↪Wayfarer
Do you really want to argue that Aristotle knew about DNA? — Janus

↪Wayfarer
Well of course they were a kind of precursor, since as I already said above, Aristotle thought the form of the oak to be immanent within the acorn, and not to be ordained by God or immaterial forms or whatever. — Janus

That response misses the point that Wayfarer was making. Of course Ari did not know the modern concept of DNA as a physical repository of genetic information. But, he captured the basic idea metaphorically, by using the philosophical concept of "Form". In his Hylomorph theory he made a pertinent distinction between physical Matter and metaphysical*1 Form. Those categories are equivalent to Quanta (res extensa) [that which you see] and Qualia (res cogitans) [that which you know]. Therefore, DNA could also be defined in Hylomorphic terms, as a combination of quantitative Matter (deoxyribonucleaic acid) and qualitative Form (genetic information).

The modern scientific concept of "Information" is similar to Aristotle's, in that it can exist both as mental logical pattern (general ; transcendent) and as material instantiation (specific ; immanent). Before Shannon, the word "information" referred only to the invisible intangible contents of private minds (ideas ; meanings). After Shannon, "information" was found to be transformable from res cogitans (ideas) into res extensa (objects). So, now Information is known to be both mental and material. FYI, that's the basis of my personal BothAnd worldview.

In the example of DNA, the instructions (design) for building a body are recorded in hundreds of spermata (blueprints), but normally only one instance of that design is actually constructed of protein building blocks. All the other wiggly packages of Potential are summarily erased, without being Actualized. By that, I mean the physical containers of metaphysical data are deconstructed by enzymes. So yes, the Form (data) is immanent (embedded ; recorded) in the physical acorn, but the Information (design) itself exists nowhere as non-physical logico-mathematical patterns (inter-relationships). In what sense does Math or Logic exist : extensa or cogitans? :smile:


*1. I use the term "Meta-physical" in the non-religious non-super-natural sense of merely non-physical or im-material. It's simply the abstract mind-stuff we call "ideas" or "meanings". There are no abstractions in reality, only in ideality. Those private ideas can only be conveyed to others when they are expressed in physical vibrations or light reflectance. But they exist covertly in the metaphysical container we call "Mind" to distinguish it from the physical machine known as "brain".

it seems that you are giving information multiple definitions for different things. Mind, Shannon, genetic, quantum.

You discount the most useful functions of brains if you rule out the ability to process non-physicals.

Pi for example is a non-physical... It does not physically exist. A ratio of circle circumference to diameter. Basic math, and it's a manipulations of brain states like this that are what information is about. Compare that to DNA molecules that are physically fixed and obviously they are not the same thing.

We agree that non-physicals do not exist, but what about brain contained non-physicals. I say that does exist and we use it all the time.

↪Gnomon
it seems that you are giving information multiple definitions for different things. Mind, Shannon, genetic, quantum.

You discount the most useful functions of brains if you rule out the ability to process non-physicals. — Mark Nyquist

Yes. Information is multi-faceted. It is universal, but emergent, and expressed in many different ways : ideas, data, genes, rocks, quantum bits, etc.--- even as Time/Change. If you want to blow your "information repository" (mind), check out the article*1 below by Sarah Walker, of the Santa Fe Institute for the study of Complexity. Her novel theory says that evanescent Time has a physical size, depending on the amount of information contained. It's OK to be incredulous --- I was, am --- but when you think about it, it makes sense, that Time is something a sentient observer can sense --- not by sniffing, but by reasoning.

Oh no, I don't rule-out the ability to process non-physical stuff. I explicitly rule it in. As I have come to understand it, largely by learning about quantum weirdness, Information exists in our world as both Mind (conscious matter) and Matter (physical forms)*2. So, for me, it now makes sense that a material information processor (brain) can generate the "non-physical" outputs that we call Ideas (as contrasted with Real objects). This theory is a novel form of Monism*3. :smile:

