Personal Morality is Just Morality

Judaka

Morality is many things, but for me, primarily, it is the ability to perceive things as right/wrong, fair/unfair and just/unjust. This manifests as social control, where the group's belief in the wrongness or unfairness of an act, and their feelings towards perpetrators or would-be perpetrators, discourage it. Ways of determining a moral view are many and varied, but that it has this effect is a core feature of what morality is.

Some claim to approach morality, not with the goal of social control, or even any interest in telling anyone else what to do. That one follows their own moral code or principles and will remain steadfast in that their aims are only personal. One only has these rules for just themselves, with the only purpose being to live a good or honourable life, with no interest in being told or telling others what to do.

To me, this is a distortion of the truth of both what morality is, and what is being done by this individual. Personal morality is not separate or distinct from social morality but rather a part of it.

One has moral views such as that a man beating his wife is "cowardly", that "incest is disgusting", or that "a man should provide for his family" or whatever else. Then frames them as a personal code or conceptual idea, representing only one's opinions and guiding how this individual should live.

The intention & motivation are distorted but are the same in every way it matters. Moral views can't involve cold practicality & indifference, they have an emotional weight behind them that characterises moral thinking. It is not an emotional feeling triggered only when involving oneself but in general.

One will still feel anger towards and lose respect for those who act immorally and they will still argue against rules or conventions that go against their principles. The role their moral beliefs still plays is identical to normal. Encouraging moral behaviour and discouraging immoral behaviour in others, and applying one's moral beliefs in every context as one would normally.

The concepts involved in moral thinking have universal applicability, for example, an idea such as "a sucker punch is cowardly", doesn't just apply to oneself, but to anyone. As one should aim to be brave and courageous instead, and as cowardly acts are frowned upon, the message is clear. If you would, as part of your own moral code, insult and demean, and show hostility to someone who sucker punched someone else, there's literally zero difference in that and how morality works in any other case.

The separation seems most useful to someone who resents the attempts of others to influence their behaviour, despite approving of the practice overall. "I follow my own moral code" as in, "don't preach to me", but nonetheless in following that moral code, one will still do the same to others. I believe this is the attraction of the distinction, but it could also be inspired by a resentment of social control in general, and a wide range of possibilities are valid.

Personal moral beliefs, though seemingly individualistic, ultimately align with the core features of morality, including social control, emotional responses, and the application of moral principles to oneself and others. I would argue there are very few, if any, notable differences between either approach.

A non-personalised approach to morality, which may explicitly demand the compliance of others, isn't distinct in how an individual experiences it from a personal one. They both involve strong emotional reactions towards what is deemed wrong, unfair or unjust. Both are experienced on a personal level and neither treat moral views as merely tools for social control.

Tom Storm

↪Judaka

I'm not entirely sure I follow your argument. I guess morality is social behavior and probably only significant where there are other conscious creatures. You don't really have or need morality if no one else exists. In this way, morality must essentially be a code of conduct or a set of 'traffic lights' to regulate behaviors. It's true that (outside of societal rules) we tend to pick moral behaviors that appeal to our preferences but this is culturally generated - a result of education and socialization. Morality doesn't vary all that much across cultures - not stealing, killing or causing suffering within communities of concern are the classic themes. The community of concern may widen or shrink, depending upon what the values of the culture. Not everyone counts as a citizen in some cultures.

One has moral views such as that a man beating his wife is "cowardly", that "incest is disgusting", or that "a man should provide for his family" or whatever else — Judaka

Are they moral reasons or aesthetic? Beating anyone may or may not be cowardly, the salient moral issue is it is causing suffering to another conscious creature. Incest being disgusting is an aesthetic response, isn't it? It may be a moral transgression, where it doesn't involve consent and results in significant birth defects and suffering.

BC

Good OP.

Personal moral beliefs, though seemingly individualistic, ultimately align with the core features of morality, including social control, emotional responses, and the application of moral principles to oneself and others. — Judaka

Personal morality is / must be derived from the social milieu in which one is reared. We may have some innate, simple forms of right/wrong, fair/unfair, but these innate forms are too limited to count as 'morality'.

