You seem to be missing the point. You can't go from "X is unknowable" to "nothing is knowable". You're suggesting that agnosticism entails global scepticism, but it doesn't. — Michael

I stand corrected on this point. I'm, however, moving to how can it be proved that ''X is unknowable.''

As an example, I might say that it is impossible to know whether or not my great grandfather had fish and chips on Jan 1st 1945. There's no self-defeating reasoning here. — Michael

At certain time, someone had access to the fact of what your great grandfather ate on Jan 1st 1945, or whether he ate at all that day. That is empirically provable. Someone knew it at some time, even if it was just the great grandfather himself. Same does not apply to metaphysics. It can't be said that someone had more access to the question of God at certain time and space. Such questions are not answered in the same way as the question of whether your great grandfather had a fish on that day or not.

All those arguments have to start with philosophy as philosophy, unlike empirical sciences, can define God and look at the most basic nature of existence in a most abstract and general way. Empirical sciences focus on different topics. This is off topic, but I challenge anyone to prove that a scientist can answer a metaphysical question using only empirical data and science. Impossible. — Coldlight

I challenge anyone to prove a metaphysical claim using any means whatsoever: what metaphysical claim has even been "proven"? Philosophers still wrangle over Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, with nary a resolution in sight.

You have simply asserted that empirical investigation cannot, in principle, provide evidence for the existence of God because they are "different topics." But from the fact that philosophy and empirical investigation are distinct areas of inquiry it does not follow that there is no overlap between them.

I gave examples of multiple philosophical argument families or fields of empirical inquiry which purported to demonstrate the existence of God. If you believe that such investigations are ill-fated in principle, then you must provide arguments to that effect, rather than bare assertions.

To be honest, it seems to me that agnostics try to dodge the bullet and don't want to admit that they're claiming that they've found an absolute truth.

I'd welcome the correct definition if anyone has it :)

Presumptions aside:

1) God is unknown. - I'm yet to hear why God is unknown and why that is not just lack of trying on our side. (God is used just as an example here, same could go for the soul or some other immaterial, empirically improvable existence) And if anyone finds it highly unlikely to be able to answer the questions of such sort, isn't it just a cultural influence? Isn't it just ''okay'' to think that we cannot know such things?

2) God's existence is unknowable. - Somehow it is knowable that it is unknowable, I wonder how that is the case. This is not a claim based on empirical evidence.

I don't even know whether you're an atheist or a theist, but you seem to think that an answer to question of whether God exists is already in hand, and that no reasonable person could believe that God (does/does not) exist. No doubt (atheists/theists) would argue just as vociferously for their position, and would say they have "yet to hear" why the negation of their belief is correct. That's the problem with such a priori metaphysical wrangling: it just goes on and on.

I take issue with that. They are more like abductive arguments, i.e. arguments to the most likely cause. But an empirical argument would require that you were able to detect 'the first cause' (or whatever) by scientific apparatus or observation; that it would be a phenomenon whose existence could be demonstrated by some actual observation or experimental outcome. 'Empiricism' means 'experienceable' in that sense - that it shows up some way that can be see either by the naked eye, or detected by instruments.

But take, for example, an argument like this: 'that evolution naturally tends towards creating higher levels of intelligence'. I think that would generally not be accepted by evolutionary biologists; although it has happened on Earth, the general belief is that 'were the tape of evolution replayed', that the outcome might be blue-green algae, or cockroaches, or sharks (as indeed it was for long periods of time). So I don't think that evolutionary theory would agree with the apparent teleological nature of such an argument.

So how would such an argument be settled empirically? I would think it could only be if a large number of other life-bearing planets were discovered - which I'm sure you will agree, seems highly unlikely. But then, if all of them showed the emergence of language- and tool-using beings, no matter what form, then you might have an empirical case that evolution tended towards that outcome.

But absent that, many of the 'arguments from design' or teleological arguments of various kinds, could never be settled empirically, even in principle. They're simply based on what seems a likely kind of explanation. — Wayfarer

Science (here broadly defined to include avenues of empirical investigation which rely upon examining data and generating explanations for phenomena by employing a reasoned analysis of said data) does employ abductive arguments (inferences to the best explanation).