*1. Time is an object with physical size :
A new form of physics called assembly theory suggests that a moving, directional sense of time is real and fundamental. It suggests that the complex objects in our Universe that have been made by life, including microbes, computers and cities, do not exist outside of time: they are impossible without the movement of time. From this perspective, the passing of time is not only intrinsic to the evolution of life or our experience of the Universe. It is also the ever-moving material fabric of the Universe itself. Time is an object. It has a physical size, like space. And it can be measured at a molecular level in laboratories.
https://aeon.co/essays/time-is-not-an-illusion-its-an-object-with-physical-size

*2. Mind/Body Problem :
Philosophers and scientists have long debated the relationship between a physical body and its non-physical properties, such as Life & Mind. Cartesian Dualism resolved the problem temporarily by separating the religious implications of metaphysics (Soul) from the scientific study of physics (Body). But now scientists are beginning to study the mind with their precise instruments, and have found no line of demarcation. So, they see no need for the hypothesis of a spiritual Soul added to the body by God. However, Enformationism resolves the problem by a return to Monism, except that the fundamental substance is meta-physical Information instead of physical Matter.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page15.html

*3. Information is :
*** Claude Shannon quantified Information not as useful ideas, but as a mathematical ratio between meaningful order (1) and meaningless disorder (0); between knowledge (1) and ignorance (0). So, that meaningful mind-stuff exists in the limbo-land of statistics, producing effects on reality while having no sensory physical properties. We know it exists ideally, only by detecting its effects in the real world.
*** For humans, Information has the semantic quality of aboutness , that we interpret as meaning. In computer science though, Information is treated as meaningless, which makes its mathematical value more certain. It becomes meaningful only when a sentient Self interprets it as such.
*** When spelled with an “I”, Information is a noun, referring to data & things. When spelled with an “E”, Enformation is a verb, referring to energy and processes.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

The concept of information refers to a formalist (i.e. computational) description of systematic transformations (i.e. entropy), the necessary and sufficient conditions of which are its instantiation in physical processes. In other words, a "ghost" (i.e. disembodied – non-instantiable – string of operations) is nothing but an empty name.

(... an operational definition rather than a platonic reification fallacy ...)

@Gnomon @Wayfarer @Janus @Fooloso4

Thoughts?

But, he captured the basic idea metaphorically, by using the philosophical concept of "Form". In his Hylomorph theory he made a pertinent distinction between physical Matter and metaphysical*1 Form. — Gnomon

Isn’t Aristotle (and his teacher) one of the main reasons the ‘scientific revolution’ happened in Europe and not India or China? (Excellent undergrad essay topic.)

Pi for example is a non-physical... It does not physically exist. A ratio of circle circumference to diameter. Basic math, and it's a manipulations of brain states like this that are what information is about. Compare that to DNA molecules that are physically fixed and obviously they are not the same thing. — Mark Nyquist

The same goes for numbers generally, and any number of other intellectual objects, such as rules, laws, conventions and logical principles. They’re all constituents of rational thought, and none of them physical (although purportedly ‘supervening’ on it whatever that is taken to mean.)

But, he captured the basic idea metaphorically, by using the philosophical concept of "Form". In his Hylomorph theory he made a pertinent distinction between physical Matter and metaphysical*1 Form. — Gnomon

I already acknowledged that Aristotle's hylomorphism was prescient, so I don't know what point you think I missed. I do disagree with "metaphysical form"; the very idea seems meaningless to me; all forms are physical as far as I know.

I don't see any fundamental difference between mental and physical, so, nothing you've said there convinces me that mental information is not supervenient on physical processes.

Cheers Tom

Unless they turn out to be fallacious. Ideas have consequences. — Wayfarer

If an idea makes you miserable, or afraid, or ecstatic then yes it can have consequences. But such responses are not inherent in the idea: the same idea might make one person afraid and another ecstatic, for example.

Perhaps you are suggesting ideas might have afterlife consequences. I can't entirely rule that out, but how could you ever decide which idea, assuming that there is an afterlife, was the beneficial one? If rebirth is the right idea, then all the Christians who believe in resurrection are fucked, and vice versa for the Buddhists if resurrection is the right idea? All those who believe there is no afterlife are fucked regardless? The idea seems absurd to me, so I'll have to presume that is not what you meant, since I think you are a reasonably intelligent fellow.

When I said that I don't buy the idea that the form of the oak in the acorn comes from somewhere else I wasn't referring to previous oaks; in fact, I explicitly said so.

