@Paine @Janus @Srap Tasmaner @Manuel

I continue, into the 2nd meditation, to assert that “perceiving” and “perception” is not a natural brain process that needs to be explained, but the activity of coming to consciously understand the ordinary criteria and conditions that something “consists of”, thus, when Descartes says “whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true” I take it that, when we are able to clearly and distinctly uncover the criteria and conditions of something, we understand how something is deemed to be “true”; what set of characteristics (criteria) it is logically necessary to conform or align with or be consistent or faithful to; what “truth” is (consists of) in this instance.

Edit: “my understanding of what a thing is, what truth is, and what thought is, derive purely from my own nature, which means that it is innate”

To say that: how something will be deemed true, such as a royal succession or an apology; what makes up a “thought”—thoughtful, thought out; or tells what is essential to us about a “thing”—what kind of object anything is, Wittgenstein will say, PI #373, which is revealed by what he terms “grammar”: the terms of the possibilities of something, Id. #90. (As an aside, he just after characterizes this connection as “Theology as Grammar”, which I have never been able to figure out.)—to say that these “understandings” are innate, arise from my own nature, is to point to something within us, that we are born with, or into, as are Plato’s forms. My answer to this are the activities, practices, judgments, etc. which are ingrained into us, unreflected upon—what we would consider “natural”—as a member of a culture.

It's unclear how to proceed with this passage, due to the differences in the aims of his project back then and what we know now.

I think what he has in mind simply the notion that when we perceive something in a manner in which we cannot say we obstructed by anything, say, bad vision or a confused understanding, we should take the experienced thing as true. It's complicated a bit by the fact that he mentions that things like colors are "obscurely" understood, which I believe he states in the Third Meditation, but we can set this aside for now.

My own impression is that when we do see things clearly, say a chair or a tree, we simply see clearly and distinctly, but I'm not confident it makes sense to say that the experience is either true or false, I hesitate here between thinking such judgments are true, or that truth doesn't arise.

I agree with him on the innateness claim, as I just don't see an alternative, unless we attribute cognition to the world. As for practices, activities and so forth, fine, so long as it is recognized that whatever these things are, and however they may vary, they are still innate to us as human beings, in other words it's within the range of what human beings do, necessarily.

I think what he has in mind simply the notion that when we perceive something in a manner in which we cannot say we obstructed by anything, say, bad vision or a confused understanding, we should take the experienced thing as true. — Manuel

Descartes' example of the wax is instructive. His senses do not yield a clear and distinct perception of the wax.

In the second meditation he says:

Rather, it is purely a perception by the mind alone – formerly an imperfect and confused one, but now clear and distinct because I am now concentrating carefully on what the wax consists in.

Clear and distinct perception requires reasoned thought.

He goes on to ask:

When was my perception of the wax’s nature more perfect and clear? Was it when I first looked at the wax, and thought I knew it through my senses? Or is it now, after I have enquired more carefully into the wax’s nature and into how it is known?

It is, of course, the latter, but what is it that he come to know clearly and distinctly about the wax based on his inquiry? From the third meditation:

For if I examine them [his ideas of bodies] thoroughly, one by one, as I did the idea of the wax yesterday, I realize that the following short list gives everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly in them: size, or extension in length, breadth and depth; shape, which is a function of the boundaries of this extension; position, which is a relation between various items possessing shape; motion, or change in position.

To these may be added substance, duration and number.

Based on this list the question arises as to how his clear and distinct perception of the wax differs from his perception of some other object. He is correct that to perceive nature of an object requires the intellect, but it seems problematic to exclude the senses from such inquiry.

That's the one issue which I have a problem with his account: colors and senses are called by him (and Leibniz too, I would add) "obscure", presumably because he can't find the whatever is composite of certain, or maybe all colors. Maybe Leibniz had light or paint in mind, but he was arguing that green was mixture of yellow and blue, something like that.

Irrespective of that, it seems to me the colors, specifically (though sound too) are amongst the clearest aspects of conscious experience I can think of.

So that part of his account is confusing because color experience is manifestly evident, so the account looks incomplete.