Not all investigation involves detecting the putative cause of a phenomenon directly: sometimes just its historical traces are examined. For instance, sometimes impactors strike the Earth, and are vaporized completely, meaning their characteristics have to be inferred from the marks they've left behind.

Also, not all directional processes are teleological in nature. Science accepts directional processes or phenomena (e.g. the 2nd law of thermodynamics).

Therefore agnostic about God must mean that God's existence is improvable and that proposition has to be proved. — Coldlight

I'd prefer to say "argued for" rather than "proven", just because of how people tend to conceptualize "proof", but I'd agree with you there if you don't see an important difference between proofs and arguments.

Define agnosticism then. — Coldlight

You already did that yourself, which is what makes the semantic shift and your inability to see it so weird:

Agnosticism is the view that the existence of God or the supernatural is unknown or unknowable. — Coldlight

At certain time, someone had access to the fact of what your great grandfather ate on Jan 1st 1945, or whether he ate at all that day. That is empirically provable. Someone knew it at some time, even if it was just the great grandfather himself. Same does not apply to metaphysics. It can't be said that someone had more access to the question of God at certain time and space. Such questions are not answered in the same way as the question of whether your great grandfather had a fish on that day or not. — Coldlight

The question of knowledge is from Michael's perspective, not some hypothetical person who has access to the empirical evidence. Yes, someone really did know what his great grandfather ate that day, but they are not us. The question is one about us. Michael cannot know what his great grandfather had for lunch if there is no evidence or way of knowing. So, short of a dated photograph or a journal showing what Michael's great grandfather had for lunch on a particular day, Michael is rationally required to suspend judgement and say he does not know.

If one is agnostic about god claims, it could mean that:

1) After examining both sides of the argument, one has found neither sides' case meets the requirements for knowledge and, thus, one suspends judgement on the existence of a god.

2) After examining the issue of god's existence, one finds the answer cannot be known from our perspective, due to the nature of god and our state of affairs in this world.

The first agnosticism is the result of applying an uncontroversial epistemological principle of suspending judgement in certain cases. The second requires an argument to motivate it.

Well, why do you not doubt your own doubts? Our reason is limited, but to what extend is it limited? It doesn't follow that the reason is limited therefore we have very little access to any truth.
--Coldlight
It partly comes studying/debating philosophy for over ten years, partly from a life of constantly seeing things go fubar, and partly because I question things enough to be pretty sure you might ask me a question such as this one; which I even mentioned in my previous post.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

How do you support the claim that the world is much more complicated than we can understand? I'm not speaking about empirical data, but about the abilities of the reason and epistemology.
--Coldlight
Well, who knows what man may understand one day, but that is not the issue at hand nor is it one I even have to bother addressing as it isn't really relevant to this issue.

It is funny but to be honest thinking about this question, I find it kind of hard to address it the right way since I'm unsure of the right um.."paradigm" you might view the world from which would make you ask such a question in philosophy forum. You see as people who study philosophy we are often skeptics are faced with the fallibility of the world more than perhaps people who do not study it. We are aware of things such as the failures in history, the number of times our leaders almost nuked the world, the human condition, etc. and knowing such things allows us to be aware of how fallible the human race can be and how the world is more complicated than some people realize ; not that it is a given that non-philosophers are not aware of the same issues.

To be honest, there is no simple way for me to explain things enough so you can see the world from my eyes (even though I wish it was possible for me to do so), nor am I sure you would really like to have such knowledge. Perhaps the easiest way for me to argue my position is to point out that Socrates has been said to have claimed that he knew he was the wisest man in Athens because he knew he knew nothing (ie. if a man that is aware of the fallibility of his own knowledge as well as the knowledge of others than this knowlde in and of itself trumps any other form of knowledge) , and what he knew back then still applies to the world we live in today. If you figure out what this means it might help answer your question.