The concept of information refers to a formalist (i.e. computational) description of systematic transformations (i.e. entropy), the necessary and sufficient conditions of which are its instantiation in physical processes. — 180 Proof

I agree with you: the idea of non-physical information makes no sense at all to me, since all information requires a medium, and there does not seem to be any other medium than the physical as far as I can tell.

:up: :up:

Thoughts?

I realize your question wasn't directed at me, but my $0.02 anyway...

Provided your "computational" is meant to be construed broadly enough to include connectionism that sounds good to me.

an idea makes you miserable, or afraid, or ecstatic then yes it can have consequences. But such responses are not inherent in the idea: the same idea might make one person afraid and another ecstatic, for example. — Janus

Subjective and relative.

Meaning what?

:up:

So we deal with non-physicals. I think monism can handle that but it is worth a closer look or you will end up arguing for Dualism. Physical and non-physical.

I remember writing last week that all mental content is in the form of contained non-physicals.
That is probably not right. If you are in the presence of some object you will have the benefit of your direct physical senses. Sight, sound, touch. So then you have both active. Like at your job, there might be no substitute for putting eyes and hands on a problem.

Of course, we are always in our physical environment but our minds can be elsewhere.

I have not read enough of the information on information to have formed an informed concept. I agree that without physical processes there would be no information.

I think monism can handle that but it is worth a closer look or you will end up arguing for Dualism — Mark Nyquist

I think some formulation of Aristotelian matter-form dualism might be quite in keeping with anything that science turns up. Remember, it doesn’t posit the ‘spooky mind-stuff’ of Descartes, instead it is the conceptual division between matter and form.

There’s a major philosophical dispute in modern culture about the reality or otherwise of number. Invented or discovered? My view is that while artificial mathematical systems are clearly intellectual constructs, at least some of the primitive constituents of mathematics are discovered rather than invented. Likewise, there are any number of principles that can only be grasped by reasoned inference - scientific, mathematical and logical. They are not created by the mind, but can only be grasped by the mind. They are the basis of the synthetic a priori, and, contra empiricism, are grasped by faculties innate to the intellect, not derived from experience.

:up:

When I said that I don't buy the idea that the form of the oak in the acorn comes from somewhere else I wasn't referring to previous oaks; in fact, I explicitly said so. — Janus

Well, then what did you mean when you said you don't buy that idea. Obviously you accept as a reality, that the form comes from somewhere else, prior to the acorn, so why did you say that you don't buy that idea?

Since the form obviously comes from "somewhere else", then this is the reality that we need to understand, rather than to try and argue that the form's origin is that it is intrinsic to the acorn. In reality, the acorn is created as a purveyor of the form, which comes from somewhere else.

I think some formulation of Aristotelian matter-form dualism might be quite in keeping with anything that science turns up. — Wayfarer

The reality of the matter is that modern science is based in Aristotelian principles. While it's true that his physics and biology were superseded long ago, his logic and categories formed the basis for scholarly study throughout the formative period of early modern science.

By "somewhere else" which I originally presented in quotation marks I was referring to "some transcendent realm". Previous oaks are not, in this sense, "somewhere else".

But the issue is, that the form is always "somewhere else", prior to being in the material object which bears it. So if we postulate a chain of material objects of prior existence of the form (an acorn before the prior tree, and a tree before that acorn), we have an infinite regress. The infinite regress runs into the problem I explained, of extremely high (approaching infinite) improbability. So if we allow a first material object, the prior "somewhere else" must be a non-material existence (transcendent realm?).

It's not an infinite regress of fixed forms, but rather an evolution of forms.

It's not an infinite regress of fixed forms, but rather an evolution of forms. — Janus

Sure the form is not fixed. The point is that the form comes from a prior form. And if each is a material form, then there is an infinite regress of material forms. This causes the problem of improbability. The improbability of infinite regress is resolved by removing the requirement of matter. Then we have immaterial forms as prior to material forms. This solves the improbability problem that the "evolution of forms" otherwise leads to when adhering to the requirement that a form is material.

