That is why no definition is finite: there still might be a thing that fits the description, but is somewhat different. — Jabberwock

Agreed. A description or interpretation is open or vague in the way you describe as there is no value in being more precise than the occasion demands.

The line between lumping and splitting itself has to be drawn exactly at the critical point where neither the lumping nor the splitting adds value to the game. To split more hairs would subtract from the cohesive identity being claimed, while to go the other way would be to risk losing meaningful shades of distinction for a small gain in greater generality.

A good definition has to strike that tricky context-sensitive balance. Which is why atomistic definitions of words rarely seem very good.

Transcendental idealists hold that the objects as we represent them in space and time are appearances and not things-in-them­selves. This, according to Kant, implies empirical realism, i.e., the view that the rep­resented objects of our spatio-temporal system of experience are real beings outside us. “

Relative to the OP’s assertion that “this forum might give the impression that idealism is more popular among philosophers than it actually is”, I would make the opposite claim concerning Kantian Idealism. It is more popular among allegedly anti-Idealist empirical realists than they realize. — Joshs

Cool. Thank you.

The world of phenomena and human experience? — Tom Storm

They are the same thing.

Is human experience of phenomena the same thing as phenomena?

Yes. That is like saying phenomenal phenomenon. In terms of Kantian lingo anyway.

In science phenomenon is just something we experience and then try and understand.

Language is also a nuanced term. If we are talking about how language is learned it is fair to say spacial and temporal position matters just as much as, if not more so, than categorising similar elements/ideas/experiences.Furthermore what we experience has emotional context always - be this through needs, wants or questions.

The World is essentially our language NOT some ‘experience of’ The World. Consciousness is ‘experience of’, as in experience of some ‘thing’. Verbalising/labelling the ‘thing’ (phenomenon) is another step. A table is a table because you understand it as such not because it is a table. A table to an ant is not … maybe some creatures other tha humans grasp the purpose of a table BUT that said it is likely only a human item not a universal item as it serves a human function not a universal one.

Other items, such as trees, will likely be ‘understood’ by other animals in roughly the same manner, but by something like an ant … no way.

:up:

I'm mostly interested in what a realist theory of language might be. — Tom Storm

I found it hard to grasp how you would approach that question if you couldn't answer Banno as to what 'realism' might be.

Much languaging (as some describe the process of expression through language), especially spoken language, is about emotion, fellowship, cooperation, problem-solving. 'Reality' seems to me just a passing notion here. I've been struck by reports about the conversations between Lukashenko of Belarus and Prighozin the Wagner leader that seem to have forestalled an internal Russian conflict. They are old comrades, who apparently swore at each other in their first conversation during the crisis for 20 minutes, and eventually arrived at a way of resolving the situation. Such a debate is very like the debates we all have at work, or, to zoom in, with a loved one: the purported 'facts' matter, but it is not through reference to 'the real' or by coming to any agreement about 'facts' that we resolve the exchange, the issues that matter. Language flows through us, especially familiar language with familiars, and we find ways to move forwards.

the underlying material of language - information — Jabberwock

This notion of 'underlying material' seems to imply 'reality' lurking under there. To me language is amazingly rich, in and of itself. It can't be reduced, and there isn't something underlying it. Here I agree with apo, though I don't personally go for any kind of universalising theory. Hilary Lawson claims to have found a universalising theory, somehow, in going beyond Wittgenstein and Derrida to notions of openness and closure. That to me seems like just another shtick to build an institute on (and he founded an Institute on that basis). I'm OK with the prior situation: that Wittgenstein talked mostly a great deal of sense, including about the limits of sense, and that Derrida's analysis vanished into a spiral of clever-clever nonsense (though his homage to Levinas and thereby the relation of the I to the Other, I've personally found rewarding).

I found it hard to grasp how you would approach that question if you couldn't answer Banno as to what 'realism' might be. — mcdoodle

Ha! That's curious. Remember my question was this:

I'm not looking for a defence of realism, I'm more interested in the implications of this matter - do we need a theory of language that explains how any realist claim is possible in order to accept those claims? — Tom Storm

My view of realism isn't really the subject at hand. And I don't have a view on this worth a pinch of shit. But I am asking about Lawson's view as expressed in the OP and what others think this says about ideas like idealism.

The point of participating on sites like this for me is to understand the range of potential questions and something of how philosophers might arrive at solutions. I'm not personally looking for answers - just the range of potential answers.

Such a debate is very like the debates we all have at work, or, to zoom in, with a loved one: the purported 'facts' matter, but it is not through reference to 'the real' or by coming to any agreement about 'facts' that we resolve the exchange, the issues that matter. Language flows through us, especially familiar language with familiars, and we find ways to move forwards. — mcdoodle

How do words map to reality? Are they just a series of arbitrary signs and signifiers (as per the post structuralists) that make it impossible for us to express certain meaning and have any kind of real purchase on the world through language? That's at the heart of Lawson's notion, I think.

Richard Rorty, (an influence on Lawson), argued that language can't mirror the world or provide a direct access to knowledge of reality. Language is a human invention used as a tool to manage our environment and is shaped by our conventions, not independent reality. Does this, if true, interfere with our capacity to know things?