The question of knowledge is from Michael's perspective, not some hypothetical person who has access to the empirical evidence. Yes, someone really did know what his great grandfather ate that day, but they are not us. The question is one about us. Michael cannot know what his great grandfather had for lunch if there is no evidence or way of knowing. So, short of a dated photograph or a journal showing what Michael's great grandfather had for lunch on a particular day, Michael is rationally required to suspend judgement and say he does not know. — Chany

The point is that someone has had access to that information via empirical evidence. Someone could see it or hear about it. Same does not apply to the question of God or any other metaphysical question. I'm arguing that asking for empirical evidence is not the same as arguing for any absolute truth in a metaphysical sense. Those are two different categories. A question about what Michael's great grandfather ate in 1945 is not in the same category as question about whether God exists or not. How is that not apparent?

You see as people who study philosophy we are often skeptics are faced with the fallibility of the world more than perhaps people who do not study it. — dclements

>:O

To be honest, there is no simple way for me to explain things enough so you can see the world from my eyes — dclements

I didn't ask to see the world through your eyes. You might as well just say that you don't know what the difference between empiricism and metaphysics is as you do not address any of the points raised.

If you figure out what this means it might help answer your question. — dclements

You're starting to irritate me with your rhetoric. Did you actually come to discuss any of the points raised, or it's all just about:

Well, who knows what man may understand one day, but that is not the issue at hand nor is it one I even have to bother addressing as it isn't really relevant to this issue. — dclements

And:

It is funny but to be honest thinking about this question, I find it kind of hard to address it the right way since I'm unsure of the right um.."paradigm" you might view the world from which would make you ask such a question in philosophy forum. — dclements

My view does not matter, I didn't start the discussion to promote my view. You're posing as an amateur psychiatrist here, so either cut it off or bring something to the table.

I challenge anyone to prove a metaphysical claim using any means whatsoever: what metaphysical claim has even been "proven"? Philosophers still wrangle over Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, with nary a resolution in sight. — Arkady

That's because of the nature of philosophy itself. The fact that there is still discussion to this day about Ancient Greek philosophical concepts does not mean that those claims cannot be proven. It's not the same as with empirical sciences. Evolution of philosophy is in improving arguments. And metaphysical claims are to be argued for/against only by philosophers as those are by nature philosophical question.

You have simply asserted that empirical investigation cannot, in principle, provide evidence for the existence of God because they are "different topics." But from the fact that philosophy and empirical investigation are distinct areas of inquiry it does not follow that there is no overlap between them — Arkady

I haven't merely asserted that. It is truth in principle. Example question:

''What is human? What is the nature of human being?'' To elaborate a bit more on this question: ''What is the definition of a human being that defines it in its most broad and principal sense?''

I'm not going to suggest any answers to this question as this serves only as an example. So, who is the most competent to answer this question? A scientist? No, because a scientist does not define human nature and does not in fact ask any questions about human nature. That is all down to philosophy. Even if scientists came up with a claim about human nature, they would have to use philosophy. In the end, philosophers are the ones to argue for or against the validity of the argument presented.

Back to the question of God. Only philosophy is capable to look at God as a concept and define it in its broadest sense. Physicians cannot ''discover'' God without knowing before hand what the God is and even after ''discovery'' they would need a validation from philosophers in order to see whether it really is God or not.

Philosophy is therefore competent of answering metaphysical questions completely without empirical sciences as those cannot grasp metaphysical concepts in its broadest and most abstract sense.

I don't even know whether you're an atheist or a theist, but you seem to think that an answer to question of whether God exists is already in hand, and that no reasonable person could believe that God (does/does not) exist. No doubt (atheists/theists) would argue just as vociferously for their position, and would say they have "yet to hear" why the negation of their belief is correct. That's the problem with such a priori metaphysical wrangling: it just goes on and on. — Arkady

I'm implying, on a personal level, that to say that we don't know answer to such questions is more laziness than a real thing. Whether I am a theist or an atheist does not matter.

The statement - ''God's existence can never be proven by logic'' is a logical conclusion. — Coldlight

But I didn't make that statement, I said

that it certainly seems to be impossible in principle, that God's existence could ever be proven by logic — John

It's not a logical conclusion, but a statement that emerges from examining our use of logic and what seem to be its limitations.