If the material forms are evolving, then how do the "immaterial forms" evolve prior to them in order to give rise to the former's evolution, and why would there not be the same problem of infinite regress with the latter (assuming for the sake of the argument that the idea of "immaterial forms" makes sense)?

I may have already participated, if not I'd add:

Why not monism? What we seek is to try and understand how everything fits together, what is it about the world that allows so much variety, if the base constituents are simple, as they seem to be?

You can choose to accept pluralism, like William James and simply marvel at the multifaceted aspects of the world - this is valuable and instructive especially in terms of aesthetic appreciation. But it won't get you far, it seems to me to stop the search for underlying principles.

And who knows, the actual monism that exists in the world may be quite different from the idea we commonly get from monism in intuiting only a single thing, like a metaphysical big bang type substance. It could be very different from such notions.

You can choose to accept pluralism, like William James and simply marvel at the multifaceted aspects of the world - this is valuable and instructive especially in terms of aesthetic appreciation. But it won't get you far, it seems to me to stop the search for underlying principles — Manuel

As long as it's a dynamic, nonreductive monism, I'm cool with it. :up:

If the material forms are evolving, then how do the "immaterial forms" evolve prior to them in order to give rise to the former's evolution, and why would there not be the same problem of infinite regress with the latter (assuming for the sake of the argument that the idea of "immaterial forms" makes sense)? — Janus

The infinite regress is the result of the materialist/monist perspective which requires that a material form is always the cause of another material form. This produces the endless chain of causation commonly understood as the problem with determinism. By introducing the immaterial cause, the endless chain is broken because this cause is of a distinct type, category, or substance, as implied by "substance dualism". With this principle we can say that it is not necessary that there is a material object which is prior, as cause, of every material object. We thereby allow for real true causation of what would appear from the materialist/monist perspective as the spontaneous generation of a material object. From the materialist/monist perspective this would be nothing other than magic (or a highly improbable symmetry breaking, or random fluctuation), but from the dualist perspective there is a true cause, the immaterial cause.

The question of "how" this occurs is unanswerable because of the current deficiencies of human knowledge. But understanding reality in this way provides us with the direction we must take if we want to expand our knowledge so as to be able to answer this question. From this perspective it becomes very clear that our understanding of time is inadequate. We base our measurements of the passing of time on observed changes to material forms. This limits or restricts our measurements and applications to that theatre, changing material forms. But if we allow the reality of changing immaterial forms, and the possibility that immaterial forms can change without necessarily resulting in any change to any material forms (a true proposition by thinking without acting), then we must conclude that time may pass without any change to material forms. This truth will open our minds to the reality of periods of time which are shorter than physically possible (when "physically" is restricted by observed changes to material forms).

I already acknowledged that Aristotle's hylomorphism was prescient, so I don't know what point you think I missed. I do disagree with "metaphysical form"; the very idea seems meaningless to me; all forms are physical as far as I know.

I don't see any fundamental difference between mental and physical, so, nothing you've said there convinces me that mental information is not supervenient on physical processes. — Janus

I understand that, from a Monistic Materialist/Physicalist perspective, matter is the sole substance in the world. But, some physicists, especially quantum physicists, have concluded that non-physical Information is more fundamental than any material substance*1. That's why they now call the basis of reality a spacious massless mathematical "field" instead of a minature massive particle. I'm not a physicist, so I'll let you argue with the scientists about those counter-intuitive conclusions.

So, what you missed is Aristotle's reason for defining physical objects as a combination ("compound") of two essences : physical material observable "hyle" and non-physical mental logical "form"*2. Why didn't he just specify a single "physical entity"? I guess it's for the same reason that modern quantum physicists still think in terms of physical local particles, even though their theory now accepts non-local non-physical Fields as fundamental. It's just easier to think in terms of things you can see & touch, instead of non-things that exist only in the realm of theory.

