Those data say things completely different from what you said — Jabberwock

Do they?

Ukraine was not worse than Russia since 1991 — Jabberwock

Not something I've ever mentioned.

its civic freedoms, while still quite imperfect, were on the higher level than Russia's at least since 2000, — Jabberwock

Again, not a claim I've ever contested.

The claims I've made are in the posts I've written. Not your head.

I'll repeat for clarity. In eight years (the time over which Russia occupied Crimea), Ukraine has gone from where Russia is now on the Human Freedom Index, to it's current state. Therefore Russia is capable, over the same time period, of the same improvement.

That is the claim. Nothing else you might want to make up about autocracy, or press freedom, or the state of affairs in 1991...

That claim is supported by the data showing that Ukraine eight years ago were in a very similar ranking to where Russia is now.

If that is so, then so would be the difference of .38 between Ukraine in 2015 and now - but the whole point of using that datapoint was to show 'evidence' for the remarkable growth that Ukraine has made in a few years? — Jabberwock

Again, try to restrict yourself to claims I've actually made. The extent to which the move was 'remarkable' is not a part of the argument. What is relevant is the difference between Ukraine and Russia (the two options available).

a handpicked data point — Jabberwock

The claim is based on a comparison of the damage done by Russian occupation. The only dataset we have of Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory in recent history is Crimea. They occupied Crimea for eight years. I picked the data from eight years ago. The data choice matches the claim. It's a relatively simple principle (or at least, I thought it was simple - my measure for what's 'simple' here may have to change).

the score from 2020 for Russia is not that relevant either, given the changes that have occurred since. I could give you a long list of those, but I will not. Do you know why? — Jabberwock

Because they'd all be speculative in effect as we don't have comparable datasets? No. I doubt that's the reason.

Odd claim though, seeing as your own data you've provided above shows a steady overall increase in the index score until 2018 whereafter the small drop is not even matched by the world ranking, which improves.

But do please provide 'the facts' which show conclusively that the last two years instigated policies which interrupted 20 years of minimal change in overall score.

It's quite simple (though you seem to be having trouble with (4))

1. Open the CSV linked.
2. Go to line 316 - 2015 Ukraine.
3. Read off column G hf-rank.
4. Avoid then picking your own data from somewhere other than the link provided to show something different. — Isaac

In the link you have provided: https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2023-01/human-freedom-index-2022.pdf

there is no data for 2015, but there are data for 2014 and for 2016: Ukraine has the score 6.50 and 6.69:



It is not unreasonable to conclude that the data for the year in between would be somewhere between that. And other publications on the site confirm exactly that: the link from 2021 shows Ukraine's score as 6.34, as shown above. Why the same site gives different scores for the same country for the same year? I do not know, it could be that they have changed the methodology in the meantime and rescored all the raw data accordingly to reflect that or maybe they just have no idea how to handle data and they just randomly put any number they want in various places. I do not know and I do not care - either way the .csv from 2018 cannot be compared to the publications from 2021 and 2022, if the concern the same results. I have mercifully not mentioned that before, but even if there was no such discrepancy, comparing rankings from different years is simply wrong - rankings are relative, so they heavily depend on the movements of other countries.

Your desperate attempt at distraction does not change the fact that the very source you have provided gives recent data and past data IN THE SAME TABLE. Claiming that the table does not say what it says because there is also another table is beyond silly, at best it discredits the very source you provide (but rather shows that you have zero understanding of their methodology).

I'll repeat for clarity. In eight years (the time over which Russia occupied Crimea), Ukraine has gone from where Russia is now on the Human Freedom Index, to it's current state. Therefore Russia is capable, over the same time period, of the same improvement.

That is the claim. Nothing else you might want to make up about autocracy, or press freedom, or the state of affairs in 1991... — Isaac

It is the claim now, but it was not before. Maybe I will repeat your claim, for clarity:

Ukraine turned from a path of corrupted oligarchy and right-wing nationalism to one of more freedom and European integration within just over a decade. So it is clear that Russian-occupied territories (even the whole of Russia) can turn from corrupted oligarchies to free democracies within a decade. — Isaac

That is simply false: the Ukraine did not turn from corrupted oligarchy to a free democracy within a decade, so not it is not clear at all that Russia can do that, no matter how much you try to water down that claim.

Your claim was also that:

Ukraine was worse than Russia around the time of Maidan — Isaac

But it is false as well. It was not worse then and it was not worse then as compared to today's Russia. Whenever you try to rely on facts, it turns out that what you write is false, because you do not know the facts.

But let us deal with your current, drastically watered down claim:

So Russia can move from the state it is now to the state where Ukraine had a temporary decrease caused by an armed rebellion instigated by Russia, with thousands of dead, dispossed, with elections blocked by the rebels etc. That is you propose that Russia move from the oppression it is under now... to the state caused by the oppression it also caused? How does that make even sense?

Before the rebellion Ukraine had scores above 7.0, that is in the middle between the current Russia and the current Spain - it was much better than Russia was then and much better than Russia is now. Before Russia has started troubles, Ukrainians were not nearly as oppressed as Russians are now, as your own source shows. So no, Ukraine did not go 'from where Russia is now', because it was never there (since 1991). It mostly improved a single indicator because it the effects of the armed rebellion caused by its neighbor were less pronounced. It had nothing to do with popular movement and it had nothing to do with fighting opression. The changes in Ukraine have nothing to do with anything what you propose.

Again, try to restrict yourself to claims I've actually made. The extent to which the move was 'remarkable' is not a part of the argument. What is relevant is the difference between Ukraine and Russia (the two options available). — Isaac

Well, your argument was that it is clear that countries can go from corrupted oligarchies to free democracies in a decade. Is it still so clear?

Ukraine was much better in all indices from Russia since 2000, with the temporary drop due to the rebellion. Given that Russia did not have an armed rebellion caused by its neighbor, it is rather unlikely it will improve in the simillar way. So how the improvement of Ukraine in a single metric - security - is an indictator of what might have happen in Russia?

Odd, seeing as your own data you've provided above shows a steady overall increase in the index score until 2018 whereafter the drop is not even matched by the world ranking.

But do please provide 'the facts' which show conclusively that the last two years instigated policies which interrupted 20 years of minimal change in overall score. — Isaac

Sure: censorship laws, freedom of movement laws, laws on companies, laws on gay 'propaganda'. These are just formal measures, as important are changes which are nor formally sanctioned, like treatment of protesters, activities of Roskomnadzor, closing publications under false pretences, etc. Here, more facts you can ignore.

In the link you have provided: https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2023-01/human-freedom-index-2022.pdf — Jabberwock

That's not the link I provided for the data in question, and it's completely dishonest to present it as such.

Why the same site gives different scores for the same country for the same year? I do not know — Jabberwock

... so just speculate instead, eh? Then assume your speculation is enough to accuse those who disagree with you of dishonesty in the same post as you blatantly lie about the source I provided.

comparing rankings from different years is simply wrong - rankings are relative, so they heavily depend on the movements of other countries. — Jabberwock

No. Rankings are there exactly so we can compare because, for example, the global economic situation affects all countries' scores, as will things like Covid restrictions and the global security situation with regards to terrorist threat and instability. Rankings avoids this. It also avoid weighting on scores because the scores are measured out of ten regardless.

Ukraine did not turn from corrupted oligarchy to a free democracy within a decade — Jabberwock

Yes it did. You re-interpreted my subjective terms so I clarified. All this in in the thread, you're not going to get anywhere pretending it didn't happen.

Ukraine had a temporary decrease caused by an armed rebellion instigated by Russia — Jabberwock

... Is not fact. You can't keep bringing in conclusions you approve of as if they countered a position I'm explaining. I don't believe the things you do. Of course your position is coherent, you've selected the beliefs which make it so. But seeing that one of your beliefs doesn't for into my narrative doesn't show us anything except that its not your narrative. We knew that.

you propose that Russia move from the oppression it is under now... to the state caused by the oppression it also caused? How does that make even sense? — Jabberwock

It doesn't. Probably one of the main reasons why I didn't say it.

It mostly improved a single indicator because it the effects of the armed rebellion caused by its neighbor were less pronounced. — Jabberwock

Ukraine's low score was the result of...

Taxation; payroll, government payments
Legal freedom; courts, enforcement, judiciary, police, protection
Economic freedom; growth, inflation control, regulatory compliance
Political freedom; party composition
Identity; overall
Rule of Law; criminal, disappearances, homicide

Apart from the disappearances and homicide (which the Amnesty International report from the time makes clear have been about equal on both sides), how are the others caused by Russia?

Before the rebellion Ukraine had scores above 7.0, that is in the middle between the current Russia and the current Spain - it was much better than Russia was then and much better than Russia is now. Before Russia has started troubles, Ukrainians were not nearly as oppressed as Russians are now, as your own source shows. So no, Ukraine did not go 'from where Russia is now', because it was never there (since 1991). — Jabberwock

Fine, we can use a different time period if you don't like 2015-2023. How about 2000-2008? Ukraine went from (using your own table seeing as you have some technical troubles opening links) 6.25 to 7.08 an increase of 0.83. The same increase would get Russia from its current 6.01 to 6.84, roughly where Ukraine is now (6.68).

