Hence the requirement for noesis, philosophical ascent. The culmination of those states is in 'seeing things as they truly are', of arriving at an insight into the totality, an epiphany or a great 'aha' moment. This is not necessarily confined to mysticism. There are episodes in the history of science where individuals had sudden noetic insights into the nature of things which lead to great breakthroughs in scientific understanding. An example would be Copernicus' realisation that the orbits of planets were elliptical whilst searching for the Platonic ideals in his observational data; Nikolai Tesla's mystical vision of the Sun and the interchangeability of matter and energy which preceeded Einstein's discovery of the same fact. There are no doubt many other examples, at least some of which resulted in the overthrow of the current paradigm... — Wayfarer

Damn you! You are not going to allow me to escape having this discussion, are you? :wink:

So suppose I said I had such a "sudden noetic insights into the nature of things which lead to great breakthroughs in scientific understanding"? Now I admit that the "which lead to" bit, only fits with a bit of squinting. I didn't propagate my insight to any significant extent. So my insight only lead to relevant scientific breakthroughs, in the sense that other people gaining similar insight over the last 36 years has resulted in a lot of scientific progress.

Now suppose that insight was about how minds emerge from the physical interactions occurring in neural networks.

How would that discussion go?

You'd probably need to start with a definition of 'physical' which I suspect will be very difficult to derive. If I was to pursue that argument, it would be along the lines that any such attempted definition could only be formulated relying on reason, which never appears in the physical data (for instance, images of neural data) but is internal to thought. That we can't arrive at an understanding of reason 'from the outside', i.e. as the consequence of something other than reason. But that would probably derail the thread, so I won't pursue it.

You'd probably need to start with a definition of 'physical' which I suspect will be very difficult to derive. — Wayfarer

I wouldn't be approaching things from a foundationalist perspective. As an anti-foundationalist I'm fine with settling for, whatever passes for the consensus of physicists, as a definiton of physical. I think we could have an informative discussion while leaving the definition of physical a bit fuzzy.

whatever passes for the consensus of physicists, — wonderer1

I don’t think there is one. There are major gaps and conundrums in physics, even without considering the very tenuous connection it might have with how or if mind ‘emerges from’ neural networks, and the implications of that. I think the sense of what is physical, in this context, is post-Cartesian. This is the view that emerges from first of all dividing the world into the two domains of extended matter and ‘thinking substance’ and then by demonstrating the conceptual difficulties with the ‘thinking substance’ (a.k.a. ‘ghost in the machine’.) So having eliminated that problematical conception of the mind, there is purportedly nothing left other than ‘the physical’ in terms of which mind can be explained.

Do you think that is near the mark?

Do you think that is near the mark? — Wayfarer

No, I don't. However, before I go into detail, do you think one of us should start a new OP? Or is there an old thread of yours appropriate to discuss things in?

‘Science as metaphysics’ seems a relevant topic to discuss it, although i suppose strictly speaking this is a subject in philosophy of mind. But I’d be interested in knowing more about what you propose as a physicalist theory of mind, either here or elsewhere.

An example would be Copernicus' realisation that the orbits of planets were elliptical whilst searching for the Platonic ideals in his observational data; — Wayfarer

I'm pretty sure that was Kepler, not Copernicus.

Perhaps there is a mode of certainty that transcends discursive understanding. — Pantagruel

A mode of feeling certain or of being certain? You cannot be certain of any discursive understanding unless it is true by definition, as is the case with mathematics. Scientific or empirical knowledge can never be absolutely certain, although almost-certainty is possible in the context of experience; for example, if I am standing in the rain I can be certain that it is raining where I am standing (leaving aside the seemingly tiny possibility that I am being elaborately hoaxed).

Like Gautama I could feel absolutely certain that I have reached perfect enlightenment, but I could never be absolutely certain of that, discursively speaking, because it's always possible that I am delusional.

