Morality mandates a perspective be taken as one member of a group, with an interest in the group's wellbeing, and any views that fall outside of this context are invalid. — Judaka

Any motivation that would clearly be contrary to the group's cannot be reasonably used as part of an argument for a moral position, [...] — Judaka

In my view, morality doesn't involve groups. It involves interactions between moral agents (individuals), which could perhaps even include interactions with oneself.

Personifying groups as though they think and act like individuals is virtually always an inaccurate representation of reality and tends to lead to all sorts of peculiar conclusions.

Secondly, I believe it is possible that the moral thing to do (or not do) can be contrary to the individual's (or for simplicity's sake, the group's) self-interest. That is self-sacrifice.


Onto your points,

Morality or discussions about morality aren't coercive by what you've described. It's people's relation to the ideas they hold which are. Fears of being wrong, of having to renounce their ideas,of ostracization, etc. - these are social or personal factors. Of course those are going to muddy the waters.

Anyone who is guided by fear rather than their honest reason will risk falling prey to delusion or deceit.

Even if one does speak honestly in a moral context, we can never be sure, [...] — Judaka

The fact is that people can virtually never be sure as to the genuineness of their interactions with one another. We can't look into other people's heads to figure out whether their behavior is authentic or some carefully crafted facade to mislead us.

That's an unfortunate fact.

But largely, to the honest intellectual it's irrelevant. Either what someone says holds merit, or it doesn't. If it doesn't, one can dismiss it. If it does, one is forced to pay heed. Truth is truth, after all, whether it is delivered by someone who intends to deceive or not.


In the end, morality is about actions and behaviors, and not about opinions. So with that point I agree - any moral opinion that is not put into practice (or about which we're skeptical whether it could be put into practice) may be taken with a large grain of salt.

Talk is cheap, as they say.

To me, the essential problem here is that one can't admit something is immoral and do it anyway. As if that actually stops anyone, it just means one must come up with justifications. — Judaka

:up:

This frustrates me no end. People judge things as immoral (evil) when they're merely uncomfortable with those things. People are whimsically cruel many times per day. People lie and distort their lives to portray themselves as central characters within them. The act of morally condemning or supporting an act contains an essential confabulation - the declaration that what we ought see has happened has indeed happened, and thus we ought judge it in the manner asserted.

I think it's better to own doing something you know is wrong, and own the moral certainty that's needed in justifying your actions post hoc.

"You hit me!" "You had it coming!" vs
"You hit me!" "Yes! I felt uncomfortable and at the time decided that punching you would let me control you by inflicting pain!"

But...

My second point is that people shouldn't aim to solve contradictions in their views when it comes to morality because you'll just end up believing the lies you create. The absurd moral epiphanies people have to think of just to morally justify a belief formed for personal or political reasons. If you're just going to use mental gymnastics to morally justify your belief, why even bother? Just acknowledge the environment is coercive and unreasonable and make up a lie instead. You'll only end up having a completely nonsensical and incoherent worldview otherwise. — Judaka

I don't know if making life choices or designing institutions to follow principles follows the above logic of confabulation in the same way; maybe you can really play the game of optimising justice without confabulation on the large scale. Like asserting that it would be better for no one to die of poverty or preventable disease. The act of declaring that one might give me moral brownie points (TM), it can nevertheless be a true statement.

I see this as a difference in the interpersonal performance of morality; which is a fountain of confabulations. And the considered implementation of it; in which good in principle goals are relevant.

In my view, morality doesn't involve groups. It involves interactions between moral agents (individuals), which could perhaps even include interactions with oneself.

Personifying groups as though they think and act like individuals is virtually always an inaccurate representation of reality and tends to lead to all sorts of peculiar conclusions.

Secondly, I believe it is possible that the moral thing to do (or not do) can be contrary to the individual's (or for simplicity's sake, the group's) self-interest. That is self-sacrifice. — Tzeentch

And yet liberalism, which seems to be your moral framework, aims to set the rules for entire communities. Or do you have another idea apart from that? I think the only people personifying groups are people who like to raise strawmen of collectivist moral frameworks. It's just a level of abstraction that even the liberal cannot escape: I'm a liberal therefore everybody should do xyz.

