The point is not that other countries can repeat what Russia has done from scratch, the point is that by completely removing Russia from the Western financial system Russia has both a need to create an alternative system as well as zero incentive (whether from fear or enticement) to cooperate in Western sanction regimes against US foes. — boethius

And my point is just why other countries would have zero incentive to trade with the West?

Many countries would be happy if the world trade would be done other currency than dollars. But that simply is something that goes back to older times.

If we take the usual suspects of the sanctions world -- Iran, North Korean, Cuba, Venezuela -- they are simply not large enough countries to create some alternative economic system, and most countries and most companies would not see a cost-benefit to running foul of the US by violating US sanctions. — boethius

Exactly, this was my point and here we agree.

Russia did not opt out of the Western financial system by itself, whether because there was no desire to or perhaps there was desire but it would have been political unfeasible to just nope out of the Western economic system. Why didn't Russia do it before? — boethius

First of all, it did prepare for this event to happen when it attacked Ukraine. It only assumed that the response would be similar to what the West had done earlier: impose some sanctions, have a brief cold period and then when the administration changes, it's time again to reset the relationship. Don't you remember this:

Yes, it's exactly that the Chinese hub is the answer.

How the situation has changed with Russia essentially joining this group is that Russia is not only significantly larger (a larger population than all these countries combined) but has the resources, has the leverage, to make an equal if not greater cost-benefit proposal to their trading partners. Russia can effectively say to many countries that: you continue to trade or you're not going to eat. As you note, that's a powerful argument to displease the US in favour of Russian foreign policy.

Does China need to sell us stuff? Or do we need to by Chinese stuff? — boethius

The answer based on economics would be yes, China needs to sell stuff and yes, we do need Chinese stuff.

But that actually doesn't matter so much.

The reality is that all the importance we give to huge corporations and the ultra-rich and their globalization, when it comes to security matters and war, they are brushed aside. Chinese leadership can possibly decide "Fuck it, we can feed our people, we have enough to make this, let's finish those rebels in Taiwan". And it takes just one aircraft carrier to be sunk for the Americans to wreck globalization, put Chinese nationals into concentration camps and demand that China should be nuked. Remember just what one big successful terrorist attack made them to do.

I think we are quite close to an age that people lived in the 1900's and early 1910's. Many argued that war would be impossible because there was so much globalization.

It's simply not a logic that scales well in the capitalist system. It takes considerable effort to maintain sanctions on small countries, it's simply not possible to go around ordering people to stop trading with a big enough country such as Russia. At some point it's just too costly and countries tell even the "mighty US" to take a hike. — boethius

Yet don't underestimate just how large was the effect of the February 24th 2022 attack on Europe. This isn't an embargo made on moral grounds, like was done against South Africa. Especially the Eastern and Northern countries of Europe don't give a rats ass about the profits they are missing because of the sanctions. Finally Russia started a war too large just to ignore.

No really, earlier the Soviet Union was the largest export market for Finland and Finland was the second largest exporter of goods to the Soviet Union after West Germany. And obviously Finland tried to make the relationship to work. No there's basically nothing. So be it. NOBODY in Finland is crying about the lost markets. There is only a discussion that the risks of those investments made to Russia, now lost, should have better understood.

So no, boethius, at some point it isn't "just too costly", when security and the possibly the survival of the country is at stake. Security policy always trumps trade policy.

However, you could also have the situation where high flying Russian fighters can track low-flying F16, though out of range, so an S-300 or S-400 could then engage with guidance from the Russian fighters. — boethius

Yeah, well, and AWACS or a fighter cannot yet act as an fire control radar to a GBAD missile. Not yet, at least. And it doesn't go like "fire in that direction and maybe the missile will find it's target".

Keep in mind also that high flying supersonic fighters decrease the range of AA systems because they can outrun incoming missiles. I.e. the range of a 100 km missile travelling at mach 5 is reduced to 50km if fired at a target running away at mach 2.5, and this doesn't take into account altitude, counter measures or additional manoeuvres that will all favour the aircraft. — boethius

Or in other words, the effective engagement range of a SAM is far shorter than it's max range.

The idea that an air force is a "more effective" method of air defense is untrue, as I explained. It functions as part of an air defense network, and it won't function on its own. — Tzeentch

I think we are just talking of different things. Obviously you need both, but once you have the air force capable of winning air superiority, then you don't need so much GBAD. If you don't have any aircraft, it's far more easier for the enemy to tackle your GBAD.

No. My argument was that modern Russian AA like S-300 and S-400 can shoot the AGM-88 down. — Tzeentch

Actually, your argument was this:

Also suggesting a somewhat inaccurate idea of how SEAD works.

AGM-88s are no magic bullets. In fact, they're pretty old.

Modern anti-air systems like S-300, S-400, Pantsir, etc. can shoot these missiles down, and it would take absolutely massive volleys to get through a layered defense like what the Russians use. (Not to mention anti-radiation missiles only destroy radar transmitters. To actually destroy an AA installation it would take a lot more). — Tzeentch

Ok, first an S-300 or S-400 system is quite useless without it's radars working. Optical tracking (with other SAM systems) is still difficult, especially if you aren't aware of the attacker.

Secondly, it's obvious that other weapons are also used in SEAD. Old iron bombs were used in Vietnam, so even that can work (if one is very careful).

