The assumption seems to be that dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps intolerance is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'. — unenlightened

I'm sorry. Those pronouns like "it" are very easy to misunderstand. This version is fine.

My fault entirely. Thank you for querying it.

Well, yes - if you don't have a definition of "reputable" that's not subjective. — Ludwig V

Heh. I think the people I read and like would say you cannot have that definition :D. Or suggest it, in various ways that doesn't assert it.

I'll grant differences, though. While NIST is ultimately a maker of subjective definitions, they are inter-subjective and checked and about as good as you can get for those purposes. That's not the same as me claiming this or that brand of peanut butter is better though; we'd call that obviously subjective.

The assumption seems to be that dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps intolerance is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'. — unenlightened

This version is fine. — Ludwig V

So I'm just going to ask the obvious: Did we actually find a description of dogma that three of us are fine with?

While NIST is ultimately a maker of subjective definitions, they are inter-subjective and checked and about as good as you can get for those purposes. That's not the same as me claiming this or that brand of peanut butter is better though; we'd call that obviously subjective. — Moliere

I'm sorry, I can't decipher NIST. What does it mean?

One could claim that one brand of peanut butter is better than another on objective grounds - that it is organic or doesn't use palm oil. Sure, the fact/value distinction would kick in, but the argument about whether those grounds are appropriate is at least not straightforwardly subjective. Whereas making that claim on the ground that "I like it" is quite different; that would be subjective. (But "I like it because it is organic" is different.)

"Reputable", it seems to me has objective elements, because (in normal use) it would be based on reasonably objective grounds. The question would be about the worth of, for example, relevant social status (relevant professorship or other mark of success).

So I'm just going to ask the obvious: Did we actually find a description of dogma that three of us are fine with? — Moliere

It looks like it. :grin:

I accept that if we dig in to it, we'll find differences of opinion.

I'm sorry, I can't decipher NIST. What does it mean? — Ludwig V

I'm sorry! I should have posted a link and not just assumed we might use the same acronyms. The National Institute of Standards and Technology has a peanut butter reference standard.

One could claim that one brand of peanut butter is better than another on objective grounds - that it is organic or doesn't use palm oil. Sure, the fact/value distinction would kick in, but the argument about whether those grounds are appropriate is at least not straightforwardly subjective. Whereas making that claim on the ground that "I like it" is quite different; that would be subjective. (But "I like it because it is organic" is different.) — Ludwig V

Yup, I think I can go along with this. I'm not hardline on how I use the objective/subjective distinction. There are other ways of expressing the same without it.

But, yes, the examples were meant to highlight exactly that one can claim this peanut butter does or does not fit a standard, or has so much oil concentration in it, or is organic and that'd be the "objective" example with NIST, and the "subjective" example is the "I like Brand A over Brand B", though in normal usage there are fuzzy cases (which is why I'm not hardline on how we use objective/subjective).

"Reputable", it seems to me has objective elements, because (in normal use) it would be based on reasonably objective grounds. The question would be about the worth of, for example, relevant social status (relevant professorship or other mark of success).

Surely with dogma, though, there'd have to be a shared other dogma which would allow for a third party to be relevant? Which is where the subject would come back into the mix -- we can poison the well ahead of time and claim our dogma is good, and their dogma is bad objectively because we have chosen a judge. This process can be repeated so as to bury the foundations, so that the judge is also chosen on objective grounds -- philosophers would be tempted to call this ground "reason".

But reason speaks differently to different people, and people are motivated by passion before reason so subjectivity has a way of coming back around even as we try our best to adhere to objective reason.

But in normal use, yes I agree. Relevant social status, and also I think a general sort of trust in our social designations gets us over the intellectual hurdles. If my doctor was right about a sickness before then she's probably right about this one. Being in a safe social environment which allows for that kind of trust is a very important feature of being able to have reasonably objective grounds for everyday use, though. If we trust our third parties and they have the relevant social status then there are objective grounds.

It looks like it. :grin:

I accept that if we dig in to it, we'll find differences of opinion. — Ludwig V

True.

I'm still happy. Progress!

Originally I wanted to have a kind of rule for classifying dogma, but this way of looking isn't really like that. It's probably better that way.