I'm mostly interested in what a realist theory of language might be. — Tom Storm

I don't know Lawson, but I also don't mind taking a stab at odd questions. Take my imaginative wonderings for what you will.

At the very least I gather that a realist theory of language somehow incorporates language into what is real. But language is a fascination for philosophers because it's the topic where maps and territories are contested. It's fairly easy to admit that in spite of the possibility of the Cartesian Demon in a logical sense you certainly don't believe in it and what you see is what you get. (sight being an important metaphor for the history of European-derived philosophy) -- but we relate our language, which is in the world under the realist notion, to the world. How is it possible to use something in the world to represent that world and at the same time refer to reality? Why can I pick up a few stones and arrange them in a tray to calculate something about the world? Is our understanding of the stone movements, and our bodies, a part of the world? But then how do we access the world?

The other side might acknowledge the illusion of language standing apart from the world we live in, but note that it has to be a part of that same world because they are, after all, related somehow. So the anti-realist will ask: How is all this meaning possible, then? How can we have a finite set of symbols which can produce an infinite set of meanings? What is this real relation between symbol and meaning?

The only reality we describe is the reality of shared human experience and concern, as I see it. Saying that the map is not the territory is saying that the network of collective representations which constitute our real, shared world is the map, while our individual pre-linguistic experiences are the territory. — Janus

That's an interesting way of looking at it. Richard Rorty says something like truth is what communities of shared understanding describe it to be. In other words, reality is a case of intersubjective agreement, not an external certainty.

Do you share some of the post-structuralist views on language and truth?

How is it possible to use something in the world to represent that world and at the same time refer to reality? Why can I pick up a few stones and arrange them in a tray to calculate something about the world? Is our understanding of the stone movements, and our bodies, a part of the world? But then how do we access the world? — Moliere

Yes, those seem to be the right questions.

How can we have a finite set of symbols which can produce an infinite set of meanings? What is this real relation between symbol and meaning? — Moliere

Yes, I think so. But I wonder what all this really indicates about the limitations of human knowledge. We obviously do well in a range of domains without necessarily making contact with 'reality' - maths, science, literature, art.

We also know that no matter how contingent and 'impossible' meaning might be - it is pretty clear that a significant nuclear war would wipe out innumerable people and animals and irreversibly change civilisation. We can accept this as an objective potential reality, right? And if you chop off someone's head they die. Reality is all fun and games until someone loses their head...

True.

Are you asking after what the point of philosophy is, given practical problems?

No. Just making the comment that the ineffable nature of truth or reality does appear to have a buck where it stops.

Ah! OK. Got it.

Maybe the thought is -- where does it stop? On which side? The realist or the anti-realist?

My gut feeling is that we can talk pragmatically about a contingent reality, which works to get certain things done, but we can't make any pronouncements about ultimate reality.

More imaginative wonderings that should be taken with salt:

I think the response from the realist side would be "what is "ultimate" doing in your sentence?"

Is the adjective that important? If we can talk about reality, then the realist is right. Maybe with some modifications down the line to acknowledge things like our cognitive apparatus -- but even a pragmatic contingent reality is at least real.

But on the other side I'd say that this is to miss the point. The Cartesian Demon scenario isn't even being considered, but rather asking after, upon accepting realism, what is the relationships between the sign and meaning? Then finding that the relationship is itself meaningful, and hence, on the other side of reality. So language is anti-real. (though reality is, by definition, real -- of course)

I think the response from the realist side would be "what is "ultimate" doing in your sentence?" — Moliere

Indeed. I guess the reason it is there is to emphasize the non contingent nature of a theorized reality as opposed to 'what is the capital of Australia' type constructions, or cats on mats, etc.

The search for reality seems to me to be sublimated search for god.

what is the relationships between the sign and meaning? Then finding that the relationship is itself meaningful, and hence, on the other side of reality. So language is anti-real. (though reality is, by definition, real -- of course) — Moliere

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Are you saying we can encounter small "r" reality, but nothing which transcends this, hence language is anti-realism?

Are you saying we can encounter small "r" reality, but nothing which transcends this, hence language is anti-realism? — Tom Storm

I'm stretching so I'm not sure what I'm saying, exactly. But yup! I'd add that if we're consistent then language, in all its forms, is nothing but ooks/eeks -- meaning isn't real, but our ooks/eeks which enable us to do human things are.

I hear you. This seems to be influenced by a more pragmatic, or post-modernist, perhaps even phenomenological account, is that correct?

Oh yeah. I like analytic philosophy, but I'm basically team continental, if I'm forced to choose.

The search for reality seems to me to be sublimated search for god. — Tom Storm

Also, often true! In philosophy it's more explicit, even. The god of the philosophers, even if philosophy is only a type of literature, is a prominent figure in the literature.

That's an interesting way of looking at it. Richard Rorty says something like truth is what communities of shared understanding describe it to be. In other words, reality is a case of intersubjective agreement, not an external certainty.