I'm not interested in setting rules for anybody but myself.

Oh, don't bother discussing it then.

Morality mandates a perspective be taken as one member of a group, with an interest in the group's wellbeing, and any views that fall outside of this context are invalid. In a philosophical context, that "group" is unlikely to be of your choosing, and instead might be the citizens of a nation or just the whole of humanity. Any motivation that would clearly be contrary to the group's cannot be reasonably used as part of an argument for a moral position, without explaining why that is fair or justified within the context of the entire group, or as the best solution to the situation. — Judaka

I think that one can successfully expand the group in such a way as to redefine what can be considered moral, even given that what you say about groups is true. For instance, most people only care about their loved ones, when really if they applied their principles universally - which I would argue is the ultimate goal of any successful morality - they would care more about children dying halfway across the world from starvation than about their dog. A moral position merely requires some sort of reasoning and an ought, not universal agreement among all moral agents in a given group.

Not to mention, is it not true that espousing a certain morality puts you in a group with others with a similar morality? Do I not have more in common with a free-thinker halfway across the world than my proselytizing, fundamentalist neighbor? Group membership can be viewed in so many different ways, and one is in so many different groups, that reducing morality to it being coercion by a group becomes a meaningless exercise except when adjudication is involved.

Would you say that those who fought for equal voting rights in the US were by default wrong merely because they were initially the minority and their views didn't benefit the wellbeing of everyone in the US? What if the reformers in this instance had viewed it that way? They wanted to guarantee everyone equal rights under a system that denied them rights, and their best arguments did not benefit the white upper or middle class. But then white people began to take up the cause because they saw the absurdity of segregation, and it was because of an expansion of group membership with little gain for those who defined how morality was judged - the group being citizens deserving rights - that people of color were given equal rights and the pre-eminent group morality was subverted. And this outcome cannot be attributed to good arguments alone; we needed people like Rosa Parks to point out the ongoing stupidities of racists with their actions.

So yes, a less common position might not agree with the morality of the group one is born into (such as white people in the 1960's) or finds themselves ensnared in, but according to your logic there can never be valid moral progress or evolution from within a group that does not favor the group being persuaded in some way; the independent reformer is potentially automatically wrong, and I think that that is a very problematic way of looking at morality, as morality must evolve as, say, technology advances. For instance, what do we do about potential AGI sling shotting us forward technologically? Or how to even engage with AGI at all? Our current modalities are not sufficient, and we need to be able to develop them to accommodate something that might be truly alien to us.

Essentially, I'm saying your view doesn't deal with instances in which a group has no motivation other than their own wellbeing to adopt a more equitable position, as it doesn't necessarily benefit the entire group in question and could even be contrary to the interests of the group at large. There needs to be some sort of external factors in there that decide it, be it actions of the minority or other, perhaps unintended things.

The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. — Judaka

Perhaps this is partially true, but those positions can be justified with reasoning given some first principles one might naturally espouse, so the moral position could be viewed as somewhat natural given the cognitive faculties humans have. Not to mention we are programmed to possess morals, even if the specific content of those morals is not synonymous with whatever behavior you think a given human would default to.

The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. One's thinking factors in one's priorities, values, goals, philosophy, and how one interprets and characterises things and other factors that don't fit into the moral context. — Judaka

Are you saying those things don't factor into one's moral perspective?

smaller perspectives might be excluded, as you're to take the position of the group in question. — Judaka

I for one have seen this happen on the forums and also the opposite, as even a minority opinion expressed well seems to earn respect here. So, I would say among people who largely try to be reasonable the smaller perspective is usually weighed, even if not charitably.

Not to mention, it seems to me that among the group of people who are aware of this thread and your OP, it appears most of the people who have responded disagree with you, so you are being coerced into believing that your own beliefs about meta-ethics are wrong, right?

In my view, morality doesn't involve groups. It involves interactions between moral agents (individuals), which could perhaps even include interactions with oneself. — Tzeentch

Even if your thought was that everyone should decide for themselves what to do, and nobody should be able to tell anyone else otherwise, you'd still be dictating to the group how the group dynamics should be.