Are you now going to say that that time period also had a whole load of special factors which we have to dismiss? I'm beginning to see a trend. Is it now your own links that aren't working?

Well, your argument was that it is clear that countries can go from corrupted oligarchies to free democracies in a decade. Is it still so clear? — Jabberwock

Yes. As above. If Russia currently is a corrupted oligarchy (6.01) and Ukraine is a free democracy (at 6.68), then it is clear from pretty much any time period you care to pick that the improvements required to get from one to the other are achievable within about a decade. Hell, Cabo Verde did it, with no war, no Russians, and no Soviets for a thousand miles. People can bring about improvements in their own freedoms without the military having to bomb the place first.

Sure: censorship laws, freedom of movement laws, laws on companies, laws on gay 'propaganda'. These are just formal measures, as important are changes which are nor formally sanctioned, like treatment of protesters, activities of Roskomnadzor, closing publications under false pretences, etc. — Jabberwock

Since 2020? What laws have been put in place then and how are you measuring their likely impact on the Human Freedom Index? Were all the changes you mention put in place after 2020 (6.01) but no similar changes made before 2006 (the last time Russia were near 6.01)? Did Putin have a break from oppressive policy instigation between 2006 and 2020? Was he on holiday?

The sum total of Putin's oppressive policies from 2006 have had virtually no impact on the score. Are you wanting to argue the the policies since 2020, are so awful, even compared to those in the entire period from 2006, that they'll push the score significantly lower to render all comparison with 2020 useless.

What sickening about this is that if you were clutching at straws to support some noble ideology, I could kind of accept that, but you're desperately using every trick you can think of, every deflection and supposition, to defend the principle that people cannot improve their own lives without war.

You're desperate to prove that hundreds of thousands of dead are a necessary price to pay.

I just can't get my head around that.

That's not the link I provided for the data in question, and it's completely dishonest to present it as such. — Isaac

So we are supposed to ignore it and pretend it that the other data are not there?

... so just speculate instead, eh? Then assume your speculation is enough to accuse those who disagree with you of dishonesty in the same post as you blatantly lie about the source I provided. — Isaac

Well, using data from two different sources if you have the relevant data in a single table in a document you have linked does look a bit suspicious, wouldn't you say? Especially if it is just the single outlier that is supposed to confirm your conclusions. But OK, I will give you the benefit of the doubt.

No. Rankings are there exactly so we can compare because, for example, the global economic situation affects all countries' scores, as will things like Covid restrictions and the global security situation with regards to terrorist threat and instability. Rankings avoids this. It also avoid weighting on scores because the scores are measured out of ten regardless. — Isaac

You do not even understand the issue. If Ukraine had the exact same score, but in the period of six years ten countries would fall behind it because people there lost their freedom, then Ukraine would automatically improve in the ranking. Is that evidence of its improvement? No.

Ukraine's low score was the result of...

Taxation; payroll, government payments
Legal freedom; courts, enforcement, judiciary, police, protection
Economic freedom; growth, inflation control, regulatory compliance
Political freedom; party composition
Identity; overall
Rule of Law; criminal, disappearances, homicide

Apart from the disappearances and homicide (which the Amnesty International report from the time makes clear have been about equal on both sides), how are the others caused by Russia? — Isaac

Are you using a different source again? I cannot even find such categories in the 2022 document.

The fact is that the sudden drop in Ukraine's score between 2012 and 2014 is mostly caused by the drop in the single indicator, i.e. disapperances, conflicts and terrorism. If you have any other interpretation of the facts that explains that, please do.

Fine, we can use a different time period if you don't like 2015-2023. How about 2000-2008? Ukraine went from (using your own table seeing as you have some technical troubles opening links) 6.25 to 7.08 an increase of 0.83. The same increase would get Russia from its current 6.01 to 6.84, roughly where Ukraine is now (6.68).

Are you now going to say that that time period also had a whole load of special factors which we have to dismiss? Are you own tables now flawed? — Isaac

No, in 2000-2008 Ukraine also did not went from 'corrupt oligarchy' to 'free democracy', as was your claim. The data shows a constant process of improvement that has lasted at least two decades, but that is only because there are no data from before 2000. That is, nothing about the data supports your claim that Ukraine went from oligarchy to democracy in a decade.

And no, we do not have to dismiss factors, only you do. I say we have to take all the factors into consideration, which you consistently refuse to do, by focusing on a single indicator from a single source. I have already explained what factors were, in my opinion, instrumental in the fact that the progress of the two countries was different. You have just ignored them. You are free to engage them at any time, just scroll a few posts back.

Since 2020? What laws have been put in place then and how are you measuring their likely impact on the Human Freedom Index? Were all the changes you mention put in place after 2020 (6.01) but no similar changes made before 2006 (the last time Russia were near 6.01)? Did Putin have a break from oppressive policy instigation between 2006 and 2020? Was he on holiday? — Isaac

I have already listed the laws, do you want every single act listed? I am not 'measuring' them, I present my opinion that e.g. strict tightening of censorship laws that put you in jail for 16 years MIGHT have some impact on the freedoms of those involved. If you believe that it would not affect the score, maybe it is a problem with the scoring system.

The sum total of Putin's oppressive policies from 2006 have had virtually no impact on the score. Are you wanting to argue the the policies since 2020, are so awful, even compared to those in the entire period from 2006, that they'll push the score significantly lower to render all comparison with 2020 useless. — Isaac

So you say that your source does not actually reflect the increasing oppressiveness of the Russian regime? I might agree with that. For example, Russia keeps scoring a full 10.0 in the relationship category, when from 2013 it has been introducing increasingly suppressive legislation against LGBT communities. So yes, your single source does not seem particularly good in describing the level of opression in Russia, thanks for pointing that out. Maybe we should use more facts than just a single indicator then? Maybe supporting your whole argument with a single fact is not the best possible methodology? What do you think?

So we are supposed to ignore it and pretend it that the other data are not there? — Jabberwock

No, but spending four posts trying to imply I've made some kind of mistake or act of deception is not just 'admitting it's there', is it?

using data from two different sources if you have the relevant data in a single table in a document you have linked does look a bit suspicious, wouldn't you say? — Jabberwock

I didn't have the relevant data in a single table, I had the CSV from 2018 anyway but had to look up the 2022 report. I can't think why the numbers are different, but it doesn't matter because even the figures you've used show the same. Ukraine went from 119 (where Russia is now). So the argument - that in eight years Ukraine has come from where Russia is now - is unaffected. This whole thing has been a massive diversion to avoid that argument.

If Ukraine had the exact same score, but in the period of six years ten countries would fall behind it because people there lost their freedom, then Ukraine would automatically improve in the ranking. Is that evidence of its improvement? — Jabberwock

Yes. If the other ten countries fell behind because of global reasons (like economic recessions), and yet Ukraine didn't, then it clearly had some compensatory improvements. That's why they show rankings. It's not perfect, but pretending it doesn't show anything is just ridiculous. Besides, I used scores, not rankings, from 2000-2008 and you won't accept that result either, so this whole 'ranking' issue has just been yet another deflection to avoid the argument. Whatever I use, you're going to fish out some hurriedly made-up reason to dismiss it. First it's there being another table, then it's the particular year (2015), then it's using rankings not scores, then it's the definition of 'autocracy'... you're clearly clutching at straws.

Are you using a different source again? I cannot even find such categories in the 2022 document. — Jabberwock

Same source because I'm referring (as you know full well I have been since the very fist time I mentioned it) to the 2018 document for Ukraine's 2015 score. In it, it breaks down the scores. I compared the relevant one to Russia's 2020 (latest). Not all categories are in both sets, but most are. The ones I've listed are the ones for which Ukraine scored lower than Russia (the reasons for it's lower ranking). Disappearances and homicides weren't even that big an effect. The corrupt judiciary caused as much of an effect on the score - but I suppose you'll claim that was the Russian's too.

in 2000-2008 Ukraine also did not went from 'corrupt oligarchy' to 'free democracy', as was your claim. The data shows a constant process of improvement that has lasted at least two decades, but that is only because there are no data from before 2000. That is, nothing about the data supports your claim that Ukraine went from oligarchy to democracy in a decade. — Jabberwock

Then either Ukraine is not a democracy (at 6.68) or Russia is not an oligarchy (at 6.01), because that is the scale of improvement Ukraine made in that timescale. The names are irrelevant (as you already know - another deflection). The point is about freedom.

I say we have to take all the factors into consideration — Jabberwock

... so long as it's Russia. Ignore the others.

I have already explained what factors were, in my opinion, instrumental in the fact that the progress of the two countries was different. You have just ignored them. — Jabberwock

I haven't ignored them. They're in the Human Freedom Index. The end result is a net improvement of some 0.6-0.8 points (you know that thing you're claiming you do about taking into account all the factors). It's you who wants to ignore some of those and focus only on the one which Russia caused.

