Great, so you finally did some reading. — Jabberwock

There ought to be a fallacy for treating a joke as if it were an argument - argumentum a gravitate perhaps...

Seriously, you're going to get a lot more out of this conversation if you drop the pretence that you're playing teacher, it just makes you sound silly.

is using a single outlier to support your argument is a fallacy or not? — Jabberwock

No. I've already explained that...

If the accusation is "there's no evidence for X" then cherry-picked evidence disproves that claim. There has to exist evidence for X in order that I can cherry pick it, it therefore disproves the claim that there is no evidence in favour of X. — Isaac

Was there something there you didn't understand?

it is easier to overcome one's confirmation bias by seeking many sources, both confirming and countering his thesis. — Jabberwock

Is it? How? You keep falling back on these lazy clichés as if they were self-evident. I don't think it is easier to overcome one's confirmation bias by seeking many sources, both confirming and countering one's thesis. I think overcoming confirmation bias has far more to do with social roles, confidence, and the payoff from doing so. It has very little to do with quantity of sources, as 'quantity' here is difficult to pin down and is easily dismissed as confirmation bias itself (as well as group think, conformity bias etc.). It might be that a volume of opinion with something detached like mathematics would be persuasive, but not with politics, economics, sociology... These are far more likely to reflect popular or less popular idealogical positions.

People have ideological biases and mostly these run in dominant and alternative (or fringe) paradigms, if you follow a more fringe paradigm it's self-evident that there's going to be a majority who assess data differently, seeing that isn't going to change your paradigm. For example, supporters of a Marxist interpretation of history are not persuaded by the fact that most historians do not view things that way, they expect that to be the case as part of their analysis.

I have proposed to review as many indices as possible, including yours, with no particular weights attached to any of them, so there would be no anchoring and no preferential treatment whatsoever. You object to that because you realize that putting them all together would indicate your source is an outlier. How exactly is that framing? — Jabberwock

For a start we've looked only at two indices in detail, that's not 'as many as possible', not even close, but putting that aside, the anchoring is implied in what you expect to see. You already have Russia as descending into something, your frame of reference, so the quality of any assessment in anchored to that metric, things either deviate from it (and so require justification), or they do not (and therefore require no justification). Likewise your 'framing' of human freedom means that deviations are what require justification, but adherences do not.

that is not what is generally meant by the term — Jabberwock

It is...

Meaning of tyranny in English
tyranny
noun [ U ]
uk
/ˈtɪr.ən.i/ us
/ˈtɪr.ən.i/
Add to word list
government by a ruler or small group of people who have unlimited power over the people in their country or state and use it unfairly and cruelly:
This, the president promised us, was a war against tyranny.
a situation in which someone or something controls how you are able to live, in an unfair way: — https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tyranny

So 'framing' this as a misuse of 'tyranny' (notwithstanding the fact that I only mentioned tyranny a few times), is a straw man. There are two definitions given by the dictionary, you have chosen the one which provides you with a means to an easy counter argument rather than use the one that was intended. It's literally the definition of straw-manning.

If you reject historical probabilism, then you cannot argue that the US provoked the war: if history is wholly undetermined and future inscrutable, then nobody could predict any course of events, therefore they are blameless. — Jabberwock

Firstly, blame is about mens rea, not actus reus, so predictability isn't important. But I'm quite content with probabilism., it's just that you've not given any probabilities, you've just slung together a load of facts and said "see, these make it more probable". I don't see. I'm unconvinced that those facts lead to the probabilities you suggest and you've not presented anything at all to argue that they do. Their mere existence as facts is not sufficient.

If you say "the defendant was most likely to have stolen the bag - he was tall and wore a hat" it's not an argument. You have to show how being tall and wearing a hat affect the likelihood of the defendant stealing the bag.

You've provided lots of facts about Russia's past but you've not provided any argument to show that they have the effect on the probability of this movement in the direction of human freedom that you're claiming they do.

Maybe you have read many sources, but you engage with only one. — Jabberwock

And yet you still cannot tell me what 'engaging' is...

Was there something there you didn't understand? — Isaac

I understand it quite well, but my accusation is not that 'there's no evidence for X', but that the evidence is cherry-picked. So joyously acknowledging that yes, your data is cherry-picked, does not address the fallacy in any way.

Is it? How? — Isaac

I have already wrote that: by challenging your view by reflecting on it from a different point of view.

The hardest thing about defeating confirmation bias is that it requires someone to challenge their own logic, which is easier said than done. The simplest way to avoid confirmation bias is to look at a belief you hold, and search out ways in which you’re wrong, rather than the ways in which you’re right. It’s of paramount importance to listen to all sides and carefully consider them before coming to a conclusion. And, having reached a conclusion, we need to continue reassessing whether our conclusion is correct as new information becomes available. You don’t need to compromise your values and beliefs to open your mind to other ideas. Entertaining another idea doesn’t mean accepting it. Just try to look at the alternative to a belief you hold and see the viewpoint of the other side. It’s here that you can begin the fight against confirmation bias. — What is Confirmation Bias and How to Reduce it?

You can overcome confirmation bias by getting out of your echo chamber to challenge your preexisting beliefs.

Here are some quick tips for getting started.
Search for accurate information, not easy-access information

Before making up your mind, spend a little more time seeking out evidence that disproves your point.
[...]
"Question your sources. Make sure you're getting your information from reliable sources and that you're not just seeking out information that confirms your existing beliefs," Dragomir says. — How to spot confirmation bias and keep it from fueling snap judgments and limiting your worldview

5 Ways to Overcome Confirmation Bias

For a start we've looked only at two indices in detail, that's not 'as many as possible', not even close, but putting that aside, the anchoring is implied in what you expect to see. You already have Russia as descending into something, your frame of reference, so the quality of any assessment in anchored to that metric, things either deviate from it (and so require justification), or they do not (and therefore require no justification). Likewise your 'framing' of human freedom means that deviations are what require justification, but adherences do not. — Isaac

You have flatly refused to look at other evidence. Could that be the reason for why we were looking just at one? Anchoring cannot be 'implied', if we are looking at several indices without rejecting any of them beforehand. 'Let us look at all the indices and average them' is not 'anchoring'. And 'human freedom' is too broad, as many ways in which human freedom is increased does nothing to resolve the actual conflict (which is caused by very specific violations of human freedom). If someone objects to slavery and someone proposes to significantly increase religious freedom of the slaves then yes, it would be a nice improvement of their index, but it would still not address the problem, i.e. slavery.

So 'framing' this as a misuse of 'tranny' (notwithstanding the fact that I only mentioned tyranny a few times), is a straw man. There are two definitions given by the dictionary, you have chosen the one which provides you with a means to an easy counter argument rather than use the one that was intended. It's literally the definition of straw-manning. — Isaac

Your claim that the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine requires overthrowing of tyranny requires a rather specific understanding of the term, which you have then tried to water down. The tyranny (i.e. the authoritarian regime) in Russia must be abolished, because it has specific properties that are the source of the conflict (like the fear that successful neighbors might instigate movements dangerous to the regime), so improving the plight of Russians in other areas has little to do with the resolution of the conflict. The question is not 'Can we make Russians happier?' but 'Can we make Russians stop subjugating other countries?' The HFI says that the first is possible (not even likely), but it says nothing about the second question.

Firstly, blame is about mens rea, not actus reus, so predictability isn't important. But I'm quite content with probabilism. You've not given any probabilities, you've just slung together a load of facts and said "see, these make it more probable". I don't see. I'm unconvinced that those facts lead to the probabilities you suggest and you've not presented anything at all to argue that they do. Their mere existence as facts is not sufficient. — Isaac

I have given you the facts, how you assess their influence on the probability is up to you. If you do not see how tight control of any form of protests might influence the probability of peaceful protests, so be it. If you do not see how the lack of grass-root activity traditions might influence people self-organization, what can I say. If you do not see how brutal suppression of opposition obstructs rising of figures around which the popular protests could concentrate around, there is nothing more I can do. I cannot do the thinking for you.

joyously acknowledging that yes, your data is cherry-picked, does not address the fallacy in any way. — Jabberwock

What fallacy? You've still not explained how my data selection in this instance is a fallacy. Throwing a Wikipedia article at it isn't an argument. How has my data selection process lead to my conclusion being less sound in a way that yours isn't? You've not given me any mechanism connecting these data selection processes with the truth.

I have already wrote that: by challenging your view by reflecting on it from a different point of view. — Jabberwock

'Challenging' it? 'Reflecting' on it? These are just amorphous terms that don't have any distinct meaning. What exactly is the nature of Freedom House's 'challenge'? What exactly am I supposed to show to demonstrate having 'reflected' on it?

You have flatly refused to look at other evidence. Could that be the reason for why we were looking just at one? — Jabberwock

You have no reason at all to believe I've not looked at any other evidence, and in fact the most cursory glance back through this very thread would have shown that assumption to be wrong, but it's not your interest to actually get that assessment right, is it?

Anchoring cannot be 'implied', if we are looking at several indices without rejecting any of them beforehand. 'Let us look at all the indices and average them' is not 'anchoring'. — Jabberwock

... he says, going on to produce a textbook example of anchoring...