(Even other animals can be observed to object to unfair treatment (in very structured situations). Primates in experimental situations stop cooperating if the rewards are unfairly distributed or are of unequally quality (cucumber vs. apple). Dogs are satisfied as long as they get something; they don't weigh quality of reward. Dry bread instead of meat counts among dogs.)

Not many children survive without adult assistance, and thus we do not have adults who really devised their own system of right / wrong. People who "march to the beat of a distant drummer" are following social morality as much as anyone else is. That someone feels the distant morality is superior to the local version is a social decision.

Judaka

↪Tom Storm

I guess morality is social behavior and probably only significant where there are other conscious creatures. — Tom Storm

In my OP I set out with the understanding of morality as the ability to percieve fairness and things being right/wrong. Thus it's not a choice, or something that can be turned on or off. I'd guess that you weren't able to follow the OP due to reading it using your understanding of morality rather than mine. As I don't understand your critique either, unless I just think of it as a critique of my explanation of morality.

Are they moral reasons or aesthetic? Beating anyone may or may not be cowardly, the salient moral issue is it is causing suffering to another conscious creature. Incest being disgusting is an aesthetic response, isn't it? It may be a moral transgression, where it doesn't involve consent and results in significant birth defects and suffering. — Tom Storm

We're approaching morality from very different perspectives, though as a sidenote, I don't think it matters for the topic of the OP.

From my perspective, the conceptualisation of morality as something like the ten commandments functions like an adjacent form of morality with the same name, but distinctly different than what I'm referring to.

I don't think of morality as necessarily involving logical or well-reasoned rules, it is simply the ability to periceve acts or situations as right/wrong, fair/unfair or just/unjust.

So, yes, for me, the idea that a man beating his wife is cowardly is a moral argument/belief, any reason would do, just so long as we're claiming a man beating is wife is wrong/unjust/unfair and it provokes an emotional response out of us if we see it.

Though, by the way, what do you mean by "aesthetic"?

↪BC

Thanks, I do agree that other social mammals display the same way of thinking as us, as your examples suggest. I also agree that what we percieve as right/wrong, fair/unfair isn't totally innate, and would argue it is very flexible, as especially religion as shown.

Tom Storm

d guess that you weren't able to follow the OP due to reading it using your understanding of morality rather than mine. As I don't understand your critique either, unless I just think of it as a critique of my explanation of morality. — Judaka

Could be.

Though, by the way, what do you mean by "aesthetic"? — Judaka

I think people often select positions based on whether they find them attractive or ugly. Like selecting some music. 'I think homosexuality is wrong' for instance, may just be a synonym for, 'I find it gross'. The statement, 'I believe in god' may just mean, 'The world is more beautiful when I attribute a creator to it.' That kind of thing.

Tzeentch

The fundamental difference is that those who follow a personal moral code do not seek to impose it on others. It's exactly that impulse to impose that makes conventional morality little more than an expression of the base will to power.

Morality devoid of the impulse to impose is simply what a personal moral code is.

Note that not imposing one's views upon others does not mean one cannot discuss views, or judge others.

ChrisH

Isn't a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others no different to personal aesthetic preference?

Mww

↪Judaka

You begin with the idea personal morality is just morality.

If I begin with the idea morality is personal, would you say we’re beginning with the same general idea?

T Clark

This is a subject I've been thinking about since your last similar discussion. I appreciate the chance to clarify for myself how I think and feel about it.

Some claim to approach morality, not with the goal of social control, or even any interest in telling anyone else what to do. That one follows their own moral code or principles and will remain steadfast in that their aims are only personal. One only has these rules for just themselves, with the only purpose being to live a good or honourable life, with no interest in being told or telling others what to do. — Judaka

You and I had an exchange about this in a previous thread. What you've written here is a good summary of how I see things.

To me, this is a distortion of the truth of both what morality is, and what is being done by this individual. Personal morality is not separate or distinct from social morality but rather a part of it. — Judaka

I see them as different, although certainly related, things. Personal morality is the path I follow when acting from my heart - empathy, fellow-feeling, friendship. I act in accordance with social morality out of fear or duty. Clearly they overlap a lot.