Thirdly, there far more to the battle between GBAD and aircraft than just one or two weapon systems. It's far more of a cat and mouse game. That an anti-radiation missile can be intercepted doesn't refute anything that I've said. And yes, I think that in this subject I do know what I'm actually talking about.

Hence that a missile can be shot down doesn't make it so that only massive volleys will get through this layered defense. You should read about these kind of operations. A great example is Israeli attack on Syria GBAD in the Bekaa Valley during "Peace for Galilee" operation named Operation Mole Cricket 19. The Syrian systems weren't so old in the early 1980's.

Obviously you need both, but once you have the air force capable of winning air superiority, then you don't need so much GBAD. — ssu

Since Ukraine and probably also Russia will not meet that criterium at any point during this conflict, I don't see why this would be relevant.

Ok, first an S-300 or S-400 system is quite useless without it's radars working. — ssu

Of course. The key here being that radars can be replaced. To destroy these modern systems it would take a lot more.

Old iron bombs were used in Vietnam, so even that can work (if one is very careful). — ssu

Unguided bombs versus an S-400?

I pity the pilot who gets that job.

If the Ukrainians were keen on losing their F-16s as fast as possible, they'd use this approach.

A great example is Israeli attack on Syria GBAD in the Bekaa Valley during "Peace for Galilee" operation named Operation Mole Cricket 19. The Syrian systems weren't so old in the early 1980's. — ssu

You're comparing two different eras.

The Syrian air defenses weren't able to engage the anti-radiation missiles fired by the Israelis, because ground-based anti-missile defense wasn't really a thing back then. All their anti-air systems (coming from the '60s, mind you) were built to engage air planes.

Russian air defense can engage incoming missiles, and the AGM-88, even the G variant, falls well within its maximum target velocity.

This is of course a crucial difference.

And my point is just why other countries would have zero incentive to trade with the West?

Many countries would be happy if the world trade would be done other currency than dollars. But that simply is something that goes back to older times. — ssu

Obviously there's no incentive to not have trade routes open, the question is the cost extracted by the US to engage with their system.

Countries, basically all countries, want the access to trade but not the cost, so this gives rise to negotiations and trade agreements.

If there's no where else to go, your negotiating position is weak (and sanctions or the threat of sanctions are basically only possible in such conditions, otherwise you're only harming yourself by blocking your own access to markets without that even being all that negative for said countries of those markets), whereas even the hypothetical of somewhere else to go strengthens your negotiating position.

It's not a binary thing and the future has to be "priced in".

For example, a monopoly may start lowering their prices simply due to the existence of an alternative even if that alternative isn't very good or can't possibly scale ... yet. This happens all the time in hardware in order to protect market share, hopefully drive the upstart out of business, and hardware monopolies are accused of this all the time.

In software the solution is to make your product free and make money on advertisement or other added value since a monopoly position is worth more than any revenue at all of selling your product. Why even Windows is free now.

US foreign policy can be viewed as protecting their monopoly on the global trading system.

Now, you may say a competitor arising and putting downward price pressure of what the US charges (not always money ...) for accessing their system is good for most people on the planet and even most Americans.

I would not have problems agreeing with. This change isn't some catastrophe and the US will still be there and much, if not most, of the globe will still be subscribed to Pax Americana, but it is a profound change for all those current subscribers that aren't "loyal fans". Maybe the US will need to offer a advert-free version for example.

I have a meeting starting a few minutes, so I'll respond to the rest of your points later, but I feel we do agree on the fundamentals just have different attitudes towards its meaning.

And, of course, these changes are very new, maybe Russia's alternative economic system grows or falls apart, but that Russia has survived sanctions so far is a major geopolitical change and some countries, I'd say most importantly Iran, are jumping on the prospective benefits of this change.

Of course. The key here being that radars can be replaced. To destroy these modern systems it would take a lot more. — Tzeentch

Well, you can say that also for Russia's main battle tanks, artillery, warships too! Just replace the destroyed ones and train new crews! The problem is replacing them. You simply don't have much to do with just the launchers. Well, you can lob the missiles at Kiev, which they have done.

You're comparing two different eras.

The Syrian air defenses weren't able to engage the anti-radiation missiles fired by the Israelis, because ground-based anti-missile defense wasn't really a thing back then. All their anti-air systems (coming from the '60s, mind you) were built to engage air planes.

Russian air defense can engage incoming missiles, and the AGM-88, even the G variant, falls well within its maximum target velocity.

This is of course a crucial difference. — Tzeentch

Uhh, actually no.

It's not so simple, actually. The real issue is fire discipline and the ability for the radar operator to know when to shut his radar off. The survival of a SAM unit isn't in it's ability to shoot down missiles, it's simply to understand when to not use the radar, when not to engage when to engage. Move and conceal your SAM's and use them only when the situation favors you. How well are all elements of your air defence commanded and how well do they fight together really matters. Trying to engage at everything, and you will be likely just shooting at decoys, spending your missiles and showing your exact location.

Air defence isn't in real life as it is in computer games. Every aspect of it has to work together, units have to be ready, communication has to work etc. In actual life it's far more difficult.

