Well put for simplicity's sake... — creativesoul

I am not sure if that is a compliment – put down – or both? Do you think my explanation of the origin of meaning – cognition – language is cogent? Could you add some subtlety to my scenario? Do you have an alternate theory of how meaning arrived – cognition and language? Perhaps cognition should come before meaning – we must have had cognitive power first before we could derive associative meaning. How did we acquire cognition? I would like to hear what you think.

Thinking about it – cognition was first. The mosquito stung the first man. He cognized the sensation……

So, John, there's much to consider here. Specifically, there's much to consider regarding the differences between our respective methodological approaches. This post aims to tease that out a bit more...

You wrote:

I don't want to argue with this except to say that I understand the word 'fact' to be equivocal. It is variously used to mean both 'true proposition' and 'actual state of affairs'. I think the first usage is the more common and consistent one, so I stick to that and avoid using 'fact' to mean state of affairs or actuality.

Strictly speaking, I think it is important to remind ourselves here that most words have multiple accepted uses. I have no issue with that situation, in and of itself. It is when the same speaker begins to use multiple different senses of the same word that we have a problematic situation.

I reject using the sense of "fact" that you're using while I'm doing philosophy, because I find that using the term "fact" to mean true statements creates an inability to account for what sorts of things can be true, and what makes them so. However, your use of "actuality" could take the place of "fact", and it seems that that's the case with your view. That's why I asked about your use of "actuality"...

You wrote:

To elaborate a bit, what I wanted to express in saying that truth speaks actuality is to say that to speak the truth is to speak actuality, along much the same lines as Aristotle's formulation:

"To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”.

To say that truth reveals actuality is to say that actuality 'comes to fruition' in our true speaking of it. I admit that there is something of poetry in all this, but I think philosophy is more of an art than a science, so that is not inappropriate, as I see it.

An artform... Indeed.

I see Aristotle's formulation as a criterion for making true/false statements. I find no flaw in Aristotle's formulation, other than it's scope. It cannot account for true/false prelinguistic thought/belief for it paints itself into a linguistic corner. Correspondence and the necessary presupposition thereof that is contained within all thought/belief(including statements thereof) is prior to language.

I cannot find similarity between the Aristotle quote and what you've written, so I'm having a hard time understanding why you think/believe that it is along the same lines as what you've written.

You wrote...

I think of the actual as the twin categories of things which act, which "have an effect", and which are acted upon, which are affected. Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive. The real I think of as both the actual, and the conditions that are necessary, whatever they might be, for the actual to be.

My summation was...

It seems to me that that is unnecessarily confusing.

...was followed by your having asked the following question:

Can you tell me what is in it that confuses you?

What the use of the term "actual" is if what's real exhausts it. Necessary existential pre-conditions are quite distinct from that which they give rise to. Real things are their own existential necessary pre-conditions that give rise to themselves which are not?

I am being reminded of Spinoza's substance... if memory serves me, it was defined in his Ethics. Seems that it and what you've offered is on the basic level as an uncaused cause, or perhaps the first cause. I cannot quite put my finger on it yet, perhaps you can elaborate...

How can something be both itself and it's own set of necessary existential pre-conditions?

I asked the following:

Would I be correct in surmising that your use of the terms "real", "actual", and "actuality" indicate awareness of our own fallibility? I mean, do they include the unknown realm?

You answered:

I maybe inadequately understand your questions here. I'm not sure if it is relevant to the intention of them, but I will say this: I believe we know the real, the actual, actuality, intimately. Here I mean knowing in the 'Biblical' sense, knowing by intimate relation. For various reasons, though, what we say does not always reflect the real, the actual; and once we begin to argue (with ourselves or others) about it; then we begin the descent into confusion.

I was wondering if the real included that which cannot be known.

Given the crucial importance of logical argument, I would temper the last part above by further qualifying/quantifying it. If descending into confusion can result in clarity then I've no issue. Not all argument descends into confusion. Some does.

You wrote:

I tend to distinguish between the real and the actual; I think of the latter as meaning something like 'the totality of what we humans experience' and of the former as 'containing, but not limited to, the actual'. The actual is what we humans experience because that is what acts upon us, and what we act upon, as actual beings ourselves; it is the world of interaction. It is real, but we also must think that what lies beyond our sphere of interaction is real, and that it includes the conditions that give rise to our sphere of interaction.