Surely with dogma, though, there'd have to be a shared other dogma which would allow for a third party to be relevant? — Moliere

That’s a problem. If there is to be a discussion, there needs to be shared ground. Wittgenstein would talk about shared practices and ways of life. IMO that’s not wrong, but too vague for specific applications. For example, discussing something is a practice (or, a collection of practices, since discussions can range from gossip and banter to legal procedures and rules of evidence to academic theories of different kinds). But it would be a start to say that the practice needs to be shared. (A practice does not need to be correct; it’s only wrong if it isn’t practical, in the sense of enabling the discussion) In one way, the practice needs to be objective, but we don’t really need that – inter-subjective or at least allowing space for each party - will do.

But reason speaks differently to different people, and people are motivated by passion before reason so subjectivity has a way of coming back around even as we try our best to adhere to objective reason. — Moliere

Tell me about it!

Subjectivity has a way of reappearing whenever we think we’ve got rid of it. Why do we want to get rid of it? Perhaps because objectivity is a way of making interesting disoveries and resolving disagreements, and we put quite a high (but not supreme) value on that.

There’s a sense of reason in which reason “moves nothing” as Aristotle said. Hume’s version was, of course, the is/ought distinction. That means, as Hume pointed out, that reason is a slave to the passions – good only for working out means to the ends (values) set by the passions). (Spoiler alert – only in one sense of reason, IMO)

In another part of the jungle, the is/ought distinction shows that theoretical reason is not relevant to the passions. But that doesn’t need to mean that they are irrational. There are reasonable fears and unreasonable fears, reasonable joys (winning the race) and unreasonable joys (preventing an opponent from winning the race – unreasonable because it undermines the point of the practice of racing.) (Actually, “reasonable” is useful also in theoretical contexts, when formal conclusive proof is not available.)

Originally I wanted to have a kind of rule for classifying dogma, but this way of looking isn't really like that. It's probably better that way. — Moliere

Rules are fine – in their place. They are best developed after one understands the relevant practice(s). Sometimes, as in the rules of a game, we have a more or less free hand – what we say goes. But we are nevertheless constrained, if we want people to play the game, by what people find worth-while and/or amusing. In addition, rules can only be effective if there is agreement on how they are to be applied (i.e. in the context of a practice). It is important to be aware that every rule can (and mostly likely will, eventually) encounter circumstances in which the appropriate application may be unclear or disputed.

truth as the only and unquestionable value. — unenlightened

It is important to be aware that every rule can (and mostly likely will, eventually) encounter circumstances in which the appropriate application may be unclear or disputed. — Ludwig V

Hence one has recourse to dogma: "The referee's decision is final." Or the Supreme Court's, or the Central Committee's, or whatever.

Right, even when wrong — unquestionable.

We can debate the meaning of any word, but only by not debating the meaning of the words we use to debate it. Thus even a debate on the meaning of dogma requires a dogmatic understanding of 'meaning', 'debate' etc. One might say that dogma is the (perhaps temporary) still, fixed point of the mind.

My thread, my rules; this is what dogma is, and this is my dogma. :rofl:

Hence one has recourse to dogma: "The referee's decision is final." Or the Supreme Court's, or the Central Committee's, or whatever. — unenlightened

Yes. Maybe this will be merely annoying, but there is a difficulty when we cannot appoint a referee. We look for a substitute - something that will determine the decision. This applies to truth, as in science. We look for facts, or we look to reason - even logic. It doesn't work very well. Hence fact and reason begin to get a bad name. Pity. There's no better authority.

We can debate the meaning of any word, but only by not debating the meaning of the words we use to debate it. Thus even a debate on the meaning of dogma requires a dogmatic understanding of 'meaning', 'debate' etc. One might say that dogma is the (perhaps temporary) still, fixed point of the mind. — unenlightened

So, paradoxically, we are modifying what "dogma" has meant through most of this thread. Now, we are distinguishing between good dogma and bad dogma. I can live with that. I still reckon I can tell the difference.

The thing is, "the still, fixed point of the mind" can change status and become the subject of a discussion. That's what preserves us from arbitrary authority.

My thread, my rules; this is what dogma is, and this is my dogma — unenlightened

:wink: That seems reasonable and I will defer to your judgement. If I don't like it, I can always go away.

My thread, my rules; this is what dogma is, and this is my dogma
— unenlightened

:wink: That seems reasonable and I will defer to your judgement. If I don't like it, I can always go away. — Ludwig V

If you don't like it, you can appeal to the mods, whose dogma is final, subject to the terms and conditions of the service provider, that are subject to the various laws of the countries involved, subject to anyone giving enough of a damn to set about enforcement.

If men are not afraid to die,
It is of no avail to threaten them with death.

If men live in constant fear of dying,
And if breaking the law means that a man will be killed,
Who will dare to break the law?

