A mode of being is not merely an attitude or a mood, but a whole, pervasive, encompassing orientation; a "form of life" to use Wittgenstein's phrase.

Modes of being are fluctuations within the dimensions of collective consciousness.

how would you explain the term "modes of being"? — Moliere

I agree with John that it's a pervasive orientation. One has to go to Heidegger or social psychology because analytic philosophy mostly assumes we are one way rather than another.

I've been reading up about perception, familiarity and anticipation. One hidden assumption in a lot of cogsci - but this goes back centuries, millennia - is that there is a sort of equilibrium we as human beings revert to, want to get back to. Our mode of being is not so much to make the world as to perceive it then act upon it.

An interactive and anticipatory way of understanding would on the contrary be that our mode of being is world-making, future- and other-oriented. As an example in language (the example I'm most interested in) the 'meaning' of anything one says or hears would then never be restricted by a compositional account, because part of the meaning would reside in what I am about to say, and what you think I am about to say, and what you are about to say, and what I think you are about to say...

So I think of 'mode of being' as indeed akin to Witt's 'form of life', and part of the fun of philosophy might then lie in trying to tease out assumptions hidden in our ways of thinking about how we are.

The relation of emotion to anticipation and memory is a related area (and I have some memory you're interested in emotion). A guy called Tronick studied infant moods and proposed that moods embodied a 'Janus principle' facing both past and present - that they are a non-cognitive way in which the past enters the present, or the present inhabits the future. That would help explain why athletes for instance focus on mood: mood changes anticipation and both in turn influence how the world is to us, and how we are in the world. Deep mood might then be how we are in the world, which would be why we call bipolarity or depression 'mood disorders'.

A man and a woman have a child, but that does not make them parents. It is what they do, how they demonstrate their care for the child, that makes them be parents.

Having is necessary but it is not sufficient, doing is both necessary and sufficient for something to be.

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Is it just a way of being? — Moliere

Fromm' study is grounded in an analysis of the authenticity of our subjectivity and the structure of experience itself, the quality of our cognitional relation with intentionality and the external world. Being is conscious, lived-experience rather than just being a passive observer where pleasure or the instinctual determines action.

It is the deceit that one will attain pleasure if they conform and psychologically reduces the prospect of conscious, lived-experience to a mere egotism and even hedonism; to strive towards having what is attractive and appreciated by the world at large despite your unhappiness. It is the subjective attitude to living with the external world, where people have come to view themselves and others as commodities where identity formed through the possession of appearances and what is socially approved rather than what you actually want.

Modes of being are fluctuations within the dimensions of collective consciousness. — stonedthoughtsofnature

Careful, now. Or you'll end up down the slippery slope of solipsism.

authenticity — TimeLine

Not again... >:O

I think we need to make a phenomenology for dummies book especially for you. Now shoo!

In it he uses a phrase: "Modes of existence", in particular to designate what both having and being are. — Moliere

Classically, "have" and "habit" are very closely related in Latin terminology. Habits are what a being has, in terms of one's active existence. The activities of a being are instances of actualizing potential, and to have a tendency to do such, in a particular way, is to have a habit. There has been debate, and discussion, as to exactly where the habit is, what is it that has habits.

What exactly is it which has the tendency to behave in a particular way? We cannot attribute the habit directly to the activity, because the habit is responsible for causing the activity, and exists whether or not the particular activity is being carried out at a particular time. But it also doesn't make sense to attribute the habit to the potential for the activity, because potential does not seem to be the type of thing that we can say "has" something.

Now shoo! — TimeLine

Wow, it seems you're not the only crazy around :D


Now, don't hit me please :-*

What is up with you, Augustino?

You are like Pepé Le Pew. You just don't seem to get it. This cat don't like you.

LOOOOOL >:O

And why would I care? :P Trust me, you're not that important in the scheme of things - even though you have a mode of being which authentically (no really, in a rationally autonomous way) puts yourself at the centre ;) ;) ;)

Sorry for a delay in responses. The rat wheel scoops me up, but I have the time and energy now. Thank you for the replies. They were nice to think over.



That's a good approach, though I'd express hesitation in using "form of life" to get at "modes of being". It seems to me that forms of life deal with daily activity, and I don't think that a mode of being relies as much upon our actions. While our actions may influence our mode of being, I'd say that there is also an experiential element to it -- something like an encounter, but not necessarily something we or I or you or they are doing.

Of course you say "like", so maybe I'm just being too literal in this reply.

've been reading up about perception, familiarity and anticipation. One hidden assumption in a lot of cogsci - but this goes back centuries, millennia - is that there is a sort of equilibrium we as human beings revert to, want to get back to. Our mode of being is not so much to make the world as to perceive it then act upon it.