I have already listed the laws, do you want every single act listed? — Jabberwock

No, only the ones instigated after 2020, the period you claim Russia has deteriorated so much as to render the 6.01 score no longer relevant. Any laws before then will show their effects in previous scores, so are irrelevant to that claim.

strict tightening of censorship laws that put you in jail for 16 years MIGHT have some impact on the freedoms of those involved — Jabberwock

It might. The blacklist was instigated in 2012, the circumvention ban in 2017. Both will also have severely restricted freedoms, but in grand total, had minimal effect on the overall score. You're arguing that post 2020 such draconian laws were put in place as to render the 6.01 score completely redundant.

Also the law you mention is a wartime law regarding mention of Ukraine war atrocities etc. Shall we include Ukraine's wartime censorship in the metric?

your single source does not seem particularly good in describing the level of opression in Russia, — Jabberwock

Ah! When the evidence doesn't support your theory, the evidence must be wrong. I thought we'd pretty much reached the bottom of the barrel, but...

I didn't have the relevant data in a single table, I had the CSV from 2018 anyway but had to look up the 2022 report. I can't think why the numbers are different, but it doesn't matter because even the figures you've used show the same. Ukraine went from 119 (where Russia is now). So the argument - that in eight years Ukraine has come from where Russia is now - is unaffected. This whole thing has been a massive diversion to avoid that argument. — Isaac

Your claim was that it went from oligarchy to democracy in ten years. Do you still support that claim?

Yes. If the other ten countries fell behind because of global reasons (like economic recessions), and yet Ukraine didn't, then it clearly had some compensatory improvements. That's why they show rankings. It's not perfect, but pretending it doesn't show anything is just ridiculous. Besides, I used scores, not rankings, from 2000-2008 and you won't accept that result either, so this whole 'ranking' issue has just been yet another deflection to avoid the argument. Whatever I use, you're going to fish out some hurriedly made-up reason to dismiss it. First it's there being another table, then it's the particular year (2015), then it's using rankings not scores, then it's the definition of 'autocracy'... you're clearly clutching at straws. — Isaac

I just ask how the evidence that you have provided supports your original claim (that Ukraine went from oligarchy to democracy in ten years). Obviously you cannot do that, therefore we are reduced to arguing about decimal differences in a single datapoint in a single source. If that change in points was indicative of your claims, then we would have to assume that from 2013 to 2014 Ukraine went from democracy to oligarchy, which of course it did not. One specific indicator has changed (through no fault of Ukrainian authorities) that has badly affected the overall score. That is the peril of using a single datapoint for your argument.

Same source because I'm referring (as you know full well I have been since the very fist time I mentioned it) to the 2018 document for Ukraine's 2015 score. In it, it breaks down the scores. I compared the relevant one to Russia's 2020 (latest). Not all categories are in both sets, but most are. The ones I've listed are the ones for which Ukraine scored lower than Russia (the reasons for it's lower ranking). Disappearances and homicides weren't even that big an effect. The corrupt judiciary caused as much of an effect on the score - but I suppose you'll claim that was the Russian's too. — Isaac

Well, I am using the 2022 table and it shows that the biggest change from 2012 to 2014 was in the category I have named. The other one was religion. In other words, Ukraine went from 7.04 in 2012 to 6.50 in 2014 mostly due to a single indicator. Yet you insist that the single score is the sufficient indicator of political oppression in the country.

Then either Ukraine is not a democracy (at 6.68) or Russia is not an oligarchy (at 6.01), because that is the scale of improvement Ukraine made in that timescale. The names are irrelevant (as you already know - another deflection). The point is about freedom. — Isaac

Of course it is not, I have already wrote about it two days ago, it is considered a hybrid regime. It had a good start, but it still has quite a long way to go.

I haven't ignored them. They're in the Human Freedom Index. The end result is a net improvement of some 0.6-0.8 points (you know that thing you're claiming you do about taking into account all the factors). It's you who wants to ignore some of those and focus only on the one which Russia caused. — Isaac

Yes, you still are ignoring them, if you consider the single indicator from a single source as sufficient evidence for your claims. According to the Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' index, Russia went ten points down since 2015, but so did Ukraine. Does it mean that they both went from democracy to oligarchy? No, it does not, it means that some particular indicators which were given arbitrary weights went one way or another. Why should your single datapoint carry more weight than mine?

No, only the ones instigated after 2020, the period you claim Russia has deteriorated so much as to render the 6.01 score no longer relevant. Any laws before then will show their effects in previous scores, so are irrelevant to that claim. — Isaac

All the measures I have described were introduced after 2020.

It might. The blacklist was instigated in 2012, the circumvention ban in 2017. Both will also have severely restricted freedoms, but in grand total, had minimal effect on the overall score. You're arguing that post 2020 such draconian laws were put in place as to render the 6.01 score completely redundant. — Isaac

No, I have argued that the score might be affected which would throw off your maths. And yes, draconian laws were introducted after 2020.

Ah! When the evidence doesn't support your theory, the evidence must be wrong. I thought we'd pretty much reached the bottom of the barrel, but... — Isaac

No, I am just pointing out that arguing from a single datapoint is not a good way for argumentation. I have just given you a single datapoint that totally negates your argument. Are you convinced by that?

Your claim was that it went from oligarchy to democracy in ten years. Do you still support that claim? — Jabberwock

Yes, but you quibbled over the meaning of 'oligarchy' and 'democracy' so I went for just the actual index scores to create what I thought would be a more objectively measurable claim. It's less subjective to say that Ukraine went from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now in terms of human freedom. What we call 'Russia-now' and 'Ukraine-now' is not relevant - I went for 'oligarchy' and 'democracy'. I could have gone for 'authoritarian' and 'less-authoritarian' It doesn't matter because the point was relative (Russia to Ukraine) not absolute (one category or another). If the territory is ceded to Russia, it will become Russia-like. If it is won back, it will become Ukraine-like, We're comparing those two, so the metric is how long it takes to go from Russia-like to Ukraine-like.

One specific indicator has changed (through no fault of Ukrainian authorities) that has badly affected the overall score. That is the peril of using a single datapoint for your argument. — Jabberwock

I've already indicated that it was more than a single indicator. Also, the same level of progress was made 2000-2008, the 'disappearances' issue didn't even register then. I'm not using a single metric, you are. I'm trying to include all the measures that have changed, you keep ignoring the ones that don't suit you and focussing only on the ones you can blame on Russia.

I am using the 2022 table and it shows that the biggest change from 2012 to 2014 was in the category I have named. The other one was religion. In other words, Ukraine went from 7.04 in 2012 to 6.50 in 2014 mostly due to a single indicator. — Jabberwock

Then I suggest you actually look at the data I've provided to support my argument rather than this pointless distraction that the data you're looking at doesn't. If my data is at fault, find fault with it. "some other data says something else" is not a fault unless your data is somehow more authoritative than mine.

Yes, you still are ignoring them, if you consider the single indicator from a single source as sufficient evidence for your claims. According to the Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' index, Russia went ten points down since 2015, but so did Ukraine. Does it mean that they both went from democracy to oligarchy? No, it does not, it means that some particular indicators which were given arbitrary weights went one way or another. Why should your single datapoint carry more weight than mine? — Jabberwock

Provide the Freedom house figures then. I'm happy to look at both. What progress does Freedom House have Ukraine making in their best eight year period, and where does it put Russia in it's latest score?

As to why my datapoint should carry more weight than yours... You're the one arguing my position is completely wrong. I'm not arguing yours is, I just disagree with it. I've no reason to claim my datapoint is more authoritative than your. My claim is merely that it is a legitimate source.

No, I have argued that the score might be affected which would throw off your maths. — Jabberwock

Only a substantial change would alter the maths. A few points leaves things the same.

draconian laws were introducted after 2020. — Jabberwock

And none were introduced from 2006 to 2020? The point is not whether they are draconian, but whether they are draconian enough to significantly alter the score. For that they'd have to be something outside the range of anything introduced in all of the recorded history of Russia in this index.

And, as I've said, wartime measures can't count otherwise we'd have to make the same adjustments for Ukraine (seeing as this is a comparative exercise). Ukraine have also instigated some very draconian laws in the midst of war. My argument is only about getting from Russia-as-it-is-now to Ukraine-as-it-is-now, so if we include wartime measures, then Russia-as-it-is-now gets worse, but so does Ukraine-as-it-is-now so the distance between them is not only affected by Russia's move.

Folks, those numbers haven't been independent.

Yes, Ukraine has been wrestling to shed the regressing shadow of the dominant neighbor for a bit. Some progress has been made, and more pending (barring PTSD). — Jul 22, 2023

The protests were also about some of the elements those numbers are derived from.

They're more independent now, as the two countries have gone in different directions, despite the Kremlin's attempts otherwise, but they share much past, politics, overlapping culture, whatever it all is.

The Ukrainians somehow managed to create a momentum of change, which Putin + team ain't too happy about (irredentism has also come up).

There was a time, maybe three or so decades ago, when Russia seemed to head in a better direction, but that ended. :/ And now ...

Warring — the Kremlin invades + bombs Ukraine
Response — multinational political and defense action — Jul 22, 2023

Putin + team probably wouldn't be too happy about Belarus changing towards democracy, transparency, and all that (perhaps even seeking NATO membership :gasp:), either.

