I think the error you are making is that you are confusing the possibility of the existence of Harry Potter, with the existence of a possible Harry Potter. — geospiza

You used Harry Potter twice in a sentence, so Harry Potter must exist in some way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc.--even if it is only as symbols on a piece of paper, computer screen, etc.

The statement "A does not exist, period" is contradictory. A must exist in some way, because a person is making a statement about it. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

The issue you're raising right here is known as the problem of "vacuous singular terms," that is, expressions that look like they refer to a real object, that are constructed just like expressions that do refer to real objects, but do not. Your interpretation, that they exist in some special way, is not the only interpretation available. I see the whole thing as a quirk of our language. Okay, maybe more than a quirk, but at any rate I do not feel compelled at all to say that whatever I talk about exists.

The question is if it is possible for something to in no way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc. exist. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

I took this to mean, is there something that not only does not but cannot exist, and of course the answer for me will be, sure.

But for you, if anything you talk about or imagine, or whatever, exists in some fashion, then your question is more like this: could there be anything that cannot even be talked about or imagined? And that is a conundrum. If you know that to be true of something, you'd have thought of it, and there you are, it now exists. On the other hand, if there is something no one can imagine, then no one will. That seems to mean that if there is such a thing, you cannot possibly know that there is such a thing.

EDIT: Hmmm. The phrase "thing I cannot possibly know no one can think of" looks like it refers to something.

The statement "A does not exist, period" is contradictory. A must exist in some way, because a person is making a statement about it. — WISDOMfromPO-MO
The issue you're raising right here is known as the problem of "vacuous singular terms," that is, expressions that look like they refer to a real object, that are constructed just like expressions that do refer to real objects, but do not. Your interpretation, that they exist in some special way, is not the only interpretation available. I see the whole thing as a quirk of our language. Okay, maybe more than a quirk, but at any rate I do not feel compelled at all to say that whatever I talk about exists... — Srap Tasmaner

Straw man.

I never said that if we talk about something it "exists".

I said that if we are able to talk about something then it must exist in some form.

If you want to refute the latter, show something that absolutely; unconditionally; no ifs, ands or buts; categorically does not exist--in no way, shape, form, constitution or state does it exist.

Of course, if you are able to show it to us then it must exist. And if you show us a something then it exists at least as a something.

The question is if it is possible for something to in no way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc. exist. — WISDOMfromPO-MO
I took this to mean, is there something that not only does not but cannot exist, and of course the answer for me will be, sure.

But for you, if anything you talk about or imagine, or whatever, exists in some fashion, then your question is more like this: could there be anything that cannot even be talked about or imagined? And that is a conundrum. If you know that to be true of something, you'd have thought of it, and there you are, it now exists. On the other hand, if there is something no one can imagine, then no one will. That seems to mean that if there is such a thing, you cannot possibly know that there is such a thing.

EDIT: Hmmm. The phrase "thing I cannot possibly know no one can think of" looks like it refers to something. — Srap Tasmaner

If A categorically does not exist, every modification of the statement "A does not exist" will be true. "A does not exist as a mental image" will be true. "A does not exist as an object that can be held" will be true. "A does not exist as a symbol representing something else" will be true. And so on.

Is such categorical non-existence possible?

Is such categorical non-existence possible? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

You use existence in a very broad sense - in fact I think your meaning of existence involves ALL domains of human experience - be it mental or physical (have I left anything out?).

If this is your definition, a few things happen:

1. It voids the naturally accepted meaning of existence as something that is physical. Many posters have clarified this point.

2. It leads to the weird(?) conclusion that everything exists. This may seem profound but is practically useless and dangerous. Losing the distinction between existence and nonexistence is usually a sign of madness or stupidity (like me). Maybe I'm missing something. Please clarify

Your idea of categorical nonexistence is empty of meaning because you won't allow us to speak of anything - the moment we do, it, according to you, exists (in some way, shape, form, constitution, state).

It's an interesting thought and if I can think of anything new I'll let you know (if you're interested).

You used Harry Potter twice in a sentence, so Harry Potter must exist in some way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc.--even if it is only as symbols on a piece of paper, computer screen, etc. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

If Harry Potter exists, then tell me, what size shoes does he wear?