I've myself tried to track with an optical sight of a French Crotale NG SAM on a F-18 Hornet flying really close. It was totally impossible to catch the fighter jet. You could track it optically and fire if a) you knew exactly where it was coming from and b) it wasn't aware of you and wouldn't be aggressively turning. Hence that you can fire the VT-1 missile without using radar or active infrared (hence no alarms will go on in the aircraft) is positive, but doesn't make it superior. Just like air combat, you simply cannot make straightforward conclusions about how things will go because of some technical aspects. Hence the idea that optimally a missile system can defeat missiles also make them some kind of wonder weapons.

Uhh, actually no.

It's not so simple, actually. — ssu

I never said it was simple.

I said the fact that Russian air defense systems being able to take down anti-radiation missiles is a critical difference which your example doesn't account for.

The real issue is fire discipline and the ability for the radar operator to know when to shut his radar off. The survival of a SAM unit isn't in it's ability to shoot down missiles, it's simply to understand when to not use the radar, when not to engage when to engage. Move and conceal your SAM's and use them only when the situation favors you. — ssu

Air defense systems have a purpose: to defend critical targets.

When they have to turn off their radars and reposition to dodge incoming missiles, SEAD is effectively Suppressing the system while (assumedly) other air assets are taking advantage of this.

Thus, being able to take down these incoming missiles rather than having to relocate is a big advantage.

For example, a monopoly may start lowering their prices simply due to the existence of an alternative even if that alternative isn't very good or can't possibly scale ... yet. This happens all the time in hardware in order to protect market share, hopefully drive the upstart out of business, and hardware monopolies are accused of this all the time. — boethius

I remember reading somewhere that this "predatory pricing", as it's called, was used by the Byzantine empire to hold on to their monopoly in the silk trade (after silk worms had been smuggled from China). So the idea isn't a new one.

US foreign policy can be viewed as protecting their monopoly on the global trading system. — boethius

They don't actually protect so much the system. More like the US takes the system as granted, as something natural and reap the harvest of the dollar being the global currency by spending as recklessly as they can. No, who protect the system are all other Western countries that are OK with current system as holds on.

Hence one has to look at this from a different point of view: Western countries accept the dollar system as it is stable enough. Basically it's similar like with NATO. It's not that the US forces countries to be in the organization, it's that European countries are totally happy to be in NATO. It's their security policy decision, not the US.

The role of the dollar was an result first of the US being the only creditor nation after WW2 ...when other Western countries and Japan had been bombed into rubble. The second act came when the US had spent wildly on the Vietnam war and the great society and Western countries, like West Germany, started to question the link that US dollar had to gold and it's reserves. Nixon promptly ended the last ties of the dollar to gold. The rescuing angel for the dollar (and the US) came in form of the Saudi-Arabia and the petro-dollar. The oil trade being traded in US dollars saved the dollar system.

But indeed things are changing, even without war in Ukraine. The thing is that now China understands clearly that it could face similar sanctions as Russia, that is obvious. Hence it is necessary for China to prepare for this kind of possibility.

It is the end of globalization as we know it. Still, it is just a possible outcome, not something that will definitely happen.

This change isn't some catastrophe and the US will still be there and much, if not most, of the globe will still be subscribed to Pax Americana, but it is a profound change for all those current subscribers that aren't "loyal fans". Maybe the US will need to offer a advert-free version for example. — boethius

I agree and this is important. Even if the dollar based system would collapse, it isn't the end of the World or of the US. It's still the largest economy and when faced with tough decision, it can make them when it has to. Just like the pandemic we went through wasn't, even if you would describe to people before what measures were taken, they wouldn't believe it. Reality isn't a Hollywood catastrophe film epic.

The US simply can go back to it's continent to eat that apple pie, and the huge vacuum will create a whirlwind of local conflicts where regional powers compete for dominance. One could say that this is already happening in the Middle East, like places like Libya. There the opposing sides are backed by countries that all ought to be allies of the US (plus Russia, of course).

Yeah, well, and AWACS or a fighter cannot yet act as an fire control radar to a GBAD missile. Not yet, at least. And it doesn't go like "fire in that direction and maybe the missile will find it's target". — ssu

Definitely firing missiles blindly in a general direction is unlikely to succeed.

However, sending targeting information from one system to another is not difficult and exists in plenty of forms already.

I do not think sharing the information would be the limiting factor, but rather the range of radar to track targets from look down which will be closely guarded secret.

The wikipedia article on this is barely a page long, but does inform us the technology is from the 60s:

Flight tests of the AN/ASG-18 system, using a modified Convair B-58, began in 1960.[3] During the 1960s, YF-12 flight tests were conducted, which included the use of the YF-12's onboard AN/ASG-18 radar system in conjunction with AIM-47 missiles to shoot down target drones. — Lookdown / shootdown

So, presumably this exact problem has been looked at pretty closely by the developers of these systems.

For what it's worth, ChatGPT claims:

Generally speaking, a high-performance radar in lookdown mode can detect and track targets at ranges of tens to hundreds of miles (or kilometers), depending on the size and altitude of the target, the radar's power and sensitivity, and the clutter conditions. — ChatGPT

However, what we can know is that it's obviously a risk that Russia has such capabilities and they work fine, so will you risk your F16's ... to accomplish what?

Or in other words, the effective engagement range of a SAM is far shorter than it's max range. — ssu

Yes, but how much is the critical question.