One has moral views such as that a man beating his wife is "cowardly", that "incest is disgusting", or that "a man should provide for his family" or whatever else. Then frames them as a personal code or conceptual idea, representing only one's opinions and guiding how this individual should live.

The intention & motivation are distorted but are the same in every way it matters. Moral views can't involve cold practicality & indifference, they have an emotional weight behind them that characterises moral thinking. It is not an emotional feeling triggered only when involving oneself but in general. — Judaka

You don't have to judge people or their behavior, call them cowardly or disgusting, in order to hold those people responsible for their actions. The important thing about beating people or incest is the harm they cause to the victims, not the acts themselves. In those cases, social and personal morality overlap. On the other hand, consensual sexual behavior or drug use alone generally don't harm anyone but the person acting. In those cases my personal morality does not match social morality.

One will still feel anger towards and lose respect for those who act immorally and they will still argue against rules or conventions that go against their principles. The role their moral beliefs still plays is identical to normal. Encouraging moral behaviour and discouraging immoral behaviour in others, and applying one's moral beliefs in every context as one would normally. — Judaka

I don't necessarily feel angry at people who behave in a manner inconsistent with my personal morality or social morality, although I might. My feelings are not what's important, it is the safety and integrity of those who are harmed that matters.

The separation seems most useful to someone who resents the attempts of others to influence their behaviour, despite approving of the practice overall. "I follow my own moral code" as in, "don't preach to me", but nonetheless in following that moral code, one will still do the same to others. I believe this is the attraction of the distinction, but it could also be inspired by a resentment of social control in general, and a wide range of possibilities are valid. — Judaka

This is an uncharitable, and mistaken, interpretation, at least for me. I recognize the value of society's rules and it is part of my personal morality to follow them unless there is a good reason not to. I can't say I never feel resentment towards people trying to get me to do what they want, but as an adult I've learned, reasonably well, how to handle conflicts between my personal desires and what other people want from me.

Personal moral beliefs, though seemingly individualistic, ultimately align with the core features of morality, including social control, emotional responses, and the application of moral principles to oneself and others. I would argue there are very few, if any, notable differences between either approach. — Judaka

No, at least not necessarily and not for me.

A non-personalised approach to morality, which may explicitly demand the compliance of others, isn't distinct in how an individual experiences it from a personal one. — Judaka

Yes it is, at least generally and for me.

T Clark

Isn't a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others no different to personal aesthetic preference? — ChrisH

I think they are the same in that they are expressions of personal values and feelings as opposed to reason. Is that what you mean?

Joshs

↪Tom Storm

Morality doesn't vary all that much across cultures - not stealing, killing or causing suffering within communities of concern are the classic themes. — Tom Storm

Notice the circularity in moral proscriptives like these.
Stealing is defined at taking that which isn’t ‘rightfully’ yours. It’s not just killing but ‘murder’, or ‘wrongful killing’ that we disdain. It is not just causing suffering but intentionally willing the suffering of others that we disapprove of. These descriptions are just redefinitions of immorality as willful disregard of what is right. They come down to saying that wrongful behavior is a failure to do what is right. Looked at through this vapid lens , it’s no wonder morality doesn’t vary all that much across cultures.

Tom Storm

These descriptions are just redefinitions of immorality as willful disregard of what is right. They come down to saying that wrongful behavior is a failure to do what is right. Looked at through this vapid lens , it’s no wonder morality doesn’t vary all that much across cultures. — Joshs

Are you saying the observation I made is vapid, or the way morality is generally framed across cultures is vapid?

They come down to saying that wrongful behavior is a failure to do what is right. — Joshs

I partly understand this point, but it's the question of what is defined as wrongful behaviour that is the issue, isn't it? Does what you say change the fact that stealing (which may have various definitions) is generally considered wrong across cultures? (And I am not saying all cultures, or all people in all cultures and I'm not talking about situational exemptions, etc)

How do you understand morality?