Every existential quantification applies to a particular domain of discourse. Informally put, it's true that Harry Potter exists assuming the domain of fictional characters, or the domain of Harry Potter's fictional world, etc.

The Invisible Pink Uniform — Marchesk

That's what the ladies have to wear when I'm in charge.

If Harry Potter exists, then tell me, what size shoes does he wear? — geospiza

One does not have to wear shoes to exist. Right now I I'm not wearing shoes.

Everything is energy and everything that we perceive is in the form of some memory that exists in some form of energy. The difference between memory (Harry Potter, the Empire State Building) is merely the difference in substantiality. Some are more tangible (outwardly shareable) than others. The energy forming the object it's more or less substantial. It's all energy no matter what.

One does not have to wear shoes to exist. Right now I I'm not wearing shoes. — Rich

Presumably though you have feet that are of a certain dimension.

This is just one illustration of your existence and Harry Potter's non-existence. One of the features of an existing person is that there is an infinity of details we can describe about them. The amount of description we can produce about Harry Potter is limited to what J.K. Rowling has included in her books. There is no answer to the question of what shoe size is worn by Harry Potter (unless it is given by his author). Even where there are answers to questions like this, they are not based on existence but rather on what the author has imagined. So J.K. Rowling could have it that Harry Potter wears size 9 shoes, but that does not somehow cloak Harry Potter with existence.

I see nothing but confusion and mischief arising from the notion that imaginary objects are part of the furniture of the universe, or that "possible worlds" are worlds actually in existence somewhere. I am not ruling out all non-physical entities from existence, but Harry Potter is purely imaginary.

Everything is essentially memory. The difference lies in the substantially of that which created the memory. To try to draw a demarcation line it's impossible. One can only differentiate by sharing different perceptions with others and await answers. P1.Did you hear that? P2.No, I heard nothing. P3.I heard something! And so it goes. Unfortunately, one would like to believe they have a privileged position to objectivity (of existence it otherwise) but no such privilege exists.

But fictions, fantasies, hallucinations, dreams and such do exist.

Yet, if anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams and perception, then it must be the perceived.

We sometimes come up with fictions and share them among us, which language and whatnot are sufficiently flexible to do.

Such fictions, fantasies, hallucinations and dreams are still confined to us, though, and could perhaps be contrasted with "real" things, depending on how we use the term "real".

@Wayfarer might have a dream in which he slapped Donald Trump, though (unfortunately perhaps) the real Trump never felt a thing. :)

I said that if we are able to talk about something then it must exist in some form. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

I get what you're talking about it here; I just don't think it's the best approach. You're thinking of existing "as an idea" or "as a concept" or "as a social construct" as the sort-of fall-back position for things that don't physically exist. So, Santa Claus and Harry Potter exist "as ideas," or something. And that seems to make sense, because how can you talk about something that doesn't exist?

I've focused so far on that last part, to try to nudge you in another direction. Let's talk about the first part.

Donald Trump does exist, and so do people's ideas about him. Does Donald Trump, besides just existing as himself, as a person, also exist as people's ideas about him? You could say that, but there's not much need to: you can just say people have ideas and some of those ideas are about Donald Trump. That seems to cover everything and there's little temptation to say he also exists as an idea. You can do everything you want--distinguish between what he's really like and what different people think he's like, for instance--without giving him an extra way of existing besides the one he's already doing.

But what about Santa Claus? Here we only have people's ideas about Santa Claus, people pretending to be Santa Claus who aren't (people who sit on a throne of lies), people talking about Santa Claus. Santa Claus does not exist as a person in just the same way that Donald Trump does. But here the temptation is strong to say that Santa Claus exists somehow, because otherwise what are people's ideas about? What do we talk about when we talk about Santa Claus? It's tempting to say he exists "as an idea."

But that doesn't really do what you want. Now that you have Santa existing as an idea, what do you do with that? Can you say what people's ideas about Santa are about? It doesn't look right to say people's ideas about Santa are ideas about Santa as an idea, no more than people's ideas about Donald Trump are ideas about Donald Trump as an idea. Children don't believe that the idea of Santa Claus comes down the chimney; they believe a person does that.