So, the odd thing is that even if we can have intuitive intellectual knowledge of reality, we cannot be certain that we can, no matter how certain we might feel about it.

So, the odd thing is that even if we can have intuitive intellectual knowledge of reality, we cannot be certain that we can, no matter how certain we might feel about it. — Janus

:100: :up:

I'm pretty sure that was Kepler, not Copernicus. — Janus

I stand corrected. :pray:

the odd thing is that even if we can have intuitive intellectual knowledge of reality, we cannot be certain that we can, no matter how certain we might feel about it. — Janus

Which brings us right back to scepticism 101.

Any objection to your thread being used as Wayfarer and I have been discussing?

Which brings us right back to scepticism 101. — Wayfarer

That's true. I'm not sure about you, but I don't see skepticism as being a bad thing. I like the idea of letting go of the need to know, being able to live with uncertainty and thus cultivating ataraxia. I see that stance above as all as truthful in being able to live in accordance with our actual situation.

I'm sure it's a valuable part of the overall philosophical repertoire, but it is all too often used as a kind of blanket to throw over difficult arguments or claims that we ourselves may not be able to ascertain the truth of.

I don't believe any arguments or claims are non-contextually true, or even if they were, that we would be able to ascertain it. That's why there always has been, and no doubt always will be, so much disagreement in philosophy. My skepticism does not apply to empirical or logical truths that can be, within their contexts, ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty.

Have at it. :up:

Is there an example of such a thing you can identify? Is there anything that couldn't be justified by using such an intuitive approach? — Tom Storm

The Cassirer I'm just reading talks about how the inherent non-self-evidentiality of perception means that the perception of the real-objective must be a function of the apprehension of the entire "system of general laws", which he clearly demarcates as separate from science. This would be a good example of a kind of foundational certainty, which is conveyed holistically, as it were.

Nice. :up:

how the inherent non-self-evidentiality of perception means that the perception of the real-objective must be a function of the apprehension of the entire "system of general laws", which he clearly demarcates as separate from science. — Pantagruel

I'm not sure what this means. Can you restate it in simple or clearer language?

I'm not sure what this means. Can you restate it in simple or clearer language? — Tom Storm

Cassirer also describes how this functions through a cyclical dialectic of analysis and synthesis. It is from the first few pages of the first chapter of Volume 2, Mythical Thinking. I can put together a more comprehensive synopsis, but you can read the source text in the meantime if you are interested.

https://monoskop.org/images/f/f3/Cassirer_Ernst_The_Philosophy_of_Symbolic_Forms_2_Mythical_Thought.pdf

Pages 29 to 32.

I'm afraid that doesn't help me - I have no idea what the words mean.
How about this?

What is -

the inherent non-self-evidentiality of perception — Pantagruel

Is this a reference to the lack of justification for realism?

What is -

the perception of the real-objective — Pantagruel

Is this a reference to a Kantian things as they appear?

What is -

a function of the apprehension of the entire "system of general laws — Pantagruel

This one has me stumped.

I'm also not sure how that answers my question -

Is there an example of such a thing you can identify? Is there anything that couldn't be justified by using such an intuitive approach? — Tom Storm

It seems to me that an initiative approach can be used to justify any position anyone might wish to make at any time. No?

Originally I was commenting on this -

Perhaps there is a mode of certainty that transcends discursive understanding. — Pantagruel

I guess some people might consider perception in this light? Sorry to be pedantic - I was intrigued by the point.

↪Pantagruel I'm afraid that doesn't help me - I have no idea what the words mean. — Tom Storm

Did you attempt to read the source text I supplied? I am working on a synopsis but it will take some time. I have about 15 excerpts noted but it will take some time to assemble those into a cohesive presentation.

No. I'm writing a submission and diverting myself with this site.

All I was asking about was a plain English account of what you have already written in 3-4 sentences. I'm not asking for any additional work. If you are unable to clarify it further, that's ok too, we can move on.

