If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration
Why would resemblance and inductive association to the accidental properties in relation to the essential thing not be a consideration? — Bob Ross
I am saying that, in this hypothetical consideration, the designs are accidental: it isn’t a question of whether people are implicitly claiming them as essential properties (in this scenario). — Bob Ross
In the scenario, as I hold the possibility is more cogent than the probability, — Bob Ross
Why are the boxes accidental? Lets not just say they are. Lets prove they are.
It is known that they randomly switch between box designs for air and not air, and it turns out the box design X and Y have exactly 50% change of having air or not air.
Now, lets say that I receive a billion boxes of X, and a billion boxes of Y. low and behold, it turns out all the X's have air, while all the Y's don't. Its an incredibly improbable scenario, but it can be independently verified that yes, its completely a 50/50 chance that either box has air or not.
The properties which I find are important to me for my memory, the curly fur and hooves, are identities of the sheep I call essential properties. Properties I observe which are irrelevant to my identity of the sheep, I call accidental properties. Accidental properties allow me to remark on how the identity is affected beyond its number of essential properties.
The designs are accidental, not an accidental property then. If you have no foreknowledge of whether box X or Y should or should not have air, then you have not yet decided whether X or Y design are essential or accidental to the identity.
Also, we have to clarify what we're referring to here. If we're referring to the core identity of the box itself as a particular type of measuring tool where air doesn't matter, X and Y are accidental. If we're referring to the probability of whether a X or Y box has air or not, then the box design is no longer accidental to our point!
Taken another way, a type of dog can be green or blue. Whether its blue or green is irrelevant to knowing the identification of the dog. However, you later discover that 74% of these dogs are green, while 25% are blue, and 1% could be any other color. When you are asking, "Is this dog that I cannot see behind a screen green or blue," at that point the probability of the color becomes an essential set or properties in knowing the outcome
To sum up an accidental property - A property which is completely irrelevant to one's assertation or denial of the identity.
Accidental properties allow me to remark on how the identity is affected beyond its number of essential properties.
To see if you understand, take your example again and try breaking it down into clear and provable accidental or primary properties for the context.
2. You hold that the only essential properties of a box-without-air is that it is a box (i.e., a container with a flat base and sides, typically square or rectangular and having a lid) and it is not filled with air in its empty space (within it).
3. You hold that the only essential properties of a box-with-air is that it is a box (i.e., ditto) and it is filled with air in its empty space (within in).
Second, clearly demonstrate what is a possibility, probability, and plausibility.
Only after that careful dismantling, try to prove that you can make a plausibility more cogent than a possibility.
Since the probability that it is a box-without-air is negligible (because it is only a 1% difference) and the experiential association of the box-with-air with design X, although the design is not a part of its essential properties, so many times (viz., a billion) warrants claiming that the first random box pulled from this sample, being of design X, is a box-with-air.
1. Probability is 51% that the box does not have air.
To be clear, this means that any box given has a 51% change that it does not have air in it. So regardless of box design, its a 51% chance that it does not have air.
The only essential property for a box is that it is a six sided box.
If it has air, its a box with air. If it doesn't, its a box without air. Anything else is non-essential.
We'll call call a box with air a BWA, and a box without air a BWOA because I'm tired of typing those phrases. :)
Any box you pick has a 49% chance of being a BWA, while it has a 51% chance of being a BWOA.
Now lets include some non-essential properties. What they are is irrelevant. Lets call them properties X and Y.
So I can have a BWA with a X, and a BWA with a Y.
Does this change the probability of the BWA being picked? No. Its still a 49% chance
What about a BWOA with a X and a BWOA with a Y? No, still a 51% chance of being picked.
This is because we know that X and Y are non-essential the the probability.
Lets say that I pull any number of boxes. It turns out that I only pull BWAs with X's and WBOAs with Y's. I've never pulled a BWA with a Y or a BWOA with a X, but its still within the odds that I can.
Is is possible that I could? Of course.
But does that change the probability? No, non-essential properties don't affect the probability.
