Noumena. What happens when that which is trained to be an eye doctor, wants to use that training to be a structural engineer. It isn’t as contradictory as it is misguided.

Understanding is misguided when it takes upon itself to think transcendentally, which it is fully entitled to do without self-contradiction, that object for which its cognitive training extends only to empirical referents.

It follows that to think noumena as a general conception is not contradictory, but to cognize a singular noumenal object as a referent for that general conception, is impossible, as it is for every transcendentally conceived object absent its intuitive representation.

What is the "referent" for the term "noumenon"? — jancanc

Kant wrote in A249 of Critique of Pure Reason that noumena, aka things-in-themselves, are given to a priori intuition. Note that intuitions are not concepts, which are a different thing altogether.

A249 - Appearances, to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories, are called phenomena. If, however, I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali),then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia).

Kant wrote in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 1783 that the category of cause and effect can be applied to things-in-themselves.

"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

A noumena is an unknown something that causes an appearance. Therefore, the referent of a noumena is the unknown something that causes such an appearance.

Because Kant applies the category of cause and effect to things-in-themselves, although the thing-in-itself cannot be known, that there is something that caused the appearance can be known.

the referent of a noumena is the unknown something that causes such an appearance. — RussellA

Great answer! However, is there a contradiction if we talk of a "something" (i.e., a "thing"), since noumenon is not an object for a subject...even if we replace "thing" with "reality", "an existence,"...still it must be a reality/existence for a perceiving subject?

a general conception is not contradictory, but to cognize a singular noumenal object as a referent — Mww

Thanks!

but does that "general conception" actually act as an object (for a subject)?

Yes, with the caveat that an object of understanding is logical only, whereas an object of sense is empirical. Since both types of cognitions belong to a thinking subject, then it follows that the general conception acts as a logical object for whichever subjects thinks it. And, of course, first off, no mere conception of anything is sufficient for its existence, and second, very few of them bother.

Oh. And noumena are not thing-in-themselves, which are always real physical worldly objects. Noumena can never be an appearance to humans, according to transcendental philosophy, for otherwise a representation would follow, which it cannot insofar as noumena are nothing but objects the understanding thinks on its own, whereas representations from perception in humans, is always sensuous and never only intellectual. Other theories may have different conditions, but those are not being considered when Kant is the given author.

Nahhhh…..the text stipulates noumena may be treated as things-in-themselves, in that neither are subjected to the totality of the human intellectual system in the pursuit of knowledge a posteriori, but that does not make them the same. I mean, what warrant would there be to make the claim that they are, when it is impossible to know anything about either of them? I’d be forced into the absurdity of claiming….it is impossible that I know what this is, but I know that is just like it. (Sigh)

However, is there a contradiction if we talk of a "something" (i.e., a "thing"), since noumenon is not an object for a subject...even if we replace "thing" with "reality", "an existence,"...still it must be a reality/existence for a perceiving subject? — jancanc

This is the same problem with Direct Realism. For example, we see the colour red, yet science tells us the cause is a wavelength of 700nm.

In Kant's terms, our seeing the colour red is the appearance and the 700nm is the noumenon. If it weren't for science, just by seeing the colour red, we would have no idea that its cause was 700nm.

The mind has evolved to equate effect with cause, to equate appearance with its noumena. When seeing the colour red, the mind equates the appearance with its cause, such that the mind believes that the cause of our seeing red was the colour red. Yet we know that science tells us the cause was a wavelength of 700nm.

The noumenon is named after the appearance, in that, if the appearance is given the name "red", then the noumenon is also give the name "red", regardless of what the noumenon actually is.

Similarly with the other senses. If I hear a grating noise, I name its cause grating. If I smell an acrid smell, I name its cause acrid. If I feel something silky, I name its cause silky. If I taste something bitter, I name its cause bitter.

Therefore, any contradiction disappears, because when we talk about a "red post-box", we are not taking about something that exists in the world. We are not taking about a noumenon which we cannot know about. We are actually talking about how the something in the world appears to us, in that we are talking about an appearance.

