From a top-down perspective, we can understand that cooperation problems in our universe must be solved by all beings that form sustainably cooperative societies. Further, game theory shows that for these strategies for intelligent, independent agents to be successful, violators must be punished. Hence, just as predicted, cultural moral norms exist and can be identified as norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. — Mark S
Because it is empirically true.
From a bottom-up perspective, all past and present cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment) can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S
Proposed counterexamples of moral norms that are not parts of cooperation strategies are always welcome. — Mark S
Deontology is not "the traditional perspective" but one traditional perspective. There are others.— Fooloso4
First, I agree. Second, deontology was not mentioned.
I was talking about imperative oughts being the traditional perspective. By imperative ought I mean “what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences”. It has been my reading of traditional moral philosophy that imperative oughts, not conditional ones, are what are being assumed in most proposed moral systems, not just Kant's categorical imperatives. Is that incorrect? — Mark S
To me the most interesting aspect of morality is whether anyone can demonstrate objective goals. — Tom Storm
traffic rules can be explained in terms of cooperation strategies, yet they are not commonly understood as moral rules. So something more specific about morality seems to be left out in your functional analysis. — neomac
If that's true, then how come that societies in the past and present do not have the same cultural moral norms? As I said there are also cultural clashes because societies do not share the same moral cultural norms, so maybe there are limits to the possibility of cooperation which morality must account for. But if cooperation is not possible, then what's left to do with societies with non-shared cultural moral norms? Exploitation? — neomac
... so it seems you are suggesting that there are cultural moral norms which might fail to meet the function you are attributing to them. And failing to meet a certain function may also mean that there is no such intrinsic function, the function is an external criterion. — neomac
There are imperatives. Imperatives are of two kinds, hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative carries the weight of an “ought” and is conditioned by desire, a categorical carries the weight of a “shall” and is conditioned by moral law, desire be what it may.
There is no Kantian categorically imperative “ought”, and traditional moral philosophy other than deontology treats conditional oughts as hypothetical imperatives, while deontologically grounded moral philosophy merely grants conditional oughts, but assigns no proper moral quality to them.
Your wording is confusing I think. — Mww
Choosing as a moral reference the function of human morality - moral 'means' as cooperation strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma - gives us two constraints on moral behavior:
Acting morally requires acting consistently with cooperation strategies
The goals of morality cannot be achieved by exploitation — Mark S
….the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought. — Mark S
If I use the term imperative ought in the future, I will include what it refers to and point out its similarity to Kant’s categorical imperative. — Mark S
]….the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought.
— Mark S
To be moral belongs to the agent in possession of the means for being so. It follows that “what makes it moral” is not quite the correct iteration, when it is much closer to the case that it should be, “what makes me moral?”. — Mww
Cultural moral norms are diverse, contradictory, and strange mainly because of 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups.
Understanding the origins of these differences provides an objective basis for groups to resolve them. Groups may not always be able to resolve their differences (different goals for moral behavior may be intractable), but at least they can focus on the right issues. — Mark S
The irony is that you keep pointing at an issue of your definition of morality as solving cooperation problems which then you refuse to acknowledge. If cultural moral norms define "who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups" and related "markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups" which are at the origin of moral differences and clashes then cultural moral norms can solve AS MUCH AS can generate cooperation problems ! — neomac
Such discussions would be much more likely to be resolved than if the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms remained mysterious. — Mark S
Such discussions would be much more likely to be resolved than if the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms remained mysterious.
— Mark S
That is more likely expresses your confidence (or hope?), it doesn't constitute evidence that your theory can actually contribute to solve moral clashes. — neomac
My claim is that Morality as Cooperation Strategies can contribute to rational discussions about which moral norms to enforce. Specifically, understanding the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes. — Mark S
The present chief barrier to resolving moral disputes by rational discussion is the existing murky, mysterious origins and power of cultural moral norms. Morality as Cooperation Strategies removes that barrier. — Mark S
And your claim is that a culture and mind-independent understanding of the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will NOT provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes? I can’t make any sense of that. — Mark S
And your claim is that a culture and mind-independent understanding of the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will NOT provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes? I can’t make any sense of that.