Positing God as an innate idea, rather than being an escape from solipsism, further isolates him. — Fooloso4

That would be the case if the thinking activity is an unbroken circle. But the experience of being imperfect does not permit that:

Nor should I think that I do not perceive the infinite by means of a true idea, but only through a negation of the finite, just as I perceive rest and darkness by means of a negation of motion and light. On the contrary, I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than there is in a finite one. Thus the perception of the infinite is somehow prior in me to the perception of the finite, that is, my perception of God is prior to my perception of myself. For how would I understand that I [46] doubt and that I desire, that is, that I lack something and that I am not wholly perfect, unless there were some idea in me of a more perfect being, by comparison with which I might recognize my defects? — ibid. page 45

The substance he can imagine providing to a stone or a lump of wax is not the same as how he can conceive of God's 'objective' reality.

That the comparison between the 'finite' and the 'infinite' requires the means of a negation is where doubt comes from. The experiment of the Meditation may provide a way out of solipsism, but it does not overcome the condition of being a doubting substance. That is why we have to crab forward by means of clear and distinct ideas.

When one factors in this primary condition, your question:

Is it true that what is more perfect cannot arise from what is less perfect? We are told that the triangle we draw is never a perfect triangle. A perfect triangle would be one that does not contain any of the defects of the one the drawing is supposed to be a representative of. It is from imperfection that we get the idea of perfection. In more general terms, it is from absence, lack or want, from the desire to have more or be more, that we get the idea of completion and satisfaction, of perfection. — Fooloso4

is what Descartes is addressing when he says:

And although one idea can perhaps issue from another, nevertheless no infinite regress is permitted here; eventually some first idea must be reached whose cause is a sort of archetype that contains formally all the reality that is in the idea merely objectively. Thus it is clear, to me by the light of nature that the ideas that are in me are like images that can easily fail to match the perfection of the things from which they have been drawn, but which can contain nothing greater or more perfect. — Descartes, Third Meditation, translated by Donald A Cress, pg 28

... my perception of God is prior to my perception of myself. — ibid. page 45

Starting, as Descartes does, with doubt, what is first is that he exists.

For how would I understand that I [46] doubt and that I desire, that is, that I lack something and that I am not wholly perfect, unless there were some idea in me of a more perfect being, by comparison with which I might recognize my defects? — ibid. page 45

The reason he doubts is because he desires to find something certain and indubitable. Recognizing that he has been deceived by his senses does not require the idea of a more perfect being, only the recognition that his senses have sometimes deceived him.

Toward the end of the third meditation he says:

I understand that I am a thing... which aspires without limit to ever greater and better things

And in the fourth meditation:

I know by experience that will is entirely without limits.

and:

My will is so perfect and so great that I can’t conceive of its becoming even greater and more perfect ...

So, it seems that the source of his idea of something perfect and without limits could be himself.

And although one idea can perhaps issue from another, nevertheless no infinite regress is permitted here — Descartes, Third Meditation, translated by Donald A Cress, pg 28

It is interesting that in arguing for an infinite idea he rejects the idea of an infinite regress of ideas.

To say that: how something will be deemed true, such as a royal succession or an apology; what makes up a “thought”—thoughtful, thought out; or tells what is essential to us about a “thing”—what kind of object anything is, Wittgenstein will say, PI #373, which is revealed by what he terms “grammar”: the terms of the possibilities of something, Id. #90. (As an aside, he just after characterizes this connection as “Theology as Grammar”, which I have never been able to figure out.)—to say that these “understandings” are innate, arise from my own nature, is to point to something within us, that we are born with, or into, as are Plato’s forms. My answer to this are the activities, practices, judgments, etc. which are ingrained into us, unreflected upon—what we would consider “natural”—as a member of a culture. — Antony Nickles

I don't understand how reference to "the activities, practices, judgments, etc. which are ingrained into us, unreflected upon" relates to the use of the "I" in Descartes' speech.

I have the same doubts about how this relates to Wittgenstein in the comment that I raised before and encounter a new one when you mention 'Theology as Grammer", Consider the different way thinking is being observed by the two philosophers. At the very least, would you not acknowledge a difference between the "I" that observes the thinking activity as an immediate event by Descartes and something like this from Wittgenstein?:

378. "Before I judge that two images which I have are the same, I must recognize them as the same." And when that has happened, how am I to know that the word "same" describes what I recognize? Only if I can express my recognition in some other way, and if it is possible for someone else to teach me that "same" is the correct word here.

For if I need a justification for using a word, it must also be one for someone else. — Wittgenstein, PI 378

From this perspective, Wittgenstein is bringing into doubt what Descartes does not question during his project.

