Sorry I didn't make my point clear. I mean that every property of representation(including spatial and temporal) which we attribute to things are properties that we represent them as having, not properties that they have. Not that the spatial and temporal property can apply to other properties. It is generalization for Kant's idealism, which is called by some philosophers representation idealism.

Can't "what" the entity is, its nature, its meaning, be considered a non-spatial and non-temporal authoctinous property of the entity? — charles ferraro

And this is exactly thing-in-itself in Kant, which have no spatial, temporal and other properties, or at least we human can not get knowledge of.

When I ask "what" a spatio-temporal entity is that I am experiencing, its "what," its "nature" cannot be a thing-in-itself precisely because I am able to experience it.

However, the entity's what, its nature, that which makes the entity be what it is rather than something else, is itself not a spatio-temporal property of the entity. It is the entity's meaning.

The meaning of the perceived spatio-temporal entity, which is grasped intellectually, may be, for example, a neutron star, a supermassive black hole, a horse, a galaxy, a flower, etc.

Also, the meaning or nature of entities is itself empirical, not transcendental like space, time, and the categories, and can only be experienced, determined, and verified in an a posteriori fashion.

I submit that Kant's epistemological theory is incomplete precisely because he neglected to address this important matter and how it would fit into his theory.

I submit that Kant's epistemological theory is incomplete precisely because he neglected to address this important matter and how it would fit into his theory. — charles ferraro

Why do you say that? Kant allowed for empirical knowledge; justifying scientific knowledge was one of his major concerns.

You misunderstood me.

I am focusing on our non-scientific a posteriori everyday experience of the "nature" of empirical objects.

Where in his works does Kant clearly and convincingly explain precisely how the "nature" of a given empirical object of everyday a posteriori experience can be generated by human sensibility and understanding simply applying space, time, and the categories to what he calls the given manifold of sensation? Kant needs more than just a given manifold of sensation.

The closest he came to trying to address this matter, I think, is in the section of the CPR concerning the Schematism which, in my opinion, is a complete failure.

Where in his works does Kant clearly and convincingly explain precisely how the "nature" of a given empirical object of everyday a posteriori experience can be generated by human sensibility and understanding simply applying space, time, and the categories to what he calls the given manifold of sensation? Kant needs more than just a given manifold of sensation. — charles ferraro

Our everyday experience consists of images, sensations and impressions, which we model as a world of empirical objects. Do we say that modeling is a part of our experience or our judgement? The "nature" of those objects, as far as we can know, is given by their observed attributes and relations, including their differences from and similarities to other objects.

Kant acknowledges that we cannot know how our experience of a world of objects is engendered by a given manifold of sensation. What we are precognitively affected by, including what we precognitively are, is simply not available to consciousness. This is what is denoted by noumena and the ding an sich.

When you say that we "model" a world of empirical objects do you mean that we deliberately "create" a world of empirical objects out of the raw sense data by our brains synthesizing the raw sense data into particular empirical objects of our own choice?

Or do you mean that we are spontaneously guided by and follow empirical rules of sensory organization imbedded in, inherent in, the raw sense data when our brains synthesize the raw sense data into particular objects not of our own choice?

In my opinion, we do not have to have immediate recourse to transcendent things-in-themselves or noumena to explain sensory organization. They explain nothing.

We simply have to posit the possible existence of empirical rules of sensory organization embedded in the sense data which spontaneously guide our brains' synthesizing activities.

When you say that we "model" a world of empirical objects do you mean that we deliberately "create" a world of empirical objects out of the raw sense data by our brains synthesizing the raw sense data into particular empirical objects of our own choice? — charles ferraro

Of course not: for it to count as a deliberate act we would need to be precognitively aware of our own primordial affections.

Or do you mean that we are spontaneously guided by and follow empirical rules of sensory organization imbedded in, inherent in, the raw sense data when our brains synthesize the raw sense data into particular objects not of our own choice? — charles ferraro

We might assume that there is some lawlike process that entails that our models are naturally isomorphic to what affects us; but we don't and cannot know that, because we cannot compare what we are conscious of with what we cannot be conscious of.

In my opinion, we do not have to have immediate recourse to transcendent things-in-themselves or noumena to explain sensory organization. They explain nothing. — charles ferraro

It is not just your opinion, we do not have recourse to what is transcendental to our experience. The ding an sich and the noumena are explicitly understood, or stipulated to be, that way by Kant.

We simply have to posit the possible existence of empirical rules of sensory organization embedded in the sense data which spontaneously guide our brains' synthesizing activities. — charles ferraro

We don't have to; we can just acknowledge our ignorance and be content with dealings with things as they appear to us.