That's because of the nature of philosophy itself. The fact that there is still discussion to this day about Ancient Greek philosophical concepts does not mean that those claims cannot be proven. It's not the same as with empirical sciences. Evolution of philosophy is in improving arguments. And metaphysical claims are to be argued for/against only by philosophers as those are by nature philosophical question. — Coldlight

Perhaps you could do me the courtesy of giving a sample of metaphysical theses or postulates which have been proven?

I haven't merely asserted that. It is truth in principle. Example question:

''What is human? What is the nature of human being?'' To elaborate a bit more on this question: ''What is the definition of a human being that defines it in its most broad and principal sense?''

I'm not going to suggest any answers to this question as this serves only as an example. So, who is the most competent to answer this question? A scientist? No, because a scientist does not define human nature and does not in fact ask any questions about human nature. That is all down to philosophy. Even if scientists came up with a claim about human nature, they would have to use philosophy. In the end, philosophers are the ones to argue for or against the validity of the argument presented.

Back to the question of God. Only philosophy is capable to look at God as a concept and define it in its broadest sense. Physicians cannot ''discover'' God without knowing before hand what the God is and even after ''discovery'' they would need a validation from philosophers in order to see whether it really is God or not.

Philosophy is therefore competent of answering metaphysical questions completely without empirical sciences as those cannot grasp metaphysical concepts in its broadest and most abstract sense.

I'm not talking about defining God (or defining anything, really). I'm talking about empirical detection of the effects God is purported to have wrought. Particular religions make particular claims about what their God (or gods) has done (or continues to do), claims which can be empirically investigated.

As I said (and which you continue to ignore), fields such as natural theology, and its modern counterparts in the intelligent design creationism movement (and creationism generally, albeit with varying degrees of scientific and historical sophistication) attempt to demonstrate the existence of a creator by means of appealing to the natural world, or by appealing to findings from archeology and related historical fields.

For instance, some believers appeal to God to intercede on their behalf and on behalf of others, including with regard to health. It is perfectly valid to investigate whether those who receive prayers for God's intercession in their disease have better health outcomes than those who receive no such prayers. This experiment has been performed, and found no statistically relevant difference.

Now, I would agree that such empirical studies may be insufficient to reach a detailed, complex, and thorough understanding of God and its nature; theology and philosophy may yet have some work to do. After all, few people can reasonably deny that there is evil in the world, and yet reach radically different conclusions about the meaning or interpretation of this data. So, even if it were demonstrated empirically that there exists some form of creator God, whether said God is good, evil, or something in between (i.e. a value judgment) would likely be outside the purview of science. But, demonstrating the mere existence of a creator god (of some sort) needn't be.

I'm implying, on a personal level, that to say that we don't know answer to such questions is more laziness than a real thing. Whether I am a theist or an atheist does not matter.

So, agnostics (qua agnostics) are lazy?

As you don't believe that the existence of God is a matter to be adjudicated empirically, and you believe agnostics are lazy people who perhaps just haven't done their philosophical due diligence, what do you believe is the a priori argument (or family of arguments) which demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt (or even with certainty) that God does or does not exist?

It is irrelevant that the claim is an empirical one, as the point was to show that, sometimes, it is rational to suspend judgement and claim one does not know. Likewise, there may be cases, like the one above, where one can argue that there is no way of currently knowing what Michael's great grandfather ate for lunch on such and such day, though this claim is stronger and requires more argument to support.

To point to a god claim (let's stick to the god of classical theism for simplicity's sake), one could be agnostic in one of two ways. First, in the weaker sense, an agnostic could be someone who looks at both sides of the theist-atheist debate and finds the arguments lacking. Neither side met the criteria necessary to claim knowledge, so the agnostic decides to suspend judgement and claim "I do not know." The agnostic is not closed off to further argument, much like any good theist or atheist is not closed off, but, at the current time, the agnostic sees no reason to think either side is right, so remains neutral. Note that this has nothing to do with being lazy, a charge that can be placed on anyone, theist, atheist, or agnostic.