An interactive and anticipatory way of understanding would on the contrary be that our mode of being is world-making, future- and other-oriented. As an example in language (the example I'm most interested in) the 'meaning' of anything one says or hears would then never be restricted by a compositional account, because part of the meaning would reside in what I am about to say, and what you think I am about to say, and what you are about to say, and what I think you are about to say... — mcdoodle

I wonder -- might these actually be two different modes of being?

It seems to me that our hidden assumptions, once explicated, about cognition or inner life are often things which we draw from our own experiences. Something which might be shared with others, but is not universal.

The relation of emotion to anticipation and memory is a related area (and I have some memory you're interested in emotion). — mcdoodle

Very much so :). To the extent that I have the time (and discipline).

A guy called Tronick studied infant moods and proposed that moods embodied a 'Janus principle' facing both past and present - that they are a non-cognitive way in which the past enters the present, or the present inhabits the future. That would help explain why athletes for instance focus on mood: mood changes anticipation and both in turn influence how the world is to us, and how we are in the world. Deep mood might then be how we are in the world, which would be why we call bipolarity or depression 'mood disorders'.

This seems kind of trippy, but at the same time plausible too. At the least I can see how mood would relate to perceptions of time, and I don't think our perception of time is a linear line with a point-like structure. (I just wouldn't be certain to what extent mood would be that perception of time, or would instead be related to that perception of time)

What would you say is this distinction between mood and deep mood?

A man and a woman have a child, but that does not make them parents. It is what they do, how they demonstrate their care for the child, that makes them be parents.

Having is necessary but it is not sufficient, doing is both necessary and sufficient for something to be. — Cavacava

Is it how they demonstrate their care for their child, or the care they feel for their child, or the relationship which they establish with their child?

It seems to me that what you're saying here is something along the lines of the existential principle that being and doing (and in particular not merely doing, but *acting*)) are, if not identical, at least deeply related.

Being is conscious, lived-experience rather than just being a passive observer where pleasure or the instinctual determines action. — TimeLine

If that is being, then what would you say a modality of being is? Would you say that the egotism you describe is such a mode? (And, if so, then what is an authentic mode?)




Interesting. Seems to me that at least you are saying what a mode of being is not -- i.e., habits.

What would you say is this distinction between mood and deep mood? — Moliere

This comes from a man called Matthew Ratcliffe, whose papers are free to read on academia. It's the notion that 'deep mood' is the way we are in the world, the profound, all-permeating, hard-to-shift mood that features in clinical diagnosis, for instance. By contrast 'mood' can be short-term, is amenable to mild drugs or even reasoning, can be measured on scales often purporting to relate to 'energy' and 'attitude'.

That's a good approach, though I'd express hesitation in using "form of life" to get at "modes of being". It seems to me that forms of life deal with daily activity, and I don't think that a mode of being relies as much upon our actions. While our actions may influence our mode of being, I'd say that there is also an experiential element to it -- something like an encounter, but not necessarily something we or I or you or they are doing.

Of course you say "like", so maybe I'm just being too literal in this reply. — Moliere

I think form of life, which may have manifestations in daily activity, depend on modes of being. Probably it's not right to say they are the same thing, but I meant it more like a form of life is a mode of being than the other way around, and expressed it badly. (Actually I didn't write "like" but probably should have). Now I want to say that a form of life is a mode of being, like a dog is an animal; an animal is not necessarily a dog.

Interesting. Seems to me that at least you are saying what a mode of being is not -- i.e., habits. — Moliere

The problem is that you create ambiguity by using "mode of being" to refer to both "having and being". Having and being are distinct, as "having" refers to what a being has (habits) while "being", refers to the thing which has habits. So if one speaks of modes of being, "being" is already assumed as the subject, and "modes" refers to what is predicated of the subject, habits. And it doesn't make sense, unless one desires ambiguity and equivocation, to say that "mode of being" refers to both predicate and subject.

Consider that there are two distinct ways to describe something. We can describe what a thing is, referring to its existence, or "being", and we can describe the way a thing behaves, its disposition. So take water for example. When we say "what it is", we describe its molecular composition of hydrogen and oxygen. When we describe the way it behaves, we designate things such as its freezing point, and boiling point. If you get very analytical, these two will seem to converge into one "what it is"; then what the thing is, and the way it behaves , appears to be one and the same, as what is predicated of the subject. But when these two become one and the same, what is lost, is the subject itself, as it is simply assumed, and is no longer distinguishable as an entity separate from its properties. But to say that a thing is its properties is a category error.