If someone objects to slavery and someone proposes to significantly increase religious freedom of the slaves then yes, it would be a nice improvement of their index, but it would still not address the problem, i.e. slavery. — Jabberwock

... I can only assume that was deliberate?

Your claim that the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine requires overthrowing of tyranny — Jabberwock

And I made such a ridiculous claim where, exactly?

The question is not 'Can we make Russians happier?' but 'Can we make Russians stop subjugating other countries?' — Jabberwock

... and goes on to provide a further text book example of framing. Perfect.

I have given you the facts, how you assess their influence on the probability is up to you. — Jabberwock

Have you ever written an argument? Have any of your teachers ever given you high grades for your 'list of facts' with the conclusion 'put them together however you want, that's up to you'? I presume you've at least had education past the level at which you're taught how to construct arguments. If you want to present an argument that your facts lead to a high probability, you must make that case (and do so persuasively). It's not 'list the facts and then roll your eyes if others don't reach the same conclusion you did' That's what persuasive arguments are for - to get others to see what you see connecting the facts to the conclusion.

What fallacy? You've still not explained how my data selection in this instance is a fallacy. Throwing a Wikipedia article at it isn't an argument. How has my data selection process lead to my conclusion being less sound in a way that yours isn't? You've not given me any mechanism connecting these data selection processes with the truth. — Isaac

I have given your four articles about the fallacy you commit. You either understand them or not. If not, then nothing can be done about it, as they are pretty clear.

'Challenging' it? 'Reflecting' on it? These are just amorphous terms that don't have any distinct meaning. What exactly is the nature of Freedom House's 'challenge'? What exactly am I supposed to show to demonstrate having 'reflected' on it? — Isaac

Yes, it seems all terms are amorphous to you.

You have no reason at all to believe I've not looked at any other evidence, and in fact the most cursory glance back through this very thread would have shown that assumption to be wrong, but it's not your interest to actually get that assessment right, is it? — Isaac

Well, even if you had a glance, you have refused to talk about it, which is about the same.

And I made such a ridiculous claim where, exactly? — Isaac

Here you go:

For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions. — Isaac

Have you ever written an argument? Have any of your teachers ever given you high grades for your 'list of facts' with the conclusion 'put them together however you want, that's up to you'? I presume you've at least had education past the level at which you're taught how to construct arguments. If you want to present an argument that your facts lead to a high probability, you must make that case (and do so persuasively). It's not 'list the facts and then roll your eyes if others don't reach the same conclusion you did' That's what persuasive arguments are for - to get others to see what you see connecting the facts to the conclusion. — Isaac

That is hilarious coming from you.

I counted on your intelligence, did not expect that I have to spell it all out for you.

Umland opines

We’re going to need that Ukraine no-fly zone after all
^{— Andreas Umland · The Hill · Jul 27, 2023}

mentioning

• food production + export
• nuclear facilities
• civilian infra, bombings of noncombatants
• reconstruction

while restricting no-flight to those that are unmanned (unauthorized).
Going half the way?
Some of this stuff has come up in the thread before.

I have given your four articles about the fallacy you commit. You either understand them or not. — Jabberwock

Odd then that none of your other arguments have simply been conducted by vague reference to Wikipedia articles. I gave you 15 articles about the fallacies and bias you committed. Was that sufficient for you to be persuaded? Or did you feel there was some room for me to have been wrong about the application of any of those to your case?

Yes, it seems all terms are amorphous to you. — Jabberwock

Many are, yes. that's why I ask for clarity. Is that odd behaviour to you? To ask for clarity when faced with ambiguous terms.

Well, even if you had a glance, you have refused to talk about it, which is about the same. — Jabberwock

I really don't see how. Did you talk about all the evidence opposing your theories? If I look back over the thread, will I find all the theories you've proposed about the war accompanied by a short statement about all the counter-evidence that there is on the matter and how you rejected it?

Here you go: — Jabberwock

For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions. — Isaac

In what way is that the same as...

the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine requires overthrowing of tyranny — Jabberwock

...? The first gives two choices, the second asserts that there's only one.

I counted on your intelligence, did not expect that I have to spell it all out for you. — Jabberwock

So your measure of intelligence is the degree to which people agree with you? Sling a load of facts together which seem to you to reach a particular conclusion and then if other people see it, they must be intelligent too. If they don't, then the only option is that they must not be very intelligent. After all, it couldn't possibly be because you're wrong, could it now? It couldn't possibly be that the way things seem to you to be is not necessarily the way things actually are?

Odd then that none of your other arguments have simply been conducted by vague reference to Wikipedia articles. I gave you 15 articles about the fallacies and bias you committed. Was that sufficient for you to be persuaded? Or did you feel there was some room for me to have been wrong about the application of any of those to your case? — Isaac

Yes, that is why I took a lot of time to point them out - I carefully examined each charge of fallacy and explained why it might and why it might not apply to my arguments (to which you implied I should not do that because it was supposed to be a joke). You have just asserted that your cherry picking does not constitute fallacy, without explaining why it would not. That is the difference.

Many are, yes. that's why I ask for clarity. Is that odd behaviour to you? To ask for clarity when faced with ambiguous terms. — Isaac

No, you do not ask for clarity, you dismiss terms based on their supposed lack of clarity. You argue about tyranny and then refuse to argue about tyranny, shifting the goalposts several more times in the process.

I really don't see how. Did you talk about all the evidence opposing your theories? If I look back over the thread, will I find all the theories you've proposed about the war accompanied by a short statement about all the counter-evidence that there is on the matter and how you rejected it? — Isaac

I have talked extensively about the only piece of evidence presented by you and I am ready to talk about any other you would be willing to present (but you are not willing). You refuse to talk about evidence presented by me. That is the difference.

...? The first gives two choices, the second asserts that there's only one. — Isaac

Given that you explicitly reject the second choice (i.e. continuing the war), then you are committed to the first one, which is, I remind you:

leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny — Isaac

Later you added that the preferred method should be peaceful protests.

That is NOT the same as: 'leave them there and allow their HFI to improve a bit'. The latter does not entail the former and does not increase its probability. Therefore the argument 'freeing the whole of Russia by peaceful protests is likely, because it is possible to improve country's HFI several decimal points in ten years' fails, because there is no direct causal link between the two, which I have demonstrated by showing that Russia's HFI increased exactly as the conflict in Ukraine deepened. Improving the HFI (even if likely, which your evidence does not show, because it can move both ways) does nothing to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. Yet we had to spend a week discussing it.

So your measure of intelligence is the degree to which people agree with you? Sling a load of facts together which seem to you to reach a particular conclusion and then if other people see it, they must be intelligent too. If they don't, then the only option is that they must not be very intelligent. After all, it couldn't possibly be because you're wrong, could it now? It couldn't possibly be that the way things seem to you to be is not necessarily the way things actually are? — Isaac

No, if I was wrong, it would be pointed out to me that the facts have no relation to my argument, just like I did with the HFI above. But sure, if you want it spelled out point by point, we can do that. It will take some time though.

I believe that having a tight state control over protests, social gathering and social organization in general has a negative effect on probability of regime overthrow by peaceful protests, because all budding protests are dispersed immediately, often brutally, and their leaders are quickly taken out by the unfair judicial process, so the protests cannot gain momentum. Do you disagree?

Angry Russia refuses to speak at UN meeting on its attacks on Ukraine’s key port city of Odesa
^{— Edith M Lederer · AP · Jul 27, 2023}

Speaking of angry: Jul 25, 2023.

Isolated Putin tries to shore up African support as Kremlin seethes over poor summit turnout
^{— Radina Gigova, Anna Chernova, Sophie Tanno, Nimi Princewill · CNN · Jul 27, 2023}

Didn't go all that well the last time either: Jun 18, 2023.
Accumulating "alternate world" type stuff? (Jul 11, 2023, Jun 16, 2023, Mar 4, 2023)

Putin woos African leaders at a summit in Russia with promises of expanding trade and other ties
^{— Vladimir Isachenkov, Cara Anna · AP · Jul 28, 2023}

Happy about free grain. Need more.

You have just asserted that your cherry picking does not constitute fallacy, without explaining why it would not. That is the difference. — Jabberwock

That you think it acceptable practice to just throw out accusations without any basis given and then expect them to stand unless sufficiently rebutted is not something I'd be particularly advertising, if I were in your shoes, but...

My use of the HFI is not cherry-picking because, as I have pointed out, the decision about which factors to include and which to weigh is a political one, not a scientific one. There's no 'right' answer, there's no rational calculation we can apply to determine which are the 'right' data points to pick and which ought to have what weight. We make a political choice as to what kind of thing we think constitutes human freedom. Cherry-picking does not apply to making political choices about value judgements, it applies to the selection of a subset of data from a wider pool of data of the same type. It applies to picking a subset from a wider set which ought to be included, not from a wider set for which there are reasons for exclusion.

If I were to pick temperature records (as your article uses) from a wider pool of temperature records, that would be cherry-picking seeing as my decision to correlate temperature already implies that any measure of temperature ought be included. If I, on the other hand, decide to use income-equality as a measure of development rather than GDP, that is not cherry-picking, it is making a value judgement as to what best indicates 'development'.