We also don't seem to feel this temptation in the same way when we're talking about things that really do exist in some non-physical or abstract way. The United States is a real thing, but it's not exactly physical. Social institutions are abstract. This again is not the same as being an idea, because someone's ideas about the United States are neither the United States itself, nor are they ideas about the United States as an idea. They are ideas about an abstract thing, the United States. The same goes for numbers. The same goes for voices, traditions, habits, migrations, wars. Those are real things, objects you can talk and think about, but still aren't physical things like a car or Donald Trump.

Is Santa Claus one of those sorts of things? Now we have language problems. If you believe, or if you pretend, that Santa Claus is a real person, you have a belief or a pretense, but those are not the thing you are believing or pretending. Those are still just what they are, your beliefs and pretenses. And those beliefs and pretenses are about a person, not something like a number or a concept or social construct. They are about a person who doesn't exist. His not existing does not change what the content of your thoughts and words is.

But in the case of Donald Trump, we want to say that the content of our ideas about Donald Trump come, however indirectly, from the object Donald Trump. Where could our ideas about Santa Claus come from, if what they're about doesn't exist? Of course, for most of us, our ideas about Santa and about Donald Trump come from other people, and we don't have direct access to the object. Some people do with Trump, but nobody does with Santa. What we really want to know is what the very first thought about Santa was about.

Which brings us back to Harry Potter. J. K. Rowling writes a whole book about someone she made up, with lots of other stuff in there she just made up. Fiction, pretending, imagining, hypothesis-- they're all on a spectrum that includes lying. All ways of saying something is so that isn't, or of talking as if something were the case, whether it is or not. I'm just going to point out that the content of a lie has to be exactly what it seems to be and not something else. If I tell you there's a tiger in the bushes, so I can swipe your dinner, I want you to have a belief that there is a tiger in the bushes. The content of that belief has to be [ tiger in the bushes ] for the lie to be successful.

You can imagine a circle that is not a circle? If you abandon the principle of non-contradiction, then you cannot imagine what you can imagine.

I can imagine the concept, not the shape. I can imagine a triangular circle physically existing within this universe, but I don't believe that to be possible. I can imagine myself imagining something I can't imagine but that's still not actually possible.

Btw if someone knows how to subscribe to a thread in these frums instead of only seeing notifications about responses to your personal comments, let me know.

I can imagine the concept — BlueBanana

So you cannot. Because if there is no difference between a circle and a non-circle then there is no difference between imagining and not imagining.

if there is no difference between a circle and a non-circle — litewave

But there is.

there is no difference between imagining and not imagining. — litewave

Non sequitur. That "if-then" is incorrect, you can't conclude that. What you can conclude from that I can imagine a circle being non-circle, is that I can imagine imagining equaling not imagining.

Wayfarer might have a dream in which he slapped Donald Trump, though (unfortunately perhaps) the real Trump never felt a thing. :) — jorndoe

Again - a lot rides on the meaning of 'to exist'. Bugs Bunny exists - as a cultural reference, a cartoon figure, that will be recognised by billions of people. But Bugs is not real in the sense of being an actual animal or individual. Perhaps fictional characters have a kind of 'conventional existence' (although we're stretching it, with cartoon characters.)

But then, as I said before, even fictional characters can embody real qualities. Bugs is the archetypical New York wise guy - he's always going to get the better of country bumpkin Elmer Fudd. That is in his character. And we recognize that character even in fictional form.

What interests me is the kind of reality that numbers and logical forms have. They are also real in a different way to fictional characters. But what does 'real in a different way' mean? There's the rub. Most folks will say that something is either real or it isn't. But if fictional characters, numbers, and physical objects are real in different ways, then what is that saying?

This doesn't answer your questions, but I can't pass up the opportunity to post it:

My taste is for keeping open house for all sorts of conditions of entities, just so long as when they come in they help with the housework. Provided that I can see them work, and provided that they are not detected in illicit logical behaviour (within which I do not include a certain degree of indeterminacy, not even of numerical indeterminacy), I do not find them queer or mysterious at all…. To fangle a new ontological Marxism, they work therefore they exist, even though only some, perhaps those who come on the recommendation of some form of transcendental argument, may qualify for the specially favoured status of entia realissima. To exclude honest working entities seems to me like metaphysical snobbery, a reluctance to be seen in the company of any but the best objects. — Paul Grice

Btw, I once heard Hugh Kenner talk about Chuck Jones, and he said Jones's favorite author was Mark Twain. Jones, he said, seemed very nearly to have Twain memorized, could quote at length from many of his books, etc. Ever since then, I've thought of Bugs as having Twain's sardonic worldview.