It's very difficult to talk about morality without a group as a context because the group's motivations and values are critical. For example, what's fair and reasonable within the context of a competitive soccer team will be different from a casual kids' soccer team. Whereas the competitive team might think it's fair to let the best players have the most field time and ball possession because of everyone's desire to win, it might seem fair to allow all the kids an equal chance to play in the casual kids' team.

It's not possible to simply assert one's own values and goals. To talk about what is "fair" and "just" one must consider the circumstances of the group, right? If one's reasoning applies only to them and not the group, such as that it is just a personal belief, then I suppose my OP wouldn't be very relevant.

I think it's better to own doing something you know is wrong, and own the moral certainty that's needed in justifying your actions post hoc. — fdrake

What are you saying makes it better? I admire one who acts like this, and I sometimes think people are overly frightened of giving even an inch. Won't tolerate the slightest admission of guilt in any regard, and thus, refuse to "own" any wrongdoing. The entire process of moral judgement seems fixed upon this initial wrongdoing, the attempt to characterise something, for instance, as malicious or deserved makes up the dispute. Ultimately, to do as you suggest can only work so long as one doesn't instantly lose control of the narrative by admitting any guilt. While I admire it, isn't it generally smarter to obfuscate or contest instead? Surely, one should at least calculate the chances of whether their reasoning will be accepted? There are no assurances against the repercussions one would want to avoid after providing a justification. Success might just depend on an ability to be convincing.

How often is morality just a sales pitch for one's ideas? Or a crucial necessity to avoid blame? If one's character, worldview, ideas, and actions, are to be judged through the lens of morality, then it's natural to pursue any reasoning that will be compelling.

It's very difficult to talk about morality without a group as a context because the group's motivations and values are critical. For example, what's fair and reasonable within the context of a competitive soccer team will be different from a casual kids' soccer team. Whereas the competitive team might think it's fair to let the best players have the most field time and ball possession because of everyone's desire to win, it might seem fair to allow all the kids an equal chance to play in the casual kids' team. — Judaka

I'm not sure if fairness and reasonableness are terms I would use to discuss morality. They are too pliable and morality requires clarity, or it risks turning, as you aptly put it, into a "sales pitch for one's ideas" - becoming just another word for opinions and personal fancies.

But let me try to illustrate my point.

Let's say there's a kids soccer game and little Jimmy has to sit on the bench the entire game even though the coach told him he could play.

The coach broke a promise to Jimmy.

The soccer game, the team, the group, etc. are not morally relevant. What's morally relevant is the breaking of a promise, and it is between (in this case) two moral actors.

What are you saying makes it better? — Judaka

A general principle that informed decisions are better ones. And that this requires accurate presentation of information. If I've shat on someone I don't want to describe it like giving them flowers.

I admire one who acts like this, and I sometimes think people are overly frightened of giving even an inch. Won't tolerate the slightest admission of guilt in any regard, and thus, refuse to "own" any wrongdoing. The entire process of moral judgement seems fixed upon this initial wrongdoing, the attempt to characterise something, for instance, as malicious or deserved makes up the dispute.

Yes. She who comes out of a conflict scenario least covered in shit counts as clean.

Ultimately, to do as you suggest can only work so long as one doesn't instantly lose control of the narrative by admitting any guilt. While I admire it, isn't it generally smarter to obfuscate or contest instead?

It's more likely to get you what you want in the moment, yeah. Trying to act as if "the way of things", "justice" or "propriety" are on your side helps make your side win. So yes, more strategic for many interpersonal goals. Except...

Surely, one should at least calculate the chances of whether their reasoning will be accepted? There are no assurances against the repercussions one would want to avoid after providing a justification. Success might just depend on an ability to be convincing.

success in intimate relationships/friendships maybe. Saying what it was, exactly, but respectfully is required for those. They're less oppositional, right? Having the dominant narrative doesn't matter when the game isn't to dominate.

The breaking of a promise seems relatively straightforward, especially without giving any reasoning that could be used to defend it.