In the stronger sense, the agnostic may claim that the status of god's existence is unknowable. This is a much stronger claim and is, therefore, harder to defend, so I won't list some hypothetical scenario, beyond that this agonstic must show that the theistic and atheistic arguments are fundamentally flawed, such that a god is unfalsifiable from our human perspective- we can easily imagine our world with a god, while we can also easily imagine it without a god.

Agnosticism is the view that the existence of God or the supernatural is unknown or unknowable — Coldlight

I'm agnostic and so the OP pinches me where it hurts. I wouldn't want to hold self-defeating thoughts - it's so hard to find them and getting rid of them is even more difficult.

To get to the point...

I believe that, as of now, God is unknown. I'm sure you'll agree, because the lack of evidence for/against God rationally demands such an epistemic stance. It's like when you meet a person for the first time. Lacking evidence we can't say s/he is good or bad. Only when we've spent adequate time with that person, gathering evidence, can we make any form judgment.

As to the self-defeating nature of such a view, other posters have adequately explained that, in a nutshell, the agnostic doubt doesn't extend to all knowledge i.e. it doesn't entail global skepticism.

The other variety of agnosticism which is that god is unknowable is, in my humble opinion, rather difficult to hold. I don't know why and how god can be unknowable. However, we can cut some slack for those who hold such a view on the basis of the narure of god's definition. Some definitions of god are such that they put god beyond human comprehension e.g. god is a non-physical, infinite, etc. entity.

Also, think of an ant. The intricacies of the human mind, e.g. mathematics and music, are unknowable to it. Likewise is the epistemic relationship between man and god.

In short, for the present, the issue of god remains unresolved and the rational thing to do is withhold judgment.

Not all investigation involves detecting the putative cause of a phenomenon directly: sometimes just its historical traces are examined. For instance, sometimes impactors strike the Earth, and are vaporized completely, meaning their characteristics have to be inferred from the marks they've left behind. — Arkady

But by definition, whatever cause science is concerned with, is not of a different order to the natural order, i.e. is not transcendent to the natural order. In the case of meteors or other types of causal agents which have all but vanished, the cause is still understood to be the kind of cause that, were circumstances different, would have been physically detectable.

The view that theological arguments are empirical is based on a misrepresentation of what is being claimed. Granted, theology and metaphysics might (as all positivism insists) be empty of meaning, but not on the grounds you have stated.

'Arguments from design', for example, might state that science can't account for the order which is necessary for life to have arisen in the first place. And that question, again, is not a scientific one, as science presumes that there is an order - otherwise it can't really even get started - but doesn't, and may not be expected to, explain how this order.

For instance, some believers appeal to God to intercede on their behalf and on behalf of others, including with regard to health. It is perfectly valid to investigate whether those who receive prayers for God's intercession in their disease have better health outcomes than those who receive no such prayers. This experiment has been performed, and found no statistically relevant difference. — Arkady

That is true, and if I or a loved one were admitted to hospital for a serious illness, I would certainly not wish to rely on prayer for the cure.

However, there is quite a lot of documentation describing various cases of alleged miraculous intervention in the case of serious or life-threatening illnesses, when these cases are considered grounds for canonisation proceedings by the Catholic Church. As the Church has been gathering such cases for centuries, there is quite a lot of documentary evidence, apparently.

"I didn't ask to see the world through your eyes. You might as well just say that you don't know what the difference between empiricism and metaphysics is as you do not address any of the points raised."
--Coldlight

Well since "empiricism and metaphysics" doesn't support your side, it is obvious that your either trying to pull something from your backside by pretending that it does or that you don't really know what you are talking about. Since I don't know you it could be either way, but since you seem kind of emotional about it I'm guessing the latter instead of the former, unless your emotions are a lie as well.