That said, I should not have to rebut a claim that is made without basis. It is reasonable to expect that if such a claim is made, it is accompanied by an explanation of how it applies first. Hence my sarcastic response (which you unfortunately took seriously - I though the self-defeating reference to argument form authority at the end would have made it obvious, but...)

you do not ask for clarity, you dismiss terms — Jabberwock

Then what is...

I'm asking how. What is this 'taking together' you think you're doing? Half way between the two? Biggest wins? What are you actually doing when you're 'taking together'? — Isaac

How? Explain what you think happens. Cato make mistakes. Freedom House make mistakes. You put them together, then what? The mistakes magically pop out? What happens to the mistakes when you look at both reports? You see the differences. How do you know which ones are mistakes/biases? Majority rules? Magic bias detector? — Isaac

...? Most likely? Where are you getting your probabilities from? — Isaac

'Likely', 'most likely'. Any idea as to the difference? — Isaac

What would constitute 'engaging' with them? — Isaac

The HFI is as good a measure of 'tyranny' as any. Short of you getting out your tyranny-o-meter, what could you possibly bring to bear to dispute that? — Isaac

Is it? How? — Isaac

And yet you still cannot tell me what 'engaging' is... — Isaac

What fallacy? You've still not explained how my data selection in this instance is a fallacy — Isaac

What exactly is the nature of Freedom House's 'challenge'? What exactly am I supposed to show to demonstrate having 'reflected' on it? — Isaac

... all of which are requests for clarity, none of which you've answered.

The point of all this is that your application of rational deductive practices to these historical, political and social facts is inappropriate, they are not data points on a graph to which we can apply some statistical analyses. Trust me, I've spent 20 years in research in social science, it can't be done.

I have talked extensively about the only piece of evidence presented by you and I am ready to talk about any other you would be willing to present (but you are not willing). You refuse to talk about evidence presented by me. That is the difference. — Jabberwock

That wasn't the accusation though was it? It's not about 'willingness' You accused me of not engaging with the counter-evidence on the basis that I hadn't spoken about it. Have you spoken about the counter-evidence to all your theories here? No. So your accusation is unfounded. We do not typically present all the counter-evidence for our theories, we support them, and expect others to counter them.

I've supported my theory about Russian-occupied Donbas's ability to achieve Ukraine-like levels of freedom within eight years, using an index which I believe shows that.

You've countered by presenting other indices which use other measures of freedom and place different weightings on those which crossover.

I disagree with the weightings and choices those other indices have made. My disagreement is a political one, I don't think they focus on the measures of freedom that are important. That's a value judgement, and making it is neither cherry-picking, nor 'ignoring' counter-evidence.

Given that you explicitly reject the second choice (i.e. continuing the war), then you are committed to the first one — Jabberwock

I am. Which is very much not the same as declaring it to be a requirement. Thinking that we ought to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner is not the same as declaring it to be a requirement that we go to the Italian restaurant for dinner.

Improving the HFI (even if likely, which your evidence does not show, because it can move both ways) does nothing to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. — Jabberwock

Who said it would? Again, you're 're-framing' the argument. The argument was subsequent to negotiation, and territorial ceding (which are the means by which the conflict might end). The counter to that is usually that it would cause more harm than good. I countered that by pointing to the relative harms in occupied Crimea and the possibilities of reaching Ukraine-like levels of freedom in Russia-occupied Donbas over that period by means other than invading it. I didn't think it was that complicated an argument, but it's clearly been caught up in the "every argument that's not 'MORE WAR!' must be wrong" trope that seems to apply to the Ukraine situation.

I believe that having a tight state control over protests, social gathering and social organization in general has a negative effect on probability of regime overthrow by peaceful protests, because all budding protests are dispersed immediately, often brutally, and their leaders are quickly taken out by the unfair judicial process, so the protests cannot gain momentum. Do you disagree? — Jabberwock

No, I don't disagree. There's a difference between a negative effect and a sufficient negative effect. Political oppression is not the only factor to consider. To dispute the case (that Ukraine-like levels of freedom are possible to achieve in eight years), you need to show why you believe that these negative factors are sufficient to make that unlikely, not merely that they work in that direction.

That's why I've used indices. They take multiple factors into account, which means that we don't have to rely on untestable predictions about how strong the effect of one or two factors might be.

That you think it acceptable practice to just throw out accusations without any basis given and then expect them to stand unless sufficiently rebutted is not something I'd be particularly advertising, if I were in your shoes, but... — Isaac

I have described very specifically why your support is inappropriate and have quoted the Wikipedia article only after you have shown that you simply do not understand what the issue is about. So 'the basis' was given several times and in detail.

My use of the HFI is not cherry-picking because, as I have pointed out, the decision about which factors to include and which to weigh is a political one, not a scientific one. There's no 'right' answer, there's no rational calculation we can apply to determine which are the 'right' data points to pick and which ought to have what weight. We make a political choice as to what kind of thing we think constitutes human freedom. Cherry-picking does not apply to making political choices about value judgements, it applies to the selection of a subset of data from a wider pool of data of the same type. It applies to picking a subset from a wider set which ought to be included, not from a wider set for which there are reasons for exclusion. — Isaac

There is nothing political about including several indices as opposed to one. Especially given the single one given is an outlier.

If I were to pick temperature records (as your article uses) from a wider pool of temperature records, that would be cherry-picking seeing as my decision to correlate temperature already implies that any measure of temperature ought be included. If I, on the other hand, decide to use income-equality as a measure of development rather than GDP, that is not cherry-picking, it is making a value judgement as to what best indicates 'development'. — Isaac

It is cherry picking because you have selected an outlier indicator that does not reflect too well the actual issue relevant to the discussion. You have switch talk about changing regime (which is specifically required for the improvement of the situation, as you have yourself admitted) to talk about nebulous freedoms and insisted that improvement in the latter somehow impact the probability of the former.

The point of all this is that your application of rational deductive practices to these historical, political and social facts is inappropriate, they are not data points on a graph to which we can apply some statistical analyses. Trust me, I've spent 20 years in research in social science, it can't be done. — Isaac

But it is you who reduced in the discussion complex political and social processes to a single HFI index and argued that it is sufficient to support your very specific argument about probability of peaceful regime change in Russia. The conclusions you draw from the possibility (not probability) of HFI do not impact that probability.

That wasn't the accusation though was it? It's not about 'willingness' You accused me of not engaging with the counter-evidence on the basis that I hadn't spoken about it. Have you spoken about the counter-evidence to all your theories here? No. So your accusation is unfounded. We do not typically present all the counter-evidence for our theories, we support them, and expect others to counter them. — Isaac

No, i have accussed you of not engaging with counterevidence I have spoken about.

I've supported my theory about Russian-occupied Donbas's ability to achieve Ukraine-like levels of freedom within eight years, using an index which I believe shows that.

You've countered by presenting other indices which use other measures of freedom and place different weightings on those which crossover. — Isaac

People in Crimea reaching higher HFI did not stop Putin from starting the other war, therefore it is not unreasonable to conclude that leaving people in Donbas to reach higher HFI will not stop Putin from starting another war for Kharkiv, Odessa or Kiev itself. Thus proposing a solution that somewhat possibly (NOT LIKELY, POSSIBLY) improves freedoms in Donbas has absolutely no impact on the resolution of the conflict itself. If you are content with a solution that does absolutely nothing to resolve the conflict, so be it, but then it means (given your alternative) that the only other option to actually end the conflict is war, as you have failed to propose a peaceful path for resolving the conflict.

I am. Which is very much not the same as declaring it to be a requirement. Thinking that we ought to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner is not the same as declaring it to be a requirement that we go to the Italian restaurant for dinner. — Isaac

If we have two choices: to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner or starve, and we reject starving, then there is no other option but to go to the Italian restaurant.

Who said it would? Again, you're 're-framing' the argument. The argument was subsequent to negotiation, and territorial ceding (which are the means by which the conflict might end). The counter to that is usually that it would cause more harm than good. I countered that by pointing to the relative harms in occupied Crimea and the possibilities of reaching Ukraine-like levels of freedom in Russia-occupied Donbas over that period by means other than invading it. I didn't think it was that complicated an argument, but it's clearly been caught up in the "every argument that's not 'MORE WAR!' must be wrong" trope that seems to apply to the Ukraine situation. — Isaac

So your solution is to cede territory and hope that the conflict MIGHT end. Putin was peacefully given Crimea and it did not stop the conflict, on the contrary, he made new demands. Why think ceding Donbas would be different?

I have described very specifically why your support is inappropriate — Jabberwock

You said it was cherry-picking and fleeced a quote from Wikipedia. That's not 'describing specifically'.

There is nothing political about including several indices as opposed to one. — Jabberwock

You haven't 'included' several indices any more than I have. You've decided that you agree with the weightings in one and disagree with those in another.

the single one given is an outlier. — Jabberwock

It isn't, and repeatedly saying it is is an argument from assertion (seeing as you're so keen on your fallacies). There are only two indices in the world which make a claim to cover human freedom as a whole (rather than specific elements like economy, press, or democracy). Those are Freedom House and Cato. That does not make Cato's an 'outlier'.