There is always an official executioner.
If you try to take his place,
It is trying to be like a master carpenter and cutting wood.
If you try to cut wood like a master carpenter,
you will only hurt your hand. — Lao Tzu

If you don't like it, you can appeal to the mods, whose dogma is final, subject to the terms and conditions of the service provider, that are subject to the various laws of the countries involved, subject to anyone giving enough of a damn to set about enforcement. — unenlightened

I take your point. Life is complicated, isn't it? However, your last clause hints at the basis of success for a dogmatic person. Keep the people quiet, because if they get really riled, you're in trouble.

Your quotation is an excellent example of the genre. Lao Tzu always steers neatly between the bleedin' obvious and the intriguingly mysterious. Each element is perfectly clear, but why they are arranged like that is completely mysterious. But I guess you quote it because there is a connection with what we're talking about. Power, and its ultimate form, death, is the ultimate weapon of dogmatics; its limitation is that it only works when people fear death; when people lose their fear of death the dogmatic can wreak terrible destruction, but will lose in the end. Philosophers seem to hate talking about power in human society and loath to acknowledge its role.

Why do we want to get rid of it? — Ludwig V

Because then we can be more correct than the other guy, objectively ;). "He can carry on with his thoughts, but I know the truth, and here are my reasons, and here are the people who will respect me for this belief", to interpret "objective" as a more competitive desire than a cooperative one. If my beliefs are objective than I can state them proudly, declaring their truth in spite of opposition. Or I can choose to quietly move on. Either way I am invulnerable to my interlocutor whose beliefs are wrong or dogmatic or subjective.

If my beliefs are subjective then while they are important to me they aren't important to others except insofar that they take an interest in me, and likewise in order to find out what's important to them I'd have to listen. But that's no fun in comparison to being right so we get rid of the subjective in favor of the objective in order to win the game of being right, and having been right all along.

At least this is another motivation for the game of reasons that lives alongside the cooperative motivations. And the subjective, in relation to that motivation, is a position of vulnerability rather than invulnerability. Whether either is called for depends upon circumstance, though -- I don't think that can be decided ahead of time. And, however we might spell out objective/subjective, we'll always be both of these things at once.

In another part of the jungle, the is/ought distinction shows that theoretical reason is not relevant to the passions. But that doesn’t need to mean that they are irrational. There are reasonable fears and unreasonable fears, reasonable joys (winning the race) and unreasonable joys (preventing an opponent from winning the race – unreasonable because it undermines the point of the practice of racing.) (Actually, “reasonable” is useful also in theoretical contexts, when formal conclusive proof is not available.) — Ludwig V

"Reasonable" works well. I think that's more or less our limit as human beings -- we can be reasonable within a particular practice which requires reason. I have to say it's a particular practice because I'm skeptical about reason in general. I think reason gets re-expressed and re-interpreted depending upon what we're doing rather than having it act like an arbiter or judge of the reasonable.

I'm in full agreement that the passions are not necessarily irrational, though. That's one reason why the distinction is fuzzy in normal use. There are frequent examples which touch on both the objective and the subjective, such as the category of "reasonable emotions" -- which I endorse as a good way of looking at one's emotions under certain circumstances, but in others I'd say it's inappropriate such as what someone feels while watching a play.

I'm in full agreement that the passions are not necessarily irrational, though. That's one reason why the distinction is fuzzy in normal use. There are frequent examples which touch on both the objective and the subjective, such as the category of "reasonable emotions" -- which I endorse as a good way of looking at one's emotions under certain circumstances, but in others I'd say it's inappropriate such as what someone feels while watching a play. — Moliere

Reasonable passions are what decent, {ie English} people feel. The Continentals cannot control themselves, and the savages don't even try.

I think it goes like this : Given fear of death, fear of tigers and poisonous snakes is 'reasonable' in the sense that they are capable of causing death, whereas fear of mice is not. But as Hume famously didn't say, "you can't get an emotion from a fact". Fear of death is not reasonable, merely common. Lay on, Macduff, And damned be him that first cries “Hold! Enough!”