The reason he doubts is because he desires to find something certain and indubitable. Recognizing that he has been deceived by his senses does not require the idea of a more perfect being, only the recognition that his senses have sometimes deceived him. — Fooloso4

The imperfection being experienced does not only come from the uncertainty of what is reported by the senses. The other modes of thinking have him wanting some events and wishing to avoid orhers where his lack of understanding and limited power to influence events gives him to see the 'thinking' substance as finite. The infinite can only be conceived by means of the negation.

If one wants to overcome this limitation in conceivability, by some sort of Anselmian trebuchet whereby that idea is also a derivative of the thinking substance, Descartes says that argument depends on being the source of one's existence:

From what source, then, do I derive my existence? Why, from myself, or from my parents, or from whatever other things there are that are less perfect than God. For nothing more perfect than God, or even as perfect as God, can be thought or imagined. But if I got my being from myself, I would not doubt, nor would I desire, nor would I lack anything at all. For I would have given myself all the perfections of which I have some idea; in so doing, I myself would be God! I must not think that the things I lack could perhaps be more difficult to acquire than the ones I have now. On the contrary, it is obvious that it would have been much more difficult for me (that is, a thing or substance that thinks) to emerge out of nothing than it would be to acquire the knowledge of many things about which I am ignorant (these items of {33} knowledge being merely accidents of that substance). Certainly, if I got this greater thing from myself, I would not have denied myself at least those things that can be had more easily. Nor would I have denied myself any of those other things that I perceive to be contained in the idea of God, for surely none of them seem to me more difficult to bring about. But if any of them were more difficult to bring about, they would certainly also seem more difficult to me, even if the remaining ones that I possess I got from myself, since it would be on account of them that I would experience that my power is limited. — ibid. page 50

That segues into the passage you quoted earlier about the pointillism of an existence that needs to be reconstituted every moment. This perspective makes this 'finite substance' a lot less grounded than the mortal soul pictured by Aristotle to be activated by a divine intellect. The 'natural light' is a flashlight compared to the cosmic lantern the old guys were using.

It is interesting that in arguing for an infinite idea he rejects the idea of an infinite regress of ideas. — Fooloso4

I think that shows Descartes agreeing with the Scholastics that an infinite series of causes must go back to what is not caused in the same way as our logos would order it: The unmoved mover blocking any view of what "self-causing" might be:

And although one idea can perhaps issue from another, nevertheless no infinite regress is permitted here; eventually some first idea must be reached whose cause is a sort of archetype that contains formally all the reality that is in the idea merely objectively. — ibid. page 42

.

The infinite can only be conceived by means of the negation. — Paine

Do you mean that the infinite is conceived by what is not infinite? If so, this is the opposite of what Descartes is claiming.

Is there some equivocation in the passage you cited:

For how would I understand that I [46] doubt and that I desire, that is, that I lack something and that I am not wholly perfect, unless there were some idea in me of a more perfect being, by comparison with which I might recognize my defects? — ibid. page 45

between wholly perfect and more perfect? For example, from the fourth meditation:

The more skilled the craftsman, the more perfect the thing that he makes ...

What the craftsman makes might be more or less perfect but is never wholly perfect. And as quoted before:

My will is so perfect and so great that I can’t conceive of its becoming even greater and more perfect ...

The term 'more perfect' allows for improvement, for greater perfection. It seems to follow that something more perfect rather than something wholly perfect is sufficient for me to recognize my lack of perfection.

From what source, then, do I derive my existence? — ibid. page 50

There is a shift from the source of my ideas to the source of my existence. He argues that the source cannot be something less perfect than himself. For this reason he rejects his parents as the source of his existence. But surely he knows enough biology and animal husbandry to know that a more perfect offspring can come from less perfect parents. The source need not be something wholly perfect or even more perfect.

At the end of the fourth meditation he says:

This is where man’s greatest and most important perfection is to be found ... If I restrain my will so that I form opinions only on what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, I cannot possibly go wrong.

His ability to avoid error and thus become more perfect comes from himself. The more perfect from the less perfect.

I think that shows Descartes agreeing with the Scholastics that an infinites series of causes must go back to what is not caused ... — Paine

Descartes does not agree against an infinite regress of causes but against an infinite regress of ideas (third meditation). He argues that the cause must have at least as much reality as the effect, but this does not mean that there cannot be a regress of causes. Perhaps the idea that there must be a limit only marks a limit to our understanding of what is without limit.