You have switch talk about changing regime (which is specifically required for the improvement of the situation, as you have yourself admitted) to talk about nebulous freedoms and insisted that improvement in the latter somehow impact the probability of the former. — Jabberwock

Then you should have no trouble quoting my doing so.

argued that it is sufficient to support your very specific argument about probability of peaceful regime change in Russia — Jabberwock

Again, you could quote me doing so if that we're the case.

People in Crimea reaching higher HFI did not stop Putin from starting the other war, therefore it is not unreasonable to conclude that leaving people in Donbas to reach higher HFI will not stop Putin from starting another war for Kharkiv, Odessa or Kiev itself. — Jabberwock

Correct. It may surprise you to hear this, but it, takes more than one single factor to stop war. I suspect that's why I've never made such a ridiculous claim as that improvement on the HFI prevents war.

i have accussed you of not engaging with counterevidence I have spoken about. — Jabberwock

And I've asked you what 'engaging' would constitute in, but since you refuse to answer I can't see how I can defend that particular accusation.

If you are content with a solution that does absolutely nothing to resolve the conflict, so be it, but then it means (given your alternative) that the only other option to actually end the conflict is war — Jabberwock

I mean... Just read that again and if it still makes any kind of sense on a second read, I don't know if I can help...

"If a strategy I advocate doesn't prevent the conflict, then that proves the only thing that will is war"? Seriously?

you have failed to propose a peaceful path for resolving the conflict. — Jabberwock

Negotiations. Compromise.

If we have two choices: to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner or starve, and we reject starving, then there is no other option but to go to the Italian restaurant. — Jabberwock

So? What has that bizarre invented counterfactual have to do with your claim that I claimed any course of action was a requirement?

So your solution is to cede territory and hope that the conflict MIGHT end. — Jabberwock

Yes, in part. As I've said, your incredulity isn't an argument.

Putin was peacefully given Crimea and it did not stop the conflict — Jabberwock

No. It clearly takes more than just ceding territory.

Why think ceding Donbas would be different? — Jabberwock

I don't. Have I anywhere made the argument "just cede Donbas, do nothing else, and that'll work"?

You said it was cherry-picking and fleeced a quote from Wikipedia. That's not 'describing specifically'. — Isaac

No, I have explained for many posts before that relying on a single datapoint out of many is incorrect. I have talked about it over and over. You did not reject it, but were seemingly unaware what the problem is. I brought in the Wikipedia article as it explains in detail what the problem exactly is about. Have you read it?

You haven't 'included' several indices any more than I have. You've decided that you agree with the weightings in one and disagree with those in another. — Isaac

Yes, I did:

The Economist Democracy Index in 2008 for Russia was 4.48, while compared to 6.94 for Ukraine, with full democracies starting at about 8. RSF Freedom of Press - Ukraine 19.25, Russia - 47 (the lower score, the greater freedom). Human Freedom index for 2008 - Ukraine 76, Russia 111 (less is better). Freedom in the World 2013 (no earlier issues) - Ukraine 4, Russia 6 (1 - best, 7 - worst). Polity IV State Fragility 2009 - Ukraine 6, Russia 8. They only indices they were comparable in was corruption. So what you wrote is simply false. — Jabberwock

They all show that the situation in Russia and Ukraine is not nearly as comparable as HFI would have us believe. Note that I further discussed them in the context of your proposed peaceful regime change (which you seemingly no longer advocate for), not your later, different argument about 'freedoms in Donbas'.

It isn't, and repeatedly saying it is is an argument from assertion (seeing as you're so keen on your fallacies). There are only two indices in the world which make a claim to cover human freedom as a whole (rather than specific elements like economy, press, or democracy). Those are Freedom House and Cato. That does not make Cato's an 'outlier'. — Isaac

The whole issue with the argument seems to be that you switched from 'we have two options, peaceful regime change in the WHOLE OF RUSSIA and war' to 'freedom in Donbass can improve'. I do not contest tthe latter, I just point out that it has little to do with the causes of war, which your proposed course of action was supposed to avoid.

Do you still believe these (i.e. peaceful regime change in Russia and war) are the two alternatives we have? Do you believe they are exclusive and exhaustive? Because now you are arguing something different.

And I've asked you what 'engaging' would constitute in, but since you refuse to answer I can't see how I can defend that particular accusation. — Isaac

I have already responded: it would require to discuss it and reexamine your argument in view of it, just like i did with your evidence.

I mean... Just read that again and if it still makes any kind of sense on a second read, I don't know if I can help...

"If a strategy I advocate doesn't prevent the conflict, then that proves the only thing that will is war"? Seriously? — Isaac

No, it does not prove it, it just means that the strategy you advocate likely does not prevent the war, just delays it. That is, the strategy you advocate likely leads to war, just sometime later and with several negative consequences. What good is it then?

Negotiations. Compromise. — Isaac

That is a method toward solution, not a solution. It tells me nothing about how the conflict would be resolved.

So? What has that bizarre invented counterfactual have to do with your claim that I claimed any course of action was a requirement? — Isaac

If you write 'there are two options', you typically mean that the options are reasonably exhaustive and exclusive. If there are more options to avoid the war, why not mention them?

Yes, in part. As I've said, your incredulity isn't an argument. — Isaac

And your credulity is not an argument either, as we still have no reason to think that this course of events is likely. On the other hand, we have a strong reason - i.e. previous Putin's conduct - to believe it is unlikely. That means that your proposed solution is not likely to resolve the conflict, i.e. it would likely just delay the war and not prevent it, while still bringing about negative consequences (i.e. oppression of Ukrainians, strenghening Putin's positions, etc.).

I don't. Have I anywhere made the argument "just cede Donbas, do nothing else, and that'll work"? — Isaac

You wrote specifically:

The argument was subsequent to negotiation, and territorial ceding (which are the means by which the conflict might end). — Isaac

So that is what I go by. If your proposed solution to end the conflict involves other factors, it would be better to include them in the means of ending the conflict.

So, again, what is your proposed solution to resolve the conflict?

No, I don't disagree. There's a difference between a negative effect and a sufficient negative effect. Political oppression is not the only factor to consider. To dispute the case (that Ukraine-like levels of freedom are possible to achieve in eight years), you need to show why you believe that these negative factors are sufficient to make that unlikely, not merely that they work in that direction. — Isaac

Sorry, I missed this one: again this evidence was used to argue that a peaceful regime change in Russia is likely, which was your argument (once), not to dispute that it is possible to improve HFI a few decimal points.

No, I have explained for many posts before that relying on a single datapoint out of many is incorrect. I have talked about it over and over. — Jabberwock

And I've explained how it isn't always the case, which is how we have a discussion because you're not the fucking teacher, and though this will blow your mind, it is actually possible that you're wrong.

Have you read it? — Jabberwock

I cited from the fucking article in the last post. What did you think I'd done? Lucky guess?

As to your 'other indices'...

The Economist Democracy Index — Jabberwock

Is a measure of democracy, not freedom. I've clearly explained, even citing an expert in Eastern European economics why the two were not comparable. You ignored that.

RSF Freedom of Press — Jabberwock

Is even more specific, hardly covering freedom and certainly having nothing to do with regime change which you claimed to believe was the argument.

Human Freedom index for 2008 — Jabberwock

Is Cato's own index anyway, and for a year that we're not even discussing. And Cato's index from a different year is not a source conflicting Cato's index from the year in question.

Polity IV State Fragility 2009 — Jabberwock

Is again specifically about democratic institutions and is again, from a year we're not even discussing.

Leaving us with...

Freedom in the World 2013 — Jabberwock

... from the wrong year.

My argument is that Ukraine moved, in the last eight years, in terms of freedom from tyranny (as defined by the dictionary definition I gave before), the same distance as it would take to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now.

You've provided a load of indices from years that I'm not even talking about using measures that I'm not even talking about and claimed they disprove the claim.

They all show that the situation in Russia and Ukraine is not nearly as comparable as HFI would have us believe. — Jabberwock

They don't. They are from the wrong years and focus on highly specific sets of data except one (the Freedom in the World - except it's still from the wrong year).

you switched from 'we have two options, peaceful regime change in the WHOLE OF RUSSIA and war' to 'freedom in Donbass can improve'. — Jabberwock

Then provide me with the quotes where I have made such claims. I'm not going to argue for claims you'd like me to have made. I will defend claims I've actually made.

I have already responded: it would require to discuss it and reexamine your argument in view of it, just like i did with your evidence. — Jabberwock

And what evidence do you have that I haven't done so, other than the fact that I still don't agree?

it just means that the strategy you advocate likely does not prevent the war, just delays it. That is, the strategy you advocate likely leads to war — Jabberwock

Nonsense. Just because a strategy doesn't address the mechanism by which conflict is ended it doesn't mean it leads to war. And besides, we're comparing it to your strategy which actually is war, so what does it not ending war have to do with any meaningful comparison. Your strategy doesn't end war, nor prevent future wars either.

That is a method toward solution, not a solution. It tells me nothing about how the conflict would be resolved. — Jabberwock

Neither does "keep chucking arms at it".

If you write 'there are two options', you typically mean that the options are reasonably exhaustive and exclusive. If there are more options to avoid the war, why not mention them? — Jabberwock

Read what I've written. The full context was...