I think it goes like this : Given fear of death, fear of tigers and poisonous snakes is 'reasonable' in the sense that they are capable of causing death, whereas fear of mice is not. But as Hume famously didn't say, "you can't get an emotion from a fact". Fear of death is not reasonable, merely common. — unenlightened

I agree. There has to be something aside from the emotion in order to be able to say that a fear is unreasonable or reasonable (it can even be another emotion about the emotion). One environment where I think this classification can be appropriate is the therapeutic environment. If a person fears death so much that they aren't able to live life, and they want to live life, then it is unreasonable, by that desire, to fear death (that much). This is a simplification, though, for how we evaluate desires as being reasonable or unreasonable. There's truth to your:

Reasonable passions are what decent, {ie English} people feel. The Continentals cannot control themselves, and the savages don't even try. — unenlightened

Not only because we compare back to ourselves in judging others reasonable, but also because of the notion of self-control: a peculiar notion which always feels contradictory to me. As if anyone could be other than who they are (when the notion is usually invoked to say that a person lacks self-control, which is to say, they dislike how that person behaves -- rather than it being a character trait)

At least this is another motivation for the game of reasons that lives alongside the cooperative motivations. And the subjective, in relation to that motivation, is a position of vulnerability rather than invulnerability. — Moliere

The flexibility of all this is quite tiresome. Philosophers, at least, regarded the subjective ("introspection") as preferable because they thought it was immune to error - the same reason as their preference for mathematics. Aiming for something objective meant risk to them - something to be avoided at all costs.

I think reason gets re-expressed and re-interpreted depending upon what we're doing rather than having it act like an arbiter or judge of the reasonable. — Moliere

You're right about that. But people do hunger for something decisive. Not knowing makes for anxiety.

I think it goes like this : Given fear of death, fear of tigers and poisonous snakes is 'reasonable' in the sense that they are capable of causing death, whereas fear of mice is not. But as Hume famously didn't say, "you can't get an emotion from a fact". Fear of death is not reasonable, merely common. Lay on, Macduff, And damned be him that first cries “Hold! Enough!” — unenlightened

Well, emotions and values are ineradicable (saving certain ideas like Buddhism (nirvana) or Stoicism/Epicureanism (ataraxia)) from human life. We need to understand them whatever their status. Human life is a good place to start to identify what's valuable (and therefore to be desired or avoided, loved or hated, feared or welcomed. Where else would be better?).

self-control: a peculiar notion which always feels contradictory to me. — Moliere

To me as well. It's just a manifestation of the preference for hierarchy. I think competing emotions and inability to decide (not necessarily irrational - sometimes there is no rational answer) are enough to explain the phenomena. No need for an arbiter.

The flexibility of all this is quite tiresome. Philosophers, at least, regarded the subjective ("introspection") as preferable because they thought it was immune to error - the same reason as their preference for mathematics. Aiming for something objective meant risk to them - something to be avoided at all costs. — Ludwig V

For fear of being tiresome (but admitting that I hold things flexible and open, and it can be tiresome): Is that not the desire to be invulnerable?

Here the philosophers cast the objective as vulnerable, the subjective as invulnerable -- so we have a certitude from which we can build towards the objective. Or vice-versa, for thems who think that measurement is invulnerable, and introspection is vulnerable, we can have certitude from measurement and build towards introspection.

Usually I opt to drop subjective/objective as a distinction because it's more confusing than helpful. Within a practice it's fairly easy to differentiate. But In general, like in a philosophical discussion, especially a general philosophical discussion, I've noticed the terms are worm-like. (to use a vague but hopefully accurate metaphor)

Well, emotions and values are ineradicable (saving certain ideas like Buddhism (nirvana) or Stoicism/Epicureanism (ataraxia)) from human life. We need to understand them whatever their status. Human life is a good place to start to identify what's valuable (and therefore to be desired or avoided, loved or hated, feared or welcomed. Where else would be better?). — Ludwig V

And even with those ideas, depending on how we interpret emotion and values they are not ineradicable as much as they can be "tamed" to live a certain way. Marcus Aurelius certainly felt things, as demonstrated by his meditations -- he just addressed his feelings from a stoic perspective. (though I'll note I even interpret Kant as emotion-driven in this sense -- since respect for others is an emotional attachment, and that's a simplified but close interpretation of what holds his ethics together on the emotional side)

I think the question I'd ask is -- human life is a good place to start, but how do you get there in such a way that one can understand emotions and values? And is it even wise to try? Don't we have a kind of understanding of emotions and values through our commitments and emotions we carry? Why do we need to understand these things at all?

You're right about that. But people do hunger for something decisive. Not knowing makes for anxiety. — Ludwig V

True. Though have you ever wondered why not knowing makes for anxiety? And why are some people comfortable with how little we know? Is this hunger for something decisive worth feeding?

Going back to dogma, amazingly (thank you for your patience!): Kantian dogma might be that set of beliefs which he thought were contrary to reason but which people believed mostly due to this hunger for something decisive where nothing decisive could be said.