@Janus @Srap Tasmaner @Manuel @frank

I don't understand how reference to "the activities, practices, judgments, etc. which are ingrained into us, unreflected upon" relates to the use of the "I" in Descartes' speech. — Paine

You’d have to show me where in the Descartes. My quote you are commenting after is in response to Descartes paragraph starting “Among my ideas, some seem to be innate”, but I do not see him making the point about our self (“I”) as above.

—Edit: I see now what you might be getting at. When I say “society” or “cultural” or “conformity” they are a catch-all which includes our lives over thousands of years which have attuned into what I am describing as “the activities, practices, judgments, etc. which are ingrained into us, unreflected upon", which I am reading Descartes to echo. But I will leave my original response below.—

If you are responding to my interpretation of his assertion of his self, I would not say it is connected to my interpretation of Descartes describing thought as a list of activities (in the 2nd Med.) other than I take thought, not as a given, continually-occurring brain activity (like talking to yourself, or, as you say “something that is always there”) which some take that he then notices and concludes that, because of our self-awareness, he must be something, but that, as he says, “while” he is asserting something—which I take as a sense of what “thinking” is, as an activity, in this case, asserting (what I argue is in relation to our culture)—then he is manifesting his self, thus: “I think. I am.”, to be understood as “[[b]while[/b]] I think [i.e., assert myself], I am [me].” I realize now that asserting yourself is not just in aversion to society or culture but can also be to be with society, as an act of, say, accepting expectations as your own duty, to define one’s self. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify.

I have the same doubts about how this relates to Wittgenstein in the comment that I raised before and encounter a new one when you mention 'Theology as Grammer" — Paine

I don’t think it is appropriate here to get into a side argument about what Wittgenstein is doing, instead of just focusing on what I take Descartes to be doing in the spirit of a non-metaphysical inquiry as Wittgenstein did. That said, I take this reference to be to this comment:

By speaking of an ‘indescribable part of myself which cannot be pictured by the imagination', it seems to me that Descartes is pointing at something that is always there but is not understood. In the Third Meditation, Descartes says he needs the existence of God to find grounds for its relation to all of his activities. That seems the opposite approach of Wittgenstein, who describes our use of language to show what it is for us. — Paine

It would be easier if you spelled a few things out for me. I’m not sure where/if Descartes does make the claim about needing God; I do take Wittgenstein as going through examples to show something, but I take that as, partly, that there is different grammar for each example so not just one way the world (thus language) works, so I don’t know what you mean that he is showing “what it is for us”—is “it” language? Language is different for us than God?—And then how is what you take as Descartes’ need for God related to what you are taking Wittgenstein to show us? That Descartes needs certainty (perfection) to communicate where “for us”, i.e., “our use of language” is different? And, as I don’t understand Wittgenstein’s theology as grammar quote, I don’t know what you are saying about that.

Consider the different way thinking is being observed by the two philosophers. At the very least, would you not acknowledge a difference between the "I" that observes the thinking activity as an immediate event by Descartes and something like this from Wittgenstein?: — Paine

Again, it would be much easier if you told me what you take the difference to be, or at least what the “something like this” illustrates about the way Wittgenstein views thinking (though only to illuminate the Descartes). From what I think I understand, I take “the thinking activity as an immediate event” just to be self-awareness, and not “thinking”, and that Descartes’ description of thinking as an activity is more like Wittgenstein’s understanding of thinking (thus why animals can do it, PI #25, in the sense of, e.g., problem-solving; or that we can do it, in the sense of considering (getting a new pen), without talking to ourselves #327-332).

Only being able to perceive the infinite through a negation of the finite says we experience the finite and our imperfections

The infinite can only be conceived by means of the negation.
— Paine

Do you mean that the infinite is conceived by what is not infinite? If so, this is the opposite of what Descartes is claiming.

Is there some equivocation in the passage you cited:

For how would I understand that I [46] doubt and that I desire, that is, that I lack something and that I am not wholly perfect, unless there were some idea in me of a more perfect being, by comparison with which I might recognize my defects?
— ibid. page 45 — Fooloso4

Yes, I fell into the gap of that equivocation. I stand corrected. That his doubt is the condition through which he recognizes the lack of perfection is a kind of 'means of negation'. Ignorance, confusion, and uncertainty exist as sources of distress even when we don't compare them to something better.