The idea that the only way to promote the freedom of the people of Donbas is to fight a bloody and destructive war to keep them under Ukrainian rule is ridiculous and ahistorical. Extraction from the yoke of tyranny has almost universally been won by the people, not governments invading each other.

For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions. — Isaac

I've bolded the relevant context to assist your reading comprehension.

we have a strong reason - i.e. previous Putin's conduct - to believe it is unlikely. — Jabberwock

That's not a reason, it's throwing a loose and undefined general comment at it in lieu of any real argument.

I don't. Have I anywhere made the argument "just cede Donbas, do nothing else, and that'll work"? — Isaac


You wrote specifically:

The argument was subsequent to negotiation, and territorial ceding (which are the means by which the conflict might end). — Isaac


So that is what I go by. — Jabberwock

Except that you skipped over the words 'negotiaion, and...' to create a ridiculous straw man.

this evidence was used to argue that a peaceful regime change in Russia is likely, which was your argument (once) — Jabberwock

Again, if it was my argument, you could quote me arguing it.

And I've explained that how it isn't always the case, which is how we have a discussion because you're not the fucking teacher, and though this will blow your mind, it is actually possible that you're wrong. — Isaac

You have literally went from:

So. The argument you were supposed to be countering was about how far Ukraine might be from Russian-style authoritarianism. The answer is, not far. The question wasn't about recent direction of travel. — Isaac

to:

tyranny in lack of economic freedom, lack of opportunity

Because that is how you have decided to define authoritarianism/tyranny based on the HFI index. The problem is that authoritarianism as it is usually meant:

Authoritarianism is a political system characterized by the rejection of political plurality, the use of strong central power to preserve the political status quo, and reductions in the rule of law, separation of powers, and democratic voting. — Wikipedia

is at the center of the issue here - the political system in Russia both fuels the Russian imperialism and depends on it. Thus, free Ukraine is a dangerous threat to it which is one of the causes of the conflict.

On the other hand, 'authoritarianism' as you define it now, i.e. the range of specific HFI values, has very little to do with that issue, as you can have a nice HFI in Crimea and still attack your neighbors, because your regime is authoritarian in the first sense. So yes, if you frame the argument in terms of general freedom indices, you might not be cherry-picking, however, your argument stops being relevant to the resolution of conflict in Ukraine.

My argument is that Ukraine moved, in the last eight years, in terms of tyranny (as defined by the dictionary definition I gave before), the same distance as it would take to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now. — Isaac

The obvious issue is that your current interpretation of 'tyranny' has very little to do with the causes and resolutions of the actual conflict in Ukraine. So sure, Russia could improve HFI by a few points in a few years, the issue is that it might still be very eager to attack Ukraine because of its authoritarian regime. How can we know it? Because Russia actually did improve a few points in HFI before it attacked Ukraine. So yes, I completely concede the argument that Russia can improve its HFI index in a few years, the issue is that it might have no bearing whatsoever on the war in Ukraine, its causes and ways to stop it.

Then provide me with the quotes where I have made such claims. I'm not going to argue for claims you'd like me to have made. I will defend claims I've actually made. — Isaac

You give the quote yourself down below.

Nonsense. Just because a strategy doesn't address the mechanism by which conflict is ended it doesn't mean it leads to war. And besides, we're comparing it to your strategy which actually is war, so what does it not ending war have to do with any meaningful comparison. your strategy doesn't end war, nor prevent future wars either. — Isaac

So on my strategy war is certain, on yours likely. Mine has the advantage of accepting the war on more advantageous terms, yours does not (because it involves ceding territories, which can be used as a staging ground for future wars, exactly as Crimea and Donbas were used).

Neither does "keep chucking arms at it". — Isaac

Are you saying that wars do not resolve conflicts? Do you want a list again?

I've bolded the relevant context to assist your reading comprehension. — Isaac

Yes, with the context there are still two options listed. Do you believe those are the only two possible or the two most possible options?

That's not a reason, it's throwing a loose and undefined general comment at it in lieu of any real argument. — Isaac

So the fact that Putin has already attacked Ukraine and annexed its territory, then threatened it with a war and started it does not give us any indication to what his possible decisions might be? Do you believe human behavior is completely unpredictable?

Except that you skipped over the words 'negotiaion, and...' to create a ridiculous straw man. — Isaac

OK, so your argument is 'negotiate and cede Donbas and then the conflict might end'. I am afraid you must be a bit more specific before the chances of that happening might be assessed.

So, again, what is your proposed peaceful solution to the conflict in Ukraine?

On the other hand, 'authoritarianism' as you define it now — Jabberwock

I'm not defining it any differently. Read the quotes I provided earlier, they explain how the "strong central power" your Wikipedia article names need not be a government. The World Bank, the IMF, Black Rock... these all act as "strong central powers" which is why economic freedom is equally important when considering freedom from authoritarianism.

you can have a nice HFI in Crimea and still attack your neighbors — Jabberwock

Yes. You can be defeated in a land war and still attack your neighbours. Being able to attack neighbours is not a factor which differentiates our two approaches.

As Samuel Charap recently pointed out in Foreign Affairs...

no matter where the frontline is, Russia and Ukraine will have the capabilities to pose a permanent threat to each other

Pushing Russia back does not end war, it changes the location of the front line.

your argument stops being relevant to the resolution of conflict in Ukraine. — Jabberwock

I disagree. As above, if one is merely moving a front line then it is of crucial importance to the advisability of that strategy that one can be sure of making improvements to the lives of those on your side of that line which are commensurate with the cost to them of that action.

As such measuring of the likely improvement is of paramount relevance to the strategy choice.

Mine has the advantage of accepting the war on more advantageous terms, yours does not (because it involves ceding territories, which can be used as a staging ground for future wars, exactly as Crimea and Donbas were used). — Jabberwock

Russia is staging ground for future wars. In this current war, forces entered from Russia and Belarus. They did not need Crimea.

Notwithstanding that, the whole argument I'm making is that ceding territories is not that much of a disadvantage. Ukraine was no picnic before the war, especially in Donbas. Ukrainian national pride might be damaged by ceding territory, but I don't give a fuck about Ukrainian national pride.

Are you saying that wars do not resolve conflicts? — Jabberwock

No, I'm saying wars don't avoid war.

Are you saying negotiations don't resolve conflicts?

Do you believe those are the only two possible or the two most possible options? — Jabberwock

What these...

leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions. — Isaac

...? Yes. I'd say either leave them there or don't leave them there pretty much exhausts the options.

the fact that Putin has already attacked Ukraine and annexed its territory, then threatened it with a war and started it does not give us any indication to what his possible decisions might be? — Jabberwock

Again, you keep dialing back from 'most likely', or 'likely' to just 'any indication' (the Motte-and-bailey fallacy - for your collection). Yes, Putin's past decisions give us information about his future ones. No, citing a single past decision is not sufficient to support an argument that a future one is likely. Not without acknowledging and ruling out competing factors.

what is your proposed peaceful solution to the conflict in Ukraine? — Jabberwock

Personally I think negotiations over independence for Donbas and an unallied Ukraine might have done it last year.

Now I think the best we can hope for is an armistice based on the current front line, some assurances of Ukraine's security (perhaps from Europe), maybe reparation payments from Russia, lifting of sanctions, perhaps trade deals to assist Ukraine in lost output from Russian occupied territory...

Then, meantime, focusing on building Russia into something better so that it's less likely to break the armistice over time.

What's yours?

I'm not defining it any differently. Read the quotes I provided earlier, they explain how the "strong central power" your Wikipedia article names need not be a government. The World Bank, the IMF, Black Rock... these all act as "strong central powers" which is why economic freedom is equally important when considering freedom for authoritarianism. — Isaac

This redefinition has even less to do with the conflict in Ukraine.

Yes. You can be defeated in a land war na d still attack your neighbours. Being able to attack neighbours is not a factor which differentiates our two approaches. — Isaac

Sure, if the war is short and indecisive. Then the conflict will still not be resolved.

Pushing Russia back does not end war, it changes the location of the front line. — Isaac

Destroying Russian's potential to wage war prevents it from further attacks for a longer time. If Russia is too weak to attack again, then Ukraine may join NATO which will prevent Russia's attack for much longer. The conflict is still unresolved, but Russia is unable to resolve it militarily.

I disagree. As above, if one is merely moving a front line then it is of crucial importance to the advisability of that strategy that one can be sure of making improvements to the lives of those on your side of that line which are commensurate with the cost to them of that action. — Isaac

However, this is not about moving a front line, but joining by Ukraine the economic and military community which will put it outside of Russia's reach for a long time. This, incidentally, would also bring about significant increase in its HFI.

Russia is staging ground for future wars. In this current war, forces entered from Russia and Belarus. They did not need Crimea. — Isaac

That is absurdly false. Taking the southern coast would not be possible, if Ukrainians held Crimea and Donbas.

Notwithstanding that, the whole argument I'm making is that ceding territories is not that much of a disadvantage. Ukraine was no picnic before the war, especially in Donbas. Ukrainian national pride might be damaged by ceding territory, but I don't give a fuck about Ukrainian national pride. — Isaac

But this is still irrelevant to the resolution of the conflict.