Fairness and reasonableness are pivotal to my understanding of what morality is, so, perhaps we're just using the word differently.


There are many cases where admitting you are in the wrong is advantageous, especially to people close to you. I agree, and often the stakes of these cases are fairly low, so one can afford to be honest.

There are many cases where admitting you are in the wrong is advantageous, especially to people close to you. I agree, and often the stakes of these cases are fairly low, so one can afford to be honest. — Judaka

Glad we largely see eye to eye. It's kinda cathartic!

How much of performed morality do you think arises in adversarial contexts vs collaborative ones? By performed morality I mean expressing judgements of what is right/wrong, providing feedback on people's actions, opening yourself to criticism, being reciprocal with an intimate and so on...

Group membership can be viewed in so many different ways, and one is in so many different groups, that reducing morality to it being coercion by a group becomes a meaningless exercise except when adjudication is involved — ToothyMaw

It wasn't my intention to characterise morality as the result of coercion by groups, and I'm not claiming that the groups one belong to are doing the coercion. My statement was about the nature of moral thinking, the "group" is set up by the context, and not by one's circumstances. We could even discuss a moral dilemma where we're not part of any of the groups, such as discussing the conditions of another country. However, that's still just a setup, my main argument isn't in the first paragraph.

The "group" is just an abstraction, and you can pick whatever you like. For example, if you include animals to talk about what is "fair" and "just" then perhaps you arrive at veganism. Most non-vegans aren't really dealing with this "group", instead, the animals are excluded entirely. So, "People should be able to eat meat if they want, or not, it's a personal choice" is a tenable position. It's only possible when you exclude what is fair or just for the animals, one might argue. Although I'm not even a vegan, comparing this process to the unravelling of racist policies seems pretty apt to me. Those policies were doomed the moment non-blacks started seeing black people as normal people whose conditions mattered.

For instance, most people only care about their loved ones, when really if they applied their principles universally - which I would argue is the ultimate goal of any successful morality - they would care more about children dying halfway across the world from starvation than about their dog. — ToothyMaw

This is very relevant to my OP because one's personal love for their dog is an example of something that probably wouldn't fit into a moral perspective. Why would one care about their dog more than a starving child across the sea? Isn't it because of love? This is why I say in my first paragraph that moral thinking is where one considers the group's interests, as one of the group. One's personal love for one's dog can't fit into that perspective, because they are disregarding the group's interests, and they aren't acting as just "a member" of the group, but taking into account their personal interests and desires.

What you may say in pursuit of this "ultimate goal", I call coercion, because essentially, the loyal dog owner is being compelled to provide a moral justification for his beliefs, even if there really isn't one. He simply loves and cherishes his dog, but because one such as you might act horrified and appalled by him saying "Screw starving children, I love my dog more" and because that doesn't actually work as a justification for him caring more about his dog than starving children, he's compelled to make something up. Forgive the overly dramatic representation here, we could go over a more serious topic if you prefer.

The result of the coercion means that his justification for why it's okay for him to prioritise his dog over starving children might be his real feelings, but considering the coercive environment, you can't really be sure. If it was never an option to just say "Screw you, I understand it might be immoral to value my dog more, but I'll do it anyway" (honestly, in this case, that answer would probably fly for most but w/e) then we can't trust his answer.

My OP is saying that first, we can't expect people to tell the truth due to the coercive environment, and therefore you can't ever be sure whether someone is telling their true feelings or not. Secondly, when their position was non-moral at first, and moral later, meaning, they've been forced to retrospectively deal with the moral question, one should consider lying. By acknowledging the environment is coercive and unrealistic, one should consider just internally acknowledging their lie, instead of actually trying to create a legitimate moral justification, provided one is going down the route of defending their actions.

Are you saying those things don't factor into one's moral perspective? — ToothyMaw

They might or might not, it depends, but certainly, some won't fit as I've explained already.

