:100:

In short, as I see it. abstractions are not primary or fundamental they are abstracted from particulars, so they are therefore secondary and derivative. — Janus

:up: :up:

I accept the other sense, but all I am asking for is textual evidence for the above sense as being more, something ontologically fundamental and at the same time "abstract" according to Aristotle, than merely the commonsensically obvious fact that every particular form or pattern can be reproduced, copied or visualized. — Janus

I told you, Metaphysics Bk 7, Ch 7. I even gave a brief quote. The form of the artificial thing comes from within the artist. This is not a reproduction or copy, it is 'the design'. In this section, Aristotle compares the coming-into-being of artificial things with the coming-into-being of natural things. This form of the thing, what the thing will be when it comes into existence, is prior in time to the thing, it is not derivative.

He has at this point, already demonstrated that the form of a material thing is necessarily prior to the material existence of the thing, as the cause of the thing being what it is, and not something else (necessitated by the law of identity). So he proceeds to inquire 'where' the form comes from. In articles of art, the form comes from the soul of the artist, but in natural things the question is much more difficult. The acorn provides an example. I discussed this section with @Dfpolis extensively in the past. Df insisted, at that time, that the form is intrinsic to, or inherent within the matter, I think that Aristotle demonstrated a similarity between natural things and artificial things, showing that the form comes from somewhere other than the matter, like the soul of the artist.

Hi!
Browsing the "All Discussions" page, I keep seeing "Why Monism?" among the topics, updated everyday, and this question has started to haunt me! :grin:
The discussion has reached 7 pages and I can't read thoroughly every comment to find some answer, or at least a frame of reference within which this question is explicitly answered or posited.
Yet, I'm still interested in it since the first day I read about this topic and responded to it ...

So, since it's your topic and you are watching its progress, can you tell me anything that supports the question "Why Monism?" and can maybe remove at least some part of the mystery it created in me? :smile:

As Art48 started by pointing out, Monism is reductionist, or you can derive the complex from the simple. — Mark Nyquist

As a scientific perspective, Monism could be construed as reductionist in that it reduces complexity & plurality down to a single principle, as in Spinoza's single substance "god sive natura". But as a philosophical worldview Monism is Holistic, in that it combines many parts into a single integrated system. Some call that system "universe" (implying all-encompassing), and others call it "Nature" (implying reality as opposed to super-natural), but more poetic scientists, such as Einstein, dare to refer that unity-of-all-things as "God"*1.

Harold Morowitz is "a leading figure in the science of complexity". In his book The Emergence of Everything, he writes : "Emergence is the opposite of reduction"*2. He goes on to define "emergence" in terms of Holism : "These are the emergent properties of the system, properties of the whole. They are novelties that follow from the system rules but cannot be predicted from properties of the components that make up the system". {my bold}

A Holistic & Monistic understanding of the universe has important philosophical consequences*3. Morowitz has the temerity to propose, in a science book, that "those studying natural Complexity should pay attention to the Idealist philosophical tradition". Again, some on this forum would consider such talk as blasphemy against Classical Science. What do you think about Monism & Holism? Are those notions too spooky for you? :smile:


*1. "God does not play dice" Albert Einstein once said, expressing his contempt for the notion that the universe is governed by probability - an idea fundamental to quantum theory.
https://plus.maths.org/content/why-god-plays-dice
Note --- Probability is essential to the science of complexity, and computers are unperturbed by the uncertainty of statistical laws of nature.

*2. In the Emergence thread on this forum, the notion of progressive directional emergence was shouted down, probably because as a non-reductionist concept it seemed to be anti-scientific to some posters. But the science of Complexity is a 21st century phenomenon, because a multiplicity of things is confusing to the analog human mind, but not to digital computers. In the book mentioned above, I made a marginal note : "classical science is reductive and elemental. The next phase of science will be pro-ductive and holistic. Now that we know the elements [including sub-atomic particles] we can begin to see how they work together to create holons that are, in turn, the elements for the next level of complexity".
Note --- A holon is something that is simultaneously a whole in and of itself, as well as a part of a larger whole.

*3. One novel idea to emerge from the science of Complexity is the notion that Mind is inherent in the rules of physics. Morowitz noted that "the reductionist behaviorist traditions would argue that mind is an epiphenomenon of the activities of collections of neurons". Then he argued that "the pruning rules of the emergences may go beyond the purely dynamic and exhibit a noetic character. It ultimately evolves into mind, not as something that suddenly appears, but as a maturing character of an aging universe".
Note --- Noetic : relating to mental activity or the intellect.

