There is an important distinction that needs to be made between consciousness and contents of consciousness.
Contents can adapt and do, but consciousness itself in uninfluencable (I know thats not even a word) so it doesn't adapt except for its contents.

P.s Maybe I didn't understand you challenge.

There is an important distinction that needs to be made between consciousness and contents of consciousness. — TheMadMan

How would you describe the difference?

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does — frank

You haven’t mentioned affect, emotion, feeling and mood. These are considered bodily by embodied approaches to cognition, and there is no consciousness that is devoid of affect. “Cognition is constrained, enabled and structured by a background of emotion-perception correlations, that manifest themselves as a changing background of implicit representations of body states.”(Ratcliffe 2002)

Clarification: By consciousness I don't only mean awakening consciousness but whole levels of consciousness, known and unknown.

How would you describe the difference? — frank

Consciousness is not caused, contents are.
Consciousness is not dependent on time and space, contents are.
Contents are epiphenomena, they can be created and/or ended, Consciousness is not subject to this kind of change (although it could be subject to a subtler evolution).

There are many other differences that are implied by these.

You haven’t mentioned affect, emotion, feeling and mood. These are considered bodily by embodied approaches to cognition, and there is no consciousness that is devoid of affect. “Cognition is constrained, enabled and structured by a background of emotion-perception correlations, that manifest themselves as a changing background of implicit representations of body states.”(Ratcliffe 2002) — Joshs

Mood is definitely influenced by bodily function. I work in healthcare, so I routinely use emotion, feeling, and mood to assess things like CO2 level in the blood. Of course I have to confirm my suspicions by testing because the same combative mood that might reflect hypercarbia, might also be a result of frustration or pain. So we have a multiple realizability issue here. There's no way to map a particular mood to any particular part of the body.

Clarification: By consciousness I don't only mean awakening consciousness but whole levels of consciousness, known and unknown.

How would you describe the difference?
— frank

Consciousness is not caused, contents are.
Consciousness is not dependent on time and space, contents are.
Contents are epiphenomena, they can be created and/or ended, Consciousness is not subject to this kind of change (although it could be subject to a subtler evolution).

There are many other differences that are implied by these. — TheMadMan

Could you be more specific? I'm not following. Can you have consciousness without any content? Can you have content without consciousness? If there's a relationship, what is it?

Can you have consciousness without any content? — frank

Yes that's the goal of meditation and maybe some other rituals. Consciousness is not depended on contents for its existence but it needs contents for expression in the physical world.

Can you have content without consciousness? — frank

No. Contents need a cause.

If there's a relationship, what is it? — frank

Consciousness is the blackboard (emptiness/space) upon which contents are written.

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does.

It’s not clear that the mind has adapted when the examples given are exclusively performed by bodies.

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does. — frank

The body does adapt, in that the strength of connections in your brain changes every time you learn something. It's simply a matter of us not being able to see and note the microscopic changes in brains hidden behind skulls. The changes to our bodies are there, and can be measured under the right circumstances, but it is easy to overlook such changes because they are hardly obvious.

Consciousness is the blackboard (emptiness/space) upon which contents are written. — TheMadMan

I think this is the view of British Empiricists, but I don't know how to line it up with the idea of embodied consciousness.

The body does adapt, in that the strength of connections in your brain changes every time you learn something. It's simply a matter of us not being able to see and note the microscopic changes in brains hidden behind skulls. The changes to our bodies are there, and can be measured under the right circumstances, but it is easy to overlook such changes because they are hardly obvious. — wonderer1

So you would agree that if "embodied consciousness" refers to the belief that consciousness arises from the whole body, then it must be wrong, since the human body doesn't adapt to diverse earthly environments, but we adapt psychologically. You're saying all that's left is to assert that consciousness is associated with brain states. I agree with that. I don't think any serious philosopher would object to that. :up:

This is usually explained by pointing to psychological adaptation, which involves changes in tool use, agricultural and hunting practices, animal husbandry, etc.

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does. — frank

It's not a psychological adaptation, it's a technological one. When it's cold I put on a jacket. When it's hot I sit around in my lounge chair naked. Here's a picture:

So you would agree that if "embodied consciousness" refers to the belief that consciousness arises from the whole body, then it must be wrong, since the human body doesn't adapt to diverse earthly environments, but we adapt psychologically. You're saying all that's left is to assert that consciousness is associated with brain states. I agree with that. I don't think any serious philosopher would object to that. — frank

I think it would be a matter of simplistic thinking to assert either consciousness comes from the whole body, XOR consciousness comes from the brain. The brain plays a central role, but other parts of the body play a role in how the brain is functioning as well. Hormones, blood flow, and the oxygen and glucose content of the blood, are some of the aspects of how parts of the body outside the brain have an impact on consciousness. Then of course there are the sensory and motor nerves, with paths all over the body, which play a big role in how our consciousness develops.