Perhaps this is partially true, but those positions can be justified with reasoning given some first principles one might naturally espouse, so the moral position could be viewed as somewhat natural given the cognitive faculties humans have. — ToothyMaw

Morality must come from a group perspective, and as you've already made clear, we can't select our group. You said we can't select our "family and friends", and that morality should be universal. Is the natural way of thinking so uninterested in one's self and one's loved ones? Do all of your ideas, thoughts, and values prioritise their application universally? How's that natural?

How much of performed morality do you think arises in adversarial contexts vs collaborative ones? — fdrake

I think there is a lot of performed morality in both adversarial and collaborative contexts, but if I had to choose, then I would say it's more common in collaborative contexts. Since people feel more comfortable sharing their opinions with like-minded people, it is done recreationally as opposed to in an adversarial context where it might be done out of necessity. One risks straining a relationship with frequent critiques, and thus one might feel it'd be better to keep that kind of thing to a minimum. My answer might change if I had specific circumstances in mind, but generally, I'd go with collaborative contexts.

Fairness and reasonableness are pivotal to my understanding of what morality is, so, perhaps we're just using the word differently. — Judaka

Probably so, but herein lies the problem.

People used to find it perfectly reasonable and fair to stone people to death for things we would now consider minor crimes or not even a crime at all.

Did the nature of morality change?

No, I don't think it changed.

The word "morality", as with many other complex English words, is bloated, filled with concepts that are distinct from each other, but also applicable in the same contexts. I distinguish between three separate concepts labelled as "morality".

The first is the evolutionary basis, that we are concerned about fairness, justice, and rules and think in terms of loyalty, betrayal and revenge. Could throw in the aversion to incest, perhaps some gender norms, it's debatable. The key features here are the emotional and psychological responses.

Secondly, there is a discussion about morality, which deals with the interpretation of what should or can be considered fair, reasonable or just. The evolutionary basis of morality just seems to entail a hatred of unfairness, but how something is interpreted to be fair or not is quite flexible. It could range from stoning someone to death over a minor offence to viewing violent responses as universally unjustified.

Thirdly, there's the morality that I'd call "philosophies of morality", which are not purely based on emotion or psychology and don't have to be at all. They can be completely divorced, and even a critique of the evolutionary basis of morality, such as emphasising logical and unbiased thinking. This might overlap with the second in providing an outline for understanding moral concepts such as fairness and justice.

There are many, including on this forum, who just define morality as something ridiculous like "reducing harm". This is a convenient definition that aims to invalidate opposing views, it is politically motivated. A good example would be incels, there is no group better defined by their strong moral feelings. They bemoan how unfair and unreasonable their circumstances are. Feeling betrayed by society, and desiring revenge, they feel hatred towards those they view themselves as being wronged by.

Our society has largely decided that "morality" only includes ideas that we agree with. So, the incels aren't motivated by moral outrage at all, they're just nasty, bitter fools, as if those things are even mutually exclusive? If we exclude these politically motivated, convenient definitions of morality, then no, it's always been the same.

Is there something wrong with being coercive and unrealistic?

No, I think morality has to be coercive and unrealistic, and even if we could change it, there are many advantages to it being this way, it's not clear at all that a change would be desirable.

If we exclude these politically motivated, convenient definitions of morality, then no, it's always been the same. — Judaka

I'm inclined to agree with this view. What I don't understand is, if the nature of morality is unchanging, aren't we looking for principles, hard 'truths', rather than pliable notions of fairness and reasonableness?

Like in my earlier example, the princple would be that breaking promises is bad, and one shouldn't make promises one cannot keep.

One might say, but in certain situations it's reasonable to break a promise, no?

To which my response would be, whether it's reasonable is irrelevant. Breaking promises is immoral. Notions of reasonableness are just there to soothe our conscience or perhaps keep fear of eternal punishment at bay. But the damage has already been done, and all there is left to do is to try and live one's life better in the future.

I'd say concepts such as reasonableness and fairness are everything in morality, and even moral systems that supposedly are strict and rigid only appear so. Lying would be 100% wrong, but then there would be a plethora of exceptions, and then due to the many ways one could interpret and characterise the concepts involved, the result is normally that it's not rigid at all.

We even have different words for things, such as tax not being theft, even though we're literally being forced to give up part of our incomes under threat of imprisonment (thought you'd like that one).