Therefore it is still more rational to assume over the course of picking more boxes that I should always guess that I'll pull a BWOA, whether that's a X or a Y.
If you believe that because every BWA you've pulled so far is a X, therefore its more reasonable that a box with a X is going to be a BWA, that's not rational, its just confirmation bias.
Your biased results don't make something more or less cogent. It is always more rational to believe that the box will be a BWOA whether its an X or a Y.
With that simplified, does that answer your question?
Now lets include some non-essential properties. What they are is irrelevant. Lets call them properties X and Y.
They are not irrelevant: they are irrelevant to the identity of the thing. That is not the same thing as them being irrelevant flat out. — Bob Ross
It is not provably possible under your terms that a BWA could have a design of Y because you haven’t experienced it before. Just to clarify. — Bob Ross
Now you have really good reasons to believe that when you see a box presented to you with design X, although designs aren’t essential properties, that it is a BWA. — Bob Ross
Secondly, if you would like to call what I just clarified as irrational, then you would have to say all inductions and abductions are irrational because that is how they work. Take Hume’s problem of induction, which you mentioned in your OP: you would have to say it is equally irrational to hold that the future will resemble the past. But this is nonsense: it isn’t irrational to induce or abduce: it can be quite rational. — Bob Ross
You are basically hedging your bets on a minuscule 1% difference and expecting, given the contextual background knowledge you would have, that this next one will be the only one out of a billion and out of every single one that you have seen that will break the correlation. — Bob Ross
"The odds of any box being without air are 51%, and the only thing that matters to the identify of the box, is that its a box,"
then the non-essential properties of the box do not matter to the probability. If X and Y are non-essential, they don't matter to the probability then. I think that's a straight forward conclusion right?
Are you saying that the probability of 51% is only a guess?
Or that we only think that the design of the box is irrelevant?
In other words, is our 51% open to change, and do we not know if it depends on X or Y?
, if X and Y are unessential to the probability, then they are unessential to the probability. Any results from experience, if we know the probability is correct, would not change the probability. Therefore no matter if we simply pulled 99/1 airs to no airs, that doesn't change the probability. The outcome of the probability does not change the probability.
I don't consider confirmation bias irrational by the way, I think that's a bit harsh.
Back to your point where I feel you changed the context a bit. You noted that it wasn't possible for you to have experienced a Box with Y that did not have air. I had assumed you had. That's true, you don't know if its possible for you to pull that box. Despite the odds, you never have. And yet you know its probable that you will, and its only incredible luck that you haven't so far.
If the odds for the air or not air do not depend on X or Y, then each X and Y has a respective 49/51 split as well. This is just a logical fact.
If you flip a coin ten times and it comes up heads ten times, does the non-essential property of you being in your living room change the odds of the coin's outcome? Of course not
"Every time I flip a coin in the living room, it changes the odds to where I always flip heads," then the living room is no longer a non-essential property to the coin flip, but has now become, in your head, an essential property of the coin flip.
Same as if after you count all the X and Y boxes that have ever been made, and sure enough, it turns out that all X's are airs, while all Y's are not airs. The odds didn't change
you could say that all boxes with X have air, while all boxes with Y's don't, and applicably know this. It just so happens that there are 49 billion X's, and 51 billion Y's.
Perhaps the issue you're really holding here is that you want to make decisions that are less rational sometimes.
To clarify, I am saying that the odds of any box being without are is 51% and the only thing that matters to the identity of the box is that it (1) is a box and (2) has or does not have air in it. — Bob Ross
No they don’t. The probability of one having design X or Y is completely unknown to you. The probability of picking a BWOA or BWA is irrelevant to the probability of it having a particular design. — Bob Ross
If you flip a coin ten times and it comes up heads ten times, does the non-essential property of you being in your living room change the odds of the coin's outcome? Of course not
That’s disanalogous: I am not saying that non-essential properties always weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occuring. — Bob Ross
Also, you being in your living room wouldn’t be a non-essential property because it isn’t a property of the probability. Is an unessential reason or factor: not a property. — Bob Ross
I am saying it is less rational to go with the 1% chance or 0.00000001% chance that it is a BWOA as opposed to a BWA in this specific scenario. — Bob Ross
Here is where you also have to clarify. Does the design of X or Y have anything to do with the probability?