The above is steeped in language use that leaves me guessing. What is the word "that" referring to in the following?

"The actual is what we humans experience because that is what acts upon us, and what we act upon, as actual beings ourselves."

Of course objections may always be made on terminological grounds; that is due to the imprecision of language.

Language is certainly sometimes imprecise and can have many different results, that being but one.

I am not sure if that is a compliment – put down – or both?

Neither.

Do you think my explanation of the origin of meaning – cognition – language is cogent?

Yup.

Could you add some subtlety to my scenario?

Yup.

Do you have an alternate theory of how meaning arrived – cognition and language?

Nope.

Perhaps cognition should come before meaning – we must have had cognitive power first before we could derive associative meaning.

Perhaps they arise simultaneously.

How did we acquire cognition? I would like to hear what you think.

I do not think that that question leads to greater understanding. Better to focus attention upon what cognition requires. What is the bare minimum criterion? What must be the case in order for cognition to happen? Does that include things that require other things? What is included within the set of necessary existential preconditions?

You're neglecting to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thinking and thinking about stuff. I suspect that you've also neglected to consider the difference between pre-linguistic thought and linguistic. I would even go as far as to guess that you also neglect to consider the difference between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.

You neglected to address the long answer, which argued for the short. Gratuitous assertions aren't acceptable. — creativesoul

This wasn't a reply to me, but I don't see a distinction between thinking and thinking about something. When thinking, it is always about stuff. If thoughts weren't about things then the thoughts would be the things themselves, similar to how words must be about things or else the words are the things themselves.

Your thoughts must take some form. They take the form of sensory impressions. You can only think in shapes, colors, sounds, etc. Words are simply colored shapes and sounds. In order for them to mean anything more than just being colored shapes and sounds, they must be about something that isn't the colored shape or sounds. There is an aboutness to our experiences and hearing or seeing words is no different than seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or feeling anything else and establishing an association between, or aboutness to, them.

The above is steeped in language use that leaves me guessing. What is the word "that" referring to in the following?

"The actual is what we humans experience because that is what acts upon us, and what we act upon, as actual beings ourselves."



Of course objections may always be made on terminological grounds; that is due to the imprecision of language.

Language is certainly sometimes imprecise and can have many different results, that being but one. — creativesoul

I think John explained the difference between real and actual very well. For example - the universe is real, but my perception of it may be a little different from what it actually is. In my example that would be the universe. I get his meaning quite clearly.

I am not sure if that is a compliment – put down – or both?

Neither. — creativesoul

I don’t think I can take this comment at face value because it leaves me guessing at what you mean. Your previous comment – “well put” – leads me to understand complimentary approval. I am still not sure what you meant by – “for simplicity's sake...” Did you mean a simplistic explanation - or something else – I honestly don’t know? If simplistic, I would infer – put down. If in fact you do mean “neither” - now – please explain what that means. Then correlate what you mean by neither with your original comment. We are talking about language and meaning – right? Please clarify.

Do you think my explanation of the origin of meaning – cognition – language is cogent?

Yup. — creativesoul

I take yup to mean affirmative – my thoughts are cogent - then I would reference back to your original comment – well put.

Could you add some subtlety to my scenario?

Yup. — creativesoul

Yup again – ok – are we playing cat and mouse? If you have something to add – please do.

Do you have an alternate theory of how meaning arrived – cognition and language?

Nope. — creativesoul

I am getting the feeling your one word comments are dismissive of our interaction. If talking about the origin of cognition, meaning and language is not pertinent to - Is Meaning Prior To Language? – I am at a loss. You are new to this forum, but not to philosophy. I have read all your comments in this thread and you do not come across as warm and gentle. More like a cross between a philosophy professor and a tyrannosaurus rex. I am not trying to put you on the defensive – I feel I could learn a lot from you. However, respect has to go both ways.

Perhaps cognition should come before meaning – we must have had cognitive power first before we could derive associative meaning.