Have you or anyone come across Feynman diagrams showing forward and backward flowing time. My interpretation is physical existence has some duration relative to clock time. It's worth mentioning in a discussion of Monism.

I don't get to deep into the quantum stuff because you should understand the math first before you even have an opinion and, beware, a lot of the people writing about this for mass audiences are clueless. — Mark Nyquist

Ironically, Time Reversal has been interpreted from observations of experiments. But they don't know how that glitch might affect our perception of forward flowing time. Time reversal is an abstract mathematical phenomenon that doesn't seem to be translated into concrete physics. So, why would it be worth mentioning in a discussion of Monism?

I was forced to get somewhat deep into the philosophical implications of "Quantum Stuff", without understanding the math, because of my interest in Information theory. Even the scientists themselves don't understand the meaning of the math*1. All they know is that it reliably predicts the outcome of experiments. The pioneers of sub-atomic science were baffled by the counter-intuitive implications of such phenomena as Superposition and Entanglement. So, they used metaphorical language to make some sense of it.

Likewise, philosophers don't have to do the math in order to derive some meaning (some clues) from the uncertainties of quantum math. Theoretical Philosophy is not constrained by the mathematical requirements of Empirical Science. :smile:

PS__Most of what I learned about Quantum Physics was derived from the dumbed-down writings of mathematical scientists for a popular audience.


*1. Shut-up and calculate :
The cliché has it that the Copenhagen interpretation demands adherence without deep enquiry. That does physics a disservice
https://aeon.co/essays/shut-up-and-calculate-does-a-disservice-to-quantum-mechanics

*2. Poetic Metaphors in Philosophy :
According to this view, metaphors can be characterized as-strictly speaking-non-philosophical but extrinsic to constitutive forms in constructing theories. In this view, their function is not to explain, and they cannot be used as arguments. But, often they contain numerous implications with value for innovation, as they can anticipate holistic projections which are not yet fulfilled by theoretical analysis.
https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Meth/MethPere.htm

Again, you are making unwarranted assumptions about me. — Janus

There you go again : accusing me of accusing you of something nefarious. Rather than "unwarranted assumptions," my rephrasing of your posts is an attempt put them into words that I can understand. If your words were clear to me, I wouldn't have to make assumptions. If my interpretation is wrong, please correct my "assumptions". This kind of re-phrasing is common in philosophical dialog. The "warrant" is in the ambiguity. :smile:

Note --- The pertinent assumption (interpretation) was in the second phrase. Is it true (warranted) that you don't want to hear what amateur philosophers have to say about the ideas of ancient authorities? If not, would you clarify what you meant by "not what you or someone other internet poster thinks about what they thought".
My interpretation of your intention :
"Apparently, you are only willing to accept the manifesto assertions of authorities on the subject, and not the humble suggestions of mere amateurs".

Monism: the idea that only one supreme reality exists. Why posit monism? — Art48

Since I came late to this thread, I haven't directly commented on the OP. So here goes.:

Fooloso4 seems to imply that Monism is a fearful attempt to avoid the "abyss of nothingness". But your rational response turns the imputed "fear" into a search for clarity. "Taken to its logical conclusion, the explanatory path must finally lead to that which is unique and absolutely uncomplex." The principle of simplicity is inherent in both philosophical argumentation and scientific experimentation.

From that perspective, Monism is simply a result of applying Ockham's Razor to the whole universe. Unfortunately, that notion could also imply the necessity for a singular Necessary Being or Supreme Reality, or other holistic notions that do not appeal to the pluralistic Reductive Mind, which favors parts over wholes. Is a singular Ground of Being a fear-inducing concept? :smile:


Simplicity theory is a cognitive theory that seeks to explain the attractiveness of situations or events to human minds.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplicity_theory

The view that simplicity is a virtue in scientific theories and that, other things being equal, simpler theories should be preferred to more complex ones has been widely advocated in the history of science and philosophy, and it remains widely held by modern scientists and philosophers of science. It often goes by the name of “Ockham’s Razor.”
https://iep.utm.edu/simplici/

I tried making the point earlier in this thread that the 'idea of the One' in Greek philosophy is not something that is amenable to discursive analysis. The philosophical aspirant who wishes to understand the idea of the One has to engage in the deep process of catharsis or purification in order to clear the inner obstacles to understanding. As Pierre Hadot remarks in his Philosophy as a Way of Life, this involves spiritual exercises which (for many) are uncomfortably close to religion.

