If you are a consequentialist, the best outcome is the one which can be most reliably produced, the one over which you have the most control. It is unrealistic to apply something like an objective standard - the best outcome - when any kind of non-trivial activity invariably results in unforseen outcomes.

What about the argument is uniquely consequentialist? It seems like the argument will apply generally, and not only to consequentialists. This is a problem if you are specifically aiming at consequentialists.

If you are a consequentialist, the best outcome is the one which can be most reliably produced, the one over which you have the most control. It is unrealistic to apply something like an objective standard - the best outcome - when any kind of non-trivial activity invariably results in unforseen outcomes. — Pantagruel

Yes. Good response, saving me the necessity of responding.

Yes. Good response, saving me the necessity of responding. — T Clark

:up:

Dit que le mieux est l'ennemi du bien

It is unrealistic to apply something like an objective standard - the best outcome - when any kind of non-trivial activity invariably results in unforseen outcomes. — Pantagruel

Clearly there are instances in which the consequentialist can effect a better outcome over another - even if non-trivial activities can have unforeseen outcomes. Just because we aren't always aware of all of the consequences of our actions doesn't mean we cannot make some accurate predictions and come up with what is a best decision according to its estimated outcome.

If you are a consequentialist, the best outcome is the one which can be most reliably produced, the one over which you have the most control. — Pantagruel

My argument specifically stipulated that the best outcome could be achieved, a stipulation that could be changed to that "the best outcome that can be most reliably produced" could be achieved. It would be relatively easy to amend my argument to accommodate your objections, as "the best outcome that can be reliably produced" could just be the best outcome once the circumstances surrounding the viability of certain decisions are evaluated.

What about the argument is uniquely consequentialist? It seems like the argument will apply generally, and not only to consequentialists. This is a problem if you are specifically aiming at consequentialists. — Leontiskos

If we were talking about some sort of absolute rules, we don't need to prioritize consequences, and, thus, one could just throw out premise (6). But yes, my argument could be applied to many different forms of ethics with some modifications.

Dit que le mieux est l'ennemi du bien

I agree.

If we were talking about some sort of absolute rules, we don't need to prioritize consequences, and, thus, one could just throw out premise (6). — ToothyMaw

As far as I can tell, premise (6) is a tautology. Is there some significant difference between an 'outcome' and a 'consequence'?

If you are a consequentialist, you must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences - not just good consequences - or you do not have good intentions. I have formulated an argument that supports this:

[...]

So, it seems that not only is consequentialism incredibly demanding, but it is also an exercise in self-deprecation if you are not some sort of selfless, Jesus-like figure incapable of a cheat day. — ToothyMaw

I find the OP to be fraught with unaddressed issues.

For any of the premises given: Good from the vantage of whom? Me? You and me together? The totality of all individuals that constitute the click or nation or culture we pertain to? The entire human species? All life in the cosmos? In some unrealizable idealization of what should be, all of these will converge into the same all the time; akin to a kind of perfected deontology. In the reality we all know, this convergence will rarely if ever happen – with a great deal of conflict between these different vantages of what is good occurring to varying extents most all of the time.

For one example, to typical hardcore capitalist(s), the dedication of one’s entire life to volunteer work (etc.) is clearly bad, for there’s no material profit to be gained by it, and maximized material profit is what the hardcore capitalist considers good. So why presume that the intention of so volunteering is a good intention? (Even those who are not hardcore capitalists still need to make enough profit to put food on the table for themselves and loved ones.)

This is not to say that the constituent minds of all these different, often competing, vantages do not all share the goal of actualizing what is good for themselves. But the issue is far more complex than the OP presents it to be. To include epistemic uncertainty during times of choice making in terms of which alternative possibility is in fact the best option for satisfying the distal goal pursued.

I’ll offer that what makes a good intention good is its ability to adequately satisfy a want when engaged in – this in the long term to the best of one’s forethought, if not also in the short term.

Different wants, different good intentions (here meaning, intentions that best satisfy the given want(s)). A carnivore’s want to catch the herbivore will thereby hold a best intention (among alternative possible intentions) that is thereby good which is directly contradictory to the best intention, which is thereby good, of the herbivore whose want is to not be caught (this to not get into possible details concerning human conflicts).

Only if there occurs a universal underlying want that is the same for all (e.g., for both carnivore and herbivore) will there then be such a thing as a universal good which the constituent minds of all previously mentioned vantages could in theory intend to actualize – this as best as each can within its own contexts even when there occur conflicts between more proximate good intentions (e.g., between what is good for the predator and what is good for the prey). Long story short, it will only be in this situation that there can potentially occur a consequence, or outcome, whose potential actualization would satisfy the wants of all. Such that an honest variant of what is themed "the greater good" is aligned with, at the very least, the long term personal good of all involved. More concretely, such that the good of established cultural mores (including the morals which the culture upholds) is itself aligned to this given universal outcome just mentioned, i.e. to the universal good (as an example of what this could consist of, to the ideal outcome of absolute fairness and hence of absolute equality of value) ... thereby making adherence to these cultural morals a more impartial good and deviation from them a more impartial bad.