— Mark S
My claim is simply that you didn’t provide evidence, so neither that there are not such evidences nor that there won’t be. Try to have a rational discussion with muslims while claiming that putting a head-scarf is a way for men to exploit women, so this cultural moral norm is wrong because cultural moral norms are there to solve cooperation problems. — neomac
Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. It is irrelevant to my arguments that there are people who will reject them for irrational reasons such as "God told them something different". — Mark S
The first claim doesn't make sense to me: it sounds as if you are claiming that evidences are based on an empirical theory.... — neomac
"confirms my suspects: taking "solving cooperation problems" as a rational condition (à la Gert) to establish what "morality" is, it's a NORMATIVE criterion,
"it's external to actual historical cultural moral norms, not descriptive of them (against what you seemed to be claiming in past posts). And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms. — neomac
Are there goals shared by all well-informed, rational people? — Mark S
Are there goals shared by all well-informed, rational people?
— Mark S
Even if that were the case (which I do not doubt), it would have no significance for moral duties because, as Hume already stated, one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is." — Jacques
Meanwhile, I believe I understand what you're getting at. I will do my best to compose a satisfactory answer to it, but it will take a few more days, I'm sorry to say.Can anyone explain
1) the continued philosophical interest in, and too common assumption of, “imperative oughts” that do not seem to exist and
2) the apparent lack of philosophical interest in universal moralities based on conditional oughts such as Morality as Cooperation Strategies? — Mark S
1) the continued philosophical interest in, and too common assumption of, “imperative oughts” that do not seem to exist and
2) the apparent lack of philosophical interest in universal moralities based on conditional oughts such as Morality as Cooperation Strategies.
Can anyone explain it? — Mark S
People aren't much interested in morality as a subject, but they're happy to hold unexamined 'oughts' which can be used to judge others. Morality functions as a series of prejudices and biases. — Tom Storm
My surprise and puzzlement is about the continued interest in the illusion of imperative oughts among people who spend their lives studying morality - moral philosophers. — Mark S
When the topic is "moral oughts", I do not understand the combination of
1) the continued philosophical interest in, and too common assumption of, “imperative oughts” that do not seem to exist and
2) the apparent lack of philosophical interest in universal moralities based on conditional oughts such as Morality as Cooperation Strategies.
Can anyone explain it? — Mark S
The lack of interest in moral concepts based on conditional norms of oughtness can be explained by the fact that it represents a relatively simple problem. When the goal is known, it is relatively easy to reach a consensus on how it can be achieved. — Jacques
I am keenly interested in why you say:
The first claim doesn't make sense to me: it sounds as if you are claiming that evidences are based on an empirical theory.... — neomac
Your interpretation is, strangely, the opposite of what I am arguing.
My first claim was: “Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.”
Perhaps we need a review of how science, including the science of morality, proceeds to conclusions:
1. Assemble an interesting category of phenomena such as “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” - This is the data set to be explained.
2. Look for hypotheses that explain why this entire data set of phenomena exist – perhaps cooperation strategies, or acting for the good of everyone (utilitarianism), or a means of social control imposed by the powerful, or ?
3. If one hypothesis is far better than any competing one at explaining this huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set, we have a potential theory.
4. If the potential theory meets other relevant criteria for scientific truth such as simplicity and integration with the rest of science, then we have a theory explaining that data set. That theory may become generally accepted as provisionally true (the normal kind of truth in science) or rejected, with rejection usually in favor a new theory that better explains the data set.
Hence:
“Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.” — Mark S
Then you say:
"confirms my suspects: taking "solving cooperation problems" as a rational condition (à la Gert) to establish what "morality" is, it's a NORMATIVE criterion,
"it's external to actual historical cultural moral norms, not descriptive of them (against what you seemed to be claiming in past posts). And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms. — neomac
Do you see why they don’t make any sense?
The theory is empirical, not “external” because it is based on its explanatory power for the huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set of “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” (plus meeting other relevant criteria for scientific truth).
Are you arguing that “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” is external to what morality ‘is’? — Mark S
Finally, you say:
“And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms.”
I have already done this in this thread and will repeat it here for convenience and emphasis.
“In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.
All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal dilemma. This includes people and our ancestors.”
The above describes why the cooperation problems morality solves are innate to our universe. The solutions relevant to morality are primarily cooperation strategies such as indirect reciprocity. — Mark S
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