No, I'm saying wars don't avoid war.

Are you saying negotiations don't resolve conflicts? — Isaac

You do not understand the difference between 'conflict' and 'war'? Because it is pretty crucial to thte discussion.

And no, I am not saying negotiations do not resolve conflicts, they do. However, they do not seem to work that well in this particular conflict.

...? Yes. I'd say either leave them there or don't leave them there pretty much exhausts the options. — Isaac

Yes, if you omit part of your own quote, then that exhausts the options. The issue is that just 'leaving them there', unlike 'leaving them there and causing a regime change', does not resolve anything, and in particular, it does not stop the war.

Again, you keep dialing back from 'most likely', or 'likely' to just 'any indication' (the Motte-and-bailey fallacy - for your collection). Yes, Putin's past decisions give us information about his future ones. No, citing a single past decision is not sufficient to support an argument that a future one is likely. Not without acknowledging and ruling out competing factors. — Isaac

It was not a single decision even in my quote, in reality there were even more such decisions. So yes, unless the competing factors are given, it should be treated as likely. So I am waiting for the competing factors. What are they?

Personally I think negotiations over independence for Donbas and an unallied Ukraine might have done it last year. — Isaac

That is it? Your personal opinion in lieu of any real argument? Let me think, how the argument might go: 'Putin promised he will not hurt Ukraine, but then he did. Ukraine (and the West) gave him what he wanted, then he promised again he will not hurt Ukraine. But then he did again. And then he threatened Ukraine again... But if he is given all the new things he NOW wants, then he will leave Ukraine in peace'. Is that your reasoning? I must remind you that you believe that free and prosperous Ukraine is seen by Putin as a mortal threat, which giving him Donbas and NATO promise would not alleviate in any way. That is, Putin would have Donbas and Ukraine's (promised) neutrality and one of the sources of the conflict, i.e. the mortal threat, would still be there. Why exactly Putin would stop at this particular point? Let us see the factors.

Now I think the best we can hope for is an armistice based on the current front line, some assurances of Ukraine's security (perhaps from Europe), maybe reparation payments from Russia, lifting of sanctions, perhaps trade deals to assist Ukraine in lost output from Russian occupied territory... — Isaac

Lol. Assurances of Ukraine's security from Europe? How about that: Western countries agree to defend Ukraine if it is attacked and call it 'Article 5'? That would not be a threat at all, unlike NATO? As Bennett said, such 'guarantees' are not worth much. Not to mention that free and prosperous Ukraine would still be a problem for Putin? Why would he not seek to resolve it militarily?

What's yours? — Isaac

I have described it above: decreasing Russia's military potential to the degree where it is no longer capable of preventing Ukraine's accession to NATO and EU, which is the only 'assurance' it can get. Hopefully this results in Ukraine getting back its lands, but it is far from certain.

Sorry, been a bit sick, so I respond only now, well later of the discussion:

I get your point. It's a valid one. Holding a different one doesn't make one uniformed, biased, nor a putin-supporter. We all want an end to this war we just have a difference of opinion as to how.

what was the likelyhood of Russia to negotiate a peace when it was still wanting to denazify Ukraine, when it was still engaged in the battle of Kyiv and war enthusiasm was very high?
— ssu

I don't know, it's not my area of expertise. Obviously people better informed than me thought it possible so that's good enough for me to consider it a reasonable option. Obviously, if possible, its the better one. — Isaac

Having the conflict and the killing halt somehow obviously would be a good thing. And it's now obvious that Russia doesn't have the ability to destroy the Ukrainian military, hence some kind of settlement between both sides has to be reached by both sides. Yet this depends on the military situation. If war is a continuation of politics by other means, then surely a political settlement of a war depends on the military situation on the ground.

And let's remember that in the first month of the war the stalemate of the current wasn't at all so obvious. The Russian southern forces (the famous "Z") had made and were making significant gains and things around Kyiv and other places didn't look yet so bad as the battle of Kyiv was still going on. And we know that the Ukrainian leadership didn't falter then and Zelenskyi didn't fly away from Ukraine. In these kind of situation it's difficult to see the reasons just why a settled peace would have been possible.

On the table, I believe, was a neutral Donbas, and, non-NATO Ukraine. Russia believes it has a right to a 'sphere of influence' in the region. — Isaac

Please give a reference to this or the source. What does neutral Donbas mean? Luhansk and Donetsk Republics in what kind of state towards Russia and Ukraine?

And do notice that both Republics are now part of Russia and Russia has annexed even more oblasts from Ukraine. I would think that anybody declaring that there was a chance for a political settlement of the war after one month of fighting in this war likely wants to shine his own image (as likely the person saying this would be linked to the negotiations).

The real possible interlocutor would be China in this case, but it doesn't feel the urge to commit everything to find a solution.

Considering Prigozhin seems still alive and seems to have even met with Putin in person, I find it really difficult to believe this was a genuine coup attempt.

Has it disbanded?
— ssu

It's effectively disbanded, ordered to either join the regular military, go to Belarus or go home. — boethius

If the term "coup" is too much, then use the word mutiny. Yet I'm not so convinced about the disbandment of the Wagner group as you are. Just yesterday Prigozhin met a representative from the Central African Republic in St. Petersbugh at the Russia-Africa summit. Wagner provides the regime of CAR crucial support and has I think gold mines there, which brings a lot of income to Prigozhin/Wagner.



The mutiny wasn't a fake, those aircraft were shot down and their crew did die. The mutiny happened and this was not some "4D chess" on behalf of Putin.



What happened was basically a revolt of a separate military faction that a weak central leadership could only negotiate with. Having the aspirations of taking prisoner the highest military leadership of the country and even driving to the capital makes some of us use the term "coup attempt" as this goes far beyond of simply not following orders (which itself done by a larger military group is called a mutiny). And the mutineer can now meet crucial people to him at a high level summit. It is as bad as it sounds.

building Russia into something better so that it's less likely to break the armistice over time — Isaac

Yeah, that's the thing.

I think of this whole thing as giving the lie to the libertarian (or anarcho-capitalist) worldview that trade and commerce and markets are natural and self-sustaining. They're not. They must be enabled by institutions that keep the peace and enforce property rights. If they are not, some warlord will just take your grain and sell it as his own, or just blockade your ports so you can't sell it, or bomb them into rubble.

In this case, since the warlord wants your land permanently -- your future grain and the ports through which it can be traded -- there's an additional incentive for him to interrupt your trade, because denying you income degrades your ability to fight him off.

You can see a different sort of invasion in Louisiana. There's reason to think the petrochemical industry actually sought out communities that were not only low-tax and pro-business, but with high levels of religiosity and low levels of education. They know what the threats to their business model are and what factors are predictive of a community that will let them do what they want. So Louisiana got some jobs, but nobody told these people they would never again be able to fish or swim in the waters they grew up around, that their land and water would be poisoned forever and their way of life gone, that they would start getting sick. But to this day, Louisianans stand up for the petrochemical companies because they brought jobs.

We are not forced to choose between these two different sorts of warlords; the answer to both is robust government. Government that does not allow force of arms to dictate terms and does not allow private interest to destroy our common inheritance for its own gain. The United States should have been able to stop the exploitation of Louisiana, but it didn't because of regulatory capture. There is no world government to stop Russia just taking Crimea and attempting to take the rest of Ukraine, but even if there were, who's to say it would have? Government failed in Louisiana and might have failed there too.

It's all so depressing, men with power who want more, men with money who want more. The sheer narrowmindedness and shortsightedness of these avatars of destruction is breathtaking. All to rule over a smoking ruin. So long as you have more than anyone else, even if there's almost nothing left.

Mearsheimer is good when he sticks to a small scale. It's his attempts at big picture theorizing that really go off the rails. I appreciate that you have to "go big" to move the ball along on theory, even if it means getting a lot wrong, but the problems in "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics'" Offensive Realism are such that I think it's worth questioning if it was worth publishing. It makes the realist camp in IR look like a caricature, and got basically every prediction about the post-Cold War era wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The irony here is that the thing Mearsheimer got right (in the 1990's) was that Russia would attack Ukraine if Ukraine would give up it's nuclear deterrence. :smirk:

Mearsheimer's real weakness is that he doesn't care about domestic politics at all. He has openly acknowledged this in his talks and really goes on with the focus on his theory. Yet foreign & security policy isn't only a game between the Great Powers where all moves are made to thwart the opposing Great Power. Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine have a lot to do with Putin's own domestic politics and views on just what is (or should) Russia be, irrelevant of there being a NATO or not.

This may be hard for Americans to understand, as their foreign establishment (sometimes called "The Blob") is quite separated from domestic politics and can really engage the World with one focus mind: earlier to fight the Soviet Union and communism during the Cold War and later engage in a War on Terror after 9/11. In that kind of environment (where foreign policy means little to the average citizen) a Mearsheimeresque approach can be how some genuinely approach the World. Yet if the question would be if Texas should be part of the US or not, part of Mexico or should be an independent country, a lot of Americans would have an opinion on that irrelevant of what Mexico or China does.