****

Also, an afterthought @unenlightened -- while I at first thought it more important to focus on science as dogma, and dropping point 1, now I can see how fact/value is atheist dogma in your sense.

Though have you ever wondered why not knowing makes for anxiety? — Moliere

As a person with a (mild) tendency to anxiety, I have never wondered that.

What relieves my anxiety is not so much feeling in control as confidence that I can adapt to whatever happens and partly by feeling that most outcomes don't matter much. (Some people think I'm easy-going!) Getting absorbed in philosophy helps - and quite a lot of other things, as well.

Anxiety gets bad when you speculate on possible outcomes and can't work out what you would do, but feel that you couldn't cope with it. Then a vicious spiral begins and fantasy takes over and things can get bad. I've always believed that many, if not most, people work like that, and failed to understand those for whom it doesn't.

In support of my feeling, I cite the obsessive discussion of anxiety in existentialist circles and the fact that most living creatures seem to live with it - have you ever watched a bird feeding, the continual pauses for a quick look round? - they are terrified. (Dogs seem mostly over-confident.) Evolution would likely favour a certain level of paranoia.

So my question is the mirror of yours - how do people who don't get anxious cope with not knowing? Confidence can be soundly based, but nonetheless is liable to failure, so it seems to me that people who don't get anxious are living in denial or under an illusion or myth.

Which is all off-topic, except perhaps to note that fear seems to rule many apparently confident and arrogant (dogmatic) people.

Kantian dogma might be that set of beliefs which he thought were contrary to reason but which people believed mostly due to this hunger for something decisive where nothing decisive could be said. — Moliere

Very plausible. As to Kant's emotion life, I've always thought that anecdote about him going for his constitutional walk at exactly the same time every day spoke to obsessive control, which suggests strong and dangerous emotions. Anyway surely a passion for philosophy and devotion to the pursuit of truth are emotions as well as values - and strong ones at that? (Some would-be rational people need to be reminded of that, IMO.)

they can be "tamed" to live a certain way. — Moliere

I prefer "balanced", but the crucial bit is the difference from repression and from indulgence. I suppose you know about the motto of the oracle at Delphi - "nothing in excess". Which can itself be overdone, of course. (Never forget about Dionysus - he'll come and get you if you do.)

Don't we have a kind of understanding of emotions and values through our commitments and emotions we carry? Why do we need to understand these things at all? — Moliere

Yes and no. By which I mean that, as well as provoking and inspiring us, they sometimes puzzle or frighten us. Though, to be honest, I'm not at all sure what "understanding" means. Certainly, knowing about my hormonal system explains nothing, in the relevant sense.

how do people who don't get anxious cope with not knowing? — Ludwig V

I'm not sure that many people live entirely without anxiety, so hopefully this clarifies: my confusion. Anxiety seems pretty common to me. I'm not sure it's as universal as the existentialists stress, but I'd go as far as to say it's a cross-cultural and cross-species phenomena. It's reasonable to tie the phenomena of anxiety to the evolutionary story, as you do.

A possible path might be curiosity, but I'm not sure that's a passion as much as a habit or character trait (and many a scientist would fit "curious" when in fact "anxious" applies, hence my hesitation to name it a passion). Even with a joyful attitude towards the unknown I don't think this is a total lack of anxiety, either. The joy of discovery works as kind of temper to the anxiety of not-knowing, to continue a theme. While there's a certain amount of anxiety there's also joy in finding out things -- but what I remain uncertain of is why some things I don't know about cause anxiety, and other things I don't know about don't.

For instance, it's not like I worry that I don't know how many grains of sand Mars contains. And with a far out fact like that I'm sure we could come up with all kinds of irrelevant questions which ask after answers but clearly aren't related to the anxiety of not-knowing. We worry about a small portion of all that we do not know.

The part that's curious to me is that often times knowing doesn't really cure the anxiety. The vicious circle you mention can spiral even with knowledge because the imagination is captivated by something more than just the knowledge (or, rather, the lack thereof).

So, yes -- it makes sense to want to know. I didn't mean to be that obtuse. :D That's a natural desire which helps us cope with the world around us. Only that it's curious that it does do so, given how there's so much we do not know (and it can even be fun to not know), and a lot of what we do not know doesn't matter to us, and how even after we know the imagination can continue its anxiety spiral regardless of that desire for knowledge being satiated.

All off-topic to atheist dogma, but I found the topic interesting to continue. Sorry un.