Perhaps they arise simultaneously. — creativesoul

This is the first comment where I feel you genuinely interact with me. You may be right that cognition and meaning are simultaneous. However, if we go back way before the first Homo sapiens – back to the beginning – and ask the same questions about cognition and meaning. The first primate-like mammals, or proto-primates, evolved in the early Paleocene Epoch (65.5-55.8 million years ago) at the beginning of the Cenozoic Era. Did they have cognition of their senses? Yes, but I am not so sure they had meaning. If we look at simple cell organisms today - we can see they will respond to stimuli – they have a rudimentary cognition, but I don’t think they have meaning. So, I think cognition comes first – then meaning somewhere down the line.

I do not think that that question leads to greater understanding. Better to focus attention upon what cognition requires. What is the bare minimum criterion? What must be the case in order for cognition to happen? Does that include things that require other things? What is included within the set of necessary existential preconditions? — creativesoul

I think these are good comments. Perhaps we can do both – understand what cognition requires and how we acquired it. I think it is safe to assume that cognition needs a neural network – a brain. The following is from Wikipedia:

“The vast majority of existing animals are bilaterians, meaning animals with left and right sides that are approximate mirror images of each other. All bilateria are thought to have descended from a common wormlike ancestor that appeared in the Ediacaran period, 550–600 million years ago.”


We, as bilaterians, are descendent from a wormlike ancestor. Something I find very comforting. Somewhere in our lineage our ancestor’s developed a brain with a neural network sufficient to cognize sensory stimulation. This is the beginning of our ability to think. Over time the neural network got more and more complex to derive meaning from complex stimulation.

A bird can play a role in human thought/belief formation without the resulting thought/belief being about a bird.

You may be right that cognition and meaning are simultaneous. However, if we go back way before the first Homo sapiens – back to the beginning – and ask the same questions about cognition and meaning. The first primate-like mammals, or proto-primates, evolved in the early Paleocene Epoch (65.5-55.8 million years ago) at the beginning of the Cenozoic Era. Did they have cognition of their senses? Yes, but I am not so sure they had meaning. If we look at simple cell organisms today - we can see they will respond to stimuli – they have a rudimentary cognition, but I don’t think they have meaning. So, I think cognition comes first – then meaning somewhere down the line.

It seems that your notion of cognition is not equivalent to my notion of thought/belief. On my view, not all stimulus/response situations involve thought/belief. Detection alone is insufficient for drawing mental correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or one's own state of mind. All such mental correlations constitute thought/belief formation. Simple cell organisms have no state of mind, for they do not have the complexity that seems obviously necessary for it.

You wrote:

I think John explained the difference between real and actual very well. For example - the universe is real, but my perception of it may be a little different from what it actually is. In my example that would be the universe. I get his meaning quite clearly.

That doesn't follow from what was written.

You wrote:

I don’t think I can take this comment at face value because it leaves me guessing at what you mean. Your previous comment – “well put” – leads me to understand complimentary approval. I am still not sure what you meant by – “for simplicity's sake...” Did you mean a simplistic explanation - or something else – I honestly don’t know? If simplistic, I would infer – put down. If in fact you do mean “neither” - now – please explain what that means. Then correlate what you mean by neither with your original comment...

It's not that difficult to understand. When one says "Well put, for simplicity's sake" it need be neither a compliment nor a put down. You see, both of those require a focus upon the author, whereas "Well put, for simplicity's sake" focused upon the content of the expression.

You wrote:

If thoughts weren't about things then the thoughts would be the things themselves, similar to how words must be about things or else the words are the things themselves.

Thoughts are things. Some thought is about stuff. Others are more simple in constitution and facilitate the very ability for our thinking about stuff.

Thoughts are things. Some thought is about stuff. Others are more simple in constitution and facilitate the very ability for our thinking about stuff. — creativesoul

Yes, thoughts are things too, which is why we can turn our thoughts on themselves - of thinking about thinking.

I don't understand the last part. Why don't you try to show ANY thought that DOESN'T consist of sensory data.