There is a shift from the source of my ideas to the source of my existence. He argues that the source cannot be something less perfect than himself. For this reason he rejects his parents as the source of his existence. But surely he knows enough biology and animal husbandry to know that a more perfect offspring can come from less perfect parents. The source need not be something wholly perfect or even more perfect. — Fooloso4

I think this shift from the source of ideas to the source of existence suffers from some of the equivocation discussed above. The argument came from whether God made me, I made myself, or my parents did. The argument against me making myself is that I would have made a better me if I was that powerful and knew more. The parents did not create their nature any more than I did mine. Applying the argument that the 'perfect' only comes from the more 'perfect" does not help his case. The parents are not the reason he is a thinking substance. Nor do they continually constitute this substance through time.

I agree that exploring Wittgenstein's thinking requires a separate discussion. But the "use of language" criteria is clearly important to Wittgenstein and it was in that sense that I asked about how the "I" was used by the different authors. In the spirit of Wittgenstein, that invites us to look at them side by side and seeing the differences. i was not proposing a variety of possible selves but noting how different were the conditions of discourse understood to be at work for each of them. You brought this perspective up and I have been trying to understand it in the context of this text.

I’m not sure where/if Descartes does make the claim about needing God; — Antony Nickles

What, then, do you make of the title: MEDITATION THREE: Concerning God, That He Exists?

If this work is an epistemology masquerading as a theology, then it seems incumbent upon those who hold to that view to explain the author's stated intent to establish one.

I’ve only gotten to the 10th paragraph of the 3rd meditation. I’ll keep going and see if I find it.

@frank @Paine @Janus @Srap Tasmaner

“Nature has apparently taught me to think that [ I can imagine an object correctly ]... When I say ‘Nature taught me to think this’, all I mean is that I have a spontaneous impulse to believe it, not that I am shown its truth by some natural light. There is a great difference between those.”

I agree with him on the innateness claim, as I just don't see an alternative, unless we attribute cognition to the world. — Manuel

Consider that our “spontaneous impulse” is to believe our judgments, which are based on the criteria and conditions that we are inculcated with, which are natural for us, as if part of our “nature” (they are how our world functions, its “cognition”), but we are not normally conscious of the workings of our judgments, not until we shine some light on them, say, by reflection.

“Things that are revealed by the natural light – for example, that if I am doubting then I exist – are not open to any doubt, because no other faculty that might show them to be false could be as trustworthy as the natural light. My natural impulses, however, have no such privilege: I have often come to think that they had pushed me the wrong way on moral questions, and I don’t see any reason to trust them in other things.”

And here we are back at the beginning, where he felt betrayed that he was wrong about something (now—as in most cases with philosophy—with a moral question) and feels he cannot rely on our “natural impulses”, our unexamined judgements, which is where philosophy starts, when we don’t know our way about and turn to reflect. Except in Descartes’ abstraction, there is no particular situation, no point of disagreement or loss as to what to do about a particular case, in a context, at a time. So he just takes his disappointment with the moral realm (where we may or may not agree) and doubts everything. So far that has actually led to uncover by reflection the criteria and conditions which are “trustworthy as the natural light”, but there remains his anxiety that God may still be deceiving us. “I can never be quite certain.”

Notes from the SEP article on Descartes' proof of God.

Despite similarities, Descartes’ version of the argument differs from Anselm’s in important ways. The latter’s version is thought to proceed from the meaning of the word “God,” by definition, God is a being a greater than which cannot be conceived. Descartes’ argument, in contrast, is grounded in two central tenets of his philosophy — the theory of innate ideas and the doctrine of clear and distinct perception. He purports to rely not on an arbitrary definition of God but rather on an innate idea whose content is “given.” Descartes’ version is also extremely simple. God’s existence is inferred directly from the fact that necessary existence is contained in the clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being. Indeed, on some occasions he suggests that the so-called ontological “argument” is not a formal proof at all but a self-evident axiom grasped intuitively by a mind free of philosophical prejudice — SEP

That is a good SEP article, and it helps me sort out some of the confusion I have (and have mixed up previously in this thread) about how 'innate ideas' work in the various arguments. This part, in particular touches on how perceiving our condition might relate to a formal proof:

The important point is that both kinds of meditators ultimately attain knowledge of God’s existence by clearly and distinctly perceiving that necessary existence is contained in the idea of supremely perfect being. Once one has achieved this perception, God’s existence will be manifest or, as Descartes says elsewhere, “self-evident” (per se notam) (Second Replies, Fifth Postulate; AT 7: 164; CSM 2:115).