Just scrolled by ... :D

Folks, those numbers haven't been independent. — jorndoe

Absolutely. But that works both ways. Why do you think...

Putin + team probably wouldn't be too happy about Belarus changing towards democracy, transparency, and all that (perhaps even seeking NATO membership :gasp:), either. — jorndoe

...? Because movement in a pro-freedom direction makes his grip weaker.

Sure, Ukraine's 2015-2023 progress has definitely been in large part bought by throwing off some of the shackles of Russia, but if Putin's fears are even half justified, we can expect a likewise positive effect on pressure for change in Russia (including any stolen territories) from a free and prospering Ukraine next door.

if Putin's fears are even half justified, we can expect a likewise positive effect on pressure for change in Russia (including any stolen territories) from a free and prospering Ukraine next door — Isaac

Sure, if Ukraine was to fare well free from the Kremlin, and Russians observe, then that might help free the Kremlin from Putinistas. Asked earlier (I gave it some thought, but figured someone better informed might take it up):

Can anyone semi-informed imagine who might replace Putin, and what policy changes would result? Or am I only dreaming? — unenlightened

Another neighbor, Finland, doesn't seem to have had much impact against Putin, though. Why is that?

Yes, but you quibbled over the meaning of 'oligarchy' and 'democracy' so I went for just the actual index scores to create what I thought would be a more objectively measurable claim. It's less subjective to say that Ukraine went from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now in terms of human freedom. What we call 'Russia-now' and 'Ukraine-now' is not relevant - I went for 'oligarchy' and 'democracy'. I could have gone for 'authoritarian' and 'less-authoritarian' It doesn't matter because the point was relative (Russia to Ukraine) not absolute (one category or another). If the territory is ceded to Russia, it will become Russia-like. If it is won back, it will become Ukraine-like, We're comparing those two, so the metric is how long it takes to go from Russia-like to Ukraine-like. — Isaac

The issue I am pointing out is that first you make very specific claims and support it with a rather unspecific indicator of freedom, which is actually comprised of many indicators. You believe that it is general measure of 'authoritarianism', but it is clearly not - the changes between 2000-2008 and 2012-2014 even though similar numerically, concerned different areas. The change from 2012-2014 concerned mostly one specific area, yet it significantly affected Ukrainian score. If the HFI is the single metrics of authoritarianism, then we must conclude that from 2012-2014 Ukraine underwent sudden change from 'less-authoritarianism' to 'authoritarianism'. But that is false, so the HFI is not the universal metrics of authoritarianism, contrary to your claims.

Then I suggest you actually look at the data I've provided to support my argument rather than this pointless distraction that the data you're looking at doesn't. If my data is at fault, find fault with it. "some other data says something else" is not a fault unless your data is somehow more authoritative than mine. — Isaac

Data that do not fit your claims are 'pointless distraction'? We should only look at your data when examining your claim and disregard data that say something else? Why?

Provide the Freedom house figures then. I'm happy to look at both. What progress does Freedom House have Ukraine making in their best eight year period, and where does it put Russia in it's latest score?

As to why my datapoint should carry more weight than yours... You're the one arguing my position is completely wrong. I'm not arguing yours is, I just disagree with it. I've no reason to claim my datapoint is more authoritative than your. My claim is merely that it is a legitimate source. — Isaac

Here you are: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/All_data_FIW_2013-2023.xlsx

And none were introduced from 2006 to 2020? The point is not whether they are draconian, but whether they are draconian enough to significantly alter the score. For that they'd have to be something outside the range of anything introduced in all of the recorded history of Russia in this index. — Isaac

If the tool you have provided does not indicate changes caused by draconian oppression, then it is not a good indicator of oppression, right? Why do you want it then to use it for that purpose?

And, as I've said, wartime measures can't count otherwise we'd have to make the same adjustments for Ukraine (seeing as this is a comparative exercise). Ukraine have also instigated some very draconian laws in the midst of war. My argument is only about getting from Russia-as-it-is-now to Ukraine-as-it-is-now, so if we include wartime measures, then Russia-as-it-is-now gets worse, but so does Ukraine-as-it-is-now so the distance between them is not only affected by Russia's move. — Isaac

OK, so we skip the wartime data.

Sure, Ukraine's 2015-2023 progress has definitely been in large part bought by throwing off some of the shackles of Russia, but if Putin's fears are even half justified, we can expect a likewise positive effect on pressure for change in Russia (including any stolen territories) from a free and prospering Ukraine next door. — Isaac

The point is there would not be a free and prospering Ukraine next door, because you would have given it away to Putin.

Another neighbor, Finland, doesn't seem to have had much impact against Putin, though. Why is that? — jorndoe

Because only the nearest abroad counts. Russians do not see Finns (or the Baltics) as 'people like them', so they do not care much whether they are free and how. Free and prosperous Ukraine, on the other hand, especially in the EU, would show Russians (and other former republics) that yes, positive change is possible for them. Successful Ukraine in EU would be a mortal threat for Putin's regime, that is why he is determined to stop it by any means, including war. All the other causes are secondary.

The issue I am pointing out is that first you make very specific claims — Jabberwock

The claim was not specific, and in context that should have been obvious. You read it that way simply to have something to bite. It's the equivalent of pointing out a spelling mistake. Read the context, and if you're not sure, ask, rather than go on a massive diversion assuming your interpretation, even when you've been specifically told otherwise.

Data that do not fit your claims are 'pointless distraction'? — Jabberwock

No. Treating them as if they proved some kind of deception or error is the pointless distraction. The data is interesting itself, but doesn't actually change anything. I used your preferred dataset to show the same thing.

We should only look at your data when examining your claim and disregard data that say something else? — Jabberwock

Kind of like...

your single source does not seem particularly good in describing the level of opression in Russia — Jabberwock

...? But no. I used your preferred tables and showed they support the same conclusion. Something I note you've studiously avoided mentioning.

Here you are: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/All_data_FIW_2013-2023.xlsx — Jabberwock

Sure. That measure clearly doesn't show anything like the achievable movement I'm advocating. Freedom House have had some criticism of their methodology, and the list of countries scoring low reads suspiciously identical to the list of oil-rich countries that the US would like some political excuse to interfere with... but I'm sure Cato has it's critics too.

The point is, so what? As I said. I'm not the one suggesting your theory is nonsense, so I don't need to trash your source. You're the one suggesting my theory is nonsense, so presenting a different source has no weight in that argument. Why are they a better source? Why, in fact, are they so much better that to believe any other source is nothing short of ideological delusion?

If the tool you have provided does not indicate changes caused by draconian oppression, then it is not a good indicator of oppression, right? — Jabberwock

It does indicate changes caused by draconian oppression. That it doesn't come up with the results you want isn't a flaw. I don't know if you're familiar with the way evidence works, but you're supposed to look to the evidence to check your theory. You're not supposed to use your theory to check the evidence.

The point is there would not be a free and prospering Ukraine next door, because you would have given it away to Putin. — Jabberwock

I'm aware of what your point is. I'm trying to move the conversation to a place where you actually begin to support it with anything like an argument.

Sure. That measure clearly doesn't show anything like the achievable movement I'm advocating. Freedom House have had some criticism of their methodology, and the list of countries scoring low reads suspiciously identical to the list of oil-rich countries that the US would like some political excuse to interfere with... but I'm sure Cato has it's critics too.

The point is, so what? As I said. I'm not the one suggesting your theory is nonsense, so I don't need to trash your source. You're the one suggesting my theory is nonsense, so presenting a different source has no weight in that argument. Why are they a better source? Why, in fact, are they so much better that to believe any other source is nothing short of ideological delusion? — Isaac

The point is, as I have repeated for a long time now, that you base your whole argument on a single metrics, which you admit is quite prone to variation due to subjective weights assigned to particular indicators. In other words, you believe that the single indicator precisely describes the state of affairs in the region. I have provided you with four other indicators, you have never engaged with them.

Sure. That measure clearly doesn't show anything like the achievable movement I'm advocating. Freedom House have had some criticism of their methodology, and the list of countries scoring low reads suspiciously identical to the list of oil-rich countries that the US would like some political excuse to interfere with... but I'm sure Cato has it's critics too.

The point is, so what? As I said. I'm not the one suggesting your theory is nonsense, so I don't need to trash your source. You're the one suggesting my theory is nonsense, so presenting a different source has no weight in that argument. Why are they a better source? Why, in fact, are they so much better that to believe any other source is nothing short of ideological delusion? — Isaac

Presenting a source that contradicts your argument has no weight on that argument? Are you serious?

No, no single datapoint is 'the best', that is the point... No single source of evidence, especially indices which have subjective weights, is sufficient to support an argument. It does not mean that we can just pick and choose the data as we want and say that this argument is as good as any other. We ahve to compound ALL the data, your source, Freedom House, The Economist, Polity etc. and any other source available. We also need to consider facts both from the history and from the current state of affairs that could influence our assessment. You flatly refuse to do that, claiming that your single metrics 'includes everything'. No, it does not, as quite a few other sources indicate something else.