If that is being, then what would you say a modality of being is? Would you say that the egotism you describe is such a mode? (And, if so, then what is an authentic mode?) — Moliere

We are the modal initiative; to say 'consciousness' is to enable the necessary preconditions that initiate an awareness or lived experience of the external world by making it 'conscious' rather than asserting a constructed reality. Indeed, if self-consciousness is a feature of consciousness (thus circular or reflexive) where being conscious is to consciousness itself, any authentic modes of experience requires the subject to be aware of the subject. Empathy, for instance, removes itself from egotism and one becomes morally consciousness.

Modes of being

I think we have multiple modes of being. We always have a present mode of being. The present mode is global in scope -although, we may not always be aware of the present. In the same regard, we have a past and future mode of being. Another global mode is our concept of our self. Like – I am a man – a democrat – a good person – happy – carpenter – and so on.

We have many temporary modes of being. We have a spiritual mode – sexual mode – eating mode – philosophical mode – and on and on. Modes of activity like eating or sex - exists in a global mode – past, present or future. Many modes can be combined and shifted about. We are in the present when we think of the past or future. We also have a conceptual mode of ideas, stories and/or mental projections. In this conceptual mode we may cogitate about philosophical ideas or tell stories or project ourselves as a hero or villain.

We also have an eternal mode. We visualize going to heaven or hell. Or going nowhere into nothingness after we die. There is also a still mind mode – just pure awareness. We have a parenting mode – sibling mode – family mode – work mode – relaxing mode – exercise mode – authentic mode – deceptive mode – we have many many modes.

All of our modes combine and commingle. However there is one mode that is supreme – the present. We are prisoners of the present from the moment of conception to our last breathe. We never leave the present. The present is our mode of being. Everything else is an addendum.

OK, cool. I found him on Academia. He's very prolific. (and does work on a lot of things I'm interested in)

I understand your explanation, but if I wanted more, is there a good starting point?



I could see that. The two phrases do seem to be getting at something similar.

I think you're on the wrong track there, Meta. Being/Having isn't about knowledge or objects as much as it is about how we are oriented towards the world. We can relate to the world in a have-mode or a be-mode, but each of these are a mode of being. A bit confusing, as you note, but nothing that isn't easily clarified.

That's what I mean when I say I don't think that what we do gets at what a mode of being is. It seems to me that there's more to it than that. Which seems to be something you'd agree with, with what you said above. The only difference I'd point out here is that rather than thinking about a knowledge of objects, I'd say it's more about self-knowledge. (or other-knowledge, perhaps, as Fromm is something of a Freudian -- though I don't mean to restrict the conversation to Fromm alone, I'm just using him as a starting point).

We are the modal initiative; to say 'consciousness' is to enable the necessary preconditions that initiate an awareness or lived experience of the external world by making it 'conscious' rather than asserting a constructed reality. Indeed, if self-consciousness is a feature of consciousness (thus circular or reflexive) where being conscious is to consciousness itself, any authentic modes of experience requires the subject to be aware of the subject. Empathy, for instance, removes itself from egotism and one becomes morally consciousness. — TimeLine

Alright, so just to make sure I have this straight...

Being is conscious, lived experience. A mode of being is initiated by us. (strong emphasis on "us"? Or do you believe it's more of an "I"?). An authentic mode is one where the subject is self-aware, empathy being a particular case of authentic consciousness.

I must admit I'm not following the part in the middle, from where you start "...to say 'consciousness' is to..." all the way to "...where being conscious is to consciousness itself..." -- My best guess is that saying and meaning "consciousness" is sort of a bootstrap operation whereby we both become aware of ourselves and reality, and given that then in-authentic modes of being would make us not aware of one or the other, since consciousness requires both. I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "constructed reality", though.

But as I said, this is a guess, and I only say these things by way of asking to express more and clarify, if you're willing to write.

I must admit I'm not following the part in the middle, from where you start "...to say 'consciousness' is to..." all the way to "...where being conscious is to consciousness itself..." -- My best guess is that saying and meaning "consciousness" is sort of a bootstrap operation whereby we both become aware of ourselves and reality, and given that then in-authentic modes of being would make us not aware of one or the other, since consciousness requires both. I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "constructed reality", though. — Moliere

Perhaps this is the best place to start; I have a big day driving the company car to the country for work tomorrow and I can only relax when I get all philosophical in the evening. Metaphysics helps me sleep like a log. :-d

When I say 'we' I speak of intentionality, that every mental act is directed to the external world and that our first person interpretation of these perceptions are not isolated from our experience in a shared social environment. This epistemic interface enables the language to communicate between the mental activity with the external object, but it does not necessarily mean that the interpretation is accurate and distinct counterfactual beliefs of the same object could easily be expressed. If our interpretation is merely a preconditioned discourse of a shared social history, while it may appear deceptively close to us as an 'I' (singular thoughts) we are really subject to the limitations of a reality constructed by our shared epistemic interactions ('we') that alters (like Wittgenstein' language games) the meaning of these experiences. Autonomy is to describe an absence of this reliance of this cognitive limitation and unmask the force of society or our external relations on our interpretations of reality, to dispute the authenticity of the decisions and opinions we hold and ascertain whether the interpretation of our interiority is genuine. Are we alienated from ourselves as a compromise, acting on the periphery of who we are for the sake of maintaining this common social reality?