Descartes’ contemporaries would have been surprised by this last remark. While reviewing an earlier version of the ontological argument, Aquinas had rejected the claim that God’s existence is self-evident, at least with respect to us. He argued that what is self-evident cannot be denied without contradiction, but God’s existence can be denied. Indeed, the proverbial fool says in his heart “There is no God” (Psalm 53.1).

When confronted with this criticism by a contemporary objector, Descartes tries to find common ground: “St. Thomas asks whether existence is self-evident as far as we are concerned, that is, whether it is obvious to everyone; and he answers, correctly, that it is not” (First Replies, AT 7:115; CSM 2:82). Descartes interprets Aquinas to be claiming that God’s existence is not self-evident to everyone, which is something with which he can agree. Descartes does not hold that God’s existence is immediately self-evident, or self-evident to everyone, but that it can become self-evident to some careful and industrious meditators.

:smile: :up:

@Manuel @frank @Paine @Janus @Srap Tasmaner

In the 13th paragraph of the third meditation, Descartes now moves on to question the impulse that there are others and other things than himself, and stumbles first on being unsure whether the things he judges are correct. Instead of accepting the fact that sometimes we are wrong or are interested in different aspects of the world, his desire to maintain the possibility of certainty forces him to turn our human condition into a theoretical problem and metaphysically split the uncertainty of our “idea” from a perfect “reality”.

To maintain control, he inserts between them that the world is (more) perfect because it is the “cause” of our (limited) idea, and thus why our idea may or may not “resemble” or represent the perfect external world.

“If I find that some idea of mine has so much representative reality that I am sure the same reality doesn’t reside in me, either straightforwardly or in a higher form, and hence that I myself can’t be the cause of the idea, then, because everything must have some cause, it will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world: there exists some other thing that is the cause of that idea.”

I take it he is arguing that there cannot be anything in the world unless he is certain he is not the cause because it is “so much” or of a “higher form”. This “cause” could just be the unexamined criteria and conditions of our culture for our ordinary practices, which are our interests in the world coalesced as the different aspects, versions, or “senses” (“uses” Wittgenstein will also say) of our practices (as in his example of the sun). And the necessity of Descartes’ “cause” (its “must”) could be that there is a certain “must” to meet these criteria for a practice to be judged to be what it is, but he is fixated again on certainty and so “eventually one must come back to an idea whose cause isn’t an idea, and this cause must be a kind of archetype containing intrinsically all the reality or perfection that the idea contains only representatively.” He not only attributes this perfection outside his self but outside the world, to avoid accepting its failings, errors, mistakes, limitations, confusions, etc.

@Manuel @frank @Paine @Janus @Srap Tasmaner

By the 28th paragraph of meditation 3, there only remains the possibility that the idea of the “infinite, eternal, unchangeable, independent” (etc.) is beyond his ability to doubt.

“my perception of the infinite, i.e. God, is in some way prior to my perception of the finite, i.e. myself. Whenever I know that I doubt something or want something, I understand that I lack something and am therefore not wholly perfect.” (Emphasis added)

I find the crux here in the throwaway feeling of “lacking” something, as he was shaken at the beginning to find himself capable of being wrong when he thought he was fine; misinformed, or betrayed by society’s habitual opinions and practices. He takes this “lack” as a problem to be solved completely before proceeding, rather than part of our human condition to be addressed going forward in each case.

The “some way” in which the infinite (perfect) is “prior to” the perception of the finite (let’s say, human fallibility) is our desire for certainty. We set it as a pre-requisite and impose that criteria over our ordinary standards and workings of our practices. We want perfection to bridge our finite, limited knowledge and condition (apart from others) rather than be personally responsible for responding to the other and trusting the shared history of our lives together into our unknown future.

@Manuel @frank @Janus @Srap Tasmaner @Paine

The third meditation, beginning at paragraph 34, is not an argument for the existence of God; it’s trying to imagine how we could exist without God. “…if God didn’t exist, from what would I derive my existence?”

Having interpreted the text to provide that we enact ourselves (or can), I will have to account for our derivation despite our imperfection. Descartes does stand by the conclusion that we are not metaphysical, that we may not exist (or continue to), though if we do exist it is without direct, conscious control over our selves.