I understand how you'd like things to be, but if we're talking about how things actually are, then you should know you're wrong.

We even have different words for things, such as tax not being theft, [...] — Judaka

I'd say that's a typical example of deceptive language; the way we seperate immoral things that also happen to be very convenient (tax) from immoral things which are not convenient (theft).

That seperation, in my view, is completely unjustified. The 'reasonable'/'fairness' part of the argument, window dressing - the sales pitch you spoke about.

(thought you'd like that one). — Judaka

:wink:

[...] but if we're talking about how things actually are, [...] — Judaka

What do you mean by this?

I'd say that's a typical example of deceptive language; the way we seperate immoral things that also happen to be very convenient (tax) from immoral things which are not convenient (theft). — Tzeentch

A moral system may state unequivocally that "Theft is immoral! No excuses!". However, not only are there many exceptions but since one has complete control over whether they describe something as theft or something else, the judgement is really subjective and applied very flexibly.

We can condemn oppression, cruelty, racism, bullying and whatever else but it's often a pointless gesture. For example, who would call something they liked and agreed with oppression? We're literally just saying "We oppose what we oppose". Objective moral principles are fraudulent, they are to be applied as one wishes, when one wishes, towards whatever or whomever one wishes. There is no moral system that has ever worked differently.

What do you mean by this? — Tzeentch

In so far as describing the morality being applied by 99% of people, in 99% of cases, that it is deeply concerned with the interpretation of fairness, reasonableness and logic, and does not condemn based on hard principles. It has always been that way.

It's very difficult to talk about morality without a group as a context because the group's motivations and values are critical. For example, what's fair and reasonable within the context of a competitive soccer team will be different from a casual kids' soccer team. Whereas the competitive team might think it's fair to let the best players have the most field time and ball possession because of everyone's desire to win, it might seem fair to allow all the kids an equal chance to play in the casual kids' team. — Judaka

I think there are two moralities—there are the standards I apply to myself, and those that groups apply to themselves and others. I think only the first of these deals with what is good and bad, right and wrong. The other deals with social control—standardizing behavior to make society run smoothly. Perhaps we should add a third type—laws and other formal standards of behavior. No, let's not.

I know right from wrong in a very personal way. It's easy to boil down—Do unto others as you would have others do unto you. Actually, it's more than that. We are human. We are social. We (generally) like each other. When I am in a social situation, I usually know what is the right thing to do, not because of some rule, but because it is built into me by human nature backed up by learning. Behavior that shows respect and concern for other people is good. Behavior that doesn't is bad. I don't need anyone to tell me that. As I noted, these standards apply to myself, not to others.

I think the other kind of morality is the primary subject of this thread. The rules, formal or informal, of social control can be fair or unfair, kind or unkind, reasonable or unreasonable, useful or not useful, effective or ineffective. They are not really moral, although they are often dressed up in moral costumes, which can give them social and personal impact. There are always going to be standards of behavior, I guess the only issue is whether or not you agree with them. For me, the most important quality a good rule should have is fairness—it should apply to everyone equally.

I think moral conflict comes into play when one of the second, social kind of "moral" standards clashes with one of the first kind. My general attitude is to follow social rules unless there is a good reason not too. Often, I don't follow them because they are inconvenient, but that's because I am imperfect.

Do you condemn societies ability to apply social standards to you? I don't think there's anything you can do about it. It's human nature. It's sociology, anthropology.

@Jamal—I usually use hyphens for dashes but in this post—in your honor—I've used em dashes. What a pain in the ass they are.

Objective moral principles are fraudulent, they are to be applied as one wishes, when one wishes, towards whatever or whomever one wishes. There is no moral system that has ever worked differently. — Judaka

However, not only are there many exceptions but since one has complete control over whether they describe something as theft or something else, the judgement is really subjective and applied very flexibly. — Judaka

I think this is more a problem with people being fraudulent.

If people have no desire for developing and upholding a genuine moral code, then morality has no purpose for them anyway. They're fooling themselves and others.

And yes, that might very well describe the majority of people.