To reach the parallel between an epistemologically objective but ontologically subjective experience rather than being automaton in ones reliance on others, lived experience is to separate ourselves from the reliance of this shared content and use the functions of our mental properties and the pre-existing cognitive tools to interpret the external experiences consciously. Indeed, we are the modal initiative, that is the experience of consciousness is authentically singular ('I') but reaching this transcendence is circular in that consciousness of the external world is a feature of self-consciousness. One can overcome being passively subordinate or a conforming subject to become aware of the vastness of the spatial network and regain an awareness of their own selfhood within this collective network and where phenomenal content is autonomously experienced.

The more we study ourselves (introspection) the more our deliberations of the external world become rational, our interpretations are no longer reliant on this collective ego where thoughts are falsely singular and where one has a self-centred preoccupation that is deficient in empathy within the context of a public self (which is why capitalism finds this mutual engagement highly advantageous). One becomes autonomous and begins to use the already inherent cognitive processes independently. Yet to overcome this psychological egoism and become aware of this external world is only possible through empathy, through moral consciousness or love. It is like stepping outside of yourself to see yourself or as Kierkegaard would say "the self is a relation that relates itself to itself" but it is not about reflecting or mirroring ourselves to ourselves in an isolated, poetic way, but rather reflecting ourselves through others but doing so consciously or autonomously.

OK, cool. I found him on Academia. He's very prolific. (and does work on a lot of things I'm interested in)

I understand your explanation, but if I wanted more, is there a good starting point? — Moliere

I@d just start randomly with one of his essays. One reason I picked 'moods' to write about for school earlier in the year is that there isn't a good starting-point, there isn't much clear thinking. There's an essay by Lauren Freeman 'Towards a phenomenology of mood' which surveys the ground. The paths she and Ratcliffe are on lead back to Heidegger and Husserl. Via college I also had access to the Oxford handbook of the philosophy of emotion, edited by Goldie, if you haven't already consulted that it's a good source for brief essays about various topics in 'emotion'.

Why would you want to explain it to someone who doesn't get the gist? Because you want them to get the gist? In that case, I would just use examples.

But I suspect that you are asking this question because you feel that you have only a tentative grasp, since you can't articulate it fully. But I'm not sure it needs to be articulated fully. Is there really a need to parse out a concept like "being a certain way"?

You could use an aphorism here: "The way-of-being of an entity is the way that entity must be, if it is to be at all. If it can't be that way, it can't be." Kind of feels as if it's dissolving into wordplay there, which sets off my you-are-wandering-up-a-garden-path alarm. But maybe that'll help.

It's just a metric I use. And you are right -- I ask because I couldn't explicate it at that level. I don't know if it needs one, but it's something I usually try to pursue. "If I had to explain this in a classroom setting, then..."

There is something of a danger of dissolving into wordplay. And there is also something to be said for it kind of depending on who is speaking. But there seems to me, at least, to be some kind of resonance (to use a term of art) to be had as well. The term, or idea, is not unique to one speaker, but it's not exactly clear what this resonance consists in.

The term, or idea, is not unique to one speaker, but it's not exactly clear what this resonance consists in. — Moliere

Hmmm, okay. Let me try something a little different: you have to differentiate being to get different entities so it's not all a big metaphysical lava-lamp. A mode of being, then, is what differentiates entities. If you alter the hammer so that it can no longer be used as a hammer, then it's not ready-to-hand as a hammer, just present-at-hand as a broken hammer. So it has lost that mode of being and taken on a different one.

It boils down to the question, "If there were no modes of being (or only one), what would that look like?" That gives you a clue about modes of being; the means by which phenomena individuate. Possibility vs. closure. What can you do with it? Depends on how it is. The space of possibilities has to be constructed somehow, and modes of being are how that happens.

But I have a nagging suspicion that perhaps I've missed that underlying resonance that makes this intelligible to both parties. Perhaps it will help to imagine where they might disagree. A broken hammer can be fixed, but you can't hammer anything with it; it's ready-to-hand qua object that can be repaired, but only present-to-hand otherwise. If you insist that it's ready-to-hand and I claim it's not, then we have to get specific about the sense in which it's ready-to-hand, because you're seeing a possibility that I don't, a way-of-being that the hammer could have that it currently doesn't, and thus, a way-of-being that it has presently. This has something of a circular flavor, though. I guess this is where Heidegger would "step outward" and involve time, which is where Being and Time gets its spiral structure...

How's that work?