In the situation we are discussing, low flying aircraft, such as to avoid Russian ground based AA missiles, cannot reach much above Mach 1. So this is only reducing the effective range of the missile by 20% and that's assuming the F16 is already flying in the opposite direction.

The fact range of anti-air missile (of any kind) is reduced by your speed running away is an advantage to the Russians in this situation of trying to fly high, look-down and track and maybe send tracking information to said GBAD systems or then maybe just shoot at themselves.

The Sukhoi Su-35 can MiG-29 fly above mach 2 at high altitude and the MiG 25 and 31 close to or exceeding mach 3, though with risk to the engines (still better then being shot down).

Flying away at Mach 3 is reducing the range of a Mach 5 missile by 70%, which is pretty significant.

The purpose of these considerations is that if you want to cover your F16 operations near the front with your own ground based air defence, you may need to get really close to the front, now risking your critical GBAD systems, otherwise you risk a supersonic interception, firing missiles and then easily running away at Mach 3 when your F16 is stuck at barely above mach 1 (ChatGPT claims "While I couldn't find an exact figure for the F-16's maximum speed at low altitudes, it is generally expected to be around Mach 1.2 to Mach 1.4 ").

To make matters worse, at least according to Wikipedia, the:

Speed PAC-2/PAC-3: Mach 4.1 — MIM-104 Patriot, wikipedia

And,

Maximum speed: Mach 4. — AIM-120 AMRAAM, wikipedia

Whereas:

The S-300FM Fort-M (Russian: С-300ФМ, DoD designation SA-N-20) is another naval version of the system, installed only on the Kirov-class cruiser Pyotr Velikiy, and introducing the new 48N6 missile. It was introduced in 1990 and has a missile speed of approximately Mach 6 for a maximum target engagement speed of up to Mach 8.5, a warhead size of 150 kg (330 lb), an engagement range of 5–150 km (3.1–93 mi), and an altitude envelope of 10–27 km (6.2–16.8 mi).
— S-300 missile system

And there's actually the specifications of the missiles and speeds further down the page, for example:

V55K, range 47 km, mach 5.5
5V55R, range 75/90 km, mach 5.5
5V55U, range 150 km, mach 5.8
48N6P-01, 195 km, mach 5.8

Which is a lot faster than a low flying F16.

Of note, the Russian air-air missile is also faster than its American counter-part, "Maximum speed Mach 5 – Mach 6", and, at least according to Wikipedia:

Mid-body strakes enhance lift[1] hence increases range. According to Defence Today, the range depends on the flight profile, from 80 nautical miles (150 km) for a direct shot[1] to 215 nautical miles (398 km) for a cruise glide profile.[...]

The missile can attack targets at altitudes of 15–25,000 meters, guided semi-actively or actively through the Agat 9B-1388 system.[5] — R-37 (missile)

Maybe US has faster missiles (but will they supply them to Ukraine?), but whatever the speeds involved, I think we agree that flying near Russian airspace is risky and to simply "help" in attritional warfare makes no sense to risk.

Of course, if some decisive battles take place that may end the war one way or another then maybe it would make sense to send in aircraft, but my in the context of my overall position I do not think such battles will take place, and if they do it would be battles that may decisive in Russia's favour, not Ukraine.

Furthermore, all these missiles may explain why Ukraine has lost most of its aircraft and is asking for F16s and sending pilots to train on these aircraft instead of flying existing aircraft in Ukraine.

However, sending targeting information from one system to another is not difficult and exists in plenty of forms already.

I do not think sharing the information would be the limiting factor, but rather the range of radar to track targets from look down which will be closely guarded secret. — boethius

Well, the problem is that for example the S-400 needs a search radar and a separate target acquisition/engagement radar. Similarly the Patriot system needs also. And yes, they benefit from getting an alert from an AWACS or other advance warning systems. But there's a simple technical problem, which you can see from the following pictures:

This is the target acquisition radar of a Patriot system:


These are the two types of engagement radars that the S-400 Triumph system has:


You do notice that there has to be done some engineering work to get these fit into an aircraft? Or to create such multi-function radars that act both in the search and the targeting mode.

Yes, but how much is the critical question.

In the situation we are discussing. Low flying aircraft, such as to avoid Russian ground based AA missiles, cannot reach much above Mach 1. So this is only reducing the effective range of the missile by 20% and that's assuming the F16 is already flying in the opposite direction.

The fact range of anti-air missile (of anytime) is reduced by your speed running away is an advantage to the Russians in this situation of trying to fly high, look-down and track and maybe send tracking information to said GBAD systems or then maybe just shoot at themselves. — boethius

(Just a technical note, use acronym SAM, surface to air missile, as with missiles AA stands for air-to-air missiles)

Those high flying Russian fighters have to stay out of the reach of the Ukrainian GBAD also. And obviously those future F-16s, when they come, will be used very cautiously. Yet in any case, the outcome relies on a large variety of factors than just the specs of the weapon systems. The way the weapon systems are used, the way the forces operate are far more important than the technical aspects of a weapon system. The difference come only when you face of far earlier generation weapon systems to newer ones, not with same generation weapons.

