Thanks. I'd like to see more of this in our discussions. It's a very rich area we tend not to explore.

The problem with using "strategy" in this context is that it suggests that moralistic fast thinking on the part of humans is part of someone's conscious plan, when it is actually a result of unthinking evolutionary processes. — wonderer1

First, the strategies in fast moral thinking (such as reciprocity strategies and kin altruism) are encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense and in cultural moral norms which shape our moral sense.
Once more, they are encoded by evolutionary processes; evolutionary processes are not cooperation strategies. Don't make the same mistake Sharon Street does.

Offhand, I can't think of a better word than strategies. Suggestions are welcome.

Oh yeah, I’m a super-duper moral relativist. Which doesn’t mean I don’t believe that there isnt some sort of progress in moral behavior. What it means is that I don’t think that moral progress should be thought of in terms of the yardstick of conformity to any universal norms, whether religious, social or biological in origin. “ Women must be submissive to men” and “Homosexuality is evil” are immoral to the same extent as Newtonian physics, Lamarckism biology or Skinnerian psychology are considered inadequate explanations of the empirical phenomena they attempt to organize in comparison with more recent theories. — Joshs

We use scientific methods as a measuring stick for progress in physics. If cultural moral norms are just parts of cooperation strategies, I don't see why we can't use science as a measuring stick for progress in cultural moral norms.

The best measuring stick for moral progress from a philosopher I am aware of is described in Singer, Peter (1981) The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. Princeton University Press. Singer describes moral progress as expanding the circle of moral concern - or expanding the circle of people who are not exploited (in Morality as Cooperation Strategies terminology). Singer's book might be revealing for you. It and Morality as Cooperation Strategies are mutually supportive regarding the definition of moral progress.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies explains fast moral thinking, not slow moral thinking. — Mark S

So you posit ad hoc distinctions in order to circumvent criticisms of your hypothesis. Until now your theory has been about the whole of morality, but of a sudden it is restricted to gut reactions rather than considered decisions...

If anyone cares to read what I actually said, the next part of my comment points out your incoherence in accepting science to be useful, but rejecting the science of morality as necessarily useless. — Mark S

It will be clear to those readers that I have not said anthropological studies of moral behaviour are useless. What I have maintained is the obvious point, that anthropological descriptions, in themselves, do not tell us what we ought to do.

Your scientism runs deep, preventing your noticing it's superficiality. I'm not seeing any progress in these discusses despite nine threads. It was perhaps an error for me to engage with you, given the fixity of your thinking.

Have a read of Mary Midgley, if the opportunity arrises. Or Tolstoy. Or just about anyone outside of your scientistic milieu.

Cheers.

Banno
20.9k
↪Mark S
Morality as Cooperation Strategies explains fast moral thinking, not slow moral thinking.
— Mark S

So you posit ad hoc distinctions in order to circumvent criticisms of your hypothesis. Until now your theory has been about the whole of morality, but of a sudden it is restricted to gut reactions rather than considered decisions...
...
What I have maintained is the obvious point, that anthropological descriptions, in themselves, do not tell us what we ought to do. — Banno

I would happily set fire to each one of your straw man versions of my proposals.

Over and over, I have explained where your straw man versions are in error, but oblivious, you raise them again like zombies from the dead.

One more time (Please God, make it be the last time! I’m an atheist, so this is only an emotional plea for supernatural intervention.) you restate the basis for the naturalistic fallacy. This time as “anthropological descriptions, in themselves, do not tell us what we ought to do”, thereby falsely, and insultingly implying that I am somehow, somewhere relying on that fallacy.

And on who knows what basis, your strawman version of my proposal now includes your wackiest claim yet, that I argue the science of morality can explain slow moral thinking which potentially includes all of moral philosophy!

You present a new low in rational discussions, straw man zombie arguments – fake representations of a position that, regardless of all attempts at correcting the misrepresentations, rise, over and over, like zombies.

You can put “Inventor of the straw man zombie argument” on your tombstone.

I once thought straw man arguments required ill intent. I now see straw man arguments as an unconscious defense mechanism against ideas contrary to existing beliefs. All of us are susceptible to making them. But when someone tells us we have misunderstood their argument, most of us listen.

Your comments have not been entirely counterproductive.

You correctly pointed out that “the questions they (philosophers) are asking are not the questions you are answering”. Quite right.

And I now understand why moral philosophy, like physics as described by Max Planck, will be progressing one funeral at a time.

The good news is that we appear to have a resolution to our disputes. You wish to no longer engage with me and I wish you to never again comment on my posts.

That was easy. I regret we did not figure out this simple solution at my third post rather than my ninth post.

Offhand, I can't think of a better word than strategies. Suggestions are welcome. — Mark S

Your request, that I suggest alternative vocabulary, is fair enough. However, I don't consider myself very qualified to offer a very good alternative, because I think moralistic emotional reactions are largely a function of how the limbic system (paleomammalian cortex) interacts with neocortex, and that isn't an area I've studied sufficiently to speak with much confidence.

Furthermore, the interactions between limbic system and neocortex seem fairly complex, with some capability for each system to override the other. (i.e. Conscious reasoning can somewhat suppress being overridden by the limbic system, but conscious reasoning is also somewhat at the mercy of the limbic system.)

That said, I'd think something like, "evolved in automated biasing of neocortex by the limbic system", might be along the right lines, though it's fairly unwieldy.

That said, I'd think something like, "evolved in automated biasing of neocortex by the limbic system", might be along the right lines, though it's fairly unwieldy. — wonderer1

The top-down and the bottom-up/game theory perspectives I describe are about our moral sense's outputs (moral judgments and motivating emotion) rather than how our brains work.

Perhaps someday we will figure out how cooperation strategies were encoded into the biology that underlies our moral sense. But I do not expect that to happen soon.

Perhaps someday we will figure out how cooperation strategies were encoded into the biology that underlies our moral sense. But I do not expect that to happen soon. — Mark S

It looks me like it is happening now, but in bits and pieces. Neuroscience is a toddler by comparison with more fundamental sciences, but it has come an enormous way from the abyssmal state I found it in when I first started looking into it seriously 36 years ago.

Meh. Take your brilliant ideas over to the What is a "woman" thread and show us what use they are.

Thanks for the links to the literature.

Since this is a philosophy forum and I take scrutinizing conceptual frameworks as a primary philosophical task, I'm mainly interested in the concepts you use: morality (descriptive vs normative), cooperation, exploitation, "imperative ought" (?), dilemma, and solving "cooperation/exploitation dilemma". You seem to give them mostly for granted.

Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

Human morality is composed of strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

Behaviors that exploit others contradict the function of human morality and create cooperation problems.

Concluding that "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are immoral because they exploit others and create cooperation problems and thus contradict the function of morality has nothing to do with my background, the social environment these 'moral' norms were enforced in, or any other extraneous circumstances. — Mark S

To me the meaning of "descriptively" must be contrasted to "prescriptively" (or "normatively") not to "universally". If you use "universality" as a condition for identifying rational moral norms then you are no longer descriptive but prescriptive. Alternatively, you can use "universality" to refer to cross-cultural descriptive moral norms and NOT to a condition of rationality. Conflating these two usages would be fallacious.
Then you should give a definition or clarification of "cooperation" and its opposite "exploitation" (independently from any moral descriptive/normative assumption, otherwise you are running in circle). You never did that as far as I can remember.
Besides this claim "Concluding that "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are immoral because they exploit others and create cooperation problems and thus contradict the function of morality " is logically questionable: 1. if morality of moral norms is established wrt their universality then you are taking universality as a rational criterion, so you are talking in prescriptive/normative terms, not descriptive. 2. if certain moral norms exist and contradict a function you claim they must fulfill , then one can question the idea that such moral norms have the function you attribute to them.

Neomac, terminology is an ongoing challenge in presenting results from the science of morality. The philosophically relevant terminology in the science of morality literature remains immature and problematic, at least in my view. I am happy to describe why my using more standard philosophical terminology to describe science of morality results is misleading and inappropriate. Suggestions for how to improve my terminology would be gratefully received.

Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.
— Mark S

To me the meaning of "descriptively" must be contrasted to "prescriptively" (or "normatively") not to "universally". If you use "universality" as a condition for identifying rational moral norms then you are no longer descriptive but prescriptive. Alternatively, you can use "universality" to refer to cross-cultural descriptive moral norms and NOT to a condition of rationality. Conflating these two usages would be fallacious. — neomac

Right. The problem my terminology addresses is that the science of morality (like all science) cannot tell us what our goals somehow ought to be or what we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do.

As you quote above, science can tell us as empirical observations that:

• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies. (“Descriptively moral behaviors” have the normal meaning in moral philosophy.)
  
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.” ("Universally moral behaviors” are universal to all cooperation strategies. There is no corresponding concept in moral philosophy that I know of. Also, the term “universally moral” is not commonly used in moral philosophy, so perhaps I can claim it as needed science of morality terminology.)

I can’t say “Prescriptively moral” in the second claim because there is no innate source of normativity in science and, here, I am only describing scientific results with no prescriptive claims based on rational thought or anything else.

Yes, universally moral here refers to what is cross-culturally moral (and even cross-species moral) but has no innate prescriptive power. This is a simple concept in the science of morality but one that does not exist in moral philosophy.

So where does the normativity come from that makes the science of morality results culturally useful?

Their normativity first comes from groups choosing to advocate these principles as moral references for refining their moral norms based on being most likely to enable achieving shared goals due to increased cooperation. Their normativity comes in the form of hypothetical imperatives in Philippa Foot’s terminology and conditional oughts in mine.

The science of morality result’s second source of normativity is from individuals choosing them as moral references in their personal lives, again as hypothetical imperatives most likely to enable them to achieve individual goals.

In this forum, I have not talked much about why I think these principles could be so compelling for adoption first as moral references in a society and then as a moral reference for individuals. That would be a good topic for a future post.