For example, if the ration of X airs to Y airs was 3/4, then X and Y are essential properties to the probability. Both of these can co-exist.
So on one hand we could say overall, there's a 51% chance of no airs vs airs, not considering X or Y. Then we can drill down further, make X and Y a part of our observations, and note that X has a 75% chance of being no air, while Y has a 25% chance of being air. These are two different probabilities, and we could even math them together for an overall probability if we wanted to.
Once you start including an attribute in your probability, it is now essential to that probability. While you are considering X and Y, you're not considering the how heavy they are right? Anything you don't include in the probability is non-essential. Since you don't care about the weight of each box, it doesn't matter. Once you notice X and Y designs, and start actively noting, "Hey, X's so far have all been with air," then you've created a new probability, and X is essential to that probability.
If it is known information that the X or Y is irrelevant to the design, then you cannot make a probability based off of it when referring to the boxes in general
If it is unknown whether the X or Y is relevant to the air inside of the box, then you could start to note a probability that is again, separate from the box disregarding the design.
I think the part of confusion Bob is you keep making non-essential properties essential to an induction, but think because its non-essential in another induction, its non-essential in your new induction. That's simply not the case. Once you start including the X or Y as a consideration, it is now an essential consideration for your new induction. That's your contradiction.
Non essential properties never weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occurring. If they do, they are now essential to that probability
A reason or a factor is a property of something. If you wish to interchange it, its fine. The point still stands.
I am saying it is less rational to go with the 1% chance or 0.00000001% chance that it is a BWOA as opposed to a BWA in this specific scenario. — Bob Ross
Only if you consider the X, Y design of the box. In which case, it is now an essential property of your induction, and you've made the separate probability as I noted earlier.
I can experience design X with BWAs my whole life and never refurbish its definition to include design X as an essential property: and that is how the scenario is setup. — Bob Ross
I can say the designs are not essential properties of the identity of a BWA and BWOA while holding that the designs, given the inductive evidence and super low probability given of pulling BWOA, are relevant to inferring (guessing) what it is (even though it isn’t an essential property of it). — Bob Ross
Let me clarify something though: what is essential to the inductive inference is not the same thing as what is essential to the identity of a thing. I think you may be conflating those two here. — Bob Ross
Non essential properties never weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occurring. If they do, they are now essential to that probability
Correct. You keep focusing too much on the probability. The idea is that there is a probability which is calculated independently of the designs, but it is a miniscule difference. — Bob Ross
There’s no probability afforded to you of whether has a design X or Y. So correct. But that was never the claim I was making. The billion experiences of X → BWA and Y → BWOA is inductive evidence: it doesn’t give you a probability and that is the whole point. — Bob Ross
It is correct that the essential properties of a known identity, and the essential property of an induction about that identity are not the same.
True. But if you're going to later include, "I believe property X is a property that indicates it has air," then you've made it an essential property to identifying whether it has air. Basically you're saying its not an essential property, but then in your application, it is
If it was non-essential, then it would have nothing to do with your induction of whether the box has air or not.
If you include the "non-essential" property as essential for your induction to the outcome of the box, then it is no longer non-essential to your belief in the outcome of the box's air or not air identity.
Regardless of the pattern of design, we still know that any box has a 51/49 probability in regards to its air. But if we later consider the design in believing whether the box will have air or not, its now essential in that belief
You don't get to decide what's essential or non-essential in application. In application, the design is now essential in your belief on whether it holds air or not. You can deny it, but you haven't proven it yet.
And the miniscule difference is irrelevant. Its still 1% more rational. Or .0005% more rational.
