What is the importance of the free will debate, in your eyes? In mine it is one of responsibility- the metaphysics only interest me insofar as they inform the notion of responsibility. If responsibility is the main focal point, then one can be a compatibilist even if determinism is false because the free will the compatibilist is concerned with is one of responsibility, not metaphysics. — Chany
On your view, in a world where microphysical determinism obtains in such a way at to enable an ideal Laplacean predictor to foresee all future events (on the basis of his knowledge of all the present physical conditions and of the deterministic laws of physics), there are two senses in which a future occurrence can meaningfully be said to be 'possible' -- epistemic possibility or ontological possibility -- where the latter doesn't depend on an agent's perspective at all. — Pierre-Normand
On your view, though, there is only one 'ontological possibility' in the Case 1 scenario. And the fact that the agent doesn't yet know (prior to making up her mind) which door it is that she will open is a case of epistemic possibility, just as it is in the Case 2 scenario. — Pierre-Normand
My question to you, then, is this: Why is it that the agent, in the first scenario, wouldn't be justified to just try one door at random and forego any prior deliberation regarding the potential threats (tiger versus snakes), just as it would make sense to forego such pointless deliberations in the the first scenario when she knows that only one door is unlocked anyway. Why is there any practical point in her prior deliberating what choice to make when, on your view, there actually just in one real (ontological) possibility that already has been set by the past state of the universe and the laws of physics; and her 'feeling' that there are two options really (ontologically) open to her reflects nothing more than mere 'epistemic possibilities'? — Pierre-Normand
On my view, if determinism is true, whatever the agent does in both scenarios, whether they deliberate or just go right ahead and try opening one door or the other, it had to happen exactly the way it did, and the agent didn't really have any choice in it. — Terrapin Station
There has to really be more than one option. — Terrapin Station
??? That's not my view. There is no "epistemic possibility" where there is no ontic possibility. An "epistemic possibility" with no ontic possibility is otherwise known as a false belief. — Terrapin Station
So what would these options be and what would this look like? — FreeEmotion
So, a claim of epistemic possibility regarding a proposition that is (unbeknownst to one) metaphysically impossible isn't the expression of a false belief. — Pierre-Normand
The reason why the issue came up is because you (and also john) were charging me with conflating epistemic and ontological issues — Pierre-Normand
I believe there is a concrete example given above, the example with the two doors - in that case, what would the 'real possibilities' be? Is that a good example to use? — FreeEmotion
Yes it is on my view. The definition of epistemic possibility that you give describes an illusion--something that one is mistaken about re how the world really is (or a false belief). Namely that it's possible that C can obtain consequent to A, in the scenario where there is only one possibility that can obtain consequent to A, B. — Terrapin Station
You are misunderstanding the definition. It's not an illusion, it's a claim of ignorance — Pierre-Normand
Re the other comments, I'm not that familiar with Van Inwagen's argument (and not that fond of the fact that it seems to be made strictly as a formal logical argument, due to my belief about what logic is, etc.). I'd have to go more into detail just what the issue would be there. Re the "luck" and "intelligibility" issues, for one, will seems to bias probabilities. There's no reason to believe that different possibilities are equiprobable. And the bias can be near 100% in some cases. — Terrapin Station
But that is not what we are talking about here, it is like the question - do parallel universes exist at the point of each possible action? — FreeEmotion
Getting acquainted at least with an informal statement of van Inwagnen's consequence argument (also credited to Carl Ginet) is useful because it has been central to the debate about free will and determinism for many decades now, and it brings into focus many of the incompatible commitments that ground the accounts of the libertarians, the compatibilists and the hard determinists.
The "intelligibility problem" for for libertarian free will is a very old objection that has been raised for it and that has been much discussed by one of the most prominent contemporary libertarian: Robert Kane. See page 23 in Four Views on Free Will, which you can preview for free on Google Books.
The "luck objection" is closely related to the intelligibility problem but it is most often raised in the context of the libertarian accounts of the "possibility to do otherwise", i.e. the libertarian way to simultaneously satisfy the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and secure "agent control" over the choice actually being made. Maybe you can just Google "agent", "control", "luck" and "PAP". It is also mentioned in the SEP article mentioned above (search the word "luck" in the page). — Pierre-Normand
If you believe that I'm saying that the definition has it as an illusion you're misunderstanding my comment. I'm saying that what the definition is describing would be an illusion, if determinism is true. — Terrapin Station
You still seem to be missing the point of the concept of epistemic possibility. If when I am claiming that for all I know my girlfriend may (epistemic 'possibly') still be at home, I am saying nothing more than that I dont know. I don't know because both propositions are consistent with everything that I do know (or believe falsely). In what sense would this seemingly justified claim of ignorance be illusory, and what is the relevance of determinism to it? Maybe I know it and have forgotten? That would by one way to interpret the claim that a statement of epistemic possibility is mistaken. — Pierre-Normand
If we're ONLY saying "I don't know if she's home or not" how are we talking about possibility? — Terrapin Station
If we're ONLY saying "I don't know if she's home or not" how are we talking about possibility? — Terrapin Station
Because it an extremely common and everyday use of the words "possible" and "impossible" — Pierre-Normand
Is it possible that I have a brother? — Michael
This comment suggests that you didn't really read or understand the comment you're responding to. — Terrapin Station
that you claimed not to be familiar with. — Pierre-Normand
Is it possible that I have a brother? It's a yes-no question. — Michael
If I'm only saying I don't know, it doesn't follow that I believe it's possible. — Terrapin Station
If it means that both the proposition and its negation are consistent with everything that you know (or believe to be true), then that's 'possible' in the epistemic sense. — Pierre-Normand
What??? You didn't seem to understand if we're only. If we're only saying that "I don't know," then we're not saying "that's possible," right? Because "that's possible" is not ONLY "I don't know." — Terrapin Station
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