Tom Storm

These descriptions are just redefinitions of immorality as willful disregard of what is right. — Joshs

Hmm - I'm trying to see this, nor can I see how this might help us in the matter. Can you sharpen this for me?

If we say, for instance, that the mass murder of a minority group is wrong - is this just a redefinition of immorality as 'willful disregard of what is right' and is so what is the alternative?

Joshs

↪Tom Storm

Does what you say change the fact that stealing (which may have various definitions) is generally considered wrong across cultures? (And I am not saying all cultures, or all people in all cultures and I'm not talking about situational exemptions, etc)

How do you understand morality? — Tom Storm

The challenge here is to use a morally neutral term in place of ‘stealing’ and then attach a judgement of wrongfulness to it. Obviously , if we simply described stealing as seeing an object and walking away with it, we dont have enough of a context to make a moral judgement. We want to know why the person took it, what they were thinking, if they assumed the object belonged to someone else, if they also assumed that other person didnt have a right to the object. At some point , a non-neutral concept must be inserted into the description of an action to make it moral or not. How do I understand such moral concepts? A very simple definition might go like this:

Traditional morality comes into play when the intention behind the actions of a person runs afoul of previously established expectations and trust between that person and others. That person knowingly disappoints a standard of conduct for no good reason.

Tom Storm

↪Joshs

Oh ok, I get you. In which case my language was insufficient for purposes.

Morality comes into play when the intention behind the actions of a person runs afoul of previously established expectations and trust between that person and others. That person knowingly disappoints a standard of conduct for no good reason. — Joshs

Thank you.

ChrisH

Isn't a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others no different to personal aesthetic preference?
— ChrisH

I think they are the same in that they are expressions of personal values and feelings as opposed to reason. Is that what you mean? — T Clark

What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference. My understanding is that it's the intention to influence others which distinguishes moral values and aesthetic preferences

Tom Storm

What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference — ChrisH

I think that's kind of what I was thinking too.

T Clark

What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference. My understanding is that it's the intention to influence others which distinguishes moral values and aesthetic preferences — ChrisH

Well I'm glad we clarified my misunderstanding. Now I can feel more comfortable disagreeing strongly with you.

Judaka

↪Mww

I made a distinction that lasts only for my argument, to highlight the difference between a view of morality that exists only for oneself and one where morality involves aiming to influence group behaviour. Morality is personal, in this, all perspectives agree, but I am arguing that morality is always both personal & social, and never just personal. What you've said doesn't indicate whether or not you agree with that.

↪T Clark

I see them as different, although certainly related, things. Personal morality is the path I follow when acting from my heart - empathy, fellow-feeling, friendship. I act in accordance with social morality out of fear or duty. Clearly they overlap a lot. — T Clark

Hmm, you've interpreted these terms "personal morality" and "social morality" in a different way that I had meant to have laid out. I took them as mutually exclusive ways of viewing morality. Personal morality as a code limited to oneself, and social morality where views are applied in social contexts, to influence others and the rules of the group.

If you want to piece-by-piece categorise your moral views, as either personal or social, or alternatively using a less binary view, that's a different approach.

However, even here, it's hard to imagine that the personal remains personal within the context of morality. So long as your feelings are genuine, then your empathy and compassion will inenvitably manifests in attempts to influence or coerce others. After all, you wouldn't sit back and watch someone else be treated cruelly and unfairly, as though it had nothing to do with you, right? You would want to intervene, and tell the belligerent to cut it out.

You don't have to judge people or their behavior, call them cowardly or disgusting, in order to hold those people responsible for their actions. The important thing about beating people or incest is the harm they cause to the victims, not the acts themselves. — T Clark

You can argue that harm is always wrong, and then list exceptions. Or you can say harm is not inherently immoral, and then argue for the cases where it would be. I'm not sure there's much of a difference. Moral systems always involve these games... You won't condemn harm when it's done under conditions that you consider fair & reasonable, so, yes, it's necessary to judge the acts as unfair, wrong, unreasonable and so on.

In those cases my personal morality does not match social morality. — T Clark

You'll have to define these terms, it's very clear that you've made them your own.