I can see a lot of Mark Twain in Bugs, now you mention it. I loved both when I was a kid.

To exclude honest working entities seems to me like metaphysical snobbery, a reluctance to be seen in the company of any but the best objects. — Paul Grice

...of any but physical objects. If Platonic realism is the case, materialism fails. Hence centuries of obfuscation.

That's what the ladies have to wear when I'm in charge. — Terrapin Station

Better invisible pink than nothing at all. We have to keep Augustino's sensibilities in mind.

You use existence in a very broad sense - in fact I think your meaning of existence involves ALL domains of human experience - be it mental or physical (have I left anything out?).

If this is your definition, a few things happen:

1. It voids the naturally accepted meaning of existence as something that is physical. Many posters have clarified this point.

2. It leads to the weird(?) conclusion that everything exists. This may seem profound but is practically useless and dangerous. Losing the distinction between existence and nonexistence is usually a sign of madness or stupidity (like me). Maybe I'm missing something. Please clarify

Your idea of categorical nonexistence is empty of meaning because you won't allow us to speak of anything - the moment we do, it, according to you, exists (in some way, shape, form, constitution, state).

It's an interesting thought and if I can think of anything new I'll let you know (if you're interested). — TheMadFool

I get what you're talking about it here; I just don't think it's the best approach... — Srap Tasmaner

It seems to me that if categorical non-existence is possible then everything about the world is random. That seems to go against the naturalist worldview that has dominated the past several centuries and says that the world is predictable.

Let's assume that there was a point at which the Empire State Building came into existence. What was that point? Judging by the majority of the responses here, people will probably say that the Empire State Building did not exist until it took on a tangible, external form. But one could argue that the Empire State Building existed before it took on any tangible form--that it existed in the minds of the capitalists who conceived it, the minds of the architects who designed it, the blueprints that the design was represented through, the minds of the engineers who had to turn those blueprints into a building, etc. Even if it did not exist before it took on any tangible form, at what point then did it come into existence? When ground was officially broken? When the first square inch of the foundation was dug out? When materials used in its construction were first purchased?

Again, a case could be made that in some way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc. the Empire State Building has a long existence--the beginning of which cannot be demarcated.
Somebody might say that the thing in the minds of business people, architects, etc. was the idea of the Empire State Building or the design of the Empire State Building, not the Empire State Building itself. At what point did that idea or design come into existence? I think that any attempt to answer that question is going to end up like the original question (at what point did the Empire State Building come into existence?). We get an infinite regression with no demarcation ever emerging, it seems.

Maybe the Empire State Building has always existed--as a potential idea, then an idea, then a design, then a contractor's plan, then a square inch of foundation, etc.--and the only variable is way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc. Maybe everything is teleological and the existence of the Empire State Building started unfolding at the beginning of space and time.

Or maybe everything is random.

I think that saying that the Empire State Building did not exist until some external physical structure took shape is absurd. If I could travel back in time before that physical structure took shape I would probably hear people talking about the Empire State Building even though there was nothing "out there" to touch, taste, see, etc. that corresponded with the Empire State Building. And I would argue that to say that Harry Potter is not a physical being like Vladimir Putin and therefore does not exist is extremely narrow-minded, near-sighted, narcissistic, or whatever better adjective you can think of. It could be that Harry Potter is just passing through our minds as a concept, image, idea, etc. at this stage in the evolution of the universe and, like the Empire State Building, will at some point take the shape of a physical being.

If categorical non-existence is possible then that seems to mean that things randomly, spontaneously come into existence and are not in any way connected to anything that preceded them.

I have answered the question. Not just in this post, but throughout this discussion.

There are several lengthy responses here, but it is not clear what their answer to the question is.

Is it possible to categorically not exist? Yes or no?

I gave a clear illustration of what categorical non-existence would be like: Every modification of "A does not exist" is true. "A does not exist as an idea" is true. "A does not exist as a potential idea" is true. "A does not exist as a symbol representing something else" is true. And so on.