Notwithstanding, whether or not one upholds the possibility of such a universal good, the same seems to nevertheless hold as regards the OP: If one’s personal wants shall include the want of not self-flagellating, then any self-flagellation (allegorical or physical) will clearly be a bad relative to one's own judgement, a bad outcome which can thereby only result from (freely chosen, rather than coerced) bad intentions.

I tentatively agree with your analysis, I would only argue that it doesn't work that way in reality, though not because it couldn't.

Flagellation, as I understand you, means being exceptionally demanding of oneself to maximise good, and not settle for "good enough". Consequentialism is a lens for interpreting what's moral, but it mightn't act in a way that defines one's lifestyle.

Morality is supposed to be overriding of all other considerations but in the mundanity of day-to-day life, I wonder whether the pragmatically-minded consequentialist would really call ignoring the most negligible of differences immoral. Will they perceive the difference between the best outcome and close runner-up as worth tolerating any inconvenience for themselves or others?

Moral frameworks such as consequentialism have their merits, but if they're sold as mandating irrationality produced by the overriding feature of morality, that burden would outweigh the value. Anyone who isn't into this "flagellation" will find a way to worm their way to rejecting the necessity, doesn't matter how compelling your logic is. It is pointless to be pedantic about logic, there's a need to be emotionally compelling. Ultimately, people need to be motivated and inspired, and for that, sometimes "good enough" needs to cut it.

If the difference is actually substantial, then I agree. Outcomes are relative, and ignoring a vastly better option because one's preferred option is "good enough", would undermine consequentialism.

If you are a consequentialist, you must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences - not just good consequences - or you do not have good intentions — ToothyMaw

This isn't necessarily true if one subscribes to rule-consequentialism. For instance, Brad Hooker's defense of rule-consequentialism—that an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value—denies this psychology. Rather, he argues a rule-consequentialist could hold the following psychology: (1) their fundamental moral motivation is to do what is impartially defensible; (2) they believe that acting on impartially justified rules is impartially defensible; (3) they believe that rule-consequentialism is on balance the best account of impartially justified rules. Thus, I don't think all types of consequentialists must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences.

So, it seems that not only is consequentialism incredibly demanding, but it is also an exercise in self-deprecation if you are not some sort of selfless, Jesus-like figure incapable of a cheat day. — ToothyMaw

I believe this is one of the main reasons Hooker defends rule-consequentialism rather than act-consequentialism. He believes it avoids the demandingness of something like utilitarianism, which requires huge sacrifices from individuals.

As far as I can tell, premise (6) is a tautology. Is there some significant difference between an 'outcome' and a 'consequence'? — Leontiskos

An outcome is, broadly, what happens as a function of our directed intention, whereas consequences in this context are what actually happens to people when one acts.

If one subscribes to a categorical imperative against lying, then lying to bring about good consequences has no place at all in terms of bringing about ethical outcomes, whereas for a consequentialist lying could very well be an outcome favored because it brings about what are deemed to be good consequences. If you have an absolute rule that says one must never lie, the best outcome - not lying - is good regardless of the potentially crappy consequences it might have for people.

This isn't necessarily true if one subscribes to rule-consequentialism. For instance, Brad Hooker's defense of rule-consequentialism—that an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value—denies this psychology. Rather, he argues a rule-consequentialist could hold the following psychology: (1) their fundamental moral motivation is to do what is impartially defensible; (2) they believe that acting on impartially justified rules is impartially defensible; (3) they believe that rule-consequentialism is on balance the best account of impartially justified rules. Thus, I don't think all types of consequentialists must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences. — DubiousDachshund

an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value — DubiousDachshund

I don't think all types of consequentialists must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences. — DubiousDachshund

What about laws that would dictate which choice is to be made upon being presented with a dilemma?

If we are presented with a law, or an intersection of laws, that tell us how to differentiate between two acts with good consequences - but one is clearly superior due to the situation or context - isn't the intention just being displaced and projected onto a law or number of laws created by people that, if followed correctly, selects the best outcome based on a deficit of good consequences (its internalization dictates it must contribute to the maximum expected value, which implies that one outcome is preferable to another)? And if so, does the impartial defense of such rules not support the logic of my argument?