But anyway, Mearsheimer is picked up as "an alternative" voice and likely has his niché audience in this which gives him speaking opportunities and income. In a way he then comes out as an motivational speaker, just like Peter Zeihan is for a crowd of Americans who want to hear that their country is still the best and others have even larger problems.

I think of this whole thing as giving the lie to the libertarian (or anarcho-capitalist) worldview that trade and commerce and markets are natural and self-sustaining. They're not. They must be enabled by institutions that keep the peace and enforce property rights. If they are not, some warlord will just take your grain and sell it as his own, or just blockade your ports so you can't sell it, or bomb them into rubble. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it's a matter of population density. If it's a few people transporting silk from China to Egypt in 1000 BC, they probably won't meet anybody on the trip. As the density increases, merchants can pay warlords for protection, or in the case of Islam, religion is merchant law and all the merchants have armies. Once the merchant class takes over the world, they can offload the cost of protecting their trade to society in general. So it's never been that societies create governments and that makes trade possible. It's the other way around. Where there is trade, there are roads and communication. Communication gives rise to innovation as good ideas come together. I'm just saying it's a rose with thorns, not just a big thorn, though that might be the way it seems sometimes.

That's a plausible story. I guess I would still say it's an innovation that by and large you no longer need to bring armed guards with you to the marketplace because there are police to take over that role for everyone, buyers and sellers alike. Yes, there's a cost savings there for merchants but protection also for you on your way home with your bag of turnips, which means you can make purchases without fear some big guy will just take it from you. A system of ordered liberty such as this has the potential to benefit everyone, not just the merchants.

This redefinition has even less to do with the conflict in Ukraine. — Jabberwock

The longer Ukraine continue their attempt to regain the lost territories, the more in debt they get to those institutions, the less sovereignty they have. Having pecuniary free market restrictions on your economy limits economic freedom and is directed by a central power. It's definitionally authoritarianism. So if Ukraine are avoiding Russian authoritarianism, it's extremely relevant that their method could lead to an equal authoritarianism from a different source.

Sure, if the war is short and indecisive. Then the conflict will still not be resolved. — Jabberwock

Nor will it if the war is long...

A study from the CSIS, using data from 1946 to 2021 found that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average.”

Your notion that there might now be a short decisive war is... what's your term... ahistorical.

But no doubt history now suddenly loses it's relevance. No doubt this war becomes the special case.

Destroying Russian's potential to wage war prevents it from further attacks for a longer time. If Russia is too weak to attack again, then Ukraine may join NATO which will prevent Russia's attack for much longer. The conflict is still unresolved, but Russia is unable to resolve it militarily. — Jabberwock

And how do you propose to do that? Charap again...

Although its armed forces have suffered significant casualties and equipment losses that will take years to recover from, they are still formidable. And as they demonstrate daily, even in their current sorry state, they can cause significant death and destruction for Ukrainian military forces and civilians alike. The campaign to destroy Ukraine’s power grid might have fizzled, but Moscow will maintain the ability to hit Ukraine’s cities at any time using airpower, land-based assets, and sea-launched weapons...In other words, no matter where the frontline is, Russia and Ukraine will have the capabilities to pose a permanent threat to each other. But the evidence of the past year suggests that neither has or will have the capacity to achieve a decisive victory—assuming, of course, that Russia does not resort to weapons of mass destruction

From where are you getting this idea that Ukraine could somehow wipe out Russia's military capability?

this is not about moving a front line, but joining by Ukraine the economic and military community which will put it outside of Russia's reach for a long time. — Jabberwock

What makes you think Ukraine will be allowed into NATO with the war still simmering? If NATO countries were willing to go to war with Russia, why not now?

That is absurdly false. Taking the southern coast would not be possible, if Ukrainians held Crimea and Donbas. — Jabberwock

According to whom? And why is it only the southern coast relevant now?

But this is still irrelevant to the resolution of the conflict. — Jabberwock

It's highly relevant, as I've explained dozens of times now. War is devastating, it needs to win very high gains to be worth it. Measuring the likely gains is absolutely crucial. It's practically psychopathic to suggest that war is a good option regardless of the gains.

The issue is that just 'leaving them there', unlike 'leaving them there and causing a regime change', does not resolve anything, and in particular, it does not stop the war. — Jabberwock

It resolves a lot for the people currently being shot at and shelled which will no longer be. It literally stops the war, Ukraine are currently on the offensive. It might not, of course, resolve the conflict, but it will, right now, stop the war.

I am waiting for the competing factors. What are they? — Jabberwock

You're seriously assuming that there are no other factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action other than whether Ukraine is free and democratic? If not, then why are you asking me for them? Explain why you've discarded them, your argument is incomplete otherwise.

That is it? — Jabberwock

Lol. — Jabberwock

I'm not interested in discussing the details of this. The suggestions I've made are those that have been made by experts in the field with far more knowledge and experience than I have, or you. Unlike a truly remarkable number of people here, I don't see myself as qualified to make these kinds of judgements because I don't have sufficient expertise in the area. I choose those theories which seem to best fit my world-view. What I'm interested in here is why you are so certain of your beliefs here that you're so casually willing to assume all other theories are nonsense, to be laughed off. It just makes you look stupid, I can't think why so many seem to think it a good play.

I have described it above: decreasing Russia's military potential to the degree where it is no longer capable of preventing Ukraine's accession to NATO and EU, which is the only 'assurance' it can get. Hopefully this results in Ukraine getting back its lands, but it is far from certain. — Jabberwock

Lol! That's it! How's that gonna work? Ukraine gonna take all of Russia's nuclear warheads! Ha! What a stupid idea! Rotfl!

The longer Ukraine continue their attempt to regain the lost territories, the more in debt they get to those institutions, the less sovereignty they have. Having pecuniary free market restrictions on your economy limits economic freedom and is directed by a central power. It's definitionally authoritarianism. So if Ukraine are avoiding Russian authoritarianism, it's extremely relevant that their method could lead to an equal authoritarianism from a different source. — Isaac

Let us check then the one sufficient indicator of human freedom there is: the Human Freedom Index. How those poor Eastern European countries opressed by the IMF (which practically financed their transition) and the free market practices of the EU are faring? Hmm, strange: Poland 7.66 (with the top 8.30), Estonia 8.73, Lithuania 8.34, Czech Republic 8.33. You will not believe it, but the HFI says they are much less authoritanian than Russia!

Nor will it if the war is long...

A study from the CSIS, using data from 1946 to 2021 found that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average.”

Your notion that there might now be a short decisive war is... what's your term... ahistorical.

But no doubt history now suddenly loses it's relevance. No doubt this war becomes the special case. — Isaac

I did not say it will be short and decisive.

From where are you getting this idea that Ukraine could somehow wipe out Russia's military capability? — Isaac

I did not say 'wipe out', I said: lower to disable its potential to attack Ukraine. Rocket attacks on the cities are nasty, but they have little to no military significance. They might hinder formal acceptance into NATO, but they will not be able to stop Ukraine's militarization and informal integration.

What makes you think Ukraine will be allowed into NATO with the war still simmering? If NATO countries were willing to go to war with Russia, why not now? — Isaac

While the war is simmering, it will not be formally accepted, it will just be armed and informally integrated, like Sweden. There will be no security guarantees, just military assistance. The point is that Russia must be too weak to stop it.

It's highly relevant, as I've explained dozens of times now. War is devastating, it needs to win very high gains to be worth it. Measuring the likely gains is absolutely crucial. It's practically psychopathic to suggest that war is a good option regardless of the gains. — Isaac

The gain is over 2.00 HFI increase on the average for the future Ukraine in NATO and EU. That should trump all, right?

It resolves a lot for the people currently being shot at and shelled which will no longer be. It literally stops the war, Ukraine are currently on the offensive. It might not, of course, resolve the conflict, but it will, right now, stop the war. — Isaac

That is not 'just leaving them there', that already assumes successful negotiation of ceasefire with Putin on unknown terms. And not resolving the conflict at this point leaves him with enough potential to start trouble again soon.

You're seriously assuming that there are no other factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action other than whether Ukraine is free and democratic? If not, then why are you asking me for them? Explain why you've discarded them, your argument is incomplete otherwise. — Isaac

No, I assume that there are exactly as many factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action that would prevent it as there are factors that would convince him to do it. You are not discarding JUST the latter, are you? So, as the ungiven factors even themselves out, we are left with the given factors, which say he would likely attack.

I'm not interested in discussing the details of this. The suggestions I've made are those that have been made by experts in the field with far more knowledge and experience than I have, or you. Unlike a truly remarkable number of people here, I don't see myself as qualified to make these kinds of judgements because I don't have sufficient expertise in the area. I choose those theories which seem to best fit my world-view. What I'm interested in here is why you are so certain of your beliefs here that you're so casually willing to assume all other theories are nonsense, to be laughed off. It just makes you look stupid, I can't think why so many seem to think it a good play. — Isaac

I am not assuming your theory is nonsense, I am just pointing out it is unsupported by you. If you are not interested in discussing support for your theory, why are you interested in discussing it at all?

Lol! That's it! How's that gonna work? Ukraine gonna take all of Russia's nuclear warheads! Ha! What a stupid idea! Rotfl! — Isaac

Yes, of course, exactly like Latvia did, when it joined NATO. Why ask?