It does indicate changes caused by draconian oppression. That it doesn't come up with the results you want isn't a flaw. I don't know if you're familiar with the way evidence works, but you're supposed to look to the evidence to check your theory. You're not supposed to use your theory to check the evidence. — Isaac

This is their chart for Russia: it has moved from 5.57 in 2000 to 6.16 in 2018. By your claims, it means that Russia has moved from an authoritarian rule under Yeltsin to a 'less-authoritarianism' under Putin. That is, under Putin the Russian government became less authoritarian. is that correct?

I'm aware of what your point is. I'm trying to move the conversation to a place where you actually begin to support it with anything like an argument. — Isaac

No need to move anywhere, just ask: by your own words free and prosperous Ukraine is a grave threat to his regime. We know that he is willing to go to war to defend against threats, so it is reasonable that he would keep threatening war until there was no chance of free and prosperous Ukraine. As you are claiming that avoiding the war is better than letting people get under oppression, you would advocate letting him subjugate the whole of Ukraine if it meant war could be avoided. We also know that he is interested in Ukrainian territories and is willing to risk war to get them, therefore we can assume that he might want more Ukrainian territories. Again, you would rather give away Ukrainian territories to avoid war, therefore you would advocate giving away further parts of Ukraine, until it run out of parts.

I've been away for a couple of weeks, but below is a saved post I didn't finish writing.

Considering Prigozhin seems still alive and seems to have even met with Putin in person, I find it really difficult to believe this was a genuine coup attempt.

Has it disbanded? — ssu

It's effectively disbanded, ordered to either join the regular military, go to Belarus or go home.

Now, if "the spirit of Wagner endures" in Belarus; sure, seems it will, but it has been effectively disbanded as far as the coup is concerned.

So why on Earth the weak timid response then from Putin and the references to 1917 and civil war? How many Russian politicians backed Putin when Wagner was marching toward Moscow? I myself don’t know that, so it’s an important question. — ssu

Maybe because it is theatre.

Why would Putin require an overwhelming show of strength if the coup is fake?

Now, if it is fake the purpose was clearly to get "buy in" with fake war of words and fake airplane and helicopter shoot downs (which are pretty easy to fake, especially if you control the whole environment).

However, we agree these details of who was backing who are obviously important for the analysis.

You seem to have the attitude of ”Everything is fine, there’s nothing to see, the Russian leadership has everything in control” as it obviously hasn’t got everything in control. Then when Wagner is truly disbanded and Prigozhin dead or in jail, then things are ”under control”. — ssu

I've made it clear I am not trying to "prove" it was fake,.

What you say is possible.

The answer to "why didn't FSB know about this ... oh, they did know about this ... and it was such an easy operation to penetrate that UK intelligence knew about it too ... ok, why didn't FSB just go arrest or kill Prigozhin the day before?"

Can just be Putin is so weak the FSB knows and does nothing about people plotting coups.

And, generally, the answer to every question would be "Putin's weak" in the case the coup was real but then aborted ... well too weak to punish the coup plotters and mutineers and intelligence that did nothing, but still strong enough to survive the coup.

And the answer to every question if the coup is fake is that it's just theatre and they are all working together.

They need to make Putin look weak to sell the coup, so they are willing to pay that price for the benefits (or perceived benefits) of staging the coup. They may simply have shows of strength planned to repair Putin's reputation or then may do nothing on the basis it doesn't matter or then "real strength" can stay quiet and is in fact more intimidating that way.

What we can agree on is that the whole series of events doesn't make a whole lot of sense and has lot's of discrepancies that would any theory would need to account for.

"The coup is real" will account for those discrepancies with Putin is weak, Prigozhin was just trying to get a better deal basically by threatening chaos and could do this because Putin is weak and /or maybe there was a pathway to a real coup (army and civilians spontaneously backing him) but that didn't work so Prigozhin cut his losses and cut a deal.

The "coup is fake" is going to explain any discrepancies as necessary to sell the coup.

Of course, whenever there are confusing events the idea it was all orchestrated neatly fits the data and has an inherent intellectual attraction. However, that the situation simply was really confusing fits the data too, there's just by definition no neat cause and effect chains that can be created.

So, in this light, the strongest evidence it was fake is

1. The timing: Prigozhin launches his coup (or "armed protest") right after Ukraine announces a delay in their offensive. There is therefore minimum risk to Russian frontline forces (no large ongoing battles threatening a break through), which therefore minimises Prigozhin leverage. Likewise, that the coup is resolved so quickly again minimises actual military risk, as it takes more than 24hrs for Ukraine to plan, launch, advance and start applying real pressure of a breakthrough. The coup timing turns out to be perfect in triggering Ukrainians to renew their offensive while, "just so happens", minimising the actual military risk.

2. The resolution: Prigozhin agrees to go to Belarus. No one in their right mind who actually just embarrassed Putin and Russia's military and intelligence agencies on the world stage would accept going to Belarus in a deal. So, in the theory that Prigozhin was just "negotiating" or then "cutting losses" in a real failed coup after failing to build the momentum, the rational deal would be to try to get to a legitimately neutral country.

The supporting evidence that supports this key evidence would be:

a. The coup starts 1000km away from Moscow without any coup elements whatsoever within Moscow. If you were plotting a classic coup you would have elements in Moscow to kill or take some symbolic buildings, or just cause general chaos.

b. As far as I know there is no combat footage of this coup that isn't easily faked. For example, planes can be easily controlled by remote control, so if you wanted to get Western media buy-in that it's a real coup then downing a plane seems pretty cheap.

c. The military plan makes zero sense. We're supposed to believe that Prigozhin is some mastermind military commander but also just launches a coup without any possibility of military success.

e. Prigozhin not only gives interviews (at least one), overjoyed, after the coup has already ended and he's leaving in an SUV but also makes cryptic remarks that moral has been boosted, it was all part of the plan, brilliant strategy of some guy ... rather than fearing for his life that he's just embarrassed Putin and Putin will certainly want him dead.

f. Ukraine does attack so if that was the goal (which if you are Russia you definitely want Ukraine to attack to be able to capitalise on all your defensive investments) then that goal is achieved. Not only does Ukraine renew its offensive but there has been no evidence of any decrease in Readiness of the Russian side as one would expect in the event of a real coup.

No need to move anywhere, just ask: by your own words free and prosperous Ukraine is a grave threat to his regime. We know that he is willing to go to war to defend against threats, so it is reasonable that he would keep threatening war until there was no chance of free and prosperous Ukraine. As you are claiming that avoiding the war is better than letting people get under oppression, you would advocate letting him subjugate the whole of Ukraine if it meant war could be avoided. We also know that he is interested in Ukrainian territories and is willing to risk war to get them, therefore we can assume that he might want more Ukrainian territories. Again, you would rather give away Ukrainian territories to avoid war, therefore you would advocate giving away further parts of Ukraine, until it run out of parts. — Jabberwock

This is your problem, you are talking in complete abstractions of what's preferable.

Neither @Isaac nor the whole of the UK where he lives, or me and the country where I live, or NATO or the whole of the EU, has a choice in front of us of "giving away further parts of Ukraine".

We do not own or control it to begin with.

You are trying to turn a false choice that does not exist into simply justifying the current Western policy of pouring arms into Ukraine.

The first choice of @Isaac and myself and other non-Ukrainians (insofar as he affects the policy of their country) is are we willing to send soldiers into Ukraine to defend it against Russia?

Now, the UK, where I live in Scandinavia, the whole of NATO, EU, not to mention other countries, have repeatedly and unequivocally made clear the position that we aren't going to be sending our soldiers into Ukraine to defend shit.

Why? Well, Ukraine is not an ally, never has been, and Ukraine (according to all these countries that have not sent soldiers) is not worth defending.

That is the policy.

Do we wish that Ukraine was free and prosperous? sure, why not?

But we aren't willing to send any of soldiers to go make that happen by force, which is the key point.

Now, seen as everyone agrees Ukraine is not worth spilling their own countries blood to defend (at least anyone who actually affects policy), the key question is whether the policy of sending arms instead is a morally justifiable in lieux of our cowardice or then a smart geopolitical move to cynically use Ukrainians to harm Russia, and if the whole of Ukraine needs to be sacrificed to do so that's just "gainz" on the geopolitical chess board.

For, you're missing the other alternative in your "free vs oppression" choice which is "they dead".

Even with pouring in arms (at a drip feed pace, only introducing the next weapons system when all the previous systems fail in their promise), Ukraine may not be able to win this war.

Is it morally justifiable to send them on a fools errand that results in them dying in huge numbers based on a series of false promises (i.e. lies and manipulation) that we're going to "do whatever it takes" and "provide whatever they need"?

If that's not morally justifiable, then you need some theory of victory that actually leads to your free and prosperous Ukraine (that also takes into account that elections have been cancelled).

You cannot structure an argument as "I prefer A and therefore support any violence that is claimed to achieve A ... someday".