"I experience no such power [to continue myself into the future], and this shows me quite clearly that I depend for my continued existence on some being other than myself."

Emerson and Thoreau and Nietszche at least, not to mention Freud, picture the self as divided in two, a part of which we may only allow to guide us, passively; that our conscious self is not our “cause”, as Descartes frames it. Emerson will talk about the exemplar that brings us to our next self; Nietzsche refers to this as the humanity above us. I take Descartes to be describing the same in saying the cause of us is in a "higher form". Thoreau will say we are at times in ecstasy, beside ourselves; in other words, “outside” our (conscious) selves, where Descartes only allows perfection to remain.

Descartes' case that we cannot be our own cause is partly based on our lack of knowledge of perfection. But our further self is unable to be "grasped by the finite", as Descartes puts it, because we are not a matter of knowledge. As I described above, our self is brought about in action, choice, reaction, interaction, into the future, held to our past, etc. We perfect our selves in “aspir[ing] without limit to ever greater and better things”. The self is not known or consciously chosen, but we strive and reach for what we “can’t grasp but can somehow touch with… thought.” We are not God, but our further self is “made in [God’s] image”, “gaz[ing] with wonder… contemplating… [its] majesty”.

The question is not the existence of God, but of us. “Once, on being asked… when the kingdom of God would come, Jesus replied, ‘The coming of the kingdom of God is not something that can be observed [known], nor will people say, ‘Here it is,’ or ‘There it is,’ because the kingdom of God is in your midst’”. Luke 17:21, New International Ver. (or “within you” in the King James Ver.)

There's a lot there and very careful notes taken, it is much appreciated, I am about to begin the 6th Meditation, but your posts deserve some comments.

I think most of your reading is on the right track, since I am no expert, but keep in mind that even after he has completed and developed this method, he says, roughly paraphrasing, that this method is as good as my reason can take me, because I cannot comprehend an infinite being, I only know that He exists and this guarantees that clear and distinct ideas gotten through this method, can't be wrong.

So, I would prefer to say that he strives for certainty, as far as human understanding goes, though some things we can't comprehend, we being finite creatures.

In modern terms, I suppose we'd say that some would like to find a certain indubitable starting point from which we can see that the foundation of our thinking as being completely seen through, a bit like seeing that 2+2=4, so a Cartesian project, without God and formulated differently.

But by now we know this is not possible, it's asking for way too much.

"Self" talk is very hard, and we would have to examine if those options you listed make sense, say of halving two selves. I think there is a sense in which Descartes "choppy" argument is rather reasonable, in that for me it feels as if the self and my feelings of it, fluctuate in intensity and intelligibility.

Thank you for taking the time to read through those notes. Rather than having an alternative “answer” to Descartes’ metaphysics, I’m finding it more meaningful in seeing that the structure of his argument mirrors that of others concerning the perfection of the self.

I would prefer to say that he strives for certainty, as far as human understanding goes… But by now we know this is not possible, it's asking for way too much. — Manuel

I’m finding that the “striving” is the important part. The goal of certainty I take as self-imposed, so I wouldn’t say we don’t have the ability to understand or that we should just settle for an approximation, but that knowledge (certainty or not) is not our entire relationship to the world, that we must complete ourselves and posture ourselves towards others beyond knowing for sure the outcome or correctness or right.

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So, I would prefer to say that he strives for certainty, as far as human understanding goes, though some things we can't comprehend, we being finite creatures. — Manuel

At the end of the fourth meditation he says:

This is where man’s greatest and most important perfection is to be found ... If I restrain my will so that I form opinions only on what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, I cannot possibly go wrong.

He has within himself the ability to become more perfect by avoiding error. Note that he allows for degrees of perfection.

In the fourth meditation:

I know by experience that will is entirely without limits.

and:

My will is so perfect and so great that I can’t conceive of its becoming even greater and more perfect ...

His will is perfect and thus the proximate and more likely source of his idea of perfection. He goes further. It is not just the idea of perfection, but the reality of perfection, as he avoids error and becomes more perfect, that is within him

I only know that He exists and this guarantees that clear and distinct ideas gotten through this method, can't be wrong. — Manuel

According to the argument it is not simply knowledge that God exists, but the claim that God would not deceive us that guarantees that clear and distinct ideas can't be wrong. But if clear and distinct ideas can't be wrong, then:

a Cartesian project, without God — Manuel

At bottom is a reliance on reason. For even his claims about God depends on reason. Further, he has established that even if God is a deceiver, his Archimedean point, his knowledge that he exists, established by reason, is fixed.

