- Hilary LawsonWhile we may wish to reject the materialist realism of science as a form of metaphysical prejudice, we cannot do so in favour of an alternative metaphysical framework that also claims to describe an ultimate reality be it a new form of idealism, panpsychism, or some Hollywood influenced Matrix version of 'we are living in a simulated reality' without having a theory of language that explains how any of these realist claims are possible.
Realism is not a construction of facts. It is a hierarchical nest of constraints. It is a pragmatic limitation of uncertainty made efficient by our willingness to go along with the game of taking utterances at face value. — apokrisis
Philosophy isn't satisfied with this and seeks to find arguments to establish that realism is naïve and untenable. I don't have a philosophical view on this. — Tom Storm
Does Lawson have a point about idealism and the necessity of a realist theory of language? — Tom Storm
This forum might give the impression that idealism is more popular among philosophers than it actually is. — wonderer1
But it leads to pansemiosis rather than Panpsychism or other Cartesian stories. So language as epistemic practice is also more generically the deep ontology of existence itself.
This cashes out in models of the “real material world” in terms of holistic systems of constraint rather than reductionist systems of construction.
This cashes out in self-reference being the feature rather than the bug. — apokrisis
I'm pretty sure Lawson has argued this too, — Tom Storm
This forum might give the impression that idealism is more popular among philosophers than it actually is. The Philpapers survey says:
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
Accept or lean toward: non-skeptical realism 760 / 931 (81.6%)
Other 86 / 931 (9.2%)
Accept or lean toward: skepticism 45 / 931 (4.8%)
Accept or lean toward: idealism 40 / 931 (4.3%) — wonderer1
I’ve not read Lawson. A quick squizz suggests he is rather lightweight. :grin: — apokrisis
But showing that this organisational logic is indeed the way that the Cosmos “reasons its way into existence” is the big step that Peirce takes. This is the metaphysical shock that naive realism is still to confront. — apokrisis
“… “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism… Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality.” (Dietmar Heidemann) — Joshs
It I say there is a cat on the mat as a real fact, I hope to get away with offering that single word “cat” and thus by implication eliminating every other interpretation you might have had.
There is no tank, or armadillo, or Empire State Building, on the mat instead. You can be sure of that. An infinity of alternative realities are being dismissed by my plain speaking realism. But by the same token, all those unactualised realities now seem confusingly like “actual possibilities” — apokrisis
I wonder if you can assist me to better understand the issue of how language does (or does not) map onto the world and what the significance of this matter might be for philosophy. I have done some modest reading in this space but am curious what others think.
If we suppose that there no realist notion of language, what is it that language does when we attempt to describe reality? (I've generally held that language is metaphorical, but then what?) — Tom Storm
But this isn’t how people use words. The actual use of a world creates a distinction not between it and an indiscriminate infinity of alternative realities, but between it and contrasting meanings that are specifically RELEVANT to the context in which the word is being used. — Joshs
Science is set up as the relentless machine for mining the "truth" of reality. Science's problem is not that it ain't sufficiently open to having its theories confounded by surprises. It's problem lies in its failure to be holistic and realise the extent to which knowledge is an exercise that is making the human self as much as comprehending the world. — apokrisis
Lawson goes off on the usual Romantic tangent of wanting to give art the role of exploring reality's openness. But that's a bit too Cartesian again. — apokrisis
Science by and large accepts the Cartesian division between itself and the humanities. It's understanding of causality is limited to material and efficient cause. Formal and final cause are treated as being beyond its pay grade.
This lack of holism is why modern life seems a little shit. And any amount of art ain't going to fix it. — apokrisis
Is there a tentative solution to this? — Tom Storm
Language usage orients language-users.If we suppose that there no realist notion of language, what is it that language does when we attempt to describe reality? — Tom Storm
Yep. Read George Lakoff et al.(I've generally held that language is metaphorical, but then what?)
Nope. (Witty's 'nonsense', re: TLP)... do we need a theory of language that explains how any realist claim is possible in order to accept those claims?
This depends on the language-game you're engaged in which uses the term "reality".If we do not employ a realist account of language (as per postmodern thinkers), what is it we can meaningfully say about this notion of 'reality' we are so fond of describing and seems to be a substitute for god?
No. Yes. Read Witty's PI as a contextual extension (rather than critical refutation or theoretical correction) of his TLP. The latter expresses only one possible language-game (re: logical atomism) out of innumerably many other language-games suggested in the former.... theory of language was not possible because it falls to the self-referential paradox that it is unable to give an account of itself.
Is this problem insurmountable or overstated?
This depends on the language-game you're engaged in which uses the term "reality". — 180 Proof
I think Hilary Lawson loses the plot – the problem of the criterion (and its ilk) arises from confusing maps with territories and then complaining that 'maps =/= territories is an intractable paradox' when it's not: in practice, a map is made by abstracting features of interest from a given territory just as language is used to discursively make explicit (e.g. problematize) the invariant, ineluctable, conditions (i.e. "reality") of their circumstance. To avoid circle-jerking p0m0 / anti-realist nonsense, language must be shown (reflectively practiced) rather than said (theorized-using-language). — 180 Proof
One problem with this survey is that modern realism is itself an outgrowth of Kantian Transcendental Idealism. — Joshs
I also want to point out how selfhood - the “reality” of the first person point of view - is a product of the closure, the epistemic cut, that produces the self-interested view we then call “the real world”. — apokrisis
Kantian Transcendental Idealism is an outgrowth of Christianity. Do you think that people shouldn't outgrow Christianity? — wonderer1
Is 'the epistemic cut' avoidable, do you think? It seems a necessary condition of existence. — Wayfarer
I would make the opposite claim concerning Kantian Idealism. It is more popular among allegedly anti-Idealist empirical realists than they realize. — Joshs
If we suppose that there no realist notion of language, what is it that language does when we attempt to describe reality? (I've generally held that language is metaphorical, but then what?) — Tom Storm
So realism aims to speak about what actually exists. But practically speaking, this is achieved by establishing it as the contrast to all else that could have been the case. — apokrisis
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