Just to give on example:why did we see footage of Bayraktar-drones destroying Russian SAM launchers early in the war and not anymore? The reason is that at start of the war there were so many limitations to SAM use as the Russian aircraft indeed flew over Ukrainian territory, that Bayraktars could have a field day. Then when Russian aircraft weren't flying anymore in Ukrainian territory (or at least, not so much), then the decision to fire on an aircraft was made easy. After all, we ought to remember the unfortunate use of a BUK-M1 shooting down that Malesian plane earlier.

The men and the military itself does matter also. Best example is just how few Abrams tanks were destroyed when operated by the US Army in Iraq and how many similar tanks have been destroyed by the Houthis fighting Saudi-Arabian troops in Yemen.

You do notice that there has to be done some engineering work to get these fit into an aircraft? Or to create such multi-function radars that act both in the search and the targeting mode. — ssu

You don't need to fit these radars into an aircraft, fighters already have radars that can track, they have to be closer than these massive ground based radars but they can be at high altitude and looking down to track low flying targets trying to evade said massive ground based radars.

(Just a technical note, use acronym SAM, surface to air missile, as with missiles AA stands for air-to-air missiles) — ssu

I'm honestly not sure, I've never seen AA to mean air-to-air missile, and if in some technical discussions somewhere that abbreviation is used, the general understanding is standing for Anti-Air, for example:

Poland's AA defences were no match for the German attack, and the situation was similar in other European countries.[56] Significant AAW (Anti-Air Warfare) started with the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940. QF 3.7-inch AA guns provided the backbone of the ground-based AA defences, although initially significant numbers of QF 3-inch 20 cwt were also used. The Army's Anti-aircraft command, which was under command of the Air Defence UK organisation, grew to 12 AA divisions in 3 AA corps. Bofors 40 mm guns entered service in increasing numbers. In addition, the RAF regiment was formed in 1941 with responsibility for airfield air defence, eventually with Bofors 40 mm as their main armament. Fixed AA defences, using HAA and LAA, were established by the Army in key overseas places, notably Malta, Suez Canal and Singapore. — Anti-Aircraft Warfare

And refers generally to AA systems. However, I agree SAM is more specific, but to a general audience (such anyone who may be reading this) my assumption is that they would read AA as anti-air. Now I think most English speakers would be familiar with SAM also, but simply saying ground based AA missile seemed to me the clearest way to for the largest audience. But I'm happy to use SAM and people need to look it up if they don't know what it is.

Those high flying Russian fighters have to stay out of the reach of the Ukrainian GBAD also. And obviously those future F-16s, when they come, will be used very cautiously. Yet in any case, the outcome relies on a large variety of factors than just the specs of the weapon systems. The way the weapon systems are used, the way the forces operate is far more important than the technical aspects of a weapon system. — ssu

Yes, we definitely agree the use of the F16s will be cautious, and there is plenty of airspace hundreds of kilometres out of range of any of the missiles we've been discussing.

The purpose of discussing the technical aspects here is to evaluate the risks involved. What a system can and can't do is the starting point of the risk analysis in trying to plan operations.

The point of developing the the facts that Russian fighters can fly high and look down is simply to establish that "flying low" is not some easy solution to the problem of SAMs.

Taking into consideration the speeds at which high altitude Russian fighters can fly, is to simply give an idea that Russia can potentially chase these low flying F16s at high speeds and maybe willing to risk being shot down themselves to do so, because they underestimated the risk, or because they have more aircraft or because they are confident they can destroy the F16 before being themselves destroyed (or all three). One certainly could not be exactly sure Russians wouldn't take large risks to shoot down your F16 nor be exactly sure what the capabilities of their systems are.

Vis-a-vis the speed of Russian missiles compared the their American counterparts, I completely agree that "The way the weapon systems are used, the way the forces operate is far more important than the technical aspects of a weapon system," but the underlying lesson here is that American weapons have been developed to be effective in the context American war fighting system and we are, in my view, starting to see the limits of what can be picked out of the US system, dropped in Ukraine in an entirely different context than the designers had in mind in making the specifications and the war planners had in mind in deciding how many such systems to order.

Just to give on example:why did we see footage of Bayraktar-drones destroying Russian SAM launchers early in the war and not anymore? The reason is that at start of the war there were so many limitations to SAM use as the Russian aircraft indeed flew over Ukrainian territory, that Bayraktars could have a field day. Then when Russian aircraft weren't flying anymore in Ukrainian territory (or at least, not so much), then the decision to fire on an aircraft was made easy. After all, we ought to remember the unfortunate use of a BUK-M1 shooting down that Malesian plane earlier. — ssu

Completely agree.

The men and the military itself does matter also. Best example is just how few Abrams tanks were destroyed when operated by the US Army in Iraq and how many similar tanks have been destroyed by the Houthis fighting Saudi-Arabian troops in Yemen. — ssu

That's somewhat an oversimplification, as Iraq is flat and the US had overwhelming superior forces and "next generation" technology (in particular night vision) engaging in the open field. The war in Yemen is not so similar.

However, for the air war over Ukraine, Russians have proven proficient and their systems effective and presumably have shot down a significant amount of Ukrainian aircraft.

The F16s can keep Russian jets from flying all over Ukraine as in the first days of the war, but it is mostly a specifications issue: once a Russian jet leaves the cover of its own air defence bubble, F16s, either on patrol or then scrambled, can fire long range missiles at the Russian jet, so the Russian jets stay in their defensive bubbles to avoid that happening.