Neither Isaac nor the whole of the UK where he lives, or me and the country where I live, or NATO or the whole of the EU, has a choice in front of us of "giving away further parts of Ukraine". — boethius

He was advocating refusing military help to Ukraine which would most likely result in Ukraine's loss of further lands and quite likely its independence. I think it is pretty much 'giving away further parts of Ukraine'.

Is it morally justifiable to send them on a fools errand that results in them dying in huge numbers based on a series of false promises (i.e. lies and manipulation) that we're going to "do whatever it takes" and "provide whatever they need"?

If that's not morally justifiable, then you need some theory of victory that actually leads to your free and prosperous Ukraine (that also takes into account that elections have been cancelled). — boethius

I do not need a theory, because it has already happened: Ukraine already IS more free than it would be if it was subjugated by Russia, which would likely happen if the help was denied. And I am not sure why you are treating Ukrainians as fools who do not know better. Why would they be 'manipulated' about the Western help, if the West in the beginning of the war flatly refused to supply them with tanks, planes and long-range artillery? They have made the choice to defend their independence (i.e. to risk death) BEFORE any Western help was promised, in fact, the West was quite resigned that they will lose the war quickly. Americans offered evacuation of Zelensky's government in the first days of the war, which might have precipitated the general capitulation, how is that consistent with the claim that they somehow 'made' Ukrainians to fight? We decided that we do not want to fight, Ukrainians have decided that they do - all they ask for is help.

Blinkin says Ukraine has already taken back 50% of the land Russia seized.

Woot woot! Go Ukraine!!!

Now, seen as everyone agrees Ukraine is not worth spilling their own countries blood to defend (at least anyone who actually affects policy), the key question is whether the policy of sending arms instead is a morally justifiable in lieux of our cowardice or then a smart geopolitical move to cynically use Ukrainians to harm Russia, and if the whole of Ukraine needs to be sacrificed to do so that's just "gainz" on the geopolitical chess board. — boethius

The usual intellectually miserable tactic of framing opponents’ views. Apparently, on matter of facts we can’t prove anything, if we happen to believe anything is because of Western propaganda, what they believe is clearly not propaganda though (even if, on the other side, all narratives are claimed to be all plausible interpretations), on matter of moral we are either coward or cynical (is that yet another interpretation? or The Facts™?).

He was advocating refusing military help to Ukraine which would most likely result in Ukraine's loss of further lands and quite likely its independence. I think it is pretty much 'giving away further parts of Ukraine'. — Jabberwock

It is totally different.

There is no moral imperative to supply arms.

And don't move the goal posts from "free and prosperous" to "independent".

I do not need a theory, because it has already happened: Ukraine already IS more free than it would be if it was subjugated by Russia, which would likely happen if the help was denied. — Jabberwock

Really? Is "no further elections" your definition of freedom?

Notice also that your "I don't need a theory of victory" is a theory of victory: that Ukraine is "winning", at least in the freedom sense so far, and your theory here is that it will continue to be this free and prosperous if the status quo of arms shipments is maintained.

But that's not in anyway guaranteed. Even if I were to accept that Ukraine is "more free" so far, that doesn't somehow imply it will continue to be even the current level of freedom compared to losing the war.

Notice also that you simply ignore all not-free Ukrainians in the process so far because they are dead.

And I am not sure why you are treating Ukrainians as fools who do not know better. — Jabberwock

It's called "war optimism".

Here's an example:

They have not done that because they were not ready. And yes, it will take tens of thousands of lives and yes, it could still fail. Still, it is the best manuever at this time.

And it will not be 'exposed salient' - if the land bridge falls, then most likely the Kherson oblast falls as well, Russians will not be able to supply the area just from Crimea. Ukrainians would be exposed only on the 80 km section from Vuhledar to Mariupol - the rest would be protected by the very same defence lines which Russians cannot breach for a year. 'Cutting from North' would be essentially repeating attacks around Vuhledar - we know how well those went. And supplies would be no problem - they would still have Zaporozhe behind them, as they do now. It is Russians who are in vulnerable position there - they have 150 km to defend with their backs to the sea and only 80 km of depth. — Jabberwock

How'd that "best manuever at this time" turn out?

Why would they be 'manipulated' about the Western help, if the West in the beginning of the war flatly refused to supply them with tanks, planes and long-range artillery? — Jabberwock

So you agree we're manipulating them with false promises?

... Just that it's ok manipulation because they know we're manipulating?

They have made the choice to defend their independence (i.e. to risk death) BEFORE any Western help was promised, in fact, the West was quite resigned that they will lose the war quickly. — Jabberwock

"They" meaning all of Ukraine?

"Risk death" as in commit to fight and be wiling to die regardless of the chances of victory?

The usual intellectually miserable tactic of framing opponents’ views. Apparently, on matter of facts we can’t prove anything, if we happen to believe anything is because of Western propaganda, what they believe is clearly not propaganda though (even if, on the other side, all narratives are claimed to be all plausible interpretations), on matter of moral we are either coward or cynical (is that yet another interpretation? or The Facts™?). — neomac

What does your comment have to do with my comment?

Are you disputing the fact that other Western countries, and also all the other countries, have not sent their soldiers into Ukraine?

Or are you arguing sending arms to Ukraine is brave? That's what a "brave" country would do, send arms instead of their own soldiers.

Feel free to have at it: You / the Western legacy media / NATO says Ukrainian sovereignty is a moral imperative to uphold ... just not without sending themselves or their own soldiers. If Ukrainian sovereignty is so important, why is it not worth risking our own soldiers lives to see it preserved?

You guys work yourselves up into a righteous moral frenzy about Ukrainian sovereignty, and then when I mention the option of raising the flag, beating the drums, rolling the fully upgraded tanks, sending in the troops, and ask why that doesn't follow from your moral position the answer is always:

1. Oh, it's Ukrainians who want to fight, not us:

We decided that we do not want to fight, Ukrainians have decided that they do - all they ask for is help. — Jabberwock

So, ok, it's not our issue, why do we care again?

If we don't want to fight, why do we want to send arms? What's this moral theory about sending arms regardless of the consequences sending arms has is the moral thing to do? Feel free to explain.

2. How dare you ask us to explain ourselves!!!

The usual intellectually miserable tactic of framing opponents’ views. — neomac

Ok, well, un-frame it for me.

In what moral theory is there a cause not worth risking much of anything yourself but is like "totally so important"? Worth sending arms ... but not too many arms!!!

Why would they be 'manipulated' about the Western help, if the West in the beginning of the war flatly refused to supply them with tanks, planes and long-range artillery? — Jabberwock

There's this delicate balance right in the middle of sending the "just right" bowl of arms that seems to aim for maximising Ukrainian dead, but at the same time it's presented as some obvious idea and anyone who's critical is "helping the enemy" who we're not actually at war with.

Absolutely nothing is obvious about this idea and every time the consequences are brought up, instead of accepting the consequences as a consequence of this idea suddenly the West isn't moral agents at all and it's Ukrainians doing all the fighting and choosing and it's their choice and we aren't to question that choice no matter how irrational it seems, but somehow sending arms isn't our choice but just obvious thing to do.

If we don't want to fight, why do we want to send arms? What's this moral theory about sending arms regardless of the consequences sending arms has is the moral thing to do? Feel free to explain. — boethius

We care about Ukrainian sovereignty, but not enough to die for it. Sending weapons has the advantage of us not dying. Ukrainians, on the other hand, do want to die for Ukrainian sovereignty, possibly because it is their own sovereignty. I would say it is rather uncomplicated.

There's this delicate balance right in the middle of sending the "just right" bowl of arms that seems to aim for maximising Ukrainian dead, but at the same time it's presented as some obvious idea and anyone who's critical is "helping the enemy" who we're not actually at war with. — boethius

I would say the amount of arms sent is not a result of deliberate anything (I would rather say too little deliberation is involved), but it is the woeful result of the state of Western politics, which is ruled strictly by popularity, therefore politicians instead of making up their minds try to please everyone, so that we have the exact situation of 'helping the effort, but not too much'. If the support for the effort was greater in the West (like it is e.g. in the Baltics, former Eastern Bloc countries and Finland), then the war would be long over with.

Absolutely nothing is obvious about this idea and every time the consequences are brought up, instead of accepting the consequences as a consequence of this idea suddenly the West isn't moral agents at all and it's Ukrainians doing all the fighting and choosing and it's their choice and we aren't to question that choice no matter how irrational it seems, but somehow sending arms isn't our choice but just obvious thing to do. — boethius

OK, let us bring up the expected consequences of not helping Ukrainians at all. I tried to bring it up with Isaac, but to no avail.

We care about Ukrainian sovereignty, but not enough to die for it. Sending weapons has the advantage of us not dying. — Jabberwock

Ok, thanks for just spelling out the obvious nature of the position, that the West's position is that Ukrainian sovereignty is not worth dying for (to us), and not deflecting with accusations of "framing" or whatever or then jumping over this important premise directly to:

Ukrainians, on the other hand, do want to die for Ukrainian sovereignty, possibly because it is their own sovereignty. I would say it is rather uncomplicated. — Jabberwock

Now, if free and prosperous Ukraine still had elections, maybe you could plausibly say the policies are what "Ukrainians" want.