From the frame of reference of human consciousness, the referent for both Noumenon and Thing-in-Itself is Nothingness. To intuit, perceive, or know either would require the ability to take a perspective outside of human consciousness, which is simply impossible. Also, any attempt to overtly, or covertly, use the principle of cause and effect, a category of the understanding, to answer this question contradicts itself.

Good post. Well thought out.

What is the "referent" for the term "noumenon"?
Can it have a referent?
Kant states that the noumenon is objectless (and also subjectless) beyond space, time and causality,
so how can there be any referent for "noumenon"?
if it is a concept, is it not then an object of thought? but if the noumenon is not an object, then we have contradicted ourselves... — jancanc

I am not the only one to notice that Kant's noumena have a lot in common with Lao Tzu's Tao. The Tao Te Ching is a whole book written to talk about that which can not be talked about. The first line of the first verse is "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." Certainly Lao Tzu recognized the irony. I've always thought he laughed while he was writing.

Fact is, that irony is the whole point. It frames a particular understanding of reality that can't be expressed in language. The intellectual trouble we all have with the contradiction kicks us out of our normal, everyday reality to a place where we have to see everything differently. So... shrug your shoulders and live with the puzzlement.

Here's one of my favorite quotes from Chuang Tzu. I think it applies equally to noumena and the Tao - “What things things is not itself a thing.” Or from a different translation "making things of things but unable to be made anything of by any thing."

What is the "referent" for the term "noumenon"?
Can it have a referent?
Kant states that the noumenon is objectless (and also subjectless) beyond space, time and causality,
so how can there be any referent for "noumenon"?
if it is a concept, is it not then an object of thought? but if the noumenon is not an object, then we have contradicted ourselves... — jancanc

Perhaps, the "noumenon", that Kant distinguishes from a material object, is merely a mental concept (an idealization of the physical object). In Charles Pinter's book, subtitled How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things . . . ., he discusses the human "sensorium" in great detail. He says that body & mind are engaged in a two-way dialog : the sensory organs transmit coded data (about an object) which the Mind (mental function of brain) interprets into self-relevant Meanings. As far as the idealistic Mind is concerned, the immaterial function (purpose ; meaning) of the object is more important than its material substance. Yet, the idea refers (points) back to the object, and the object reminds us of the idea.

The sensory Appearances represent the object in terms of feelings (sight, sound, touch). And that superficial portrayal is all we ever know for sure (empirically) about the "real" object. But the core meanings are like an X-ray : abstracting away the surface material, to reveal the logical Form within. That notional structure defines both its primary, and its possible, functions in the world. If the observer is astute enough, she will then know something about the essence of the object. It's that Ideal Soul of the thing that Kant refers to as the "noumenon", which is an immaterial belief about*2 the object in its perfect form.

When we talk about a thing (e.g. a ball point pen ; plastic & metal), we imagine its function relevant to the user. You can write an essay with it, or twirl it in your fingers. Those functional uses are not physical things, but possible processes that may be beneficial to the observer. Conceptually, they are the essence of penness, the noumenal referent of the word "pen".

Plato imagined a whole realm of perfect Ideal logical structures (ghosts of objects) separated from the messy mundane Real things of the phenomenal world of appearances. Ironically, all we flesh & blood humans ever know are those appearances (sensory impressions). But we can imagine a Platonic referent in an ideal noumenal world of essences. :smile:

PS__I apologize if this post is opaque. I just wanted to jot down some ideas for my own future reference.


*1. Noumenon :
(in Kantian philosophy) a thing as it is in itself, as distinct from a thing as it is knowable by the senses through phenomenal attributes.

*2. Aboutness refers to the central theme or conceptual logic of a referent object
Note -- Aboutness is a quality, it references an idea, not an object

Thanks. ‘Preciate it.

”What things things is not itself a thing” — T Clark

Marvelous subtelty in there as well.

All great answers, thanks! musing on all!

how can there be any referent for "noumenon"? — jancanc

The word itself is the neuter middle-passive present participle of noeîn, 'to think, to mean', which in turn originates from the word noûs, an Attic contracted form of nóos, 'perception, understanding, mind', often translated as 'intellect' (wikipedia). So originally the word meant 'a mental object' or 'an object of mind' -- something which could be grasped by the intellect, as distinct from by the senses. And that is the origin of the distinction between 'phenomena' (what appears) and 'noumena' (what truly is) or, put more simply, reality and appearance. Arguably, that is the fundamental dualism of Western philosophy (now there's an OP idea.)