Yes and no. By which I mean that, as well as provoking and inspiring us, they sometimes puzzle or frighten us. Though, to be honest, I'm not at all sure what "understanding" means. Certainly, knowing about my hormonal system explains nothing, in the relevant sense. — Ludwig V

Right!

And so the ancient wisdom from the religious traditions still has an appeal because it deals with this non-factual understanding that's hard to really articulate.

For the modern Humean such stories are thought to be nothing but falsity, but this non-factual understanding is a part of their attraction, I think.

Only that it's curious that it does do so, given how there's so much we do not know (and it can even be fun to not know), and a lot of what we do not know doesn't matter to us, and how even after we know the imagination can continue its anxiety spiral regardless of that desire for knowledge being satiated. — Moliere

Does it help to say that we have to start somewhere and the things around us and affect us are not a bad place to start? But there's always more to be known and so anxiety is always a possibility.

All off-topic to atheist dogma, but I found the topic interesting to continue. Sorry un. — Moliere

You're right. I've taken a lot more interest in this kind of discussion since I read Cavell, especially on the question what lies behind scepticism, since it seems impossible to put it to bed (or, better, the grave.)

For the modern Humean such stories are thought to be nothing but falsity, but this non-factual understanding is a part of their attraction, I think. — Moliere

We live by and in stories. Arguably, it's the first kind of understanding and even science has one. (It's called history, but it serves the main purpose of orienting us towards life).

When I was young and knew everything, I was what you call a modern Humean. It took a long time and much actual life to get the point.

Interesting discussion guys, and not off topic at all. It connects this thread neatly to my follow-up thread. It is my working definition of life that to be alive is to give a fuck. Thus a virus is an uncaring replicator, not alive, whereas a bacterium actively absorbs food and ejects waste and 'knows the difference'. See Bateson's 'difference that makes a difference'.

Attraction/ repulsion is the beginning of emotion as judgement that arises out of sensory discrimination. And this primary division persists in every feeling and every judgement being positive or negative. but as senses multiply, and discrimination becomes more nuanced, feeling and judgement become matters of reasoning and calculation and conflicts can arise.

Anyway, I would suggest that animals are wary, not anxious. I think anxiety is very much verbal in origin.
Birds have to be constantly wary of cats, and other birds, whereas anxiety always seems to arise in a place of safety, the dis-ease of armchair philosophers rather than rock-climbing philosophers. But that story of the difference between animal and human is fleshed out in the other thread in more detail.

Thanks. I'm afraid I have a problem - I don't know which thread is your other thread.

And this primary division persists in every feeling and every judgement being positive or negative. — unenlightened

Isn't there a third possibility? Neither positive nor negative, i.e. irrelevant to me.

the dis-ease of armchair philosophers rather than rock-climbing philosophers — unenlightened

Perhaps. I would hope that a rock-climbing philosopher would be at least somewhat fearful. It shouldn't be a surprise if there were few anxious people among them. Anxious people will tend to avoid rock-climbing, won't they?

I fear I'm nit-picking.

I don't know which thread is your other thread. — Ludwig V

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14393/the-beginning-and-ending-of-self/p1

Isn't there a third possibility? Neither positive nor negative, i.e. irrelevant to me. — Ludwig V

Sure. :up: :down: :meh:

Is "meh" a feeling? The feeling of not having a feeling?

Anxious people will tend to avoid rock-climbing, won't they? — Ludwig V

Yes, whereas rock-climbers seek out and confront fear and thereby avoid anxiety. (Perhaps.) I could almost define anxiety as the fear of fear, but I wouldn't defend that if it doesn't fit.

Anyway, I would suggest that animals are wary, not anxious. I think anxiety is very much verbal in origin.
Birds have to be constantly wary of cats, and other birds, whereas anxiety always seems to arise in a place of safety, the dis-ease of armchair philosophers rather than rock-climbing philosophers. But that story of the difference between animal and human is fleshed out in the other thread in more detail. — unenlightened

That's a helpful distinction, and I accept this correction. There is something about being able to articulate an emotional life that changes it -- discriminations between the discriminations. The fear of things not present is what I was thinking about with anxiety, and relating that to the bird. But the verbal dimension compounds this fear through the imagination.

At least this gets along with my understanding of Epicurean psychology.

Anxiety of death, in particular, seems to me to require verbalization since we never experience death. The bird is wary of being eaten, and the evolutionary story would say this is because animals which are wary tend to reproduce more, but the bird is not anxious about the end of their existence. They cannot hoard to fight off the inevitable impending death. That requires planning.