And if things get really bad with both SAM depletion and Russians able to effectively target F16 airbases in Ukraine, they can always simply be based in a NATO country. In terms of denying Russia air supremacy, they are clearly more useful than not having any planes.

You don't need to fit these radars into an aircraft, fighters already have radars that can track, they have to be closer than these massive ground based radars but they can be at high altitude and looking down to track low flying targets trying to evade said massive ground based radars. — boethius

Modern fighter jets shoot other jets and can shoot down cruise missiles. But shooting down artillery rockets is a different thing.

Completely agree. — boethius

And that example just underlines how difficult it is to use both aircraft and GBAD at the same time. The problem of IFF (identification Friend or Foe) is a difficult one. Even today.

That's somewhat an oversimplification, as Iraq is flat and the US had overwhelming superior forces and "next generation" technology (in particular night vision) engaging in the open field. The war in Yemen is not so similar. — boethius

In many cases you can have the money to buy expensive weapons, but not things like an educated well trained force for their optimal use. And there are many differences, hence we should avoid oversimplifications.

However, for the air war over Ukraine, Russians have proven proficient and their systems effective and presumably have shot down a significant amount of Ukrainian aircraft. — boethius

Except that everybody assumed that the Ukrainian Air Force and GBAD would be crushed at start of the war and Russia would gain air superiority. Which didn't happen. Likely they are adapting to the situation, yet it hasn't been the greatest success story.

The performance has been mediocre. I think the best thing is that they have understood their limitations and do hold back in using their air force, which hasn't suffered like losses like Russian armored forces. Russians do have the ability to improve their performance, even if the authoritarian culture makes it difficult.

A very interesting video of the effects of the Ukrainian war in the Russia near abroad. A nice summary of the troubled hot spots in the Russian sphere in Caucasus and Central Asia. Or in inside Russia, like in Tatarstan.

Drones strike Moscow.

:grimace:

https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/ukraines-offensive-and-its-meaning-for-the-war/

Washington's minimum objective in this Ukraine conflict was to manufacture a scenario where relations between Russia and Europe but particularly Germany could be severed. This mission is complete; Nord Stream is dead, eleven rounds of economic sanctions and an endless convoy of European armaments supplied to Kiev have poisoned relations. What's more, Russia has shifted its entire economic and cultural focus from Europe and towards the East.

The alignment of German technical capacity with Russia's unlimited reserves of cheap resources has long been feared by USA strategists. This is the Realist perspective, often detailed by Professors of political science like John Mearsheimer, as the guiding principle of US foreign policy for over 100 years.

Having outlived its purpose, the war is now an unnecessary political, economic, and strategic liability. The ostensible goal of defeating Russia or triggering regime change was a long shot. but it was a crucial narrative to lure and secure European support.

As for the war itself, the battle for Bakhmut represented Ukraine's last stand. It is clear that the Ukrainian military had no realistic capacity and/or a genuine objective of defeating or defending itself against Russia. Otherwise, it would not have wasted tens of thousands of soldiers on this one settlement. But Bakhmut was more than that, it was the heart of the Ukraine's defence strategy. Sitting above 120 miles of deep underground salt mine tunnels, Bakhmut offered a defensive advantage that cannot be replaced.

And so the promised great Ukraine offensive will did not come. The Biden administration presses for an offensive it knows will fail. The aftermath of this failure presents the administration the opportunity to abandon the project, claiming what more can we do? It's Afghanistan reloaded.

Notably, both President Zelensky and General Zaluzhnyi, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, are fully aware of the implications behind the administrations fixation. So increasingly we see Zelensky traveling the world, avoiding Kiev, as he plans for life after the war. While General Zaluzhnyi disappears for weeks at a time, randomly posting videos of himself inspecting the front lines and chanting perpetually that he still needs better and more weapons before any offensive can be contemplated.

The loss of men and equipment has left the Ukraine with little offensive capacity. Whilst, Russia continues to relentlessly shell and kill from a distance, preserving its military capacity. The Ukraine has turned to Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine intelligence, Budanov's grand idea is to conduct something akin to a guerrilla marketing war: bizarre and random drone strikes destroying street signs in Moscow paired with lightning hit and run cross border incursions into defenceless Russian villages. Neither of these serve any strategic military purpose, but they do inspire dramatic headlines in the Western media.

As for the war itself, the battle for Bakhmut represented Ukraine's last stand. It is clear that the Ukrainian military had no realistic capacity and/or a genuine objective of defeating or defending itself against Russia. Otherwise, it would not have wasted tens of thousands of soldiers on this one settlement. But Bakhmut was more than that, it was the heart of the Ukraine's defence strategy. Sitting above 120 miles of deep underground salt mine tunnels, Bakhmut offered a defensive advantage that cannot be replaced. — yebiga

One look at the map is enough to see that the above is not true. The Sloviansk/Kramatorsk complex is much bigger than Bakhmut and much better defended, moreover, it cannot be passed without breaching the Pavlohrad/Kramatorsk or Izyum/Sloviansk line. At this time Russians have no realistic option to make significant ground gains in the area.

Moreover, if Bakhmut was Ukraine's 'last stand', then Russian strategy since its taking would be completely absurd: instead of pushing forward, they went back to lick their wounds, squandering any advantage they might have.