Again, a case could be made that in some way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc. the Empire State Building has a long existence--the beginning of which cannot be demarcated.
Somebody might say that the thing in the minds of business people, architects, etc. was the idea of the Empire State Building or the design of the Empire State Building, not the Empire State Building itself. At what point did that idea or design come into existence? I think that any attempt to answer that question is going to end up like the original question (at what point did the Empire State Building come into existence?). We get an infinite regression with no demarcation ever emerging, it seems. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Does it bother you that people often report the exact moment when an idea occurred to them?

I gave a clear illustration of what categorical non-existence would be like: Every modification of "A does not exist" is true. "A does not exist as an idea" is true. "A does not exist as a potential idea" is true. "A does not exist as a symbol representing something else" is true. And so on. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

This still just looks like the copula to me. "A is not an idea." "A is not a potential idea." "A is not a symbol representing something else."

There is weirdness here even Frege couldn't get around. Something that can be said to fall under or not fall under a concept is an object. What's a concept? Yuck. We have no choice sometimes but to talk about them as things, because grammar, but insofar as you talk about a concept this way, you're talking about it as an object, not as a concept. It doesn't really matter, so long as you get the knack of working with objects and concepts, and we all do.

So there is an "easy" answer to your question: Fregean concepts are predicated of objects but are not themselves objects and are not predicated of. They're never on the left-hand side of the copula, always on the right.

And the other easy answer is, everything that doesn't exist. I don't have a sister. The phrase "my sister" when spoken by me is a vacuous singular term. You can choose between saying all statements of the form "My sister is (not) ..." are false or not well-formed, as you like, but none of them will be true.

There is so much stuff that categorically doesn't exist, you couldn't begin to count it.

There is weirdness here even Frege couldn't get around. — Srap Tasmaner

Google an essay called 'Frege on knowing the Third Realm', Tyler Burge. Interesting read on these topics.

Found it. I'll give it a read soonish. Thanks!

But there is — BlueBanana

A triangular circle is a circle that is not a circle, so a circle and a non-circle are the same thing: there is no difference between a circle and a non-circle.

Non sequitur. That "if-then" is incorrect, you can't conclude that. What you can conclude from that I can imagine a circle being non-circle, is that I can imagine imagining equaling not imagining. — BlueBanana

Once you assume the existence of a circle that is a non-circle you abandon the principle of non-contradiction. From that moment, all your arguments automatically refute themselves.

Does it bother you that people often report the exact moment when an idea occurred to them? — Srap Tasmaner

That tells us at what point A occurred to somebody, not at what point A came into existence.

Is it possible to categorically not exist? Yes or no? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

But the rules of your game preclude any such possibility. We must speak/write of things but the moment we do, the things we speak/write about exist. It's like inventing a game where you, the inventor, can't lose. The commendable creativity aside, you won't find people who'll play this game. Even if they do, they'll spend most of the time commenting on your rules (as you can see)

I also don't understand how if categorical nonexistence is possible, everything has to be random. Please explain.

What I can see from your posts is you're drifting, purposely(?), into some kind of determinism. Can you elaborate on that?

So there is an "easy" answer to your question: Fregean concepts are predicated of objects but are not themselves objects and are not predicated of. They're never on the left-hand side of the copula, always on the right... — Srap Tasmaner

And concepts exist.

What about the possibility of categorically not existing?

And the other easy answer is, everything that doesn't exist. I don't have a sister. The phrase "my sister" when spoken by me is a vacuous singular term. You can choose between saying all statements of the form "My sister is (not) ..." are false or not well-formed, as you like, but none of them will be true.

There is so much stuff that categorically doesn't exist, you couldn't begin to count it. — Srap Tasmaner

And I don't own a planet made of crumbled feta cheese with moons made of grape tomatoes.

But a planet made of crumbled feta cheese with moons made of grape tomatoes does exist--as an idea. Therefore, it is not categorically non-existent.

Somebody once said to me (I am not saying he is right) that the Catholic church invented the idea of people spending eternity in a place (Hell) and that the Bible really says that people will be "blotted out of existence". That is the closest thing to the possibility of categorical non-existence that I have heard.