Anyway, I think I understand where you are coming from. But I left that classical physics position behind many years ago, when I started studying the cutting-edge of modern physics. For people who never travel beyond the valley they were born in, and don't have access to satellite imagery, the Flat Earth concept adequately serves their pragmatic needs. Likewise, materialistic classical physics still serves the needs of those who don't push the boundaries of reality*3. So, I'm not trying to denigrate your worldview, but just to help you understand mine. In the new information-centric physics, Information is not "supervenient" upon matter, but matter is an emergent form of Generic Information*4. Hence, immaterial Information is the essential substance of the new Monism. :smile:


*1. Is information the only thing that exists? :
Physics suggests information is more fundamental than matter, energy, space and time – the problems start when we try to work out what that means.
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23431191-500-inside-knowledge-is-information-the-only-thing-that-exists/

*2. Hylomorphism is a philosophical doctrine developed by the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, which conceives every physical entity or being (ousia) as a compound of matter (potency) and immaterial form (act), with the generic form as immanently real within the individual.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism

*3. Classical physics is no longer used in research -- it says that mass is conserved, time is absolute, there is no laser possible, quantum levels do not exist, and the hypothesis of continuity is true. Mass is only conserved as an illusion, its value changes according to E0=mc2, and binding energy.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Would-be-better-for-students-to-avoid-classical-physics

*4. Is Information Physical and Does It Have Mass? :
Some researchers suggest that information is a form of matter, calling it the fifth state of matter or the fifth element. Recent results from the general theory of information (GTI) contradict this. This paper aims to explain and prove that the claims of adherents of the physical nature of information are inaccurate due to the confusion between the definitions of information, the matter that represents information, and the matter that is a carrier of information. Our explanations and proofs are based on the GTI because it gives the most comprehensive definition of information, encompassing and clarifying many of the writings in the literature about information. GTI relates information, knowledge, matter, and energy, and unifies the theories of material and mental worlds using the world of structures. According to GTI, information is not physical by itself, although it can have physical and/or mental representations. Consequently, a bit of information does not have mass, but the physical structure that represents the bit indeed has mass.
https://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/13/11/540
Sci is an international, open access journal which covers all research fields and is published quarterly online by MDPI.



QUANTUM FIELD : matter is the dots ; information is the links

Why didn't he just specify a single "physical entity"? — Gnomon

According to Aristotle biological beings are a single physical entity. There are no separate forms and hyle floating around waiting to be combined. There is not one without the other, substantiated in living physical entities, that is, substances.

Why not monism? What we seek is to try and understand how everything fits together, what is it about the world that allows so much variety, if the base constituents are simple, as they seem to be?

You can choose to accept pluralism, like William James and simply marvel at the multifaceted aspects of the world - this is valuable and instructive especially in terms of aesthetic appreciation. But it won't get you far, it seems to me to stop the search for underlying principles.

And who knows, the actual monism that exists in the world may be quite different from the idea we commonly get from monism in intuiting only a single thing, like a metaphysical big bang type substance. It could be very different from such notions. — Manuel

Good point! The general or universal Principles that Plato & Aristotle referred to are not physical objects, or even one primary object among many. Instead, a Principle is an assumption or axiom serving as a premise for explaining Complexity *1 *2. Obviously, those assumed principles are not empirical physical objects, but theoretical meta-physical*3 concepts. They are the presumed Wholes that overly Plurality like a blanket.

Since we are just guessing about those long-ago and far-away principles, we can't say for sure what the ultimate Monism of the world actually is. The Big Bang (act of creation) was one such hypothetical Monism or Principle intended to explain the plurality of physical entities in the universe. It was an alternative to traditional Genesis-like God-Monisms. But even that so-called "Singularity" has been hacked into bits, as we search for a more satisfactory explanation for "how everything fits together". Nevertheless, the notion of all-encompassing Monism meets the philosophical principle of Simplicity within Complexity espoused by Ockham. :smile:

PS___For the record : What I mean by this modern usage of the ancient term "metaphysics", is not supernatural or spiritual entities, but the natural concepts or feelings or principles that we call unique "Qualia" to distinguish them from enumerable "Quanta"*3.