All I was asking about was a plain English account of what you have already written in 3-4 sentences. I'm not asking for any additional work. If you are unable to clarify it further, that's ok too, we can move on. — Tom Storm

As I said, I am working on it. An additional point that you might find engaging is the intuition of causality as a foundational element. Causality is certainly a plausible fundamental category for empirical consciousness. But remember that there are different kinds or modes of causality. Formal and final causes don't fit within a strictly materialist framework, but they do emerge in plain sight for a cultural consciousness. So our apprehension of reality is the overall causal-intuition supported by the 'system of general laws' (Cassirer identifies this to clarify that what we are seeing is not just one example of one law being instantiated, but rather, our sensory experience is always composite, so many laws of different types of universals and particulars are always involved) including the formal/final dimension which transcends the boundaries of science. I elaborate somewhat on Cassirer.

I'm not even sure what point we are trying to address. :wink:

I'm looking at a kind of foundational synthetic-intuitive apprehension that grasps the essence of what it means to be objectively-real, across the spectrum of the empirical and the ideal.

Ok. Sounds somewhat too ambitious for me but I would be interested to hear it. I'm not a customer for the product 'objectively real' - except in a contingent sense, wherein certain actions can generate certain results, or may be useful for certain purposes. Beyond this is blackness...

:up:

I've attempted to summarize my points as concisely as possible with respect to the source text. I had wanted to explore the idea of the fundamentality of the idea of causality (in all of its aspects) and the cyclical project of analysis and synthesis, but this would have required several days, not hours, of work.

Quotations are from Continental Divide (CD - Harvard Press 2010) and The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms volume 2 (PSF2 - Routledge 2021)

Real-objectivity - the Realm of Reality

In its modern sense, physics is the science which studies matter in its most fundamental form. In other words, the properties of matter at the most abstract or general level. Science, as the collective knowledge about nature (phusis) has evolved into a myriad of unique and discrete sciences, wherein knowledge is pursued and validated through the use of the scientific method. Scientific progress and technical power derive from the application of general laws to specific cases. Understanding the general principles whereby (models of) neural networks operate facilitates the construction of simulated intelligences. Understanding the principles of evolutionary biology and organic chemistry facilitates techniques like gene splicing. Understanding the principles of general mechanics facilitates the use of levers and wheels. In each case, the power of the science of a domain is a function of the specificity of the domain. But each of these domains is the product of the formation of a complex system out of more basic elements. So while the face of modern science is best known in the miracles of gene-therapies, AI, and rocket engines, the overarching project of modern science is to understand what it is that connects the myriad of specifics in the most general way. Physical sciences can all be seen as specialized subsets of physics, the science of the most basic properties of matter.

Except that the apparent regularities of matter are entangled with the conceptualizing influence of the experiencing mind.

The earliest use of the term metaphysics was not by Aristotle, but by a later editor of his works, denoting those writings in his collection which came "after" (meta) physics. This purely positional identification quickly assimilated the additional apparently mystical sense of "beyond physics." In its earliest (pre-Socratic) usage, phusis (nature, becoming) contrasted with nomos (law, human convention). Thus Kant's observation of a fundamental mental orientation which is the "precondition for concept-formation" and hence structuring the conceptual regularities that characterize the becoming of nature (phusis), is adumbrated by the original sense in which nomos stands apart from phusis.

If the domain of nature (qua observed) is itself generalized to include the realm of the observer, then we have proceeded beyond physics to metaphysics. Reductive materialism sees the sciences of man as just further examples of highly specific theoretical realms. Culture emerging from psychology and biology just as chemistry emerges from physics. But is the mind, qua observer, a material product first? Or is it integrally involved in the construction of observed reality?

Insofar as the world is cognized, it is cognized in terms of regularities. In Kantian terms, "the world is intelligible...only thanks to certain conditions that we impose on it a priori." (CD, p7) Kant also identifies a mental orientation which is the "precondition for concept-formation although it is not itself conceptual." (CD, p.5) Peter Gordon suggests that "the orientations that lie at the very heart of conceptual argument seem...to precede thinking...at a level we might call preconceptual...[embracing] metaphor and affect. (CD 5-6)

I can do no better than cite Cassirer at length.