I usually use hyphens for dashes but in this post—in your honor—I've used em dashes. — T Clark

Much appreciated.

What a pain in the ass they are. — T Clark

Don't blame the dashes. Blame the world.

I agree morality is often overapplied. A completely amoral society would still have the social contract, it would still have laws, there would still be manners, things that were culturally unacceptable, expectations on your behaviour and so on.

I don't condemn society's ability to apply social standards to me, they are usually practical and beneficial for everyone. and I generally support these rules.

I think this is more a problem with people being fraudulent. — Tzeentch

Well, it's just how language works, you call it being fraudulent because you believe it, and someone who didn't believe that wouldn't agree with you. The same applies to moral terms, language always expresses the opinions and feelings of the speaker. When one puts their objective moral ideas into words and condemns "negative word", that negative word will only be used by a speaker who feels negatively about something.

When someone does this within their own thinking, to say, for example, "I hate idiots", what they really mean is "When people frustrate me, I call them idiots". It's backwards, they don't dislike idiots, they call people idiots when they're displeased with them, and one earns the word by displeasing them.

The exceptions are often sensible, I'm sure we could come up with many examples where lying is acceptable. Such as if it's to preserve something important, or because one is being threatened, or any number of other things. And then if one is allowed to interpret these concepts as they wish, to define "being threatened" as they want, then you've already allowed the subjectivity to explode. It's pretty much unavoidable. I imagine you perhaps feel differently because you alone follow your moral code. If you actually had others following it, you'd see it be perverted by their application, it's inevitable.

I'm sure we could come up with many examples where lying is acceptable. Such as if it's to preserve something important, or because one is being threatened, or any number of other things. — Judaka

Note that you used the term 'acceptable', and not 'moral'.

Lets assume lying is immoral. In that case, lying is always immoral. Sometimes people still lie, when the circumstances are pressing enough. That doesn't make the act of lying any less immoral.

If one is forced to kill someone out of self-defense, that act of killing wouldn't suddenly become a moral act. It would still be deeply wrong.

Whether one deems the act 'acceptable' after the fact is irrelevant. Acceptable to whom? Society? The perpetrator's conscience? God? These are all concerned with avoiding punishment, whether at the hands of society, god or guilt. That has nothing to do with morality.

The damage has already been done. The only thing there's left to do is to accept one has committed an immoral deed, hopefully learn something and live better in the future.

I agree morality is often overapplied. A completely amoral society would still have the social contract, it would still have laws, there would still be manners, things that were culturally unacceptable, expectations on your behaviour and so on.

I don't condemn society's ability to apply social standards to me, they are usually practical and beneficial for everyone. and I generally support these rules. — Judaka

I don't see a functional difference between a social standard that says I shouldn't throw garbage in my neighbor's yard and one that says I shouldn't engage in consensual homosexual acts in private. That doesn't mean I don't realize one is reasonable and one is not.

Do I really believe that? Let me think about it.

So what does it mean for something to be immoral, if it's permitted or encouraged? Lying is wrong, I'm allowed to do it under various circumstances, but it's "immoral"? Is that an attitudinal thing then, or something else? To me, if something is immoral, then you denounce and condemn it, to say it's immoral and acceptable is a contradiction.


Err, I don't understand what you're responding to, but there is no functional difference between those things. It's probably that you would accept the argument that society would be worse off if people pointlessly and maliciously dirtied each other's property, and you don't accept it'd be worse off if people were allowed to have consensual homosexual sex.

There are those who believe society is worse off for allowing the latter, but you don't share that view. I don't think there's much more to it than that, right? It's just basic social contract stuff.

I'm guessing you are not religious, but the way you talk about morality is as if hell is awaiting sinners.

Allowed by whom? Acceptable to whom? God?

Inevitably as one lives on may commit immoral deeds, and when that happens there is nothing left to do but take responsibility, learn something and live better afterwards. Not make petty excuses for why it was no big deal that one time.

If one is convinced of their moral principles, breaking them is a punishment all its own, and one would never do that voluntarily.

There's not some final punishment awaiting, other than the responsibility for and the consequences of one's misdeed, whether large or small.