*1. Principle :
Principle in philosophy and mathematics means a fundamental law or assumption.
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Principle

*2. Axiom :
An axiom is a foundational premise that is supposed to be self evident.
http://www.gavinjensen.com/blog/2014/5/29/introduction-to-some-philosophical-principles

*3. PHYSICS : OVERT QUANTA . . . . METAPHYSICS : COVERT QUALIA
***Quantifiable things are easy to talk about, because we can point to them and enumerate them. For example, "woman" is the female half of the Sapiens species. We can recognize them by their quantitative features : tits, ass, etc. These are itemized parts of the whole we categorize as "female". But "femaleness"or "femininity" is a Qualia, which is not so easy to express in specific words. It's a je ne sais quoi , (I can't say what) or (I can't be specific). And "quoi" (pronounced "qua") may be etymologically related to Latin "qualia". So, it's the quality of wholeness that is knowable in general, but difficult to express in particular words.
***Physicalism is all about Quanta (things), while Meta-physicalism is about Qualia (ideas or opinions or feelings about things). Quanta (e.g. boobies) are sensuous --- we can see & touch them. But Qualia (femininity) are intellectual, because they are invisible & intangible.
***Feelings are holistic, and difficult to express in words. We gesture when we talk, in order to express the unspeakable. In philosophy, we use metaphors to conjure images of things unseen (qualia).

If there mist be a first cause, which is by no means established. I see no reason why it could not be a material cause. With the idea of an immaterial cause you have the problem of understanding how something immaterial or non-physical could effect the material or physical. Either way, there is no guarantee that reality must operate in accordance with human reasoning.

The idea that information is ontologically fundamental, not to mention non-physical, is very far from being a consensus view among contemporary physicists as far as I am aware, so your lame attempt to cast my questioning of the idea as coming from a mindset mired in classical physics is laughable.

I knew that the paradigmatic idea that information is fundamental is Wheeler's notion of "it from bit", so I searched on that and found this abstract from here:

Since special relativity and quantum mechanics, information has become a central concept in our description and understanding of physical reality. This statement may be construed in different ways, depending on the meaning we attach to the concept of information, and on our ontological commitments. One distinction is between mind-independent ‘Shannon information’ and a traditional conception of information, connected with meaning and knowledge. Another, orthogonal, distinction is between information considered as a fundamental physical entity (Wheeler’s ‘it from bit’), and an ontological agnosticism where physics is about our information of the world rather than about the world itself. Combinations of these lead to various possibilities. I argue that adopting mind-independent information as ontologically fundamental is a hitherto undefended position with important advantages. This position appears similar to Floridi’s informational structural realism, but is fundamentally different. Rather than ‘epistemically indistinguishable differences’, it requires a robust conception of information as consisting of readable and interpretable messages.

Note that according to the author Wheeler conceived of information, not as non-physical, but as "a fundamental physical entity"!

You also might want to read this to educate yourself as to the diversity of views on the matter of information.

This is nice apt summation:

According to Aristotle biological beings are a single physical entity. There are no separate forms and hyle floating around waiting to be combined. There is not one without the other, substantiated in living physical entities, that is, substances. — Fooloso4

If there mist be a first cause, which is by no means established. I see no reason why it could not be a material cause. — Janus

I'm not arguing a "first cause", I am arguing a cause of material existence. This is an actuality which is prior to material existence, as cause of material existence. Since it is prior to material existence it is immaterial.

All material things have a cause. This is essential to the nature of being a material thing. Material things are generated and destroyed, they are contingent. This is simply the defining feature of being composed of matter. So a material thing without a cause (which is what would be required for a material thing to be the first cause), would require changing the definition of "matter". But then we would just be within a different conceptual structure from the Aristotelian hylomorphism. If that's what you want, go right ahead, but how would you propose to define "matter"?

Either way, there is no guarantee that reality must operate in accordance with human reasoning. — Janus

This is not the issue. The issue is to conform human reasoning to be consistent with reality. If we assume something uncaused, like your proposed material first cause, then this thing is designated as unintelligible to us. A significant part of understanding things is learning the cause of them. So when we stipulate that a certain thing is uncaused (like spontaneous generation for example) we are designating that thing as unintelligible in that respect.

What we have here is a case of human reason not operating in accordance with reality. Reality, as we know it, is that all things have a cause (principle of sufficient reason). So when we allow ourselves to say that such and such a thing has no cause, we are really allowing our reasoning to be not in accordance with reality, by accepting this premise. So to conform our reasoning to be in accordance with reality to the maximum extent that we know reality, we must deny this premise of an uncaused material cause.