Here's worthwhile video called The Coherence of Platonism by Irish youtuber Keith Woods. It's a talk on Lloyd Gerson's book, Platonism and Naturalism. The jacket copy:

In this broad and sweeping argument, Gerson contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world, and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy. Thus, the possibility of philosophy depends on the truth of Platonism. From Aristotle to Plotinus to Proclus, Gerson clearly links the construction of the Platonic system well beyond simply Plato's dialogues, providing strong evidence of the vast impact of Platonism on philosophy throughout history. Platonism and Naturalism concludes that attempts to seek rapprochement between Platonism and Naturalism are unstable and likely indefensible.

Taking the example of the acorn: I would say the form of the oak is inherent within, immanent to, the acorn, and I think Aristotle thought the same. You seem to be claiming it is something "abstract" that comes from "somewhere else". I don't believe Aristotle would agree with this (although Plato might, depending on how you interpret him). Today we know about something Aristotle didn't: DNA. So, the form of the oak is encoded within the DNA in the acorn. But that DNA comes from previous oaks, and there is no reason to think the DNA itself has not changed, evolved, over time from ancestor trees, precursors to the oaks and other types of trees that evolved along different lines..

Try googling Aristotle and DNA....you may be surprised....

As I remember it (it's a while since I read the book) Pierre Hadot in Philosophy as a Way of Life understands the various ancient Greek philosophical systems as sets of ideas designed to live by, not consisting of claims to be critiqued and argued over. Philosophy under that conception has a different purpose: to provide ways of living designed to free practitioners from the unruly desires, petty concerns, existential anxieties, and worldly attachments that can make life a misery.

A modern equivalent would be Cognitive Behavior Therapy or Gestalt Therapy: if you undertake that practice, you are not there to argue about their different metaphysical or phenomenological claims, but rather to accept the set of ideas that constitute the therapy and practice in accordance with them to (hopefully) gain the result.

So, as Hadot points out Stoicism, Skepticism, Cynicism, Epicureanism, Platonism and Neoplatonism all had very different sets of metaphysical ideas, but they were all similar in there status as philosophical and ethical practices designed to live in better ways. Epicureanism, for example, explicitly rejects the idea of afterlife.

So, I don't think you can cite Hadot to support any contention that it was the metaphysical ideas in the ancient philosophies that were of primary importance: it is more likely that such ideas were as diverse within the systems as were the different kinds of people with their different mindsets, that they sought to attract.

Do you really want to argue that Aristotle knew about DNA?

Of course not, but it has been widely observed that his ideas were precursor to the discovery of both evolutionary theory and DNA.

Well of course they were a kind of precursor, since as I already said above, Aristotle thought the form of the oak to be immanent within the acorn, and not to be ordained by God or immaterial forms or whatever.

Right. See https://www.jstor.org/stable/3654247

Looks quite interesting, but I cannot access the book. Anyway, it's probably a good thing given my list of books to read is already of ridiculous proportions.

As I remember it (it's a while since I read the book) Pierre Hadot in Philosophy as a Way of Life understands the various ancient Greek philosophical systems as sets of ideas designed to live by, not consisting of claims to be critiqued and argued over. Philosophy under that conception has a different purpose: to provide ways of living designed to free practitioners from the unruly desires, petty concerns, existential anxieties, and worldly attachments that can make life a misery.

A modern equivalent would be Cognitive Behavior Therapy or Gestalt Therapy: if you undertake that practice, you are not there to argue about their different metaphysical or phenomenological claims, but rather to accept the set of ideas that constitute the therapy and practice in accordance with them to (hopefully) gain the result.

So, as Hadot points out Stoicism, Skepticism, Cynicism, Epicureanism, Platonism and Neoplatonism all had very different sets of metaphysical ideas, but they were all similar in there status as philosophical and ethical practices designed to live in better ways. Epicureanism, for example, explicitly rejects the idea of afterlife.

So, I don't think you can cite Hadot to support any contention that it was the metaphysical ideas in the ancient philosophies that were of primary importance: it is more likely that such ideas were as diverse within the systems as were the different kinds of people with their different mindsets, that they sought to attract. — Janus

:clap: :fire: Excellent synopsis!