I don't necessarily feel angry at people who behave in a manner inconsistent with my personal morality or social morality, although I might. My feelings are not what's important, it is the safety and integrity of those who are harmed that matters. — T Clark

Certainly, your motivations are more nuanced that what I've written, to be sure, but surely, even putting emotions aside, common sense dictates that you should address the cause of the harm in some way, right? I'm not against it, by the way. I have no hidden motive.

This is an uncharitable, and mistaken, interpretation, at least for me. — T Clark

I don't think what's written there describes you. You've tried to argue, as I understand it, that your concern is for the victim, and your motivation is to help people, not influence. It's not as though all moral issues have such a clear perpetrator/victim narrative that can be applied. I'd like to hear how you've been defining personal/social morality, and whether you really need to debate with me, that your moral views do not contain attempts to influence anything beyond yourself. I'm sure you can see it false.

Mww

I am arguing that morality is always both personal & social, and never just personal. What you've said doesn't indicate whether or not you agree with that. — Judaka

I wanted a better understanding of what you mean by personal morality is just morality.

I disagree morality is both personal and social. Morality is personal as a function of will, ethics is social as a function of behavior. A decidedly minority opinion, to be sure, but I’m ok with it.

Judaka

↪Mww

I agree morality is a function of will, but it has a social function & effect, and my OP is arguing that this effect is present regardless of whether one characterises their particular approach to morality as being a code they live by. Btw, did you read more than the title? I am curious as I feel a good portion of responses to my threads lately seem a response to the title and nothing else.

Tzeentch

What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference. My understanding is that it's the intention to influence others which distinguishes moral values and aesthetic preferences — ChrisH

Assuming a moral relativist view, any and all notions of morality are nothing but personal fancy (aesthetic preference), and the only question is who gets to impose their personal fancies on other people; "might makes right."

Assuming a non-relativist view, morality is, regardless of what people believe (e.g. Plato's 'the Good'). It's neither personal nor collective. It's up to us to discover, which is what a lot of philosophy, religion and spiritual practice have dedicated themselves to.

ChrisH

What I was attempting to say was that a personal morality that doesn't seek to influence others is not, in my view, really a morality - it's aesthetic preference. My understanding is that it's the intention to influence others which distinguishes moral values and aesthetic preferences
— ChrisH

Assuming a moral relativist view, any and all notions of morality are nothing but personal fancy (aesthetic preference), and the only question is who gets to impose their personal fancies on other people; "might makes right." — Tzeentch

I broadly agree with the view that all 'notions of morality' are essentially 'nothing but personal fancy' (personal values).

However, it doesn't follow that because 'notions of morality' and aesthetic preferences are both
based essentially on personal values that they are the same.

For me, the crucial distinction is that moral values are those values we wish to see adopted by others. One way of saying this is that we feel these values ought to be shared by others.

Tzeentch

For me, the crucial distinction is that moral values are those values we wish to see adopted by others. — ChrisH

That's fine, I suppose.

However, if this indeed is the crucial distinction then it doesn't get us very far. There are many groups who have views on which values ought to be adopted by others.

Many such groups are terribly destructive.

Is what they are doing moral?

Based on what you've provided, I think you'll have to answer in the positive.

Personally, I'm not a moral relativist. I think morality loses all its meaning when it is viewed through moral relativism and you simply end up with morality being whatever the strongest group manages to impose on the rest of the people - "might makes right."

ChrisH

Is what they are doing moral? — Tzeentch

I think you're confusing two meanings of moral.

The first describes any value/opinion/preference broadly encompassed by what is generally agreed to be the human activity, morality.

The second (the usage you're using I think), is "moral" as shorthand for morally good/permitted.

So I would answer that what they are doing is moral[ity] in the first sense. It simply doesn't make sense to ask if their values are moral in the second sense without specifics.

Personally, I'm not a moral relativist. I think morality loses all its meaning when it is viewed through moral relativism and you simply end up with morality being whatever the strongest group manages to impose on the rest of the people — Tzeentch

Isn't that what happens now?