A bathrobe and the dynamic of cultural evolution will help bring that technology into a better light.

I think it would be a matter of simplistic thinking to assert either consciousness comes from the whole body, XOR consciousness comes from the brain. The brain plays a central role, but other parts of the body play a role in how the brain is functioning as well. Hormones, blood flow, and the oxygen and glucose content of the blood, are some of the aspects of how parts of the body outside the brain have an impact on consciousness. Then of course there are the sensory and motor nerves, with paths all over the body, which play a big role in how our consciousness develops. — wonderer1

Additionally, the embodied consciousness thesis is often bundled with that of embedded cognition (environmental factors are also integral to cognition). And there is extensive experimental evidence to that effect. If cognition isn't construed narrowly as just thinking, but is understood as a kind of enaction, then the theory of embodied consciousness really isn't that far-fetched. After all, think about how intimately the nature of our thoughts is entwined with the nuances of our physical form, the dexterity of our fingers, the nature of our other senses. Knowledge is the result of a "hunger" which is then satisfied. Imagine how different our thoughts would be if we were instead squid-like creatures who absorbed sunlight through an algae-symbiote living in our skin.

A bathrobe and the dynamic of cultural evolution will help bring that technology into a better light. — Paine

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does. — frank

Neurobiology explains the embodied consciousness of an animal. Language and maths is what then promotes humans to the kind of selves that also live life through a social and technological lens.

So we have stuff like self-aware or introspective consciousness – how things would look if we could see ourselves from the socialised point of view of a linguistic community,

We still live embodied in our neurobiological personal point of view. But then we add the perspective of ourselves as social actors embodied within a realm of culture and socially rational meaning.

So there is a faultline in the human psyche that just isn't properly realised even within mainstream psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It is only in sociology and anthropology does this extra level of situatedness simply seem the bleeding obvious.

Additionally, the embodied consciousness thesis is often bundled with that of embedded cognition (environmental factors are also integral to cognition). And there is extensive experimental evidence to that effect. If cognition isn't construed narrowly as just thinking, but is understood as a kind of enaction, then the theory of embodied consciousness really isn't that far-fetched. After all, think about how intimately the nature of our thoughts is entwined with the nuances of our physical form, the dexterity of our fingers, the nature of our other senses. Knowledge is the result of a "hunger" which is then satisfied. Imagine how different our thoughts would be if we were instead squid-like creatures who absorbed sunlight through an algae-symbiote living in our skin. — Pantagruel

I don't see the theory of embodied consciousness as far-fetched at all. From my perspective it seems pretty intuitively obvious.

So there is a faultline in the human psyche that just isn't properly realised even within mainstream psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It is only in sociology and anthropology does this extra level of situatedness simply seem the bleeding obvious — apokrisis

Could you given an example from the work of a specific sociologist or anthropologist illustrating this extra level of situatedness missing from mainstream psychology? Can you think of any non-mainstream approaches in psychology that realize this faultline? What about embodied enactivist accounts that, following Merleau-Ponty, make intersubjectivity primary? For instance, Shaun Gallagher writes:

“…intersubjective (social and cultural) factors already have an effect on our perception and understanding of the world, even in the immediacy of our embodied and instrumental copings with the environment.”

Some proponents of embodied cognition would argue that the environment provides the body with all the stimulus necessary for navigation to food and shelter. So there's no need to assign inference to this navigation.

If that were true, then why do humans have a superior ability to adapt to diverse environments without any significant physical adaptation? And whatever the answer to this is, why do humans have this capability and few other animals do?

If I take the position of the embodied cognitionist, I'll have to explain why the traditional answer to this question, that is, that humans adapt psychologically, is wrong.

At the heart of my challenge is a form of multiple realizability recognized by Descartes in regard to wax. Why do we call a melted blob "wax" and a solid cube "wax"? Or as it relates to this topic:

The staple diet of the Guilford Indians was made from the acorns of white oaks, which were abundant where they lived. They would pound the acorns into blobs and then wrap them in the leaves of poison ivy, then bury these items in the sand under a running creek. A day or so later, they would take the items out and put them in a fire until the acorn dough turned black and had the consistency of charcoal. According to English observers, the result was sweet.

On the other hand, the Maasai of Africa eat milk, meat, fat, blood, honey, and tree bark.