Likewise, if men were allowed to leave the country and weren't forced into fighting, maybe you could say they "want" to fight, because they aren't leaving.

But, please explain the simple answers to these issues, as it's all uncomplicated to you.

Likewise, let's assume you are correct and "Ukraine wants to fight", and lets say we (the arms suppliers) know Ukraine will lose the war at immense cost, death and suffering.

Should we still send arms even if we knew Ukraine is very likely to lose anyways?

Because you also say in your uncomplicated world view that you don't need a theory of victory, so is Ukraine losing at the cost of a million Ukrainian lives worthwhile?

I would say the amount of arms sent is not a result of deliberate anything — Jabberwock

You sweet summer child, like a leaf blown along the winds of hope without a care in the world.

Honestly seems nice to be that naive, but let us continue for the sake of argument.

it is the woeful result of the state of Western politics, which is ruled strictly by popularity, therefore politicians instead of making up their minds try to please everyone, so that we have the exact situation of 'helping the effort, but not too much'. — Jabberwock

Ok, well, if this "woeful" state of Western politics results in Ukraine losing the war at a massive cost of lives and suffering, are you saying the "woeful" support was justified nonetheless, or are you actually against the current policy, preferring sending no arms rather than insufficient support (which may not be achievable at all with only arms shipments but may require sending actual soldiers)?

the support for the effort was greater in the West (like it is e.g. in the Baltics, former Eastern Bloc countries and Finland), then the war would be long over with. — Jabberwock

Extremely doubtful, unless you're talking sending in troops, which, as you note:

We care about Ukrainian sovereignty, but not enough to die for it. — Jabberwock

So I assume you aren't.

But, we agree that the support isn't at the level of the former Eastern block, Baltics and Finland so seems a moot point.

OK, let us bring up the expected consequences of not helping Ukrainians at all. I tried to bring it up with Isaac, but to no avail. — Jabberwock

We've gone through the alternative many, many times with previous interlocutors. I haven't read all the posts since my haitus here so I'm going to assume @Isaac did in fact answer you sufficiently, or then just dealing with your continuous deflection, but I can summarise the alternative:

First, not-helping Ukraine at all other than humanitarian aid the West can arguably be said to provide universally (or then makes an honest attempt, such as Médecins Sans Frontières) isn't a moral catastrophe. There's plenty of wars all over the place, not to mention those in which the West is the aggressor, in which we do not "help".

So not helping Ukraine would be the less hypocritical, and therefore more honest and more moral position.

Nevertheless, the alternative to arms shipments is diplomacy based on the honest position that we're not willing to die for this cause and there's zero evidence sending arms to Ukraine will result in a better outcome for Ukraine or anyone else (that the only hopium-light reason to do so is a cynical expenditure of Ukrainian bodies, "fight to the last Ukrainian", for debatable, and arguably counter-productive, geopolitical ambitions), but we (the West, and in particular Europe) may have things both Russia and Ukraine want that can help end the conflict.

Of course negotiating a resolution to the conflict requires both compromise and risk.

So, if you're opposed to either compromise or any risk (obviously only diplomatically and not the risk of warfare which you are perfectly content with) on principle then we should debate that first.

You seem to take it for granted that Ukrainians continuing to fight "to victory" (while also not requiring a theory of victory of how that happens) is the only reasonable option.

Are you against a negotiated resolution?

Right. Thanks for the numbers. So in about 17 months we've had nearly 100,000 dead, 6.3 million refugees, $143 billion in damage, wheat and fertiliser production almost causing the starvation of another 10-15 million... and what have we got. Ukraine are nearly half way to wearing down Russian ability to cause more damage.

So after another 100,000 dead and nearly $300 billion in debt they maybe equalise...?

I'm not sure who "we" is supposed to be here. Ukraine opted to ignore Western advice on committing to a maneuver warfare-centric offensive and instead focus on attrition, particularly of Russian artillery systems. They considered the losses they would sustain in a more rapid push to be unacceptable, and wanted to focus more on destroying Russian resources that could be used for future offensives.

This seems totally rational to me. The West and Ukraine have different priorities. Ukraine is far more than "halfway" in reducing Russia's supply of artillery systems, and given Russian morale issues, it seems unlikely that they could conduct a significant offensive without a large artillery advantage.

In any event, given Russia just had a rebellion and Putin is going on air to warn about collapse and civil war, admitting that he is in a weak negotiating position vis-a-vis Prigozhin in the press, it seems possible that Russia is more than halfway to a defeat. In attrition warfare, you don't win in a linear fashion. One side gets exhausted and then collapses.

Big picture, it's hard to see how this war has improved Russia's security situation. They are going to end up with Finland and Sweden in NATO, very likely Ukraine in NATO, and Georgia is significantly more likely now too. Moldova also looks more likely than before, or might at least join the EU. China has gained tremendous leverage over them and has made huge strides in pulling the Central Asian states into its orbit.

Moreover, Russia has reneged on its defense export deals around the world and the war has been an absolutely abysmal advertisement for Russian hardware. China sits ready to fill the void, with the T-96 and T-99 being superior vehicles that can be produced far quicker, and a true LO fifth gen multi-role, carrier capable fighter on the way out with export models likely to follow. They even got Pakistan to pivot away from the US and go for the J-10 as well by offering to help them with indigenous production of the JF-17. Point being, China is very likely to replace Russia as the main arms exporter that isn't US aligned and without exports Russia cannot afford anywhere near the same R&D efforts. This was going to happen anyhow, but they've sped it up very quickly, as previously China's focus on high end air defense, MRLS, and its navy meant they weren't as interested in the export market since they didn't want capabilities leaking on AD/MD, and they were also making stuff outside most nation's price points, e.g. nuclear subs, war ships, carrier-focused ballistic missiles, ABM, etc. (combat drone aside, which they do dominate sales of).



Mearsheimer is good when he sticks to a small scale. It's his attempts at big picture theorizing that really go off the rails. I appreciate that you have to "go big" to move the ball along on theory, even if it means getting a lot wrong, but the problems in "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics'" Offensive Realism are such that I think it's worth questioning if it was worth publishing. It makes the realist camp in IR look like a caricature, and got basically every prediction about the post-Cold War era wrong.

But it's instructive on how he sees the world. I recall Hal Brand's comments on Mearsheimer and Walt's "The Israel Lobby," at a conference being" "a fairly banal account of how foreign lobbying works that is spiced up by some antisemitism," which is about right IMO. In my experience, I haven't seen anything to suggest Israel's efforts are particularly more successful than say, Saudi ones, and of course similar books have been written about the Saudis, Russia etc.

Point being, you don't even have to assume he is biased, because either way he is just frequently wrong.



Yes, but there are other costs to giving Putin what he wants, e.g. an increased risk of Russian aggression in the future. Forcing Russia to burn through its entire Cold War stock of hardware and ammunition greatly reduces their ability to wage future wars. Even at current wartime production levels it will take Russia well over a decade to put together anything like the force they initially invaded with, likely far longer.

Now, if free and prosperous Ukraine still had elections, maybe you could plausibly say the policies are what "Ukrainians" want.

Likewise, if men were allowed to leave the country and weren't forced into fighting, maybe you could say they "want" to fight, because they aren't leaving.

But, please explain the simple answers to these issues, as it's all uncomplicated to you. — boethius

Yes, of course, not all of them. When we use the collective nouns, we rarely mean every one of thing represented. Still, the support for the defensive war seems to be high, around 70-80%, of course it is higher in those places less affected by the war, so yes, I would say that in the general sense in which we typically use such phrases, they want to fight. Everyone reporting on the war, including Russians, acknowledge high morale of Ukrainian troops, desertions seem to be rare, so it does not seem that most of them are forced to fight.

Likewise, let's assume you are correct and "Ukraine wants to fight", and lets say we (the arms suppliers) know Ukraine will lose the war at immense cost, death and suffering.

Should we still send arms even if we knew Ukraine is very likely to lose anyways?

Because you also say in your uncomplicated world view that you don't need a theory of victory, so is Ukraine losing at the cost of a million Ukrainian lives worthwhile? — boethius

The issue I think I have already mentioned in this thread, possibly even in discussion with you, is that many people are somehow hang up on the issue of 'winning' or 'losing'. That is rather unrealistic and makes the discussion rather difficult, as everything depends then on the 'theory of winning', as you say, which is necessarily rather vague. I do not expect neither Ukraine nor Russia to 'win' the war in any reasonable sense. I believe it rather unlikely that Ukraine will get back all the territories and I believe Russia will not succeed in subjugating the whole of Ukraine, which I would say were the main goals for both sides.

Thus it is difficult to answer your question in principle, without defining what would be considered 'losing'. I would say that if we knew beforehand that they would very likely not gain anything and lose many Ukrainians, then we should refrain from it. I do not know though why they would do so, if they knew they were certain to lose?

You sweet summer child, like a leaf blown along the winds of hope without a care in the world.

Honestly seems nice to be that naive, but let us continue for the sake of argument. — boethius

That is hilarious from someone who believes in a solution negotiated with Putin.