Do you share some of the post-structuralist views on language and truth? — Tom Storm

I agree that reality, in the determinate sense, is what is agreed upon intersubjectively. So, reality cannot be anything more, or other, than empirical. What is intersubjectively agreed upon is what is in accordance with (most) everyone's experience.

The most immediate reality for each of us is our own lives; we experience what we experience (even if we cannot put it into words) and things seem to be as they seem to be. We don't experience objective reality; there is arguably no such thing other than what is intersubjectively agreed upon, and we don't experience that intersubjective reality, we experience concrete things in a concrete environment; whereas the (collective) reality is the abstracted commonality of that experience.

I don't much like the post-structuralist notions that everything is text, or that words don't map onto the world. For me words do map onto the world insofar as the world is not something we experience but a collective generalized abstraction.

Thanks, yes that resonates with me.

:cool:

I agree that reality, in the determinate sense, is what is agreed upon intersubjectively. — Janus

We do know by example what it is for a group to agree upon a convention, either explicitly through negotiation, or implicitly through action.

Do we know what it is for everything to be a convention? Does that include the people engaged in the instituting the convention? Does it include the fact of their agreeing to the convention? Hard to see how they could agree to agree without already agreeing, and without already existing.

You can get around this by bootstrapping the convention non-conventionally, and that means granting that not everything is conventional.

Or you could say the point is not about what is real, but about how we talk and think about what is real, how we use words like "real" and "reality", and it's the use of these words and our ways of thinking and talking about reality that are conventions. The conventions at stake are conventions of our behavior.

But what's that supposed to mean? Are we granting that we are in fact organisms, entities of which it is permissible to posit behavior? If this too is only a matter of convention, then that's to say it's only a matter of our behavior (how we think and talk) that we are organisms that engage in a certain sort of behavior. How could such behavior be ours, how could it be behavior?

I'm not yet convinced there's a coherent way to make the claim you're making. I get the impulse, I think, and I even sympathize to a degree. But I can't help thinking this is an analogy that's been pushed to the breaking point.

This is kind if a misuse of the original intention of this kind of terminology.

To talk of ‘intersubjectivity’ in relation to ‘reality’ is kind of a contradiction if one understands the intent of phenomenology.

It is bootstrapping if this kind of lingo is used completely out of context.

Intentionality (phenomenological) is not concerned with objectivity in any measured sense.

There seems to be a common theme hitting the threads recently around the idea of ‘knowns’ and ‘unknowns’. I find it hard to stomach reading someone talk of ‘objective’ and ‘intersubjective’ as if they are synonymous … if they are why use both?

Arguing with ‘bracketing out’ in the first place is probably where the bootstrapping would make sense. Seems to be a lot of crossovers here in terminology that are clouding my understanding of what is being said.

I find it hard to stomach reading someone talk of ‘objective’ and ‘intersubjective’ as if they are synonymous … if they are why use both? — I like sushi

The notion that 'what people think of as objective is really just a construct of intersubjective agreement' is pretty common and certainly was (one of the frames) taught at my university. Richard Rorty puts it like this - 'In philosophical terms, it is the thesis that anything that talk of objectivity can do to make our practices intelligible can be done equally well by talk of intersubjectivity.' Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 (1998).

The questions as to whether this is useful or accurate are separate matters.

Yes, but they are not the same.

Yes, but they are not the same. — I like sushi

That's the post-modern argument (as per Rorty's quote). There is no objectivity. It's a contrivance. What we think of as objective is actually a shared subjectivity held by communities of agreement - whether we are talking the Amish, politics or quantum mechanics. Which is why for some thinkers, objectivity and intersubjectivity amount to the same thing, function in the same way, as Rorty says. You may not agree but many do.

But I am asking about Lawson's view as expressed in the OP and what others think this says about ideas like idealism. — Tom Storm

Well, I had a listen to the Lawson - Searle - Dawson podcast. Searle went over the usual observations concerning realism, Dawson did not seem to have much of significance to say, preferring to firmly assert his position than to argue his case, while Searle pointed out the obvious problems, using the arguments I've borrowed and used hereabouts many times. Neither seemed to have much to say that was novel. there's more on Dawson's web site, but it is paywalled, and presumably in his books, but the reviews are mixed. From this material I haven't gained a strong inclination to pursue his writing.

Dawson was interesting, apparently looking for some middle ground. I don't think there is a middle ground, since I agree with Searle that realism pretty much inevitable - and by that I mean simply that there are true sentences. An unfashionable view, to be sure, but who gives a fuck.

Lawson strikes me as bit like Feyerabend, in wanting to make the world better by showing that there is no "ultimate truth" to be discovered. For Feyerabend the enemy was Big Science, the Moto "anything goes". In the end the come back was that "Anything goes" becomes not a motto for reform or revolution but for conservatism: if anything goes, why change anything? "Anything goes means that everything stays the same". If Dawson's target is more political and social than methodological, then the outcome is Putin and Trump and Johnson, and in Australia Scotty from Marketing and Mr Potato Head. In denying that there is any truth, he gives such turds permission to say and do whatever they like.