So we have two very diverse adaptations. How do I explain how each of these takes place without any inferences? Without any concepts? With nothing but bodily engagement to the environment?

I think in order to adhere to this particular brand of embodied cognition, I'd have to posit some sort of bodily process that has not been discovered yet, but that would explain why there's no psychological adaptation going on.

Or, if I say that I don't have to explain anything because the Guildford Indians and the Maasai were both adapting physically, then I think I'll have to explain why humans have covered the globe in a way other animals haven't. What's special about us that our bodies adapt to diverse environments, but other animals have limited ranges?

Yes, but it is oriented around a more 'expansive' understanding of what consciousness is. There is a long tradition of consciousness as an interior movie, an interior monologue, things going on "in the head." The whole layer of intelligence involved in the micro-coordination of our overt actions and behaviours is ignored by many people.

There are non-human animals who adapt in terms of behavior, but not physically. An example close to home is mice and hamsters who escape from pethood. Unlike tame birds, who can't adapt to being wild once they're adults, some mammals can easily transition from dependent pets to independent, wild animals.

Could we argue that the neuroplasticity that allows mice and cats to become wild is also responsible for human so-called psychological adaptation? Perhaps it's just that humans ended up with such big brains that a more primitive adaptability present in all mammals is more pronounced in humans?

Whether or not we decide that it's reasonable to explain complex cooking techniques by an extension of something more primitive, what I'll note is that we've moved to the realm of speculation, not observation of what's actually happening.

What about embodied enactivist accounts that, following Merleau-Ponty, make intersubjectivity primary? — Joshs

There's a problem with trying to go from Merleau-Ponty to any of the hard sciences. There's just no bridge from his observations about what we can and can't separate, and biology, or its scientific mother, physics. Science starts with a methodological naturalism where analysis is built-in. There's no room for synthesis. Or if you think there is, you'd have to explain how.

There's a problem with trying to go from Merleau-Ponty to any of the hard sciences. There's just no bridge from his observations about what we can and can't separate, and biology, or its scientific mother, physics. Science starts with a methodological naturalism where analysis is built-in. There's no roo — frank

Science starts from whatever metaphysics informs it at the time, which is why there is no such thing as ‘science’ as some specific methodology that encompasses all eras of empiricism. If there is no bridge between science and Mwrleau-Ponty, it is because the particular brand of naturalism that a science is in thrall to makes no room for Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. Varela, Thompson, Gallagher, Petitot and others claim phenomenology can be naturalized
once we transform and update our thinking about scientific naturalism so as to accommodate it.

Varela, Thompson, Gallagher, Petitot and others claim phenomenology can be naturalized once we transform and update our thinking about scientific naturalism so as to accommodate it. — Joshs

What an astounding assertion. Do they have any predictions about which century this update will be downloaded?

What an astounding assertion. Do they have any predictions about which century this update will be downloaded? — frank

Astounding? Not when it comes to biology, neuroscience or cognitive science

The newer naturalized models are already out there.Lynn Margulis’ work on symbiosis and the new synthesis updates biological thinking, and as far as physics is concerned, writers like Karen Barad, a physicist and philosopher, and Michel Bitbol, interpret quantum field theory in terms that move away from the old naturalism.

Astounding? Not when it comes to biology, neuroscience or cognitive science

The newer naturalized models are already out there.Lynn Margulis’ work on symbiosis and the new synthesis updates biological thinking, and as far as physics is concerned, writers like Karen Barad, a physicist and philosopher, and Michel Bitbol, interpret quantum field theory in terms that move away from the old naturalism. — Joshs

Ok, so maybe later in this century, but for now, all mainstream science starts with an analytic attitude. That means we can't connect Merleau-Ponty to science as it is today. We might be able to connect him with the science of 2070.

y. We might be able to connect him with the science of 2070. — frank

Could be.

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does. — frank

So the reason why your brain understands what is going on in your body is because of nerves which send communications to the brain. it is these nerves which allow your extended consciousness. People who have dead nerves in certain places of their body cannot feel anything there.

As for the body not adapting, how do you conclude that? Increased Melanin in Africa. Extra eye folds for glary environments in Asia. Less melanin for people in cloudy sun limited climates. Even more basic, you can tan your skin, scar, and get calluses. All of these are adaptations.

So the reason why your brain understands what is going on in your body is because of nerves which send communications to the brain. it is these nerves which allow your extended consciousness. People who have dead nerves in certain places of their body cannot feel anything there. — Philosophim

What sort of embodied cognition would you say you're defending?