Ok, well, if this "woeful" state of Western politics results in Ukraine losing the war at a massive cost of lives and suffering, are you saying the "woeful" support was justified nonetheless, or are you actually against the current policy, preferring sending no arms rather than insufficient support (which may not be achievable at all with only arms shipments but may require sending actual soldiers)? — boethius

No, I am against the current policy, preferring much stronger support. And I am not sure what you mean by 'unachievable'. Was the current level of support insufficient for taking back Kherson? Because I am pretty certain that it still did happen. Did Ukraine win back 10% of its territory or not? So it seems the support was sufficient for that, was it not? I would say quite a lot has been achieved, but of course with greater support Ukraine could achieve much more.

We've gone through the alternative many, many times with previous interlocutors. I haven't read all the posts since my haitus here so I'm going to assume Isaac did in fact answer you sufficiently, or then just dealing with your continuous deflection, but I can summarise the alternative:

First, not-helping Ukraine at all other than humanitarian aid the West can arguably be said to provide universally (or then makes an honest attempt, such as Médecins Sans Frontières) isn't a moral catastrophe. There's plenty of wars all over the place, not to mention those in which the West is the aggressor, in which we do not "help".

So not helping Ukraine would be the less hypocritical, and therefore more honest and more moral position.

Nevertheless, the alternative to arms shipments is diplomacy based on the honest position that we're not willing to die for this cause and there's zero evidence sending arms to Ukraine will result in a better outcome for Ukraine or anyone else (that the only hopium-light reason to do so is a cynical expenditure of Ukrainian bodies, "fight to the last Ukrainian", for debatable, and arguably counter-productive, geopolitical ambitions), but we (the West, and in particular Europe) may have things both Russia and Ukraine want that can help end the conflict.

Of course negotiating a resolution to the conflict requires both compromise and risk.

So, if you're opposed to either compromise or any risk (obviously only diplomatically and the risk of warfare) on principle then we should debate that first.

You seem to take it for granted that Ukrainians continuing to fight "to victory" (while also not requiring a theory of victory of how that happens) is the only reasonable option.

Are you against a negotiated resolution? — boethius

You have written a lot of words, but I do not see described any of the actual consequences, beside that you would feel morally superior.

I am not taking it for granted, as I wrote, I doubt Ukraine will 'win' the war in the sense you insist on, but I do believe that it is capable of achieving some more goals before the conflict ceases.

And I am not against a negotiated resolution, in fact I fully expect that this particular war will end with one, as surely none of the sides is able to force the other to complete capitulation. I just do not believe that a negotiated resolution before the war or during the war before we started helping Ukrainians would provide any benefit beside postponing the conflict a bit, because it would certainly not resolve it. But sure, please describe what solution you have in mind and why you think it would fare any better than Khasavyurt, Minsk 1 or Minsk 2.

The point is, as I have repeated for a long time now, that you base your whole argument on a single metrics, which you admit is quite prone to variation due to subjective weights assigned to particular indicators. In other words, you believe that the single indicator precisely describes the state of affairs in the region. I have provided you with four other indicators, you have never engaged with them. — Jabberwock

There's nothing to 'engage' with. Yes. There are other metrics which show things in a different light. What exactly is it you want me to do about that? Carry out some phoney 'rational synthesis' which somehow determines the Truth of the matter (despite experts in the field being unable to decide), and no doubt suspiciously resembles the position I held in the first place? I'm about 25 years past that kind of naivety.

We ahve to compound ALL the data, your source, Freedom House, The Economist, Polity etc. and any other source available. We also need to consider facts both from the history and from the current state of affairs that could influence our assessment. — Jabberwock

Oh. Turns out yes.

Why did Freedom House not do that then? They have the staff, they have the expertise. Why are they leaving it to us laymen? If The Economist has data that needs accounting, then what's stopping Freedom House from including it?

The reason these sources differ is because they differ in opinion as to what's relevant, how important each issue is, and what it all means put together. There's no resolving those differences. Finding some kind of 'mean average' doesn't get you closer to the truth, it's not done by vote and it's neither does splitting the difference.

is that correct? — Jabberwock

You already know it isn't because I've already explained three times how to interpret my use of the term, since you refuse to listen, I can't see the value in doing so a fourth time.

Ukraine is a grave threat to his regime. We know that he is willing to go to war to defend against threats, so it is reasonable that he would keep threatening war until there was no chance of free and prosperous Ukraine. — Jabberwock

Yep.

As you are claiming that avoiding the war is better than letting people get under oppression, you would advocate letting him subjugate the whole of Ukraine if it meant war could be avoided. — Jabberwock

Pretty much, yes. But as @boethius has pointed out, that option is not the one we're considering right now.

We also know that he is interested in Ukrainian territories and is willing to risk war to get them, therefore we can assume that he might want more Ukrainian territories. — Jabberwock

True also.

you would rather give away Ukrainian territories to avoid war, therefore you would advocate giving away further parts of Ukraine, until it run out of parts. — Jabberwock

Yes. That's right.

You seem to think you've reached some kind of conclusion.

I think that course of action protects the most people's well-being. I've asked if you disagree and your answer was pretty much that you don't really care about the well-being of non-Ukrainians because you don't know any, so I don't see much we can discuss further.

There's nothing to 'engage' with. Yes. There are other metrics which show things in a different light. What exactly is it you want me to do about that? Carry out some phoney 'rational synthesis' which somehow determines the Truth of the matter (despite experts in the field being unable to decide), and no doubt suspiciously resembles the position I held in the first place? I'm about 25 years past that kind of naivety. — Isaac

I certainly did not expect you to ignore all the data that contradict your thesis.

Oh. Turns out yes.

Why did Freedom House not do that then? They have the staff, they have the expertise. Why are they leaving it to us laymen? If The Economist has data that needs accounting, then what's stopping Freedom House from including it?

The reason these sources differ is because they differ in opinion as to what's relevant, how important each issue is, and what it all means put together. There's no resolving those differences. Finding some kind of 'mean average' doesn't get you closer to the truth, it's not dome by vote and it's neither does splitting the difference. — Isaac

Assessing more data does not get you closer to truth than carefully selecting just the one that confirms your thesis? Because that is how you have selected it in the first place, right? You base your whole theory on an outlier (you do know what an outlier is, don't you?) and try to convince me it is valid methodology? I wonder why all those people are wasting time doing metaanalyses, if you can just pick out the result of this one study that you like best!

You already know it isn't because I've already explained three times how to interpret my use of the term, since you refuse to listen, I can't see the value in doing so a fourth time. — Isaac

OK, so let us stick just to relative terms, exactly as you want. Considering that Russia's score in 2000 was 5.57 and it moved to 6.16 in 2008, i.e. (improvement of 0.59), and Ukraine made the progress of 0.83 from 2000 to 2008, which was the period you mentioned, then we have to conclude that both made about the same progress in those respective periods?

Yep. — Isaac

If yep, then Putin would still attack Ukraine if it had prospects for being free and prosperous, no matter whether it was in NATO or not. Conceding NATO membership would not stop the war, if Ukraine was to be free and prosperous, it would still be attacked.

Pretty much, yes. But as boethius has pointed out, that option is not the one we're considering right now. — Isaac

So if we conceded the whole Ukraine to Putin, as you propose, we could not 'expect a likewise positive effect on pressure for change in Russia (including any stolen territories) from a free and prospering Ukraine next door', as there would be no free and prospering Ukraine next door. It pretty much would diminish the likelihood of the successful Russian revolt, would it not?

I think that course of action protects the most people's well-being. I've asked if you disagree and your answer was pretty much that you don't really care about the well-being of non-Ukrainians because you don't know any, so I don't see much we can discuss further. — Isaac

And you seem to care about well being of non-Ukrainians only if Ukraine can be blamed for its decrease, otherwise you are content with 'balance', as you wrote. If you sold your Fairphone and donated the whole amount to charity, you would protect well-being of even more people, most likely save a few lives. But you do not do that, you do not choose the course of action that protects most people's well-being, you prefer the course of action that protects some people's well-being AND lets you keep your Fairphone. You keep your Fairphone even if it means that more people would die, but object that Ukrainians want to keep their freedom, if it means more people would die.

Yes, but there are other costs to giving Putin what he wants, e.g. an increased risk of Russian aggression in the future. Forcing Russia to burn through its entire Cold War stock of hardware and ammunition greatly reduces their ability to wage future wars. Even at current wartime production levels it will take Russia well over a decade to put together anything like the force they initially invaded with, likely far longer. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As you probably know, my view is that the Russians were provoked into invading Ukraine.

If they are provoked similarly in the future, and conventional means are no longer available, they will likely react more extremely; possibly with nuclear weapons. Remember the Cuba Crisis.

Further, if the purpose of western intervention was to send a message, who is listening? Independently-minded countries like the BRICS don't buy the narrative of an unprovoked invasion, and they have all refused to side with the US over this issue.

Meanwhile, the US has its hands tied in Ukraine trying to protect a two-decade investment which it will probably end up losing in the end. The US is losing influence all over the world, the Persian Gulf being a prime example. China is the laughing third.

This strategy has been a disaster.