the religious sense of souls.

So, if brain function is necessary for consciousness, what reason do we have for thinking consciousness could be something non-physical?

Is ChatGPT conscious? What about a future version that passes the Turing Test? — RogueAI

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that ChatGPT is conscious, then would its consciousness not be as dependent on a physical substrate as the human?

↪RogueAI
Ah. I'm sure it will happen.


I agree that machine consciousness is metaphysically possible, but I'm far from sure it will happen. Evolution has had around 500 million adapting neuron 'design' and the way neurons interconnect, to result in us. It's not obvious to me that human ingenuity can achieve a sufficiently similar result. (More likely seeming to me, is that humans could develop a nonconscious AI that then proceeds to design a conscious AI, but that is scary^2 and I tend to doubt that humanity is that stupid.)

I'm also inclined to raise an ethical objection to an attempt to create a conscious AI, in that I think it is almost a certainty that initial attempts at a conscious AI which did result in consciousness, would result in an 'insane' consciousness.

[quoting from the OP]

However, what I found most fascinating is the idea that qualia constitute the self, rather than being something perceived by the self.

I haven't read through the full thread, so forgive me if you have already done so, but could you point out a specific passage from the article that you interpreted as promoting such a view?

In his article Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995), David Chalmers posed the (hard) question: "Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel?"


I think Dennett suggested that it was an evolutionary "neat trick". In other (anthropomorphising of evolution) words, it is a means evolution stumbled upon which achieved an adaptive end. Perhaps a more adaptive end could have been reached by neurological processes evolving differently with no consciousness evolved, and perhaps not.

I see consciousness as a function of our brain's innate tendency to develop a model of physical reality based on our sensory and motor interactions with reality. Qualia might be seen as the symbols various parts of our brain present to 'modeling central' to represent the state of things in reality - the marks on the map, so to speak. Consciousness may simply be, what happens when some parts of the brain are outputting symbols in the form we associate with qualia. while simultaneously other parts of our massively parallel processing brains are monitoring the cloud of symbols being presented.

I don't see why it would be unreasonable to answer Chalmers with, "That's just the way evolution went." Unfortunately succinct perhaps, and I could suggest reasons to think that's the case, but I think this post is long enough.

Is ChatGPT conscious? What about a future version that passes the Turing Test? — RogueAI

BTW, there is another angle on this: if some AI passes the Turing test, meaning that it can convince anyone that it is conscious, would it necessarily follow that it is, in fact, conscious? In other words, if to be conscious is to experience, would an AIs ability to convince us that it is conscious prove that it experiences anything?

However, what I found most fascinating is the idea that qualia constitute the self, rather than being something perceived by the self.
— Luke

I haven't read through the full thread, so forgive me if you have already done so, but could you point out a specific passage from the article that you interpreted as promoting such a view? — wonderer1

Have you read the article? It's not long.

But we still have to address the crucial question: Why? Whatever could have been the biological advantage to our ancestors, and still to us today, of having conscious experience dressed up in this wonderful – and, some philosophers would say, quite unnecessarily exotic – fashion? To quote Fodor again:

Consciousness … seems to be among the chronically unemployed … As far as anybody knows, anything that our conscious minds can do they could do just as well if they weren’t conscious. Why, then, did God bother to make consciousness? What on earth could he have had in mind?

I can’t answer for God. But in answering for natural selection, I think we can and should let first-person intuition be our guide. So, ask yourself: what would be missing from your life if you lacked phenomenal consciousness? If you had blindsight, blind-touch, blind-hearing, blind-everything? Pace Fodor, I’m sure there’s an obvious answer, and it’s the one we touched on when discussing blindsight. It’s that what would be missing would be nothing less than you, your conscious self.