Sorry, been a bit sick, so I respond only now, well later of the discussion: — ssu

So sorry to hear that. Hope you're recovered now.

it's now obvious that Russia doesn't have the ability to destroy the Ukrainian military, hence some kind of settlement between both sides has to be reached by both sides. Yet this depends on the military situation. If war is a continuation of politics by other means, then surely a political settlement of a war depends on the military situation on the ground. — ssu

Agreed. Neither side can win this and negotiation is inevitable. Ukraine must weigh any gains it might make at the negotiating table from it's military position against the losses that obtaining that position might entail. The US and Europe must do the same regarding their support, but with the additional concern of the losses in their economies and wider humanitarian concerns.

In these kind of situation it's difficult to see the reasons just why a settled peace would have been possible. — ssu

Difficult may be, but as I said...

Obviously people better informed than me thought it possible so that's good enough for me to consider it a reasonable option. — Isaac

... so any difficulty is on our part understanding the factors those experts took into account, not a judgement of the likelihood. My guess there would be considering a different theory about Putin's motives, the way in which Putin interprets a satisfactory 'sphere of influence' will determine what negotiation positions people think might have proven sufficient.

Of course we can bemoan that he ever obtained that much leverage, but that ship's sailed now.

Please give a reference to this or the source. — ssu

https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-invasion-end-ukraine-war-four-conditions-1685492

And do notice that both Republics are now part of Russia and Russia has annexed even more oblasts from Ukraine. — ssu

I'm not sure what that's supposed to indicate. Russia were offering a deal they thought they might be an opening to getting stuff they wanted. It wasn't a shopping list.

The real possible interlocutor would be China in this case, but it doesn't feel the urge to commit everything to find a solution. — ssu

Yes, China's involvement I think would be incredibly useful.

I think of this whole thing as giving the lie to the libertarian (or anarcho-capitalist) worldview that trade and commerce and markets are natural and self-sustaining. They're not — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah. I think this is what gets in the way of people accepting Mearsheimer-like realism, they've been fed the bullshit of self-regulation such that it seems impossible to find ourselves in a situation where we might have to do what one of the warlords says because he's got more guns. there's a sense that there simply must be some balancing side of the equation, some internal motivating set of factors which prevent this kind of thing. But there isn't. Russia has enough weapons to threaten absolute devastation if they don't get what they want, and there's nothing we can do about that foundational position. The US is the most free-market country there is yet it commits to more wars than any other nation on earth. Far from politics by other means, war is business by other means. It's just another tool which will be reached for by businesses competing in the open market for profit. The moment it is more profitable to lobby for war, that is what they will do. In Russia, the businesses are, of course, directly in charge of government so there's no need to even lobby.

International policing would be an ideal, but at the moment, it could only be an agreement between governments and the power of the industry lobbies would ensure any such thing were entirely toothless.

The thing with government (strong or otherwise) is that it too is just a tool. It's an amalgamation of power which means it can get jobs done that individuals couldn't do, but what matters is who's wielding it. Here, of course, we have two choices; the most powerful, or the most numerous. The first group have default control (kings, landowners, corporations), for the second group to have any say requires that they speak in collectives, which requires solidarity, which requires organising.

The final nail in the coffin of any hope we had of 'the people' wielding that power was the almost complete buyout of the press and campaign groups. Without any organising capability, people are just people, shaking our fists at the sky.

Let us check then the one sufficient indicator of human freedom there is: the Human Freedom Index. How those poor Eastern European countries opressed by the IMF (which practically financed their transition) and the free market practices of the EU are faring? — Jabberwock

Have any of their countries had their infrastructure wiped out and over a hundred billion debt racked up by war? No. Even the IMF can only lend people the money they ask for. It cannot create debt out of thin air. That's why war is so popular, it makes a good load of debt.

I did not say it will be short and decisive. — Jabberwock

Right. So if no peace deal is reached, history tells us the war will drag on for decades. So remind me again how that helps the people of Ukraine? Remind me how decades of war gets them any more freedom, any more 'sovereignty'. Just your wild and unsubstantiated hope that somehow Russia will run out of artillery first?

Rocket attacks on the cities are nasty, but they have little to no military significance. They might hinder formal acceptance into NATO, but they will not be able to stop Ukraine's militarization and informal integration. — Jabberwock

On what basis? The economy is already tanking https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-war-drags-europes-economy-succumbs-crisis-2022-08-23/ . What grounds do you have for believing this level of militarisation can be sustained for another ten years?

While the war is simmering, it will not be formally accepted, it will just be armed and informally integrated, like Sweden. There will be no security guarantees, just military assistance. The point is that Russia must be too weak to stop it. — Jabberwock

Again, on what grounds? This is just pie in the sky wishful thinking at the moment. How is the west going to sustain this level of militarisation for decades when it can't even keep out of recession after just two years?

That is not 'just leaving them there', that already assumes successful negotiation of ceasefire with Putin on unknown terms. And not resolving the conflict at this point leaves him with enough potential to start trouble again soon. — Jabberwock

Yes. Again, history shows that strong ceasefire negotiations work https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/japanese-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/virginia-page-fortna-peace-time-ceasefire-agreements-and-the-durability-of-peace-princeton-university-press-5500-hbk-isbn-0691115117-1895-pbk-isbn-0691115125/7EA4C90743959B060B9C319E6F9C6EAD

It also shows, as above, that continued war doesn't.

I assume that there are exactly as many factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action that would prevent it as there are factors that would convince him to do it. — Jabberwock

What exactly?

If you are not interested in discussing support for your theory, why are you interested in discussing it at all? — Jabberwock

Because I'm darkly fascinated by this new trend for absolute certainty in the mainstream opinion. Ukraine, Covid, ... both shared this odd feature that even though solidly qualified experts in the respective fields disagreed, the lay populace were utterly convinced that only one side were right and the other were little short of murderers. I'm exploring that.

I'm not sure what that's supposed to indicate. — Isaac

Link didn't work, but I guess I found what four terms were talked about.

Well, if then Mr Peskov as the spokesperson indicated that Ukraine should acknowledge Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, now those two "independent" states have joined Russia and are an "integral" part of Russia. And not only these two are now officially part of Russia, but also Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasta. Hence my argument that the situation had changed quite much from what Peskov had suggested.

That's what it means.

And then is the really big issue of what actually the demilitarization of Ukraine would have meant in reality and in what situation this would have put Ukraine. Because it's quite a stretch to think with Ukraine demilitarized Russia would leave things there.

Just like the Baltic States, Soviet Union didn't demand annexation right from the start, it only demanded military bases and got them in September - October 1939 from the Baltic States. Only in June 1940 Stalin gave ultimatums to the Baltic States and annexed the countries in August 1940.

Yes, China's involvement I think would be incredibly useful. — Isaac

I'm not so optimistic for this to happen. China will win little with it: perhaps by being an active diplomat in the war, this would work to normalize the relations with European countries and China as the action obviously would warm the now cool relations. But the US wouldn't budge.

And likely China doesn't want to be viewed in Russia (or by Putin) as giving a "Dolchstoss", stab in the back, at Russia in it's moment of danger. The only thing actually that China has done is that it has declared it won't tolerate the use of nuclear weapons. At least that's positive.

the situation had changed quite much from what Peskov had suggested. — ssu

Absolutely. It's got way worse. What was on the table at the time was fairly mild in the circumstances - knowing the West weren't going to seriously commit to Ukraine's defense at the outset. It's like the police always say to mugging victims "just give them your handbag, it's not worth your life". It doesn't somehow become less sensible advice at different scales. International legal action is the way to deal with criminal acts of invasion, not utterly devastating your country to somehow 'teach them a lesson'.

A good deal was scuppered and that's on the heads of all involved. Now the choice is decades of war or an armistice which is definitely going to leave all Russian-occupied territory as it is. At least for the foreseeable future.

The only thing actually that China has done is that it has declared it won't tolerate the use of nuclear weapons. At least that's positive. — ssu

Yes, let's hope that carries some weight.

I'm wondering if there is a law against discussing/criticizing this:

Russian investigators call children as witnesses against their mother accused of discrediting army
^{— AP · Jul 29, 2023}

For that matter, is there a law against discussing/criticizing those war censorship laws?
Presumably they can't be used to enforce themselves.

Can anyone semi-informed imagine who might replace Putin, and what policy changes would result? Or am I only dreaming? — unenlightened

There are a few marginally better/worse in terms of democracy and transparency. Someone like Yashin might well give democracy a chance. Putin has consolidated a number of power positions, making such moves challenging, though.

The Economist has a "City liveability index"; Kyiv dropped close to the bottom in Mar 2023:



There seems to be a recognizable geographical distribution:

I'm darkly fascinated by this new trend for absolute certainty in the mainstream opinion. Ukraine, Covid, ... both shared this odd feature that even though solidly qualified experts in the respective fields disagreed, the lay populace were utterly convinced that only one side were right and the other were little short of murderers. — Isaac

Have you tried climate? Abortion? ... ← Some here considered little short of potential genociders? :gasp:
(hm "absolute certainty", more rhetoramble?)
The Ukraine war isn't quite as amenable to scientific inquiry anyway.