Perhaps. I would hope that a rock-climbing philosopher would be at least somewhat fearful. It shouldn't be a surprise if there were few anxious people among them. Anxious people will tend to avoid rock-climbing, won't they? — Ludwig V

To remove the idea of danger I'd suggest that the anxiety of rock-climbing is similar to the anxiety of dancing. Absolutely nothing harmful will happen if you dance in front of people, but people have so much anxiety to let loose and go in front of others that they exempt themselves from this simple pleasure.

But if you start to dance it's not like the anxiety goes away. It's still there. But then there's an excitement in the creation of the moment -- you don't know how the dance will end, but that's not the point. It's the self-expression and creation in light of anxiety that drives the thrill.

Eventually the anxiety fades away.

This is easier with dancing because there's a positive element. It's harder with pain because no one wants to feel pain. That's sort of its function. But there's truth to the notion that we can accept pain, be wary of it, but not anxious in the sense of building it up as something verbal. Letting go of the anxiety is how pain is easy to endure. Or, well -- easier. Because pain with anxiety about more pain is even more unpleasant.

But that's easier to say than do, I think.

Then there's the odd phenomena of becoming accustomed to dangerous situations. I think thrill-seekers go through this -- the fear is the point. It's an adrenaline ride which powers you through fear to do more than you would have. The fear is still there, of course, otherwise the thrill wouldn't be there.

A bit meandery, but these are the thoughts that came to mind.

Thanks for the link. I'll have a look.

By the way, I'm still thinking about "wary". It's not the same as fear or anxiety, not obviously an emotion or a mood, more like a policy. https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/wary defines it as "having or showing a close attentiveness to avoiding danger or trouble". The lists of synonyms and antonyms is interesting. No emotions or moods occur, yet clearly "fear" and "anxiety" are related.

Is "meh" a feeling? The feeling of not having a feeling? — unenlightened

That fits with my impression. But I'm not at all sure I've really understood it properly - which may be framing it wrongly. My impression includes the impression that it is as much a speech act as an emotion.

I could almost define anxiety as the fear of fear, but I wouldn't defend that if it doesn't fit. — unenlightened

That makes sense.

I think the standard distinction between anxiety and fear in academic discussion is that anxiety is said to be a mood, rather than an emotion. Part of the difference is supposed to be that anxiety doesn't necessarily have an object, whereas fear does. I tend to think of it a fear looking for an object. But that's not the whole story. If I'm anxious about rising prices, it's not the same as fearing them. Perhaps because the danger is a possibility/probability rather than real.

But the verbal dimension compounds this fear through the imagination. — Moliere

That seems perfectly true. But there's a big and difficult problem, compounded by the idea that emotions are introspectible, so that second/third parties have limited authority. Yet we do not accept first person reports as entirely authoritative. This ambiguity fuels the difficulty in understanding the rationality of emotions. The problem is particularly acute when we want to apply the framework of emotion where language is missing (yet the framework of action is at least partially applicable). I'm talking about what some people call embedded beliefs.

Shades of grey, on the border between categories. Partly empirical, partly conceptual. Hence difficult for philosophy. Nonetheless, important for understanding human beings.

The fear is still there, of course, otherwise the thrill wouldn't be there. — Moliere

Yes. It is convenient for understanding this that adrenaline supports both fight and flight. Hence the term "adrenaline junkie".

adrenaline supports both fight and flight. Hence the term "adrenaline junkie". — Ludwig V

Exactly. The adrenaline junkie fights the urge to flight and wins, and that becomes their 'habit'.

Anxiety of death, in particular, seems to me to require verbalization since we never experience death. The bird is wary of being eaten, and the evolutionary story would say this is because animals which are wary tend to reproduce more, but the bird is not anxious about the end of their existence. They cannot hoard to fight off the inevitable impending death. That requires planning. — Moliere

It was all going so well, until the last sentence, and I thought, first of squirrels hoarding their nuts, and then of The ant and the grasshopper. One might suggest that even plants hoard sunlight as sugars and other carbohydrates in seeds or bulbs. In this case the evolution of DNA informed by consistent long term environmental pressures does the 'planning' - " Make hay while the sun shines, and make seed (or bulb, or tuber) when it starts to shine less." Thus the rationale that we make for what plants do because the ones that didn't died out. We understand:- plants just grow and make seed.

