I think you just replaced beliefs that are just sitting there, to a model that's just sitting there. — frank
How many beliefs does one mind hold? — Moliere
'Belief' is also a useful approximation, especially when predicting how other people are going to behave. * — Srap Tasmaner
Now the problem of other minds is insurmountable. — frank
A very good question, one that overlaps a conversation I am having with Sam26 in PM. Beliefs are not discrete pieces of mental furniture, despite our tendency to treat them as such. — Banno
what we think the world would say if it could talk. — frank
the belief that some philosophers (and others) who deny consciousness or deny our subjective experiences as an illusion. I think this is a grave error. — Sam26
I remember wondering what would happen if we reversed that, if we took words as saying things and instead said it was us borrowing that capacity, that we're the ones who don't literally *say* anything, only our words do. — Srap Tasmaner
"He wrote as someone might who had witnessed the creation of the world, a man who understood the voice of the mountains and of the rain." — Srap Tasmaner
Is it? :brow: It's not a problem for me... — creativesoul
It was quite interesting to me, probably as a direct result of my strong methodological naturalist bent! — creativesoul
maybe you're like a dark cloud that says it's going to rain — frank
And I think it reasonable to suppose that this case can be generalised, such that if in any conversation we were to list the points of agreement against the points of disagreement, it would be unusual to find the former to be shorter than the latter. — Banno
This is of course a simplification of Davidson's more rigorous argument concerning the incommensurability of conceptual schemes, from which I am convinced, contrary to the popular view, that talk of the map not being the territory mis-pictures what is going on; that in the case of language one cannot distinguish the map and the territory in this way.
And that's what I think is in error in the posing of the question in the title.
It looks like we agree. How would you determine that we really do think the same things? As opposed to just appearing to? — frank
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