Indonesia proposes demilitarised zone, UN referendum for Ukraine peace plan
^{— Kanupriya Kapoor, Olena Harmash, Gerry Doyle, David Holmes · Reuters · Jun 3, 2023}

• demilitarised zone separating currently held positions by 15 km
• UN peacekeeping force in zone
• cessation of hostilities
• UN referendum "to ascertain objectively the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of the various disputed areas" —Subianto

Somewhat similar to earlier suggestions.
Objectively ascertaining majority wishes could be difficult, because a number of Russian actors could have entered the areas posing as Ukrainians whenever told so by who/whatever downstream from the Kremlin, thereby "polluting" any votes; this sort of thing would have to be figured out to some reasonable extent.
I'd suggest UN peacekeepers in Donbas and Crimea (also ensuring the airways weren't one-sided), then trying to set up genuine votes.
Anyway, it's technically doable; best done before hatred of the other side settles more severely.

Any takers hereabouts?

As long as one or both sides are interested in continuing the war, UN involvement is practically impossible. For one, because Russia can veto any UN resolution it doesn't like, and secondly, one of the basic principles of UN peacekeeping is to have consent of all involved parties.

, the Ukrainians want the invaders to leave them alone, the Kremlin wants, well, hard to tell exactly, but officially no Nazis, no NATO.
Whatever the Kremlin wants, is not likely to be compatible with what the defenders want. By the way, from memory, they mentioned a demilitarised Ukraine some time in the past.
The UN voted a few times prior, but the suggestion of peacekeepers and votes could depart some from that, or at least perhaps bring more of what the parties want out in the open.
Worthwhile? Try? Waste of time? Futile?

The UN voted a few times prior, but the suggestion of peacekeepers and votes could depart some from that, or at least perhaps bring more of what the parties want out in the open.
Worthwhile? Try? Waste of time? Futile? — jorndoe

The UN General Assembly can vote, but such votings have no actual power. Only Security Council resolutions do.

So until both sides are interested in a truce, these types of proposals should be seen as more political in nature. A way for nations to signal their stance on issues.

the Kremlin wants, well, hard to tell exactly — jorndoe

What do all parasites want?

Russia's Lavrov accuses West of 'supporting genocide' in Ukraine
^{— Gareth Jones · Reuters · May 30, 2023}

Give it up, Lavrov. Still not working. What will the Kenyans take away?

Russia's Lavrov says Kremlin drone incident was 'hostile act'
^{— Mark Trevelyan · Reuters · May 5, 2023}
Ukraine minister in 'disbelief' at closed Kyiv bomb shelters
^{— Dan Peleschuk, Nick Macfie · Reuters · Jun 4, 2023}

Maybe Lavrov comes from a parallel universe (cf Bondarev). A bit comedic if not for the :fire:.

https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/suspicious-activity-what-are-german-fighter-pilots-doing-in-china-a-25ac852d-887d-454b-8d73-02a595c83c32

Explainer: What would it mean if Ukraine joined NATO?
^{— Sabine Siebold, Charlotte Van Campenhout, Mark Heinrich · Reuters · Jun 5, 2023}

Despite not having been granted a MAP [Membership Action Plan], the country's military has taken major steps in transitioning towards NATO standards since Russia's invasion 15 months ago.
This process is set to accelerate as Kyiv gradually runs out of Soviet-built arms and ammunition, while the West trains Ukrainian troops according to NATO standards and rushes more and more advanced weaponry to the country.

Makes it sound like the aid also is part of preparations for Ukraine to join NATO, not just immediate defense.

"Moreover, if Bakhmut was Ukraine's 'last stand', then Russian strategy since its taking would be completely absurd: instead of pushing forward, they went back to lick their wounds, squandering any advantage they might have."

In the absence of overwhelming support from the local population, the occupation of a hostile territory by a military force may be achieved, but sustaining that occupation becomes a formidable challenge. This timeless lesson was vividly reinforced a mere 18 months ago with the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan. It is also worth noting that the conquest of enemy territory, while historically significant, was not an essential feature of the cold war. The ramifications of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine extend far beyond its geographical confines, permeating multiple global dimensions of paramount importance.

Merely considering the modest territorial gains Russia has attained on the eastern fringes of Ukraine obscures the profound transformation in Russia's economic prospects. The Eurasian expanse has witnessed a remarkable tapestry of trade alliances and investments involving Russia and its eastern neighbours; colossal joint ventures encompass the expansion of rail and road networks, the escavation of harbours, and the construction of pipelines that span the vast Euro-Asian continent, reaching as far as Vladivostok. Notably, for the first time in history, these initiatives unfold independent of the influence and oversight of either EU member states or the United States.

To put it succinctly, the attempts by the US and the EU countries to isolate Russia from the global community have backfired. Countries from Africa, South America, and the Euro-Asian continent, though often quietly, are progressively and openly challenging the policies dictated by the US and the EU. Western political leaders have revealed a disconcerting disconnect from reality, their inherent hubris rendering them oblivious to their own fallibility. Accustomed to exerting influence and power over others, they believe their actions to be consistently well-intentioned, freedom-loving, compassionate, and just, while perceiving the rest of the world as less developed and impoverished solely due to their divergence from Western ideals.