Thank you 180 :cool:

A modern equivalent would be Cognitive Behavior Therapy: if you undertake that practice, you are not there to argue about its metaphysical or phenomenological claims, but rather to accept the set of ideas that constitute the therapy and practice in accordance with them. — Janus

Your background understanding of the nature of the world will have a bearing on your practice. If you accept the materialist attitude that the Universe is inherently unintelligible and that life is the product of chemical necessity, it's hard to see how you could incorporate any kind of stoicism as anything other than personal affect. The Stoics, while materialist, also believed that the universe was animated by the Logos. The entire milieu of ancient philosophy was spiritual in a way that can be challenging to the modern attitude.

The passage I linked to from Hadot put it like this:

Askesis of Desire
For Hadot, famously, the means for the philosophical student to achieve the “complete reversal of our usual ways of looking at things” epitomized by the Sage were a series of spiritual exercises. These exercises encompassed all of those practices still associated with philosophical teaching and study: reading, listening, dialogue, inquiry, and research. However, they also included practices deliberately aimed at addressing the student’s larger way of life, and demanding daily or continuous repetition: practices of attention (prosoche), meditations (meletai), memorizations of dogmata, self-mastery (enkrateia), the therapy of the passions, the remembrance of good things, the accomplishment of duties, and the cultivation of indifference towards indifferent things (PWL 84). Hadot acknowledges his use of the term “spiritual exercises” may create anxieties, by associating philosophical practices more closely with religious devotion than typically done (Nussbaum 1996, 353-4; Cooper 2010). Hadot’s use of the adjective “spiritual” (or sometimes “existential”) indeed aims to capture how these practices, like devotional practices in the religious traditions (6a), are aimed at generating and reactivating a constant way of living and perceiving in prokopta, despite the distractions, temptations, and difficulties of life. For this reason, they call upon far more than “reason alone.” They also utilize rhetoric and imagination in order “to formulate the rule of life to ourselves in the most striking and concrete way” and aim to actively re-habituate bodily passions, impulses, and desires (as for instance, in Cynic or Stoic practices, abstinence is used to accustom followers to bear cold, heat, hunger, and other privations) (PWL 85). These practices were used in the ancient schools in the context of specific forms of interpersonal relationships: for example, the relationship between the student and a master, whose role it was to guide and assist the student in the examination of conscience, in identification and rectification of erroneous judgments and bad actions, and in the conduct of dialectical exchanges on established themes.

That passage is not from Hadot. In any case, I don't think one's metaphysical views have any bearing on one's spiritual practice; on one's ability to realize equanimity, non-attachment, peace of mind or whatever you want to call it.

Whether you believe in an afterlife, in resurrection, rebirth or reincarnation or you don't believe in any afterlife at all is irrelevant. I find it most plausible to think that people are simply attracted to systems that accord with their personal views.

This is evidenced by the diversity and incompatibility of the metaphysical views associated with the various practices and cultures throughout history.

As to believing in an afterlife it can be plausibly argued that such beliefs are motivated by self-concern, and so if anything, might be thought to work against achieving equanimity and non-attachment to ideas of self and self-interest in general.

The burgeoning secular buddhist movement also speaks in favour of thinking that ideas like karma and rebirth are unnecessary to spiritual practice.

It's a precis of a chapter in Philosophy as a Way of Life.

I don't think one's metaphysical views have any bearing on one's spiritual practice; on one's ability to realize equanimity, non-attachment, peace of mind or whatever you want to call it. — Janus

Nāgārjuna said that all spiritual teachings are like a stick you use to poke the fire. When the fire is well alight you can thrown the stick in with it. But only then.

Nāgārjuna said that all spiritual teachings are like a stick you use to poke the fire. When the fire is well alight you can thrown the stick in with it. But only then. — Wayfarer

That says nothing about having to entertain any particular metaphysics in order to practice. Of course if you are drawn to a particular tradition with its particular set of metaphysical views you are not there to question the views, but to use them as aids and/ or inspiration for practice. Different traditions have different views and practices and will appeal to different aspirants.

Ancient philosphy, according to Hadot, consisted in several such schools or traditions. Nowadays there are schools which eschew metaphysical concerns altogether in favour of workable techniques. What is important is what works, and that will differ depending on the individual.