It seems that your notion of cognition is not equivalent to my notion of thought/belief. On my view, not all stimulus/response situations involve thought/belief. Detection alone is insufficient for drawing mental correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or one's own state of mind. All such mental correlations constitute thought/belief formation. Simple cell organisms have no state of mind, for they do not have the complexity that seems obviously necessary for it. — creativesoul

My notion of cognition can be viewed in a “line of continuation”. We started as single cell organisms. We progressed to where we are now. Somewhere in this continuum we developed the ability to think – cognize. Did cognition and ability to hold meaning – what you call thought/belief – develop simultaneously? I do not know – all is speculation. If we look at dinosaur predators and ask – did they have thought/belief? It seems so because they looked at another animal and saw food. Food is meaningful. Did they have state of mind? I doubt it. My question is whether or not there is a fulcrum between thought and belief in the “line of continuation”? I think it is worthy of speculation to a certain degree – and – I think we have reached that degree. There is another fulcrum in the “line of continuation” for the question of state of mind. When did beings start to think about their own thoughts?
.

That doesn't follow from what was written. — creativesoul

Thank you for your abundant objection and explanation.

It's not that difficult to understand. When one says "Well put, for simplicity's sake" it need be neither a compliment nor a put down. You see, both of those require a focus upon the author, whereas "Well put, for simplicity's sake" focused upon the content of the expression. — creativesoul

Thank you for being generous with your ideas and praise – well done.

I suppose this marks a good time for the following:Thought/belief is accrued and gains in it's complexity over a sufficient time period. A thought need not be meaningful in order to be a thought. A grain of sand need not be a beach in order to be a grain of sand. Meaningful thought requires simpler ones. The attribution of meaning arrests the senses of language-less creatures. Creatures without written language are always in the moment, and never thinking about being so. Such creatures are more than capable of attributing meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between 'objects' of sensory perception and/or themselves(their own 'state of mind').

What is sensory data, and does containing it equate to being about it?

Creatures without written language are always in the moment, and never thinking about being so. Such creatures are more than capable of attributing meaning to 'objects' of sensory perception by virtue of drawing mental correlations between them and/or themselves(their own state of mind). — creativesoul

I think you may be right that written language is indicative of state of mind. I define state of mind as the ability to contemplate one’s own thoughts. Here is an interesting look at Koko. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNuZ4OE6vCk
A remarkable being. Sign language is a type of written language. How far back can we go in the animal kingdom and see self contemplation?

The ability to contemplate one's thought/belief is metacognition. Metacognition is existentially contingent upon the ability to isolate one's own thought/belief. Isolating one's own thought belief requires two having two symbols for the same thing. A state of mind does not.

On my view there is an interesting distinction between a state of mind and thinking about one's own thought/belief. The latter is introspection. Being fearful requires no such thing. Being fearful is a state of mind.

Yes, thoughts are things too, which is why we can turn our thoughts on themselves...

This works from the dubious presupposition that being a thing is what allows introspection(metacognition).

We can think about our own thought/belief because of the terms "thought/belief". That is how.

You wrote:

Sign language is a type of written language.

Gestures are not marks.

"Seeing self-contemplation" is a tricky way to talk. Self-contemplation happens in more than one way, and does so quite differently, depending of course, upon the complexity of agent involved the process of introspection. It is important to note here that self-contemplation cannot get exceed the scope of knowledge afforded to the creature by virtue of the complexity of it's thought/belief system. Self-conception - as we know it - requires written language, for it is an integral part of having a worldview.

Emotional reasoning, or social reasoning takes place when the mind is still. Once you've dealt with all of the circumstantial, and bodily concerns, and gots none of those worries, the brain will just automatically shift to emotional, or social reasoning. Here is the place you'll learn about yourself, because of that reaction you or someone else had, that impacted you, and this matters for some reason. Just like when there is a problem in any other area of life, emotional or social problems always point at an excess, or deficiency. Whether yours or someone else'.

Just like with all other forms of reasoning, general security, confidence, health, age, social strata, sex, gender, height, weight, and a million other things will also effect the process, and predispose one to certain conclusions (to say one's constitution).

Hey Wos!

Self requires other. Not sure if all problems point to an excess or deficiency, but that's an interesting thing to say...

I didn't say that.

You sure?

...? L2r bro...

Just like when there is a problem in any other area of life, emotional or social problems always point at an excess, or deficiency. — Wosret

He edited his previous comment which omitted excess, and only said deficiency...

What other problems are there besides emotional, social, and any other area of life?

On my view, you seemed to be saying "Just like all problems(in any other area of life)... emotional and social ones always point at an excess or deficiency.

Got any other suggestions?