If X > Y, and no other considerations are made, its always more rational to choose X
Patterns are a more detailed identity of a cogent argument than possibility alone,
Secondly, I am also not even claiming that the designs are essential to inducing what box it is (which would be the latter thing in your quote), because that would imply that if I didn’t know the design then I couldn’t induce at all what box it is—which is clearly wrong. I am saying that it is a relevant factor. — Bob Ross
f by “essential property of the induction” you just mean that I am using designs to make my induction, then I have no problem with that; but that has nothing to do with the substance of the scenario nor does that entail that it is essential to the induction. The point is that the colossally observed pattern of design → box, in this particular context, outweighs going off of the minuscule probability. — Bob Ross
I hope your Saturday is going well Bob!
Disregarding your first point for a minute, this is what I'm trying to inform you of. A relevant factor is an essential property. A non-relevant factor is a non-essential property in regards to the induction. Anytime you make the design relevant to an induction, a pattern in your case, it is now a relevant, or essential property of that induction. Again, can you make the pattern induction if you ignore the design? No. Therefore it is an essential property of that pattern. .
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.
Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B, (X and Y not considered).
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y (X and Y considered)
Why would it be more cogent to predict the next coin is heads rather then saying it could be either on the next flip?
You are not comparing inductions properly. The first induction does not consider X and Y. You cannot say a later induction that does consider X and Y is more cogent than the first, because the first is a different scenario of considerations
I hope this finally clears up the issue!
This has forced me to be clearer with my examples and arguments, and I think the entire paper is better for it.
I don’t have a problem with this: you seem to just be noting that I wouldn’t have made that exact inductive inference without the pattern which, to me, is a trivial fact. — Bob Ross
but, my question for you is, why explicate this? What relevance does this have to the scenario I gave you? — Bob Ross
I agree that the calculated probability (which is not an inductive inference) is not considering Y and X while the inductive inference about X and Y is; but this doesn’t make it an unfair comparison; — Bob Ross
Also, a real example, like my scenario, can’t be negated by saying it is an “unfair comparison” because, in reality, you would have to compare them and choose (as described above). In the scenario, you wouldn’t just throw your hands up and say “UNFAIR COMPARISON!” (: — Bob Ross
there is a probability you are given and there is an inductive inference you could make either (1) based off of that probability or (2) off of the experiential pattern. In this scenario, they are at odds with each other, so you can’t induce based off of both (as they have contradictory conclusions): so you have to compare them and determine which is more cogent to use. — Bob Ross
Why would it be more cogent to predict the next coin is heads rather then saying it could be either on the next flip?
It wouldn’t. If all you know is that you are performing a 50/50 random coin flip, it doesn’t matter how many times you get heads: it’s the same probability. This is disanalogous to the scenario because your knowledge of the design correlations is not derived from the sample size. — Bob Ross
If you do not consider the X and Y properties as relevant, you choose the probability. If you consider the X and Y properties as relevant, you do not have a probability that considers the X and Y properties. Therefore you choose the pattern. You're comparing an apple to an orange and trying to say an orange is more rational. You need to compare two apples and two oranges together.
We don't compare the two because they don't apply to the same situation, or the same essential properties. We compare coin flip with coin flip with what we know, and sunrise to sunrise to sunrise with what we know. The hierarchy doesn't work otherwise. You're simply doing it wrong by comparing two different identities Boxes without X and Y, and boxes with X and Y, then saying you broke the hierarchy.
Probability: A coin has a 50/50 chance of landing heads or tails.
Possibility: The sun will rise tomorrow
We don't compare the two because they don't apply to the same situation, or the same essential properties.
The point was to demonstrate that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. We both agree on this then
It sounds like you are in agreement with me that the best choice in the scenario is to use the pattern, but you disagree that it is an example of a possibility outweighing a probability: is that correct? — Bob Ross
Which indicates to me you are agreeing with me that the pattern is the most cogent choice in the scenario, but you are disagreeing whether that conflicts with the probability. Is that right? — Bob Ross
quote="Bob Ross;817572"]The implication with your example is that they are completely unrelated, but the probability and possibility in my example are both related insofar as they are being used to induce a conclusion about the same question. That’s why you have to compare them.[/quote]I honestly don’t understand how I could be misusing the hierarchy if the two options are a probability or possibility (fundamentally).