"might makes right." — Tzeentch

Only if you believe that what ever is imposed is necessarily "right". I don't.

NOS4A2

↪Judaka

The goal of criticizing immorality isn’t “social control”, whatever that means, but appealing to conscience and reason. One cannot control another’s morality anyway, and anyone who views coercion as immoral will avoid it in favor of moral arguments and leading by example, neither of which have any effect beyond the one who abides by them.

If one happens to change his ways in light of this criticism, it wasn’t because he was pushed to do it, but because he came to agree and followed his own conscience. So I think the so-called effect of personal morality on others is overstated.

Tzeentch

The first describes any value/opinion/preference broadly encompassed by what is generally agreed to be the human activity, morality.

The second (the usage you're using I think), is "moral" as shorthand for morally good/permitted. — ChrisH

If morality is "opinions that one believes ought to be adopted by everyone", then having such opinions is moral in and of itself, no?

If morality is relative, then "morally good/permitted" is a tautology. Any moral opinions one holds (i.e. opinions that one believes ought to be adopted by everyone) are morally permitted.

It simply doesn't make sense to ask if their values are moral in the second sense without specifics. — ChrisH

Indeed, but if one holds a moral relativist view, the specifics cannot matter.

The reason all of this might sound confusing, is because moral relativism makes the term 'morality' become meaningless (and therefore it makes little sense, in my view). That's the point I'm trying to get across.

Isn't that what happens now? — ChrisH

Often times yes. An unfortunate state of affairs to be sure!

Only if you believe that what ever is imposed is "right". I don't. — ChrisH

But then it makes no sense to believe morality, personal or collective, are aesthetic preferences.

Mww

↪Judaka

Morality can have a social effect, certainly, but I don’t think that makes morality any less an irreducibly personal condition.

Yes I read the OP. Interpreting the title as I did, I questioned whether the initial argument was sufficient support for it.

ChrisH

The first describes any value/opinion/preference broadly encompassed by what is generally agreed to be the human activity, morality.

The second (the usage you're using I think), is "moral" as shorthand for morally good/permitted.
— ChrisH

If morality is "opinions that one believes ought to be adopted by everyone", then having such opinions is moral in and of itself, no? — Tzeentch

I don't know what you mean by moral in and of itself.

Such opinions are moral opinions (in my first sense above) but as I said:

It simply doesn't make sense to ask if their values are moral in the second sense without specifics.
— ChrisH

Indeed, but if one holds a moral relativist view, the specifics cannot matter.

The reason all of this might sound confusing, is because moral relativism makes the term 'morality' become meaningless (and therefore it makes little sense, in my view). That's the point I'm trying to get across. — Tzeentch

I haven't identified as a moral relativist and so it would be helpful if you directed your comments at what I actually say rather than at what you believe moral relativism entails. I'm still not sure you've grasped the distinction I've drawn between the two senses of "moral".

But then it makes no sense to believe morality, personal or collective, are aesthetic preferences. — Tzeentch

I thought I'd clearly said I didn't think they were the same?

Tzeentch

I thought I'd clearly said I didn't think they were the same? — ChrisH

Well, I don't think trying to distinguish between personal and collective morality is going to lead to a very coherent argument. This is what I tried to make clear in my first response to you. But have at it.

What those arguments tend to boil down to is that when many people believe a thing, it is moral. When a person believes a thing it is personal opinion.

I think that holds no water.

They're either all personal opinions (moral relativism), or they're all subject to objective moral 'laws' that human can try to discover (in which case there's no distinction).

Pantagruel

↪Judaka

This appears to be a recapitulation and recasting of your "Morality is Coercive" discussion.

As I said then, the essence of morality as a kind of duty (Kant) which makes us better is a much more satisfying concept and appeals to a great many people, versus this pessimistic and sad outlook.

Perhaps the question of who sees morality in what kind of way is understandable as an aspect of the psychological question of an internal versus an external locus of perceived causality. This aligns with the tendency to feel like one is responsible for what one does. I can see where some people would prefer to feel like they are not responsible for what they do.

Personal Morality is Just Morality

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions