It is a positive philosophy that says no to suffering and false hope. — Andrew4Handel

Just like many a tyrant has claimed on the past. Ironically they pursue obliteration and/or various forms and extensions of human suffering rather than tempering them. An aim with an absolute solution is always fanatical and often antithetical to its proposed purpose.

I have a lot of anecdotes about my life but they are usually relevant so excuse me if I seem to overshare. I am a frank person.

I think philosophy should be based on real life and lived experience and not exist in a closed off abstract domain.

My dad worked in hospitals and I once asked my mum if he ever worked on a children's ward and she said something like "No because he doesn't have an affinity with children" I asked if she knew that before she married him and she replied yes.

She then went on to have six children with him. Neither of them were good parents and he was particularly unreasonable.

For example when my late oldest brother left the Plymouth Brethren for a Pentecostal church he soon after developed MS and my dad told him he developed MS as a punishment from God for leaving the Brethren. My mother also told me that her cousin died in a bike car collision because he left the brethren and had a career in music. My aunt later told me an open bible was found next to the bed in my deceased cousins bedroom.

The church we grew up in focused on original sin and hell and damnation so like a lot of Christians my parents believed in the principal of total depravity and that they were giving birth to children cursed from birth and heading for hell unless they become religious drones.

So I don't see how you can justify having children with someone that doesn't like them and like a lot of religious people under the premise they are cursed from the outset. The bible and other religions also have a built in narrative to justify human such as the Adam and Eve story.

As a child I asked my mum why brambles had prickles on them that could hurt humans and animals and she said it was all to do with the fall of man. That any suffering and problem in nature was to blame on Adam and Eve.
So parents do give rationalisations for having children that can be and examined and are not just like animals in the wild spontaneously procreating.

Just like many a tyrant has claimed on the past. Ironically they pursue obliteration and/or various forms and extensions of human suffering rather than tempering them. An aim with an absolute solution is always fanatical and often antithetical to its proposed purpose. — I like sushi

It should be a personal choice not to create a child based on conscience. I don't know which tyrants tried to obliterate suffering. A lot of current western governments claim to want to end human suffering in contradiction to their policies. The same with the general public who's actions go against their alleged moral stances.

You can have a (transhuman?) policy of ending human suffering without advocating antinatalism. We just know it is not working and is unlikely to work. It also flies in the face of the natural cycle of change and decay - call it entropy if you will.

I don't see why people get angry about antinatalism considering it is a minority held position that is having no impact as far as I can see and their are billions of humans a live to day and many more being born all the time.

In that case if there is "harm" in giving birth to children. The harm is not human. But from other animals that "imposed our humanness on us". Should we then go out and blame all human hardship on australopithicus? — Benj96

I believe in free will based on my own experience and as I have pointed out in one of my last posts humans give reasons for having children and have stated beliefs that can be examined unlike any other animal.

Human society is built on reason not on blindly responding to natural urges. I am gay so I am not going to accidentally impregnate a woman whilst drunk or in a fit of lust so I can sympathise with heterosexuals maybe succumbing to wild lust. But strangely most humans are successful at controlling family size ( and even some species restrict population size).

Parents are causally responsible for harm because they are a necessary component in human harm occurring what ever their intentions.
However much I am enjoying an aspect of life (Like the music of Handel or a takeaway) It doesn't make me consider forcing it on someone else. I know most people don't listen to baroque music and I don't like sport and don't like that being forced on me. Having some niche tastes and viewpoints and cognitive issues like ASD and ADHD I can see how one size does not fit all. I cannot just assume other people are like me and replicate that.

We are all going to die anyway and barring an afterlife scenario go extinct and be unaware that we ever existed. I am personally frightened of suddenly ceasing to exist. But when you are in the thick of life it is hard to imagine nothingness and having no concerns and never seeing anyone again. This is one area where I think the religious and other believers in an afterlife have an advantage. They are offering their children eternal life. But unfortunately I see no evidence for the major religions claims.

I think people have problems with it due to low resolution understanding and/or because fanatics of antinatalism also possess low resolution views.

As a thought experiment it has value. As an ethical template it is both irrelevant and contrary.

:up:

@plaque flag @Tzeentch Here is a thought experiments for you:

If you had the ability to give the gift of the following to a friend:

• Creating or experiencing art and music that inspires and moves you.
• Accomplishing personal goals and achievements.
• Falling in love and experiencing deep emotional connections.
• Building meaningful relationships with family and friends.
• Exploring new cultures and traveling to different parts of the world.
• Embracing adventure and taking risks
• Appreciating nature
• Reading/writing good literature
• Learning X thing and mastering Y ability
• Experiencing technological innovations
• Flow states
• Games and hobbies

But then, in order to gift the above positives to a friend you also definitely had to give that person at least several of these things below:

• Chronic illness - cancer, disease, mental illness, breakdowns, etc.
• Acute illness- bed bugs, disease, mental illness, parasites, food poising etc.
• Accidents and misadventures (everything from broken limbs and car accidents, to getting eaten by a lion)
• Disasters
• Betrayal
• Loneliness
• Anxiety
• Trauma
• Addiction
• Financial hardships
• Poverty
• Loss
• Practically unavoidable, unwanted and tedious situations
• Abuse
• Discomforts of great and small variety that adds up when combined (everything from mistreatment by others in small ways, to traffic jams, to stubbed toes, to uncomfortable situations, to embarrassment, etc.)

Would you feel comfortable and moral providing the group of positives if you knew you will 100% also be giving some variation of the group of negatives?

I think you would not feel comfortable nor think that this was moral. But procreation is not seen this way. And here lies the misguided and wrong-headed thinking regarding procreation. It's no different.

@Tzeentch @plaque flag Many of these positives do exist at the same time with a number of the negatives enumerated here. There is heartbreak , and yet there is a spirit of adventure that can lift one from it.

If one is absolutely sure that the harms would be outweighed by the good, then it would indeed be better to focus on the latter. However, procreation is certainly different because one's actions are not affecting an already existing person who may have interests that diverge from our perspective and who may not require the positives for living a life they value. In this case, one's purportedly benevolent act would either be unnecessary (if the person is already in a state they cherish) or downright detrimental (if it carries overwhelming risks that would destroy the good that is present). When it comes to procreation, there isn't pure knowledge about the future, which is why one has to think about the risks as well as the opportunities. Universal anti-natalism is, I think, obstinately misconceived.

This makes no sense. There is no difference in the scenario I provided except one is a friend that exists. The form is the same for both. You give one you give the other.

The point is that you would not be comfortable in one of them, but it should be both because they are essentially doing the same thing. A gift is not truly a gift if you burden someone. Thinking it is would be its own problematic idea of gifts and/or one’s megalomaniac idea that you are the bearer of someone’s burdens because you think this is somehow good to cause for someone else. Again, problematic.

It makes all the difference. For a friend (a sentient being with a well-being that deserves protection), one has to act in a way that they do not experience any loss of a good that they never needed to bring sufficient value to their lives. It would be problematic to make someone run a marathon so that they can experience the relief of sitting. The struggle becomes acceptable if the good (like the bliss of relaxing) is absent. Only when we can establish that the benefit would actually be greater than the harms and would not put the person in a worse state than they were before does the action become justifiable. It is evident that non-existence helps (or hinders) nobody. But if preventing suffering is good in an impersonal sense, then providing happiness is also important.

benefit would actually be greater than the harms and would not put the person in a worse state than they were before does the action become justifiable. — Existential Hope

This is still wrong. If I give my friend a car and they might get into an accident is a different calculation than if I give my friend a car but they will get various pains and woes of life. I would never make that trade off on behalf of a friend,

It is evident that non-existence helps (or hinders) nobody. — Existential Hope

The action isn’t about an existing person, it’s about a future person that could exist. In lingistics this is the future conditional tense.

But if preventing suffering is good in an impersonal sense, then providing happiness is also important. — Existential Hope

Happiness giving is not ethical but supererogatory. If I don’t give someone happiness in my daily life but don’t cause suffering I have done nothing wrong. If I cause suffering, at least potentially I have. Circumstances matter.

This is still wrong. If I give my friend a car and they might get into an accident is a different calculation than if I give my friend a car but they will get various pains and woes of life. — schopenhauer1

An accident would qualify as a woe, but the car can also save one's life as one is attempting to reach the hospital or enable one to spend time with their significant other, even if they live far away. Unless all the concomitant pleasant aspects of existence are sitting in the car alongside the woes, it would undoubtedly be immoral. And it's not as if the benefits alone are adequate. What also matters is whether these positives would put the person in a preferable state to the one they would have found themselves in without them.

The action isn’t about an existing person, it’s about a future person that could exist. In lingistics this is the future conditional tense. — schopenhauer1

Which is why it has no value. If it can be bad, then the condition is that it can also be good.

Happiness giving is not ethical but supererogatory. If I don’t give someone happiness in my daily life but don’t cause suffering I have done nothing wrong. If I cause suffering, at least potentially I have. — schopenhauer1

A society where people were constantly being bombarded for gifting happiness would be sawing off the branch it was sitting on. For most existing people, not directly harming them is surely enough for them to live lives that they find worth living. However, when one is creating people (a state which nobody prefers), the positives matter as much as the negatives.

Unless all the concomitant pleasant aspects of existence are sitting in the car alongside the woes, it would undoubtedly be immoral. And it's not as if the benefits alone are adequate. What also matters is whether these positives would put the person in a preferable state to the one they would have found themselves in without them. — Existential Hope

It’s not ethical to judge for someone else the amount of harms is appropriate for the “treat” of goods. In fact, that’s perverse. You are playing god of misery and pleasure on behalf of someone. Remember this “gift” is given, it’s not requested. And they can’t “tweak” it beforehand to their liking or predict what it is.

Which is why it has no value. If it can be bad, then the condition is that it can also be good. — Existential Hope

This literally is the scenario in both cases . Future conditional in both cases. Your non-identify argument is weak and special pleading. I’d drop it.

A society where people were constantly being bombarded for gifting happiness would be sawing off the branch it was sitting on. For most existing people, not directly harming them is surely enough for them to live lives that they find worth living. However, when one is creating people (a state which nobody prefers), the positives matter as much as the negatives. — Existential Hope

Not understanding so no comment.

It’s not ethical to judge for someone else the amount of harms is appropriate for the “treat” of goods. In fact, that’s perverse. You are playing god of misery and pleasure on behalf of someone. Remember this “gift” is given, it’s not requested. And they can’t “tweak” it beforehand to their liking or predict what it is. — schopenhauer1

It is not ethical to judge for someone else that a good they could be deeply grateful for should not be bestowed because one has been tempted by the religion of pessimism. Gifting something that cannot be requested is not unethical.

This literally is the scenario on both cases . Future conditional in both cases. You’re non-identify argument is weak and special pleading. I’d drop it. — schopenhauer1

It isn't. In one case, one's actions are affecting a real person. In the other, nobody is being left in a more desirable or less desirable state as a result of what we have done. And if the prevention of harms can be good without a person being there, the prevention of happiness is also bad, even if there is no experience of hankering for the positives. Consistency and consideration for the range of applicability should not be hastily dropped. Although, their robustness is not something to be trifled with.

Not understanding so no comment. — schopenhauer1

Fair enough (and apologies for possible equivocation). All I meant was that the nature of giving happiness differs to existing beings who already have varying levels of well-being differs from those who are yet to exist.

It is not ethical to judge for someone else that a good they could be deeply grateful for should not be bestowed because one has been tempted by the religion of pessimism. Gifting something that cannot be requested is not unethical. — Existential Hope

I'm sorry it doesn't work that way. I can't assume someone wants me to do a "happy" thing for them. But I can safely assume, and in fact am morally obligated not to purposefully harm someone when I don't have to. Certainly, not because I think the pain intendent with whatever happiness I bestow will be "worth it" in my own estimation. You can't keep doing this reverse role and think it comes out the same. It doesn't.

a real person — Existential Hope

When that person is born, it will be real. That is how the future works. Do you believe in a state called "the future"? Sounds like you don't. I wonder why :roll:.

nobody is being left in a more desirable or less desirable state as a result of what we have done. — Existential Hope

Future conditionals exist. If you do X, then Y will happen. You are preventing Y from happening. You don't need someone for the statement "Y will happen" to be true, because there will be a person who exists. Get over this argument. It's not a good look. It really shows special pleading and lack of common language usage.

And if the prevention of harms can be good without a person being there, the prevention of happiness is also bad, — Existential Hope

No because as stated earlier, happiness-giving is not an ethical act but a supererogatory one. Not causing avoidable suffering is ethical though. Even more so, willingly wanting to cause suffering because it brings about good is more than negligent, and certainly misguided.

Fair enough (and apologies for possible equivocation). All I meant was that the nature of giving happiness differs to existing beings who already have varying levels of well-being differs from those who are yet to exist. — Existential Hope

I don't think so on any substantive level. The person presumably to be born will have varying amounts of happiness just as your friend. The scenario is the same for each so it's not even considering individual levels, just broad experiences like "appreciating friends, art, achievements, etc.".

I'm sorry it doesn't work that way. I can't assume someone wants me to do a "happy" thing for them. But I can safely assume, and in fact am morally obligated not to purposefully harm someone when I don't have to. Certainly, not because I think the pain intendent with whatever happiness I bestow will be "worth it" in my own estimation. You can't keep doing this reverse role and think it comes out the same. It doesn't. — schopenhauer1

I am sorry, but I am afraid that it does. No matter how many times it is repudiated by some, the fact that the good is relevant is inescapable. Just as one may choose to rescue someone based upon their judgement of the perspective of that person and then find out that they wanted an end without making their action wrong when it occurred, one can also decide to do the right thing for someone else when they cannot attain the positive themselves. In the end, your worldview is far too narrow due to the pessimistic biased that fuel it and restrict it to risks and burdens, not opportunities and gifts. And, once again, for those who exist, not directly harming them can, usually, be enough. This is not a about reversal; it is about not being obsessed with one dimension of life. I think that it is far too deficient of a worldview.

When that person is born, it will be real. That is how the future works. Do you believe in a state called "the future"? Sounds like you don't. I wonder why :roll:. — schopenhauer1

And then, when they do possess the capacity to be harmed and benefitted, we will hopefully behave in an ethical way. I have little time for imaginary goodness or inconsistent ideas.

Future conditionals exist. If you do X, then Y will happen. You are preventing Y from happening. You don't need someone for the statement "Y will happen" to be true, because there will be a person who exists. Get over this argument. It's not a good look. It really shows special pleading and lack of common language usage. — schopenhauer1

They certainly do, but this does not automatically lead to the manifestation of value for someone. If X does not happen, then Y will have absolutely no significance for anybody who is absent. "Common language" and intuitions can be wrong. It is not a good look to arbitrarily argue that the absence of harms can be good sans true benefits, but the lack of happiness is not a worse state of affairs simply because nobody can ask for it.

No because as stated earlier, happiness-giving is not an ethical act but a supererogatory one. Not causing avoidable suffering is ethical though. Even more so, willingly wanting to cause suffering because it brings about good is more than negligent, and certainly misguided. — schopenhauer1

Giving happiness is an ethical act. If you do not cause me pain, you have allowed me to live a happy life, which is good (though, admittedly, it isn't the same as actively doing something for others). The mere fact of practical limitations of providing happiness does not diminish its worth. Not creating positives is unethical. Willingly wanting to prevent all of it because one is unable to look beyond their obstructed perspective is even more wrong-headed.

I don't think so on any substantive level. The person presumably to be born will have varying amounts of happiness just as your friend. The scenario is the same for each so it's not even considering individual levels, just broad experiences like "appreciating friends, art, achievements, etc.". — schopenhauer1

However, I think otherwise and believe that you are mistaken here. It isn't the reality of happiness that is pertinent. Rather, the point is that there is a non-trivial difference between doing good for one who already exists and has a particular state of well-being, and someone who does not. In the former case, current positives should compel us to rethink the necessity of risks, whereas in the latter case, the dearth of any existing level of happiness and interests put the harms and the benefits on equal footing.

one can also decide to do the right thing for someone else when they cannot attain the positive themselves — Existential Hope

Getting someone a traditional gift, and handing someone a box of gifts with tremendous burdens are two very different things, and to equivocate the two is rhetorical obfuscation.

not opportunities and gifts. — Existential Hope

Only totalitarian regimes would force people into opportunities and post-facto justify it. It is totalitarian thinking to think that one forces another's hand in the name of "opportunities" and then say, "Well, let's get the suicide machines out" as a consolation prize. Cringey.

And then, when they do possess the capacity to be harmed and benefitted, we will hopefully behave in an ethical way. I have little time for imaginary goodness or inconsistent ideas. — Existential Hope

That capacity exists as a real state of affairs. Again, that is what we mean by "future conditionals". It's not inconsistent to understand how future conditionals work. You are denying a whole range of states of affairs don't exist.

If X does not happen, then Y will have absolutely no significance for anybody who is absent. — Existential Hope

That's the point. Don't bring about X so Y doesn't happen. Cause and effect. Future conditional. If this, then that could happen. Don't do this.

It is not a good look to arbitrarily argue that the absence of harms can be good sans true benefits, but the lack of happiness is not a worse state of affairs simply because nobody can ask for it. — Existential Hope

You are confusing how epistemology works. Future conditionals are only understood by someone who exists to know "If then statements". It is from the POV of someone who can comprehend "If then statements" that we know this to be true.

If you do not cause me pain, you have allowed me to live a happy life, which is good (though, admittedly, it isn't the same as actively doing something for others). — Existential Hope

Oddly, this is just bolstering the AN point. This is how it works when someone is born (they just live their life without your negative interference). However, from the future conditional perspective, you are not going to start negatives for another. It is not letting known harms occur (that could have).

Willingly wanting to prevent all of it because one is unable to look beyond their obstructed perspective is even more wrong-headed. — Existential Hope

But we are not talking about unmitigated good are we. Perhaps if a paradise only universe existed and guaranteed you might have some argument. So hey, at least I'm giving you that point! But alas, we know this world is not that. But I'd even argue, EVEN in that scenario, though it is perfectly permissible to go ahead and start that life, not starting it isn't unethical. As you admit, not starting something does nothing for no one. Nothingness doesn't "hurt" anyone.

Getting someone a traditional gift, and handing someone a box of gifts with tremendous burdens are two very different things, and to equivocate the two is rhetorical obfuscation. — schopenhauer1

Receiving a pointless burden that stands in the way of a free and happy life is quite different from being given the very ability to experience the positives (and not by dragging inexistent souls from a superior state of existence). Evasion resides on many territories.

Only totalitarian regimes would force people into opportunities and post-facto justify it. It is totalitarian thinking to think that one forces another's hand in the name of "opportunities" and then say, "Well, let's get the suicide machines out" as a consolation prize. Cringey. — schopenhauer1

Your usage of the word "force" despite the absence of any evidence that demonstrates the desire of non-existent beings to avoid existence is indicative of your excessive faith in the negative. Only dictatorial dispensations would seek to eradicate all potential good due to their failure to observe value in it. It's myopic to think, "Well, I can see that you sincerely love your life, but since you were not there to ask for it, they ultimately mean nothing and, if given the chance, I would have prevented your existence." Is it "cringey"? I cannot answer that. Nevertheless, I believe that it is unfortunate. It's also not as frivolous as getting the machines out. It is undeniably tragic that people have to go through terrible afflictions. Our efforts to address this have to be incessant and multifaceted (without annihilating the good). If no other option remains, being able to find a graceful exit should not be an unconscionable demand.

That capacity exists as a real state of affairs. Again, that is what we mean by "future conditionals". It's not inconsistent to understand how future conditionals work. You are denying a whole range of states of affairs don't exist. — schopenhauer1

I am denying that the absence of states of affairs can be better/worse in any meaningful way without a being. More importantly, I reject the double standard that attempts to devalue that which is positive.

That's the point. Don't bring about X so Y doesn't happen. Cause and effect. Future conditional. If this, then that could happen. Don't do this. — schopenhauer1

X not happening results in A happening instead, which is good for Z. When Z is not there in the first place, the absence of X or A means nothing to Z. However, if it does in one case, I don't see any good reason to think that it doesn't in the other.

You are confusing how epistemology works. Future conditionals are only understood by someone who exists to know "If then statements". It is from the POV of someone who can comprehend "If then statements" that we know this to be true. — schopenhauer1

Not really. It is you, I think, who is projecting value judgements onto nothingness by conflating the absence of a being and the presence of some good that supposedly comes from it. Also, if/them statements stretch beyond the negative.

Oddly, this is just bolstering the AN point. This is how it works when someone is born (they just live their life without your negative interference). However, from the future conditional perspective, you are not going to start negatives for another. It is not letting known harms occur (that could have). — schopenhauer1

Which is a mirage. Negative interference and positive intervention both have a role to play. The only thing is that an existing person can live a decent life without the latter, whereas there is no life at all before birth.

But we are not talking about unmitigated good are we. Perhaps if a paradise only universe existed and guaranteed you might have some argument. So hey, at least I'm giving you that point! But alas, we know this world is not that. But I'd even argue, EVEN in that scenario, though it is perfectly permissible to go ahead and start that life, not starting it isn't unethical. As you admit, not starting something does nothing for no one. Nothingness doesn't "hurt" anyone. — schopenhauer1

I am thankful to you for your magnanimous attitude. However, I cannot but continue to disagree. If, hypothetically, we lived in a hellish landscape devoid of all love and beauty without any hope, your view would have had immense worth. But as we are not discussing boundless harms, ignoring the good cannot be ethically justifiable. Your next statement about that possible utopia further reflects your deep-rooted pessimistic bias by forgetting about the fact that procreation can also have unimaginable value for those who exist. Finally, not starting anything benefits nobody either.

I'm reposting part of my question from another thread here, since it was one of the questions that "started" this thread. I still cannot answer myself - why (and how) should an antinatalist live?

https://unherd.com/2023/04/we-need-to-talk-about-extreme-antinatalism/

I came across this article, and the following is an excerpt from the linked article:

... Jiwoon Hwang, Rafe McGregor, and Ema Sullivan-Bissett (last two are not antinatalists) have all persuasively argued that promortalism is the core of antinatalism. ... For all three individuals, if you accept that life is suffering, it is reasonable not only to want to cease the propagation of life but to end life. Sullivan-Bissett and McGregor offer the analogy of smoking — if you think smoking causes harm, you don’t only think people shouldn’t start smoking. You believe that people should stop if they already smoke ...

This is a paper by Jiwoon Hwang (an antinatalist) arguing it's always better to cease to exist
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3184600

So, is there really no reason for an antinatalist to live?

So, is there really no reason for an antinatalist to live — rossii

That is answered from where the premises are being framed. Most AN arguments are about notions of starting or imposing suffering onto others. Not starting does not necessarily entail thus ending one’s life once born. Indeed part of the suffering and imposition to begin with is even being put in a position where once must decide if life is worth living, and thus where Cioran’s quote encapsulates a sort of resigned mindset of the living pessimist:

It is not worth the bother of killing yourself, since you always kill yourself too late. — Cioran

Meaning, suicide is an impossible wish of undoing the suffering that has already occurred. What we really want is to never have suffered in the first place. Annihilation after the fact doesn’t negate this.

What we really want is to never have suffered in the first place. Annihilation after the fact doesn’t negate this. — schopenhauer1

Doesn't non-existence in the first place leave the equation absurd? To not have existed is to never have had a will to not suffer. The relief from suffering cannot exist for something that does not exist. We have to exist with suffering in order to want to be free from suffering. This paradox makes the will to never have existed an essentially meaningless yearning. Since it is with even less meaning in its fundamental emptiness than a meaningless existence that actually exist.

Not quite. Too clean cut and dry, people commit suicide for all sorts of reasons not because they "never really wanted to have suffered." The one subject Camus is actually worth reading for. — Vaskane

Can you explain your objection? At the end of the day my point is antinatalism doesn’t entail promortalism, whatever the reasons great or small for suicide. Camus asked if we should kill ourselves if life has no meaning and of course his answer was live rebelliously with the absurdity. Not causing suffering for others, by imposing life doesn’t mean one ought to not choose to continue with the burdens foisted upon them by continuing to live.

We have to exist with suffering in order to want to be free from suffering. This paradox makes the will to never have existed an essentially meaningless yearning. Since it is with even less meaning in its fundamental emptiness than a meaningless existence that actually exist. — Christoffer

That strengthens Ciorans point in suicide. We are put in an impossible situation. The nostalgia for “unbirth” can never be attained. It doesn’t negate choosing not to impose the very dilemma on another.

Suicide is much more than just/if even at all "an impossible wish of undoing suffering." IMO. Carry on with your views though. — Vaskane

You simply didn’t answer me so I guess I will carry on since you have no response..shrug.

That strengthens Ciorans point in suicide. We are put in an impossible situation. The nostalgia for “unbirth” can never be attained. It doesn’t negate choosing not to impose the very dilemma on another. — schopenhauer1

But we do impose the dilemma on others by acknowledging that the suffering of existence exists, putting a spotlight on ideas that in themselves lead to the suffering. And we also need to interact with the ideas in order to process suffering and find a way past it. To interact with the ideas require interaction with others over these ideas.

I think that when adding our biological drives into the mix, people find social bonds meaningful, regardless of their meaninglessness intellectually. We have this vague feeling of meaning when with others. So in that sense, imposing the ideas that lead to suffering on others is impossible to avoid, but equally required for us in order to find meaning and a will to exist. So we can't be free from imposing these things on others because we need to interact with the ideas about our suffering to process it through our social bonds.

I just happen to see that as a bit of a reductionist way of viewing suicide. — Vaskane

Suicide is multifaceted. My point was how it’s not entailed with antinatslism. We can discuss peoples reasons for suicide but the quote was to point the paradoxes associated with it. It ends suffering, but for whom? The suffering has already occurred by the time it is committed. I believe life to entail suffering, both necessary and contingent. Suicide in some way is a response to this in some way, whether philosophically driven regarding meaning or acute reasons like specific circumstances.

We have this vague feeling of meaning when with others. — Christoffer

Sure, and others can cause suffering.

So we can't be free from imposing these things on others because we need to interact with the ideas about our suffering to process it through our social bonds. — Christoffer

Not sure what this means.