When I ask "what" a spatio-temporal entity is that I am experiencing, its "what," its "nature" cannot be a thing-in-itself precisely because I am able to experience it. — charles ferraro

You have a sensory experience of an object - i.e. you see it - but your categorisation of it ('it's a tree') etc is dependent on your prior knowledge of what such objects are. Both the sensory apprehension and the apperception are elements of experience but both are needed to interpret the meaning of objects, in line with the maxim 'percepts without concepts are blind, concepts without percepts are empty.'

However, the entity's what, its nature, that which makes the entity be what it is rather than something else, is itself not a spatio-temporal property of the entity. It is the entity's meaning. — charles ferraro

or the 'form', 'principle', or 'idea'.

Also, the meaning or nature of entities is itself empirical, not transcendental like space, time, and the categories, and can only be experienced, determined, and verified in an a posteriori fashion. — charles ferraro

But is it? Identifying something as a black hole, for instance, might require empirical evidence (i.e. an image or observation of refracted light) but you will only know to look for it, and know how to interpret the data, because of theory. You could not have even begun to look for a black hole, prior to the theoretical basis on which they were projected (which was wholly mathematical).

I am focusing on our non-scientific a posteriori everyday experience of the "nature" of empirical objects. — charles ferraro

If this were the case, then..…

We simply have to posit the possible existence of empirical rules of sensory organization embedded in the sense data which spontaneously guide our brains' synthesizing activities. — charles ferraro

…..that would follow.

But it isn’t, so it doesn’t. Our experience is of representations of empirical objects, from which follows the rules cannot be embedded in the sense data, which are not representations, but only mere appearances.

Rules imply a logical form. If the faculty of sensibility from which sense data is obtained has no logical predication, then rules, principles or a priori legislation of any kind, cannot reside therein.
————-

Where in his works does Kant clearly and convincingly explain precisely how the "nature" of a given empirical object of everyday a posteriori experience can be generated by human sensibility and understanding simply applying space, time, and the categories to what he calls the given manifold of sensation? — charles ferraro

He goes to a relatively minor extent to expose the error in doing exactly that, the “clearly”, “convincingly” and “precisely” being judgements as subjective as the reader’s willingness to accede to the tenets of the work as a whole.

The nature of a given empirical object from which its matter alone is given a posteriori, is nothing more than an undeterminable change in our sensory condition, or, which is the same thing, the manner in which the senses are affected by the presentation of that object to them. That by which the matter is arranged, and by which the object is determinable, cannot be contained in the sensation, but must reside a priori in intuition. From which follows it isn’t the nature of the given empirical object, but the nature of the representation of that object, that is our experience. In short, it is we that say what that nature is, in accordance with the kind of intelligence incorporated in our nature.

Nevertheless, you’re kinda right, in that his implementation of imagination in both the faculties of sensibility and cognition, for which he admits (A76/B103) as having no clear, convincing, precise exposition, leaves one to either grant the necessity of it logically, or…..you know, like……question the very ground of the theory itself.

Same as it ever was…..

Do humans encounter Being directly, or indirectly.? Does Being present itself directly to humans, or do humans have to re-present being?

For example, Brentano, Husserl and Sartre (intentionality, pre-reflective Cogito, and nihilation) on the one hand, versus Kant, Fichte, and Schopenhauer (transcendental idealism) on the other hand.

For me, this remains the perennially unresolved issue.

Does Being present itself directly to humans, or do humans have to re-present being? — charles ferraro

Only things are presented, being is not a thing so is not presented. And while things that are presented presuppose the necessity of their existence, or if one wishes to say the necessity of their being, there is nothing gained by exchanging one for the other.

Cogito I understand. What is pre-reflective cogito?

I don't understand how your comment relates to mine.

What does "things that are presented presuppose the necessity of their existence" mean? Are you claiming that human beings presuppose that all things (entities) that present themselves to them are the cause of their own existence (i.e., that they are necessary, rather than contingent things)?

So what? This has nothing to do with what I was writing about.

I guess Sartre was mis-speaking when he provided detailed descriptions of how both BEING-in-iself and BEING-for-itself present themselves to human beings.

Sartre's explanation of the pre-reflective cogito can be found in The Transcendence of the Ego and in Being and Nothingness.

Hint:
One can study the object as an object, or
One can study the subject as an object, or
One can study the subject as a subject.

Ok. Thanks.

Any empirical entity I encounter is given to my perception as a complex of sensations that has already been completely organized according to a principle which always precedes and is unrelated to any subsequent, deliberate effort on my part to attempt to conceptually categorize or classify the entity.