This is where man’s greatest and most important perfection is to be found ... If I restrain my will so that I form opinions only on what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, I cannot possibly go wrong.

He has within himself the ability to become more perfect by avoiding error. Note that he allows for degrees of perfection. — Fooloso4

The will argument is somewhat strange, especially when he says that the scope of the will is larger than the scope of the intellect. Since he allows for degrees of perfection, there are aspects in which we could be more perfect.

I had in mind the following quote, near the end of the Fourth Meditation:

"And I have no cause for complaint on the grounds that the power of understanding or the natural light which God gave me is no greater that it is; for it is in the nature of a finite intellect to lack understanding of many things, and it is the nature of a created intellect to be finite."

Continuing in this line, a bit further down, in which Descartes speaks of the will, as you have quoted, he also says:

"... but it is undoubtedly an imperfection in me to misuse my freedom and make judgements about matters which I do not fully understand. I can see, however, that God could have easily brought about it that without losing my freedom, and despite the limitations in my knowledge, I should nevertheless never make a mistake."

He proceeds to say that he could see how it might be more perfect that we live in this world than one in which we never make an error and then:

"And I have no right to complain that the role God wished me to undertake is not... the most perfect of all."

According to the argument it is not simply knowledge that God exists, but the claim that God would not deceive us that guarantees that clear and distinct ideas can't be wrong. — Fooloso4

Thanks for precision, that's correct, he does say that. But that specific part of the argument doesn't seem to me to have aged very well.

At bottom is a reliance on reason. For even his claims about God depends on reason. Further, he has established that even if God is a deceiver, his Archimedean point, his knowledge that he exists, established by reason, is fixed. — Fooloso4

Yes, I agree. The thing is I don't see reason as being "transparent", that is, I can't get to the bottom of reasons in a way that I feel no problems in "seeing", this is as simple and as foundational as any reason can get, there's just so much in every judgment and proposition that are assumed.

I'm only about halfway through this discussion, but I want to say thanks Fooloso4!

I am really appreciating your commentary.

The will argument is somewhat strange, especially when he says that the scope of the will is larger than the scope of the intellect. — Manuel

Good point. Limiting the will seems to be unnecessarily self-limiting. There is something else going on here.

I can't get to the bottom of reasons in a way that I feel no problems in "seeing" this is as simple and as foundational as any reason can get, there's just so much in every judgment and proposition that are assumed. — Manuel

Descartes has a universal method for solving problems, his "mathesis universalis". He describes the mathesis univeralis in Rules for the Direction of the Mind. The first rule is:

The aim of our studies must be the direction of our mind so that it may form solid and true judgments on whatever matters arise

(emphasis added)

With his method he will be able to solve for any unknown. With his method it becomes less and less necessary to limit the will, for the intellect will be continually expanding.

Thank you for saying so!

What I find particularly fascinating, in reading through this thread, is the following:

In a letter to Mersenne, Descartes reveals:

...there are many other things in them; and I tell you, between ourselves, that these
six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But that must not be
spread abroad, if you please; for those who follow Aristotle will find it more
difficult to approve them. I hope that [my readers] will accustom themselves
insensibly to my principles, and will come to recognize their truth, before
perceiving that they destroy those of Aristotle.
– René Descartes to Mersenne, January 28, 1641, Œuvres de Descartes,
3:297–98, quoted and translated by Hiram Caton in The Origin of
Subjectivity, 17

Can anyone shed light on how Descartes would have meant with what is translated as "insensibly"? Might we translate it "subconsciously" today?

I see a certain merit to Descartes strategy, but my view is based on my understanding the relationship between our minds' intuitive faculties and the behavior of neural nets. I find it rather remarkable that Descartes recognized the potential effectivess of the communication strategy he describes, despite not having access to modern neuropsych. (Though of course he put a lot of thought into the nature of thought.)

I take the 'insensibly' to mean that the principles will be accepted as self-evident and natural before they are recognized as a refutation of Aristotle. So, not subconsciously but more like 'unassociated' until fully appreciated.

As I understand it, he is saying that he wants his readers to become accustomed to his way of thinking before they sense what the consequences are. That is,

before perceiving that they destroy those of Aristotle.

I see Paine beat me to it.