The probability and the possibility are both being used to infer the same thing — Bob Ross
We don't compare the two because they don't apply to the same situation, or the same essential properties.
Just to hone in on this: they absolutely do!!! The question is “does the box have air?” — Bob Ross
The point was to demonstrate that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. We both agree on this then
We don’t agree on this. All your example demonstrated was that patterns extrapolated from random pulls from a sample are not more cogent than probabilities pertaining to that sample. That is not the same thing as proving that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. — Bob Ross
If you introduce new properties which are of consideration within the probability, that is a new context.
…
A^B != A^B & X^Y
You are not asking the same question
Otherwise its just a strawman argument.
Simply prove the coin flip example wrong, and then you'll be able to back that its not proven
After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y.
You can have two induction which use different relevant factors to infer a solution to the same question in the same context. The use of different relevant factors does not change the context — Bob Ross
Suppose I sit down with a bunch of strangers at a poker game. The dealer deals himself a full house. Then he deals himself four of a kind. Then a royal flush. Then another royal flush. What does your theory say about when I should leave the table?
9h — RogueAI
You usually do fair readings, but this time you're not. I've told you how the theory works, you don't get to say my own theory doesn't work the way I told you!
In this case, you're telling me the theory I made should be something different. That's a straw man...But insisting it is something it is not is wrong.
My internet is down so I'm having to type these on the phone for now.
Take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.
After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y.
Take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.
An example of the hierarchy
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.
…
Another example of the hierarchy:
Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y
…
An example that is NOT the hierarchy:
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y
I understand what you are conveying — Bob Ross
1. In the scenario I gave, is the possibility or the probability what you would go with (or perhaps neither)? — Bob Ross
2. Do you agree with me that if you decide one over the other that you are thereby comparing them? — Bob Ross
3. Do you agree that all the possible inductions for a question within a context are thereby within the same context as each other? — Bob Ross
by my lights, it is useless (since it cannot be applied) for practical examples. — Bob Ross
That depends on what you find essential in pulling the boxes.
Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting that these two inductions (which pertain to answering the same question in the same context) cannot be evaluated with respect to each other to decipher which is more cogent because you are generating two different hierarchies for them; and you are expressing this in the form of saying that it is up to the person to define what they think is essential. — Bob Ross
Firstly, unless there is some sort of separate criteria in your methodology for what one should consider essential, then it seems like, according to your methodology, a truly arbitrary decision of what is essential. I am ok with the idea of letting distinctive knowledge be ultimately definitional: but now you are extending it to applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross
Secondly, because it is an arbitrary decision whether one wants to include the X and Y designs into their consideration, the crux of the cogency of their induction is not furnished nor helped by your induction hierarchy and, thusly, your methodology provides no use in this scenario. — Bob Ross
Thirdly, I find that it would actually be less cogent to go with the probability (in that scenario) and somehow merely saying they don’t want to include the designs as essential doesn’t seem like a rational counter. The strong pattern, in this case, clearly outweighs using the miniscule probability. So I think that, as far as I am understanding it, using this methodology in this scenario can lead people to making an irrational decision (in the case that they arbitrarily exclude their knowledge of the patterns). — Bob Ross
Would you at least agree that this scenario demonstrates how your methodology affords no help in some scenarios? — Bob Ross
After pulling literally two billion boxes and noticing there was a 100% match of design to air or not air, it seems silly not to consider it.
You're still hung up on comparing that pattern to the probability though. You can't because you're not considering the same properties in both instances. It doesn't work that way. Stop it Bob. :D
The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.
The fact that people can misunderstand, misuse, or make mistakes in applying a methodology is not a critique on the methodology. Do we discount algebra because it takes some time to learn or master? No.
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.