One of the most striking facts about human patients with blindsight is that they don’t take ownership of their capacity to see. Lacking visual qualia – the ‘somethingness’ of seeing – they believe that visual perception has nothing to do with them. Then, imagine if you were to lack qualia of any kind at all, and to find that none of your sensory experience was owned by you? I’m sure your self would disappear. — the article

I don't see why it would be unreasonable to answer Chalmers with, "That's just the way evolution went." — wonderer1

"That's just the way evolution went" does not explain the "adaptive end", the evolutionary purpose, or the biological advantage of the development of phenomenal consciousness. In other words, it does not answer the hard problem of why we have phenomenal consciousness. "Evolution did it" is about as explanatory as "God did it".

So, if brain function is necessary for consciousness, what reason do we have for thinking consciousness could be something non-physical? — Janus

Any macro property is reducible to the properties of particles and the four forces. Individual particles aren't liquid, solid, or gas. But we know how the properties of particles make a group of particles liquid, solid, or gas. Particles don't fly. But we know how the properties of particles give rise to things like aerodynamics and lift, allowing flight. We can't see enough detail to calculate the results of the cue ball hitting the balls on the break, much less calculate every particles movement in a hurricane. While have much success calculating what masses of air are going to do, it's all because of the particles.

Which properties of particles give rise to a group of particles being aware of things, aware of itself, and aware of its awareness? How do we trace this macro property down the levels to the properties of the particles?

Also, there's meaning, as I mentioned here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/807412

This must also explain teleology. DNA doesn't have a vision of the future that it is trying to bring about. It does not have a plan of bringing about anything. It doesn't intend an acorn to become an oak tree. It doesn't envision a human, and work towards creating one. And it does not know it has brought about anything once it has. Everything it does is the result of the properties of particles and physics.

Yet one conglomerate of particles has a clear vision of the future, and acts to bring it about. Its actions are caused by a future state. A state that might never even be realized. Which micro property gives us this ability? Which scientific principle allows it? I know someone who talked about his plan to go to a concert. He said his clothes would be at the concert because of the laws of physics. As his body moves, the laws of physics do not allow his clothes to do anything but move with him. If things like consciousness, awareness, and teleology are nothing more than the laws of physics, then he will attended the concert for the same reason his clothes will. A more complex web of interacting particles than the reason his clothes will be there, but still just particles of properties, and the laws of physics.

The evolutionary advantages of human conscious experience are plentiful. Perhaps they can be summed up as a tremendous increase in human adaptability.

BTW, there is another angle on this: if some AI passes the Turing test, meaning that it can convince anyone that it is conscious, would it necessarily follow that it is, in fact, conscious? In other words, if to be conscious is to experience, would an AIs ability to convince us that it is conscious prove that it experiences anything? — Janus

I don't think it could convince us that it's conscious. We would always wonder if it really is conscious. Passing the Turing Test is just a milestone, it doesn't confer consciousness.

BTW, there is another angle on this: if some AI passes the Turing test, meaning that it can convince anyone that it is conscious, would it necessarily follow that it is, in fact, conscious? In other words, if to be conscious is to experience, would an AIs ability to convince us that it is conscious prove that it experiences anything?
— Janus

I don't think it could convince us that it's conscious. We would always wonder if it really is conscious. Passing the Turing Test is just a milestone, it doesn't confer consciousness. — RogueAI

It's true that we will never really know. We can't prove we are conscious to each other. Many will never believe a machine is conscious. If a machine became conscious today, many would still not believe it a hundred years from now.

I wonder what will happen. Will the law be that nothing not human can be conscious, so there will be no rights? Knowing humanity, I don't expect we will give them the benefit of the doubt, and treat them like fellow sentients; like equals.

OK, it seemed that you were offering passing the Turing test as a criterion for believing that AIs are conscious, but apparently you were not. So, if there is no test for consciousness, the passing of which should convince us that an AI is conscious, then there would seem to be little point speculating about it.

That said, I would believe an AI is conscious if it acted in a spontaneous way that could not be explained by its programming, and which showed that it really cared about something.