you may be able to enlighten me about Biosemiotics (BS). Which has been proposed as an alternative to Panpsychism (PP) as a mechanism for the emergence of Mind from Matter. — Gnomon
So I’ll let others explain their own views as best they can, — javra
So I’ll let others explain their own views as best they can, — javra
You did a splendid job of misrepresenting what biosemiosis claims. :up: — apokrisis
To apply biosemiotics to a former cosmos devoid of life from which life emerged will either necessitate a panpsychistic cosmos by default or, else, again, it will make no sense: the semiotics of life, i.e. biosemiotics, applied to processes of non-life in attempts to explain life’s emergence and all aspects of life, thereby explaining the semiotics of life. — javra
Simply put, semiotics resolves the antique dilemma of realism vs idealism by inserting the epistemic cut of the “sign” between the world and its interpretation. — apokrisis
Self-replication requires a distinction between the self that is replicated and the non-self that is not replicated. The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image. This epistemic cut is also required by the semiotic distinction between the interpreter and what is interpreted, like a sign or a symbol. In physics this is the distinction between the result of a measurement – a symbol – and what is being measured – a material object.
I call this the symbol-matter problem, but this is just a narrower case of the classic 2500-year-old epistemic problem of what our world image actually tells us about what we call the real world.
there is somehow an “observer” baked into the physics — apokrisis
But then, in this thread about the science of consciousness you’ve so far been unable to address the rather basic question of whether “I am conscious of this text” is a truth-baring proposition. — javra
...you’ve so far been unable to address the rather basic question of whether “I am conscious of this text” is a truth-baring proposition. — javra
I gave you the answer. Your question suffers from logical vagueness. Affirming yes or no would make no useful difference. — apokrisis
It remains up to you to define consciousness in terms that pragmatically means anything measurable if you are indeed talking about “the science” of it. Or even just it’s metaphysics. — apokrisis
What is your theory of truth? — wonderer1
To precisely demarcate what personal conscious is is not to define one's personal consciousness in ways that are measurable. Nor does metaphysics mandate that what is shall itself be measurable. — javra
You do a lot of weaselling to avoid supplying a definition to the term that I must give a yes or no answer on. — apokrisis
I’ll help you out. Do you mean something more than attending and reporting if I agree I am conscious of the text? If more, what exactly? — apokrisis
how on earth could I when you address the proposition of "I am conscious of this text" as neither having a truth-value nor being without one. — javra
Let me insult you again. You continue to weasel your way out of the requirement to provide a counterfactual definition to fit your counterfactual proposition. Technically, your position becomes not even wrong, simply vague. — apokrisis
Counterfactual conditionals (also subjunctive or X-marked) are conditional sentences which discuss what would have been true under different circumstances, e.g. "If Peter believed in ghosts, he would be afraid to be here." — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_conditional
Capable of being wrong rather than not even wrong. — apokrisis
Still not even an attempt to define your use of consciousness here then? You had many chances now. That says you can’t do it. — apokrisis
Yes. Materialism is not helpful for dealing with the philosophy of mind*1. That's why David Chalmers, a professional Neurologist, calls the metaphysics of Mind : "the hard problem". The philosophy of Panpsychism is all about aboutness*2. :smile:Yes. Exactly. Science needs materialism to work. Are there aspects of life where a materialist view is not helpful? — T Clark
That's why David Chalmers, a professional Neurologist... — Gnomon
Chalmers received his undergraduate degree in pure mathematics from the University of Adelaide in Australia.[10] After graduating Chalmers spent six months reading philosophy books while hitchhiking across Europe,[11] before continuing his studies at the University of Oxford,[10] where he was a Rhodes Scholar but eventually withdrew from the course.[12] In 1993, Chalmers received his PhD in philosophy and cognitive science from Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter,[13] writing a doctoral thesis entitled Toward a Theory of Consciousness.[12] He was a postdoctoral fellow in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program directed by Andy Clark at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 to 1995.
I agree that Biosemiotics is a theory of living things, not thinking things. So, I don't understand why sarcastically replied that "You did a splendid job of misrepresenting what biosemiosis claims". His alternate explanation is way over my head : "Simply put, semiotics resolves the antique dilemma of realism vs idealism by inserting the epistemic cut of the “sign” between the world and its interpretation".I won’t be much help, and this because I so far find this very quoted affirmation to be nonsensical. Bio-semiotics is the semiotics of life – it addresses the meaning transference of lifeforms and all this entails. To apply biosemiotics to a former cosmos devoid of life from which life emerged will either necessitate a panpsychistic cosmos by default or, else, again, it will make no sense: — javra
Sorry. Perhaps I mis-spoke. What do you call a "neural scientist" if not a "neurologist"? A "neuroscientist"? I didn't mean to imply that he is an MD. Apparently, he's merely a Ph.D. :smile:Do you have any evidence for Chalmers being a neurologist? — wonderer1
Thanks for stepping-in there. Your explanation makes more sense to me than the "epistemic cut" notion. For someone with no formal training in Philosophy or Biosemiotics, such jargon is way over my pointy little head. :smile:What he's calling 'an epistemic problem' is actually the metaphysical problem of appearance ('world image') and reality ('what we call the real world'). So I don't see that as 'resolving' the idealist-realist distinction. — Wayfarer
Back to the drawing board — javra
You just switched from “conscious of x” to “first person awareness”. Are we talking about a thing or a process, counterfactually speaking here?
I was talking about a process. — apokrisis
And then when you make claims about consciousness of x - as something more than attention+reporting - is consciousness of the presence of a colour the same as consciousness of some bit of text? And is consciousness of a lump of rock the same as consciousness of a bit of text? — apokrisis
Yes, you do need to back to the drawing board and do some work on your definitions so that there could be a less amateur discussion here. — apokrisis
All definitions are capable if being wrong as they all may incorrectly describe usage. — bert1
You might want to ask more questions of those you disagree with, answer those questions you’ve been asked by them, and address the replies you've already been given. — javra
That unknown, or uncertainty, or vagueness as you term it, is part of my stance. — javra
You’re laughing because you, in contrast, have certain knowledge of what consciousness is and isn’t in an empirically measurable way. — javra
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