Whether you realize it or not, YOU DID ASK ME HOW I CAME TO MY POSITION which in the context of the question is the same thing as asking me how I came to my religion/system of beliefs which I evaluate the world around me. You are acting as if any and all ideologies/cultures merely only have 'logical', 'empirical', etc elements to them (or perhaps you feel this it is how it is or should be with agnosticism) but that isn't really how it works. People believe and see the world they way they do mostly because of the human condition and not because any empirical or metaphysical whatever tells them that is what they should believe; and if you don't understand this than it is something you will eventually have to figure out. "We do what we do because that is the way we do it", not because some logical/ empirical/ metaphysical nonsense can any sense from our world or our existence.


"My view does not matter, I didn't start the discussion to promote my view. You're posing as an amateur psychiatrist here, so either cut it off or bring something to the table."
--Coldlight

You didn't start this thread to promote your view, yet even the title of this thread (as well as the OP) contain your views as well as your arguments you used to support it. I almost feel like pointing out how naive it is to try and argue in such a way, if doing so wasn't so moot.

When debating religious issues (which includes the pros and cons of agnosticism more or less), it is a given that in order to ARGUE such issues one has to do so from some sort or religious/ ideological/ cultural/ system of beliefs/ etc. of one's own. In other words there is no real 'NEUTRAL'' or 'OBJECTIVE' position one can have when someone evaluates another religion/ ideology/ system of beliefs than their own, because there is NO way to evaluate someone else's WITHOUT RESORTING TO THE METRICS CONTAINED IN OWNS OWN IDEOLOGY OR SYSTEM OF BELIEFS; even if you or anyone else trying to do this is unhappy with this fact.

While you don't like that I may seem to be playing "amateur psychiatrist" with you, I'm just asking enough questions and playing enough head games to be able to pull from you whether you are aware of such issues (which I think they teach in either philosophy 101 or perhaps psych 101) in order to know where your coming from before I start arguing about things involving more complicated stuff that requires me to concentrate more than I really want to sometimes.

If you really understood the difference between 'fact' and 'opinion' (as it is taught in philosophy 101) you would realize that your argument that people 'ought' to not believe in agnosticism is merely your opinion since Hume several centuries ago pointed out you can't get an 'ought' from an 'is'; leaving you.

And even if you think that "I" am CRAZY for agreeing with Hume (as well as other people that agree with him as well), Hume's argument just so happens to be one of the major doctrines in western society (although there are similar arguments in eastern society as well) which makes such arguments and/or beliefs almost on equal terms with theism; which in a nutshell puts you somewhere harder than between a rock and a hard place if you believe you can 'logically' or through some other means prove people who think as I do are more of a secret squirrel than you are.

Hopefully this helps in some way answer the question you gave in your OP, and if not than oh well, it isn't like there is a rhyme or reason to anything anyways...

But by definition, whatever cause science is concerned with, is not of a different order to the natural order, i.e. is not transcendent to the natural order. In the case of meteors or other types of causal agents which have all but vanished, the cause is still understood to be the kind of cause that, were circumstances different, would have been physically detectable. — Wayfarer

Not necessarily. Yes, natural science generally adheres to methodological naturalism in its day-to-day work: phenomena under study are presumed to have a naturalistic explanation, and this explanation is sought by interrogating nature by means of contrived experiments or natural observations as a means of testing hypotheses (indeed, even the 40% or so of scientists who believe in God usually adhere to MN in their work). This general strategy has been extremely successful since the advent of modern science.

However, adherence to MN doesn't entail ontological naturalism, i.e. the belief that the naturalistic universe of objects exhausts all possible entities in this reality. And notice that when discussing "science," I've been careful to propound a broad definition of that term as including those fields which examine evidence or data combined with rational analysis of said evidence or data, in service of learning about the world. This empirical methodology, broadly construed, could apply to history, archeology, anthropology, sociology, investigative journalism, and many other fields which normally wouldn't fall under the ambit of the natural sciences (there are some borderline cases, of course).