By the way, I'm still thinking about "wary". It's not the same as fear or anxiety, not obviously an emotion or a mood, more like a policy. https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/wary defines it as "having or showing a close attentiveness to avoiding danger or trouble". The lists of synonyms and antonyms is interesting. No emotions or moods occur, yet clearly "fear" and "anxiety" are related. — Ludwig V

I'm content with changing the locution from "wary" to something else -- it's the verbal aspect of fear and anxiety that I was picking up on as the important distinction. There's an emotional relationship between ourselves and other life, for sure, but being able to verbalize is what changes the emotional life of a being to have anxieties which compound upon themselves through the imagination.

Shades of grey, on the border between categories. Partly empirical, partly conceptual. Hence difficult for philosophy. Nonetheless, important for understanding human beings. — Ludwig V

Definitely. Also why I like it :D -- I'm usually attracted to the ambiguous and uncertain concepts. And even though I know in trying to clarify the ambiguous I usually lose what I was attempting to understand, I just do it again anyways. Failing better every day.

It was all going so well, until the last sentence, and I thought, first of squirrels hoarding their nuts, and then of The ant and the grasshopper. One might suggest that even plants hoard sunlight as sugars and other carbohydrates in seeds or bulbs. In this case the evolution of DNA informed by consistent long term environmental pressures does the 'planning' - " Make hay while the sun shines, and make seed (or bulb, or tuber) when it starts to shine less." Thus the rationale that we make for what plants do because the ones that didn't died out. We understand:- plants just grow and make seed. — unenlightened

Good point.

That's what I get for importing ancient psychology -- that's the Epicurean explanation for anxiety. Epicurean psychology hints at the irrational, but ultimately it is a rational psychology. So it has weaknesses.

I'm content with changing the locution from "wary" to something else — Moliere

I didn't mean to suggest that. On the contrary, I think that "wary" is perfect (as near as one ever gets, anyway).

Thus the rationale that we make for what plants do because the ones that didn't died out. — unenlightened

Yes. But that doesn't mean there's anything wrong with it. After all, who else is going to make explanations and seek to understand?

I didn't mean to suggest that. On the contrary, I think that "wary" is perfect (as near as one ever gets, anyway). — Ludwig V

Ah! Then another blunder on my part here.



The picture of hoarding, to explain the psychology I'm thinking through, comes from anxiety as explanation for why people seek power and money beyond even what their needs are -- the thought is that conceiving of our non-existence is to treat death like a person which, if you amass enough wealth or power, you can defeat them. Obviously no one really believes they can kill death, but the craving for wealth and power beyond what one needs can serve as a kind of substitute for defeating death.

But you are right to say the action of hoarding isn't right for the examples you listed, and then I thought of how crows demonstrate the ability to plan too. Also while that psychological story makes a kind of sense, it only makes a kind of sense from afar. I'm not sure to what extent I could determine that really the fear of death built up into an anxiety spiral is what is driving someone to amass wealth and power. Also it should be noted that wealth and power aren't the only ways to attempt to satisfy the unsatisfiable desire to escape mortality.

So I'm trying again:

Anxiety of death seems to me to require verbalization since we never experience death. The bird is wary of being eaten, and the evolutionary story would say this is because animals which are wary tend to reproduce more, but the bird is not anxious about the end of their existence.

I'm sticking to "verbalization" because I want to simultaneously maintain the distinction between Writing and writing -- I think it's a very helpful way of looking at language. Here I'm thinking it's writing in the small sense which seems to make the emotional life different. The bird is wary because that's how birds feel and it generally directs them to move their eyes about and that just so happens to help them avoid predators. But the homo sapien is anxious because they know that they will die, and that this is the only life they have, and they had better do something with it given that you only have one chance -- give it your all, experience it all, dominate it all. All are worthy distractions from the inevitable.

Except it makes us anxious, and that's unpleasant. But in the face of death anxiety is fine!

Ah! Then another blunder on my part here. — Moliere

:smile: I'm going to take that as a joke.

I want to simultaneously maintain the distinction between Writing and writing — Moliere

I'm sorry. I haven't heard that distinction before. Could you explain, please?

I'm sorry. I haven't heard that distinction before. Could you explain, please? — Ludwig V

No worries. It's my interpretation of Derrida. Which is informed but... I'm an autodidact and Derrida is hard.

Writing in the big sense is the cliche: Everything is text. Writing in the small sense is what we're doing to communicate as homo sapiens -- with words we usually recognize as writing.

What I like about it is how it relates and differentiates us from other animals -- meaning is in the world, every creature is Writing, and we write about it.

I'm going to take that as a joke. — Ludwig V

Oh, and no joke -- I thought you were uncertain about the locution since it invokes various meanings, but your later post suggested that you were uncertain about the concepts, so I thought I was off-base.