I'm sure you both of gentlemen are familiar with some version of this parable, which is very much in line with Hadot's reflections on Hellenistic philosophies ...

As the Buddha travelled around delivering his teachings, he gathered many followers who set aside their worldly life to follow him.

One of these men was an intellectual named Malunkyaputra, who had been inspired by the Buddha’s deep insight. However, Malunkyaputra eventually grew frustrated with the Buddha, who seems to have avoided answering basic metaphysical questions, like “is there an afterlife?” and other grasping at understanding the universe its purposes.

One day Malunkyaputra confronted the Buddha about it, and declared that, unless the Buddha answered his questions, Malunkyaputra would give up the Buddhist life and return to his old life within society.

The Buddha responded with a story:

Suppose a man has been shot with a poison arrow. His friends and family that were with him rush to call a doctor to remove the arrow and administer an antidote to the poison. But, before they’re able to, the man who was shot stops them, shouting “I will not let this arrow be removed until I know — who shot me? How tall was he? Of what material was his bow made?”

Then the Buddha asked Malunkyaputra what he thought of the man in his story, who refused treatment for his injury until his questions about the man that shot him were answered. Malunkyaputra responded: “He is a fool — his questions are not relevant to treating his injury, and he will die before he gets them answered.”

“Similarly,” said the Buddha, “I do not teach whether or not there is an afterlife and what it is like and such. I teach only how to remove the arrow of your suffering, by revealing its origin, and the Eightfold Path to its end.”

Yes, I'm familiar with that parable and it is very pertinent.
We all seem to enjoy thrashing out these issues, maybe by way of diversion. I don't see any profoundly important moral battle going on between metaphysical materialism and spiritualism in modernity.

The only form of materialism I find ethically and spiritually compromising is the kind of materialism that consists in attachment to excessive material profit, wealth and status, and I think that exists equally among people of all kinds of metaphysical persuasions.

It’s not a defense if common-sense realism. It’s an admonition that speculative views are not conducive to living the holy life, which is the aim of the teaching.

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.063.than.html

Obviously. I posted that ancient Buddhist parable to support @Janus's apt reading of Pierre Hadot's work as compared to your typically biased (i.e. anti-naturalist, anti-pragmatic) misreading, sir.

I got that. It should be added that while speculation about the next life was never encouraged, it was also understood that, should one not practice or honor the Buddhist faith, it wasn’t going to be good. Buddhism is many things, but naturalist, it isn’t.

We all seem to enjoy thrashing out these issues, maybe by way of diversion. I don't see any profoundly important moral battle going on between metaphysical materialism and spiritualism in modernity.

The only form of materialism I find ethically and spiritually compromising is the kind of materialism that consists in attachment to excessive material profit, wealth and status, and I think that exists equally among people of all kinds of metaphysical persuasions. — Janus

:100: :up:

In any case, I don't think one's metaphysical views have any bearing on one's spiritual practice; on one's ability to realize equanimity, non-attachment, peace of mind or whatever you want to call it.

Whether you believe in an afterlife, in resurrection, rebirth or reincarnation or you don't believe in any afterlife at all is irrelevant. I find it most plausible to think that people are simply attracted to systems that accord with their personal views. — Janus

Again. :up: Nicely put.

In any case, I don't think one's metaphysical views have any bearing on one's spiritual practice — Janus

Unless they turn out to be fallacious. Ideas have consequences.

I would say the form of the oak is inherent within, immanent to, the acorn, and I think Aristotle thought the same. — Janus

What Aristotle shows is that there necessarily is a form (actuality) which is prior to the potential (matter) of the acorn. This would be the prior oak tree. The prior oak tree puts the form into the acorn, and the existence of the acorn, as the potential for another tree is dependent on the existence of that prior form, the tree, as cause, just like art is dependent on the artist who puts the form into the piece of art.

This would be similar to the which came first, chicken or egg question. When it is put in terms of "actual" (form) and "potential" (matter), Aristotle shows why potential is always dependent on a prior actuality, so actuality is necessarily first. This is known as the cosmological argument, and the Christian theologists have adopted this necessary, prior actuality, as God.