It is one of the first and essential insights of critical philosophy that objects are not "given" to consciousness in a rigid, finished state, nakedly in themselves, but that the relation of representation to the object presupposes an independent, spontaneous act of consciousness. The object does not exist before and outside of synthetic unity but is rather constituted only through it - it is no shaped form that consciousness itself simply imposes and impresses, but rather, it is the result of a forming that takes place by virtue of the basic medium of consciousness, by virtue of the conditions of intuition and pure thinking....Every such worldview is possible only through specific acts of objectivization, the reshaping of mere "impressions" into intrinsically determinate and configured "representations." (PSF2, p. 37)

And

what we call the world of our perception is already not simply nor self-evidently given from the outset but "is" only insofar as it has passed through certain basic theoretical acts, grasped through the world, by which it is apprehended and determined....If we ascribe a certain size, a certain position, and a certain distance to things in space, we are not thereby speaking about a simple datum of sense impression but are situating the sensible data in an interconnection of relations and a coherent system, one that proves ultimately to be nothing other than a judgment-complex. Every organization in space presupposes an organization in judgement....The transition from the world of immediate sense impression to the mediated world of intuitive "representation"...is based on the fact that in the fleeting, always the same series of impressions, the constant relationships in which they stand and according to which they recur, must gradually be emphasized as something independent...These constant relationships now form the fixed structure and, as it were, the fixed framework of "objectivity"....for critical contemplation, [the naive] assertion of constant things and properties dissolves when one traces them back to their origins and to their ultimate logical grounds, to the certainty of such relationships....The being of the objects of experience is constituted in and through them....every apprehension of a particular empirical "thing"...contains within it an act of evaluation. The empirical "reality," the fixed core of "objective" being, in difference to the world of mere representation or imagination, stands out in that the permanent is more and more sharply and clearly distinguished over against the fluid, the constant against the variable. (PSF2, pp. 38-40)

And regarding holism, objective-validition being confirmed by the "entire system of general laws."

The individual sense impression is not simply taken for what it is and immediately gives; rather, it is questioned as to what extent it is confirmed by the whole of experience...Only if it can withstand this inquiry and this critical test is it considered to be included in the REALM OF REALITY....Thus, the boundaries between the "objective" and the merely "subjective" are not rigidly determined from the beginning but instead are formed and determined only in the continuing process of experience and its theoretical foundation....what we call objective being is constantly displaced in order to be restored in a modified and renewed shape. (PSF2, pp.40)

What we call objective being - i,e the logical form of experiential thinking which is science - is constantly displaced in order to be restored in a modified and renewed shape. This is the sense in which I have been linking science and metaphysics. In a way that is consistent with the notions of the metaphysical research project and the paradigm shift, as others have mentioned. And the confirmation of specific contents of consciousness by the whole of experience suggests that the relative concreteness of our experiences is a function of the comprehensiveness of our theory of reality in its most abstract scope.

There are a lot of interesting aspects to this. Progression through a cyclical dialectic of analysis and synthesis, which Cassirer discusses. This is one of my own core tenets, which I feel completely resolves the inherent antinomies that form the basis of so much philosophical dispute, expressible ultimately as the paradox of mind and matter. Also the notion of the fundamental category of causality, in both its material and teleological evidence. Metaphor, myth, magic. Lots of room for metaphysical analysis there.

Have at it. :up: — Pantagruel

Thanks Pantagruel.

Getting back to this:

I don’t think there is one. There are major gaps and conundrums in physics, even without considering the very tenuous connection it might have with how or if mind ‘emerges from’ neural networks, and the implications of that. I think the sense of what is physical, in this context, is post-Cartesian. This is the view that emerges from first of all dividing the world into the two domains of extended matter and ‘thinking substance’ and then by demonstrating the conceptual difficulties with the ‘thinking substance’ (a.k.a. ‘ghost in the machine’.) So having eliminated that problematical conception of the mind, there is purportedly nothing left other than ‘the physical’ in terms of which mind can be explained.