I should be able to better respond to your other points once I hear your response. What do you think?

Right. The problem my terminology addresses is that the science of morality (like all science) cannot tell us what our goals somehow ought to be or what we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do. — Mark S

If morality is about what goals “we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do” (e.g. when there is a conflict between individual and collective goals), and morality cannot tell us “what our goals somehow ought to be” then there is no science of morality.
If your assumptions leave moral goals to be set and chosen by individuals and not by scientific principles, in what sense we are not ending up in a form of moral relativism?

I can’t say “Prescriptively moral” in the second claim because there is no innate source of normativity in science and, here, I am only describing scientific results with no prescriptive claims based on rational thought or anything else.

Yes, universally moral here refers to what is cross-culturally moral (and even cross-species moral) but has no innate prescriptive power. This is a simple concept in the science of morality but one that does not exist in moral philosophy. — Mark S

You keep repeating that “there is no innate source of normativity in science” and yet you also maintain that “the strategies in fast moral thinking (such as reciprocity strategies and kin altruism) are encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense and in cultural moral norms which shape our moral sense” (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/816533).
So how can something be encoded in our biology and yet not be innate? What’s the difference between “innate” and “biologically encoded”?

Their normativity first comes from groups choosing to advocate these principles as moral references for refining their moral norms based on being most likely to enable achieving shared goals due to increased cooperation. Their normativity comes in the form of hypothetical imperatives in Philippa Foot’s terminology and conditional oughts in mine. — Mark S

OK my point is that there are costs in increasing cooperation that outweighs the supposed benefits of cooperation. So what I may argue against your core claims is that maybe morality is not only about boosting cooperation but also about shaping and constraining it.
Besides the same social interaction can be seen as a form of cooperation or exploitation: is the capitalist appropriation of the surplus value of wage labour a cooperative or exploitative exchange? If you hold capitalist standard views then you would more likely see it as cooperative, if you hold marxist standard views then you would more likely see it as exploitative.

If morality is about what goals “we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do” (e.g. when there is a conflict between individual and collective goals), and morality cannot tell us “what our goals somehow ought to be” then there is no science of morality.
If your assumptions leave moral goals to be set and chosen by individuals and not by scientific principles, in what sense we are not ending up in a form of moral relativism? — neomac

Thanks for your reply. Let’s see if I can use it to clarify the science of morality concept of morality as a natural phenomenon. So far as I know, this concept of morality does not exist in traditional moral philosophy.

I am happy to answer all of your questions, but getting the grounding right about what Morality as Cooperation Strategies claims will provide a framework within which those answers can make sense.

Summarizing morality as a natural phenomenon:

• The science of morality has answered the question, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” by explaining them as parts of cooperation strategies. Cultural and biological evolution selected for these norms and our moral sense based on the benefits of cooperation they produced.

• This concept of morality (Morality as Cooperation Strategies) is as innate to our universe and cross-species universal as the mathematics that defines the cooperation/exploitation dilemma and the strategies that solve it.

• However, being innate to our universe does not necessarily imply any innate, imperative bindingness - what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences.

• Rather, Morality as Cooperation Strategies’ bindingness comes from individuals and groups choosing to advocate it. Groups that do not find solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma cannot form highly cooperative societies. Applying solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma has made us the incredibly successful social species we are.

• People already unknowingly advocate applications of Morality as Cooperation Strategies when they advocate their cultural moral norms and act on spontaneous moral judgments.

• The science of morality is then culturally useful when it identifies 1) those norms and judgments as heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma and 2) the cross-cultural and cross-species universally moral subset of those heuristics that do not exploit others. People can use this knowledge to resolve disputes about refining their morality to meet their needs and preferences better.

Do the above claims seem coherent, or do you still see internal contradictions?

• However, being innate to our universe does not necessarily imply any innate, imperative bindingness - what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. — Mark S

Saying that moral norms are innate "to our universe" (what do you mean by "our universe"? "universe" in the sense of "all existing matter and space considered as a whole; the cosmos." or "universe" in the sense of our species?) in some sense, but not innate in some other sense is not clear unless you clarify the senses in which something is innate as opposed to not innate. Is mathematics innately binding? Do we ought to abide by mathematics rules regardless of our needs and preferences?

People can use this knowledge to resolve disputes about refining their morality to meet their needs and preferences better. — Mark S

How? Show me how being aware that moral norms are just heuristics to solve cooperation problems and that those norms that are cross-cultural and cross-species are the ones which do not exploit others can help understand if the capitalist appropriation of the surplus value of wage labour is moral or immoral, or a solution to the cooperation/exploitation problem or not? Or how can this awareness help us understand if the policies of all main involved parties in the war in Ukraine is moral or immoral, a solution or not to cooperation/exploitation dilemmas?
If you can't bring anything NEW on the table and you just keep repeating things that liberal Westerners already accept (e.g. that slavery is bad and sexism is bad from cross-cultural non-exploitative moral rules), where is the help?