Notice that below you reference the Catholic Church's evidence-based investigations into the veracity of supposed miracles. You have also spoken approvingly of Ian Stevenson's scientific research into reincarnation. You and I have spoken about the scientists who investigated supernatural phenomena as part of the Society for Psychical Research (when I recommended The Ghost Hunters to you). And so on and so forth. All of these investigations employ empirical methodology to collect data of various types and interrogate that data to see if a particular hypothesis concerning particular supernatural phenomena passes muster (in other words they all at least aspire to a scientific methodology; whether some have fallen short is a different matter). Nothing in my definition of empiricism would rule out such fields of study (indeed, I encourage them, as when I spoke approvingly of OBE studies which I thought were well-designed).

The view that theological arguments are empirical is based on a misrepresentation of what is being claimed. Granted, theology and metaphysics might (as all positivism insists) be empty of meaning, but not on the grounds you have stated.

I never said that all theological arguments are empirical: some, such as the ontological argument and first cause argument, don't seem to rely on empiricism at all. I also never said they were "empty of meaning;" this is just more of you poking the corpse of logical positivism.

'Arguments from design', for example, might state that science can't account for the order which is necessary for life to have arisen in the first place.

This sounds rather more like the fine tuning argument, wouldn't you say? Or would you consider that argument to be one type of the argument from design?

And that question, again, is not a scientific one, as science presumes that there is an order - otherwise it can't really even get started - but doesn't, and may not be expected to, explain how this order.

I'd say that it is more the case that science observes that the universe is orderly. And only in highly circumscribed instances is it orderly enough to predict its behavior for any length of time (which is why we still don't have long-term weather forecasting, despite decades of effort; though things are improving).

That is true, and if I or a loved one were admitted to hospital for a serious illness, I would certainly not wish to rely on prayer for the cure.

However, there is quite a lot of documentation describing various cases of alleged miraculous intervention in the case of serious or life-threatening illnesses, when these cases are considered grounds for canonisation proceedings by the Catholic Church. As the Church has been gathering such cases for centuries, there is quite a lot of documentary evidence, apparently.

Yes. And even if the alleged miracles are not on quite as firm a footing as the Church may suppose (it doesn't help that the Church picks its own supposedly skeptical peer-reviewers in the form of a "Devil's Advocate;" I don't know if that practice has fallen by the wayside), you will note that the Church here at least aspires to employ scientific rigor in its investigations of purportedly supernatural or sacred phenomena, contra those (including perhaps yourself) who might insist that such matters are not for science.

Socrates said it: "All I know is that I know nothing"...

even if the alleged miracles are not on quite as firm a footing as the Church may suppose (it doesn't help that the Church picks its own supposedly skeptical peer-reviewers in the form of a "Devil's Advocate;" I don't know if that practice has fallen by the wayside), you will note that the Church here at least aspires to employ scientific rigor in its investigations of purportedly supernatural or sacred phenomena, contra those (including perhaps yourself) who might insist that such matters are not for science. — Arkady

The Catholic Church devised the office of 'the Devil's Advocate', and the intention of the role was to try and disprove claims of miracles. And as Jacalyn Duffin noted in her review, she was very surprised by the degree of scepticism she found amongst the clerics:

If a sick person recovers through prayer and without medicine, that’s nice, but not a miracle. She had to be sick or dying despite receiving the best of care. The church finds no incompatibility between scientific medicine and religious faith; for believers, medicine is just one more manifestation of God’s work on earth.

Perversely then, this ancient religious process, intended to celebrate exemplary lives, is hostage to the relativistic wisdom and temporal opinions of modern science. Physicians, as nonpartisan witnesses and unaligned third parties, are necessary to corroborate the claims of hopeful postulants. For that reason alone, illness stories top miracle claims. I never expected such reverse skepticism and emphasis on science within the church.

So the reason the Church 'aspires to employ scientific rigour' is because the question being examined is, 'is this cure something explicable by science or medicine?' To declare that it is not requires a pretty high standard of evidence. But if it does succeed in establishing such a claim, then the conclusion is that it is a cure for which there isn't a scientific explanation. The question can then be asked - is this using science to investigate something that is beyond science, or for which there is no standard scientific explanation?

I would think, in methodological naturalism, the answer might be: something not known to science has produced an effect (while still bracketing out or leaving open the question of what that might be.) Which is, pretty well, 'agnosticism'. ;-)