Do you think that is near the mark? — Wayfarer

I interpret the sentence I bolded to be suggesting that I am proposing a sort of 'physicalism of the gaps'. That is not at all the case. What I would like to see is more people developing the cognitive toolkit to recognize that an understanding of human thought and consciousness, as supervening on physical processes, is extraordinarily explanatory and not just a simplistic parsimony.

Sure there are gaps and conundrums in all sciences and not just physics, but despite there being unknowns in many areas, I think it is important to understand what Sean Carroll was attempting to communicate with his article, The Laws Underlying The Physics of Everyday Life Are Completely Understood.

The connection between physics, and the information processing that occurs in neural networks, is no more tenuous than the connection between physics, and the information processing occuring in the device you are using to read this post. However, the ability to recognize the explanatory power of neural networks in understanding human thought, supervenes on a fairly broad knowledge of science generally. So I don't hold out much hope of this being persuasive to people who lack the knowledge base required for such recognition to occur.

Still it seems worth trying to communicate this idea, despite the difficulty in doing so, and perhaps talking about things at the level of psychology might be somewhat effective at conveying aspects of my thinking on this subject. Have you read Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow?

Thanks for that extensive answer. I can't really comment as it is not my area of expertise. For what it's worth, I don't think of science as uncovering the truth about reality - I see it as providing tentative approaches or theories, using the best information we have available at a given time, subject to revision. Humans don't have access to ultimate reality or a 'value free' view from nowhere.

I like the idea of letting go of the need to know, being able to live with uncertainty and thus cultivating ataraxia. I see that stance above as all as truthful in being able to live in accordance with our actual situation. — Janus

I tend to agree with this. If only for the fact that most metaphysical views or scientific theories make no difference to how I live my life or what choices I make.

I'm aware of that book, but no, haven't read it. Watched an interview with the now very aged Daniel Kahnemann the other night, he's clearly a brilliant thinker.

What I would like to see is more people developing the cognitive toolkit to recognize that an understanding of human thought and consciousness, as supervening on physical processes, is extraordinarily explanatory and not just a simplistic parsimony. — wonderer1

As far as your broader point is concerned, I can do no better than to cite @Pantagruel's excellent post immediately above yours, especially the lengthy passages from Ernst Cassirer, who eloquently states what I would struggle to articulate. I think what it brings out, is the sense in which critical philosophical reflection subverts the belief that the objective science can 'explain' the nature of existence as experienced. These of course are themes and ideas which have been considerably elaborated in existentialism and phenomenology.

As regards Sean Carroll, I'll only observe that physicists do indeed have a tendency to take the world as given, whilst overlooking or neglecting the role that the observer has in the interpretation and synthesis of meaning which is constitutive of our knowledge of the world. (I made some comments on one of Sean Carroll's blog posts here (although be warned contains references to controversial topics and thinkers.) He's plainly an influential science populariser and physicist, but I wonder if he would get Cassirer's point.)

I tend to agree with this. If only for the fact that most metaphysical views or scientific theories make no difference to how I live my life or what choices I make. — Tom Storm

If we could somehow know the absolute truth about "life, the universe and everything" then it might make a difference to how we live our lives. But as it is there is just a plethora of competing ideas, some of which we may find more attractive than others.

One thing that seems to me to be absurd, and perhaps even unethical, is to live one's life with the expectation and aim of gaining merit for an existence after death; I think that idea has the potential of radically devaluing this life.

That said, if otherwise reasonably responsible individuals want to hope for an afterlife because it comforts them and makes the inevitable rigours of this life easier to bear, and their ideas do no harm in this life, then I find it hard to argue with that. Whatever works, and we are all different, right?