The ensuing issue which is evident, is that from the materialist/physicalist perspective, we look at the temporal existence of physical objects, and we realize that in every case the potential for the object precedes the actual material existence of the object. The simplistic, monist, inclination tends toward the conclusion that potential is prior to actual, because of this materialist/physicalist perspective which inclines us to think in this way. Furthermore, our conceptions of time tend to bind time with physical/material actuality. This allows the materialist/physicalist to simply assume an unintelligible origin to material existence, as the potential for actual material existence is represented as prior to time.

The problem with this materialist/physicalist, monist, perspective which Aristotle demonstrates, is an issue with the nature of "potential". Potential provides the possibility to be actualized in a number of different ways. Not any single, specific actuality is necessitated by a condition of potential. But since there is in reality, one specific and particular actuality which proceeds (we might say emerges) from any condition of potential, we need to assume a cause of that particular actuality. There is a reason (cause) of why one particular actuality is derived from any condition of potential, rather than some other particular actuality. This is known as the contingency of material/physical existence. "Contingent existence" means that the particular material object which exists was necessitated by a cause. It is contingent on a cause. This cause is the necessary actuality, and the need to assume such an actuality negates the possibility of potential being prior to actual, in an absolute sense.

ou seem to be claiming it is something "abstract" that comes from "somewhere else". I don't believe Aristotle would agree with this (although Plato might, depending on how you interpret him). — Janus

What I am claiming, is what Aristotle actually painstakingly demonstrates. The prior actuality, which comes from "somewhere else", is not properly represented by spatial terms. In his "On the Soul" the soul is described as that prior actuality. And, he makes an effort to show that it is a mistake to represent this immaterial existence in spatial terms. In his "Metaphysics" he demonstrates why it is necessary to assume an actuality (Form) which is prior to all material existence (cosmological argument).

Today we know about something Aristotle didn't: DNA. So, the form of the oak is encoded within the DNA in the acorn. But that DNA comes from previous oaks, and there is no reason to think the DNA itself has not changed, evolved, over time from ancestor trees, precursors to the oaks and other types of trees that evolved along different lines.. — Janus

Don't you think that the presence of DNA requires a cause? If "DNA" represents the potential for a living body, and DNA exists as an actual material form (itself a material object), wouldn't you think that it's reasonable to believe that there is a specific cause of this particular and unique material object?

Suppose that prior to the existence of DNA there is some sort of "matter" which would serve as the potential for DNA. This matter would have to have a particular form to serve as that potential. Then we would have to assume another potential as prior to that form. As we proceed in this way, to avoid infinite regress, and also to properly represent the reality of the situation, the "potential" involved becomes more and more general, providing a wider range of possibility. So each time we step backward in time, toward the original material condition of possibility, the range of possibility gets greater, approaching infinity as the limit, in the manner of calculus. Consequently, the materialist perspective is to assume an original infinite potential (in Aristotelian terms, prime matter).

The cosmological argument shows the deficiency of this perspective. What happens, is that when we look backward in this way, toward the wider and wider range of possibility, the cause which 'chooses' to actualize this particular actuality rather than some other, becomes more and more important, as providing significant and very important direction. So the actuality which corresponds with this proposed possibility becomes more and more significant, in the sense of important or meaningful. In the case of your example, DNA, you can see that the actuality which 'chose' to create DNA, and not something random, is extremely significant. As we approach the limit, the proposed infinite potential, the magnitude of potential (number of possibilities) would get so high, and coincident to that (to provide the reality of that very high degree of possibility), the level of actuality must be conceived of as extremely low. However, the first step, of that actualizing cause, to go in the required direction, is at a correspondingly high (approaching infinite) level of importance, and this is not provided for by that extremely low level of actuality, logically necessitated by the high magnitude of possibility.. So the idea of that extremely important actualizing first cause, coming from that very low degree of actuality provided by the almost infinite potential, becomes just as highly (approaching infinity) improbable.

Something to consider about Monism is if it explains everything. There seems to be the principal of simple to complex and complex to simple...the full spectrum of things that work together.

One problem I see is if brains handle non-physical content then when you scale down there is no physically simple mechanism that exists to do that.

Just some observation might give some understanding though. This containing of non-physicals occurs in masses of neurons in neural networks that are connected to our senses and muscles through our central nervous system. This brings things to the physical scale we deal with.

If you want to propose information at the quantum level, then there is the problem of chain of control all the way from quantum events to our physical scale. The biological solution seems much more plausible.

I think the Dualist view might have better instincts about what mind is and the Monist view puts things off limits that should be part of philosophy.