The absent future does not, cannot, force free consciousness to do anything, for it is free consciousness which prefigures, imagines, makes the not-yet that is its future existence. Time originates via this nihilative capacity to conceive the absent future, whereby, the present is transcended and made past...
Nothing, nothingness, as consciousness, is real. — quintillus

But imagine if a person does nothing, the person would die of starvation or something like that. This dying, which would occur, would be the person being forced into the past, by the future, as the future becomes the past in the passing of time.. So the person must do things of necessity, or else be forced into the past by the future Therefore the force of the future makes it necessary for the person to do things. Our inclination to do things is a reflection of the reality of the future.

Contrary to what you say, the future is not absent at all. It is here with us, all the time, continuously making it necessary (forcing us) to act. If there was no future imposing itself on us, we would have no anticipation, no anxiety, no desire to eat, or desire for anything whatsoever for that matter, therefore no inclination to act.

The future is here with us as an absence. Consciousness, which is freedom, and which makes that absent future, cannot be forced to do anything, except by its own volition, for it is free.
You are positing an absolutism of the future, while, all the while, consciousness is always free and unbound, to imagine its next future...You have become so totally deterministic in your world view, via living in a totally jurisprudentially deterministic world, that you absolutely insist there must always be something Other out there which, cinesiologically, is in motion forcefully moving you...

Thanks for the answer. Bye bye

You are positing an absolutism of the future, while, all the while, consciousness is always free and unbound, to imagine its next future...You have become so totally deterministic in your world view, via living in a totally jurisprudentially deterministic world, that you absolutely insist there must always be something Other out there which, cinesiologically, is in motion forcefully moving you... — quintillus

This is not me at all, and it demonstrates that you did not understand what I said.

I understood; and, I responded kindly. You set forward an untoward absolutism of the future; but, you are kind and do not attack one's person.

It is not an "absolutism" concerning the future, but proof that the future is real and therefore not as you claim, "nothing".

It is not an "absolutism" concerning the future, but proof that the future is real and therefore not as you claim, "nothing". — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not my personal claim. What I am presenting here is J.P. Sartre's conception of how a human act originates by what he calls a "double nihilation", to which I subscribe. 'Nihilate' is a word Sartre invented, and means: to make nothing. Future is a human creation, and is, in current worldwide existential ontological thought, a "present absence".
You have the future determining the person while it is actually persons that determine future.

I think what I was trying to show is that Sartre and the "current worldwide existential ontological thought", might be a little of the mark in how future is represented. If the future was really nothing, then our freedom would be absolute. But our freedom is limited, as I explained above. The future exerts a real force on us, which would kill us if we did not act to prevent it from doing that. Therefore the future is not noting, and Sartre's existentialism seems to have a mistaken premise.

However, I would appreciate it if you could provide for me a coherent interpretation of Sartre's "double nihilism" so that I might better understand the concept.

According to Sartre human freedom is an absolute capacity to intend a particular future, although, circumstances can and will obviate the realization of the intended state.
I have explained double nihilation, I think twice here already, but, here it is: Human consciousness nihilates, i.e., makes a nothing which is a particular intended future state of affairs, which is unrealized; absent; not-yet; hence non-being/nothing. As consciousness establishes that absence as a presence, it transcends the present, rendering the present as past. That rendering present as past is the second nothing making/nihlation wherein the present becomes nothing.

According to Sartre human freedom is an absolute capacity to intend a particular future, although, circumstances can and will obviate the realization of the intended state. — quintillus

Do you accept that the human capacity to realize an intended future state, is not "absolute" as you claim Sartre affirms? If so, then you will see that "obviate" is not an appropriate word to use here in the description of how circumstances relate to the realization of the intended state.

In reality, the circumstances indicate to us the real restrictions which exist in relation to our "capacity to intend a particular future", making this capacity far less than absolute. In general, we recognize the circumstances as limiting the possibilities. Possibility, often known as "potential" is how we understand the future. So the conventional understanding is that the future is not "nothing", it is what may or may not be (as potential), and this violates the law of excluded middle. So the future has some sort of real existence, but it is a type of existence which violates this fundamental "law" of logic.

Human consciousness nihilates, i.e., makes a nothing which is a particular intended future state of affairs, which is unrealized; absent; not-yet; hence non-being/nothing. — quintillus

For the reason explained above, this is not an accurate representation. The "particular intended state of affairs" is understood by the human consciousness as a possible, or potential state. Potential is not nothing, it is categorically distinct from being and non-being (existent and non-existent) as that which cannot be described by those terms. Further, the human consciousness apprehends circumstances, (describable in terms of what is and is not), as having a bearing on, or being somehow related to future possibilities. This relationship is understood in terms of "necessity", what is "necessary". That is why, despite what Sartre says, human freedom is not commonly understood as "an absolute capacity", and this is a misrepresentation of how human consciousness actually apprehends its own freedom.

I can make neither head nor tail of your thinking Sir...

Well, If you cannot grasp the fact that the human capacity to realize an intended future state is not "absolute", then go ahead and keep your daydreaming mind occupied by your fantasy world. But don't try to do anything strenuous please, that might shatter your illusion.

The right/freedom to hold or not hold religious belief is absolute.

Even if rights could be absolute (an assumption which in itself requires justification), how would that be relevant to the human capacity to realize intended future states?

It is absolute that free choice is absolutely without justification. The capacities to realize, to fail, are ontologically absolute, and cannot possibly be overthrown. The double nihilation is ontologically absolute and cannot not be done/performed..
Law, though an absolutism, is not absolute, human freedom to obey/disobey is absolute.

The capacities to realize, to fail, are ontologically absolute, and cannot possibly be overthrown. — quintillus

You set forward an absolutism of the future. This is very deterministic.

No, I am describing human freedom, an absolute, which can fail in its quest to make an intended future. Humans constitute past present and future...