Hypothetically speaking, a person encountering an empirical entity for the first time has no prior knowledge of what such an entity is, and this prior knowledge is not required to function as an indispensable condition for that person to be able to perceive the entity presenting itself, in the first place, as an organized complex of sensations - as a clearly delineated finished product, so to speak.

Only later, at a more sophisticated level, does theory development and predictive guidance come into play.

Any empirical entity I encounter is given to my perception as a complex of sensations that has already been completely organized according to a principle which always precedes and is unrelated to any subsequent, deliberate effort on my part to attempt to conceptually categorize or classify the entity. — charles ferraro

Ah, but that's not the point. That's an 'instinctively empiricist' view - you're assuming the prior reality of the object. Kant's philosophy is about how we make sense of experience, without making that assumption.

Yes, that is precisely the point.

In my opinion, Kant's epistemology never successfully demonstrated how the subsequent reality of any empirical entity could be generated by simply applying the transcendental forms of intuition and the transcendental categories of the understanding to a given manifold of sensation. Kant's chapter on the Schematism, which was supposed to demonstrate this, was and still is a dismal failure.


That is my reasoned view and, rest assured, there's nothing "instinctive" about it!

In my opinion, Kant's epistemology never successfully demonstrated how the subsequent reality of any empirical entity could be generated by simply applying the transcendental forms of intuition and the transcendental categories of the understanding to a given manifold of sensation. — charles ferraro

What do you mean 'subsequent' reality? Subsequent to what? In this online edition, do you mean the chapter 'Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding'?

Take a read of Schopenhauer's Critique of the Kantian Philosophy to understand what I am trying to get at.
Yes, that's the chapter.

At the moment, I'm reading that chapter I mentioned, which (as always) is a pretty hard slog, but as I keep promising myself to read more of Kant then I will stick with the source at the moment, so if I do read Schopenhauer's criticism I will better grasp it.

Any empirical entity I encounter is given to my perception as a complex of sensations that has already been completely organized according to a principle which always precedes and is unrelated to any subsequent, deliberate effort on my part to attempt to conceptually categorize or classify the entity. — charles ferraro

Taking vision as paradigmatic, what you seem to be saying is that we can, prior to any learning or influence of culture and language, see things and that how those things merely appear, as opposed to what we think of them as being, is not modified by cultural or linguistic accretions.

In order to see something it must stand out from its environment, or if you prefer, from the whole visual field. What is it that makes objects stand out, such that humans and animals alike arguably see the same things in the same places?

An intriguing, rather unique answer to your figure/ground question can be found in Sartre's explanation of how human pre-reflective consciousness (also called Being-for-Itself) constantly and spontaneously uses the process of Nihilation, that is, actually uses Nothingness, to try to distance itself from itself and to distance itself from that which is not itself (Being-in-Itself), in order to make already existing objects emerge or stand out from their ground (Being-in-Itself). Again, there is no deliberation involved in this process, it is spontaneous and occurs constantly.

I haven't read much Sartre, and that explanation makes no sense at all to me, I'm afraid. Is it supposed to explain how things stand out for animals too?

No, does not apply to animals.

Maybe my interpretation of his theory did not do it justice.

Many explanations and theories that fall outside the accepted paradigm(s) will, of course, "make no sense" upon first reading.

Why not read Sartre's original works before passing judgement.

The most plausible explanation would have to apply to both humans and animals, since it is with animality that we begin.

I already have too many things of interest to read and too little time; why would I consider reading a philosopher of little interest to me?

Your first statement is a presumptuous non-sequitur.

Everyone is entitled to their opinion.

So be it.

Best of luck.

Your first statement is a presumptuous non-sequitur. — charles ferraro

You don't seem to know what 'non sequitur' means. So, you don't accept the premise that we are basically animals evolved from other animals?

As I said, best of luck!!!

As I said, best of luck!!! — charles ferraro

I don't think I'm the one who needs it...

Good for you!

Where in his works does Kant clearly and convincingly explain precisely how the "nature" of a given empirical object of everyday a posteriori experience can be generated by human sensibility and understanding simply applying space, time, and the categories to what he calls the given manifold of sensation? — charles ferraro

I think he 'illegally' takes for granted the commonsense realism that grasps in the usual way the causal relationships between eyes and apples and trombones and ears. This same commonsense realism is absurdly denied by simultaneously (tacitly) being appealed to. Kant inherited the methodological solipsism from others. Philosophers generally took it as obvious, despite its serious shortcomings, because of its genuine advantages.