But every action, including progress itself, begets both positive and negative outcomes. Until a few decades ago, despite the numerous missteps of the Western world, it could be argued that our technological and cultural influence on a global scale propelled humanity towards a brighter future. However, the equilibrium has dramatically shifted. Technological advancements continue unabated, but our cultural fabric has deteriorated into a kind tragicomedy. We find ourselves detached from reality, perhaps a consequence of decades of unprecedented abundance, or perhaps not. What remains indisputable is the hollowness of our democratic systems, values, and institutions, now reduced to theatrical rituals.

Western critics are not celebrating the ascendancy of Russia or China. Rather, they stand astonished at the erosion of Western culture, thought, and ethics. Our actions, not our words, reveal our values. Once, like China today, the West was driven by the pragmatic pursuit of building and progress, guided by an ethical compass oriented toward improving the human condition. Yet, now we speak grandly of these values while our deeds betray them. We prioritize the trivial and the irrational, elevating them to prominence, while crucial matters go unaddressed or unspoken.

We find ourselves indebted to the generations before us for the privileges we enjoy, yet we, like spoiled children, fail to appreciate our inheritance. Our problems—economic, social, health-related, mental health, justice, geopolitical, poverty, inequity, and beyond—are products of our self-indulgence.

If the diagnosis is clear, so too is the remedy.

Russia's actions, whether right or wrong, can be understood within the context of a nation perceiving its security to be under threat. While many non-Western countries strive for a roadmap to peace between Russia and Ukraine, it is the Western world that zealously adds fuel to the conflict, embroiling itself in a precarious dance with a nuclear superpower.

In the process, just as the cause of the destruction of the nordstream pipeline remains a mystery, so have we become an enigma to ourselves, lost within labyrinthine of our lies . Meanwhile, the best of what once defined us languishes forgotten and forsaken in the dark confines at Belmarsh prison, in the once-great city of London.

This reply is completely irrelevant to my post, which pointed out the factual inaccuracies in your previous post.

That is why I will reply to this one shortly: it is equally factually incorrect. Russia's economic prospects are rather bleak. While its output in energy resources in volume is close to pre-war levels, the income from their export is down by 45%. Given that before the war it accounted for almost half of the federal budget, it is a significant loss. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the federal spending is higher by about 30% (due to the costs of this unnecessary war). It is enough to say that Russia's deficit has reach its projected annual value in three months. Russia is not ascending, it is deteriorating. It did not start with the war, but it certainly has accelerated that process.

And the talk of the loss of values in the West is rather hypocritical, given the 'values' of Russia's allies. It is not a coincidence that they are all authoritarian states.

These are an impressive set of numbers for a country about to collapse under the weight of the Empire's unanimous enmity. All the more so when you consider the volume of money sent to prop up Ukraine, the training of their troops for the last 18 months, the elite NATO advisers, the volunteer mercenaries, the most advance detection systems, the equipment and ammunition stores depleted from Western Europe.

But all of that is but a drop in the ocean compared to the creative choreography directed at portraying a heroic Zelensky and an innocent Ukraine valiantly defying and outsmarting those Russian villains who strangely resemble the vilest of humanity as portrayed by Hollywood films for the last 20 years.

Russia's inflation rate is not only only lower, but multiple levels lower than either the USA or the EU: Russia 2.5% USA 5% plus EU 8% plus

https://www.statista.com/statistics/276323/monthly-inflation-rate-in-russia/

GDP growth -2.1% (2022) 0.7% (2023f) 1.3% (2024f)

Russia’s significant trade surplus of over US$ 330 billion. Despite western Ukraine-related sanctions, Russia’s exports surged by nearly 20% in 2022.

Much of the trade surplus is driven by grain exports. Russia produces almost 12% of the world’s wheat, all non-GMO. Total world wheat production for this period is estimated at about 781 million tons.

The combined BRICS-plus Iran output is almost half of global production. That of China (18%), India (13%), and Russia (12%), account for a combined 43% of total world production. Almost half of one of the world’s key food staples is produced by just three BRICS countries.

Food leverage is not in Western hands.

Russia’s overall trade increased by 8.1% in 2022 over 2021, to US$ 850.5 billion equivalent. The bulk of Russia’s exports were energy products, gas and petrol, amounting to about two thirds of all exports, US$ 384 billion equivalent.

This is an almost 43% annual increase despite western sanctions
And it's currency reserves have been restored to pre-war levels.

Having said all that, if I was the Russians I would be very very nervous because, in the immortal words from the opening scene in Patton : "Americans are winners, we hate to lose and love to win" And in this instance winning is going to require something from left field.

And the talk of the loss of values in the West is rather hypocritical, given the 'values' of Russia's allies. It is not a coincidence that they are all authoritarian states. — Jabberwock

Democracies seem decadent, weak, corrupt and verge of collapse to the authoritarian. And, of course, they are also homosexual and are against traditional values, which the authoritarian regimes often declare to be the sole defenders of. It was so in the 1930's and it is so now.

Seems that Russia blew up the Kakhovka damn to prevent any crossing from western part (western end) of the Dnipro. But it obviously puts a lot people into danger.

the head of the Kherson region, Oleksandr Prokudin, said that as a result of the explosions, “water will reach a critical level in 5 hours” and that residents in nearby areas would be forced to leave their homes. “Around 16,000 people on Kherson’s right bank are in the critical zone," he said, adding that residents would be evacuated by bus.