If we are presented with a law, or an intersection of laws, that tell us how to differentiate between two acts with good consequences - but one is clearly superior due to the situation or context - isn't the intention just being displaced and projected onto a law or number of laws created by people that, if followed correctly, selects the best outcome based on a deficit of good consequences (its internalization dictates it must contribute to the maximum expected value, which implies that one outcome is preferable to another)? — ToothyMaw

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that when a rule is selected for internalization, the intention behind that choice would still follow (4) in your argument. That is:

4. Good intention requires a desire to bring about good outcomes — ToothyMaw

So, let's say there is a choice made between two rules, R1 and R2. R1 states: "One should keep one’s promises," and this would lead to 100 expected well-being. R2 states: "One should only keep promises made to those one likes," and let's say this rule only leads to 10 expected well-being. Then, at this moment of selection between R1 (100 good) and R2 (10 good), where they select R1 since it maximizes expected good, their intent would be like (4). And good outcomes are only the ones with the best consequences (from 8). Thus, a rule-consequentialist would be required to internalize R1 or they would lack good intention.

And if so, does the impartial defense of such rules not support the logic of my argument? — ToothyMaw

I have two comments on this. Firstly, I still think a rule-consequentialist following Hooker's theory would reject (4). Sure, the selection of the rules would be about maximizing consequences, but the intention behind following these rules would be something like "it is the most impartially defensible theory". Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. The reason for being a rule-consequentialist would be that it is the moral theory that answers these kinds of questions the best. Thus, when selecting rules, the rule-consequentialist should select R1 rather than R2 because R1 leads to more well-being, but the intention would be "follow the most defensible moral theory" rather than "desire good outcomes." I think this is different enough to maintain my original point.

However, it is possible that by denying (4) the rule-consequentialists actually abandons consequentialism. I'm not sure about this, but I know Peter Singer has criticized Hooker's theory for being a form of deontology, only being consequentialist in name. If that is the case, then it would be no problem that Hooker-style rule-consequentialists reject (4) since your argument isn't even about them.

Secondly, even if the argument holds for the rule-consequentialist and (4) remains in the way that it is projected onto the choice of rules, I don't think it would lead to an absurd conclusion compared with act-utilitarianism for instance. Each decision wouldn't be determined by maximizing the good, rather, a limited number of rules would be followed. Everyone can only internalize so much, and the more complicated the rules, the more costly to internalize. The cost of internalization would also be affected by the cost of going against human psychology. If the rules require one to live a life of self-sacrifice, then the cost of internalization would likely be impossibly high. The resulting rules would by that token be far less demanding.

ANOTHER THOUGHT
I hope I'm not bombarding you with too much stuff, but I had another thought. How do you think your argument applies to ethical egoism? It could be considered a consequentialist theory as the "best outcome" would be something like: "maximizes what is good for oneself."

Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. — DubiousDachshund

That rule consequentialism is appealing or desirable because of these things is undeniable.

Firstly, I still think a rule-consequentialist following Hooker's theory would reject (4). Sure, the selection of the rules would be about maximizing consequences, but the intention behind following these rules would be something like "it is the most impartially defensible theory". Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. The reason for being a rule-consequentialist would be that it is the moral theory that answers these kinds of questions the best. Thus, when selecting rules, the rule-consequentialist should select R1 rather than R2 because R1 leads to more well-being, but the intention would be "follow the most defensible moral theory" rather than "desire good outcomes." I think this is different enough to maintain my original point. — DubiousDachshund

I think that when you say that rule consequentialism says that the justification for following rules that are selected because they maximize value must either be grounded in estimated consequences, or it really is just deontology with a pre-justification of maximizing expected value in the form of your assertion that “an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value”.

You also say that the rules built on this rule are justified because they are impartially defensible. Well, they are only impartially defensible according to whether or not they would fit into this internalization-filter if premise (4) is denied, and their only criterion for selection is tied to that which makes them good; it becomes circular: a rule is good if it contributes to the maximum value because a rule says that maximum value is worth pursuing leads to maximum value by justifying that rule according to itself.

I don't think that this is a problem, however, if one concedes either that rule-consequentialism like Hooker's is actually deontology, as the inception of the internalization rule - or any of the rules it leads to - could just be treated like any other rule that can be defended in any of the often circular or specious ways people typically defend rules, i.e. lying is wrong because it is by nature dishonest and dishonesty is wrong, you have the duty not to lie because of divine proclamations, etc.

If you wanted to factor in all of the desirable aspects of rule-consequentialism as a defense of the assertion that the rules one might formulate should be judged based on whether or not they are impartially defensible, you would need to change the mechanism by which the rules are internalized.

Regardless, this means Hooker's rule-consequentialism would circumvent my argument, I think.

Secondly, even if the argument holds for the rule-consequentialist and (4) remains in the way that it is projected onto the choice of rules, I don't think it would lead to an absurd conclusion compared with act-utilitarianism for instance. Each decision wouldn't be determined by maximizing the good, rather, a limited number of rules would be followed. Everyone can only internalize so much, and the more complicated the rules, the more costly to internalize. The cost of internalization would also be affected by the cost of going against human psychology. If the rules require one to live a life of self-sacrifice, then the cost of internalization would likely be impossibly high. The resulting rules would by that token be far less demanding. — DubiousDachshund

Yes, if you can prevent it from dissolving into act-utilitarianism then I agree that it seems it would be more reasonable.