In Kant's philosophy the use is more complicated, because of the equating of noumena with the 'thing in itself' (ding an sich) which may or may not be the same concept. A key phrase:

The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves. But the understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in themselves, because these possess significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity by means of general à priori connecting conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time. — CPR, Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena

Schopenhauer criticizes Kant for adopting the term 'noumenal' for his own purposes without proper regard for the way it was used in earlier philosophy.

In most modern philosophy, with its implicit commitment to empiricism, 'phenomenon' is tacitly used to indicate 'everything that is', without regard to its origin as one of a contrasting pair of terms, resulting in a serious dilution of its original meaning.

”What things things is not itself a thing”
— T Clark

Marvelous subtelty in there as well. — Mww

Sounds straight out of Heidegger.

If only objects of the senses, that is those things which appear to us as objects, are things in themselves, would space, time, causality and the perceiving subject be counted as noumena, but not things in themselves, according to Kant?

What is the "referent" for the term "noumenon"? — jancanc

The epistemically unsurpassable limit ("boundary" Kant wrote, which Hegel disputed, IIRC) of any phenomenon as such.

If only objects of the senses, that is those things which appear to us are things in themselves…… — Janus

Things that appear to us, cannot be things as they are in themselves. Upon affecting us, things are no longer in or of themselves.

If only objects of the senses, that is those things which appear to us (….), would space, time, causality and the perceiving subject be noumena, according to Kant? — Janus

I’d have to say no. While it is the case these are never given as appearances, therefore can never be phenomena, doesn’t thereby mean they are noumena. Space and time are not conceptions understanding thinks on its own accord, they are pure intuitions, so do not meet the criteria for noumena. Causality is a derivative manifestation of a category, which is a conception but not one understanding thinks on its own accord, insofar as it arises from a transcendental deduction of reason, the faculty of principles, so also does not meet the criteria for noumena.

The perceiving subject is unclassifiable, I think. Or maybe I just don’t know to which class it belongs. Technically, subjects don’t perceive, that being the domain of the senses. Subjects are that which comprehends, or that to which comprehension belongs, is about as far as I’d go with what it is, but I’d be ok with stipulating what it isn’t, that being noumenon.

‘Tis a wicked game we play, innit? With our opinions?

Things that appear to us, cannot be things as they are in themselves. Upon affecting us, things are no longer in or of themselves. — Mww

Right, I understand that the things which appear to us are things in themselves, but of course their appearances are not.

Causality is a derivative manifestation of a category, which is a conception but not one understanding thinks on its own accord, insofar as it arises from a transcendental deduction of reason, the faculty of principles, so also does not meet the criteria for noumena. — Mww

So, can you give me an example of any kind of thing that would be classed as noumenal?

‘Tis a wicked game we play, innit? With our opinions? — Mww

Trying to sort them out, get them right, is perhaps wicked in the sense of 'departing from the straight and narrow', but it does seem necessary...

... the main tendency of twentieth- and early twenty-first-century AngloAmerican commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason has been to downplay Kant’s metaphysical commitments, particularly his conception of the noumena (‘things in themselves’) as objects of a divine ‘intellectual intuition’ whose unavailability to human beings defines the limits of human understanding. For the most part, AngloAmerican commentary has viewed the Critique as a critique of metaphysics written in defence of empirical knowledge, rather than as a renovation of metaphysics designed to tether the empirical sciences to transcendental principles of intelligibility and morality. Such commentary has typically sought to confine Kant’s own philosophy within the limits of empirical experience, treating the transcendental intelligences or noumena as an abyss from which the eyes of philosophical understanding must be averted at all costs. From this winnowing reception has emerged a Kant for whom there are not two worlds — the sensible and the intelligible — only ‘two viewpoints’ on a single spatio-temporal world, as if the noumenon were simply a particular kind of conceptual abstraction applied to empirical things. This is a Kant for whom the last vestige of the noumenal — the power of empirically unconditioned moral choice — is viewed not as testimony to a self-acting intelligible or rational being within us, but only as a viewpoint that ordinary phenomenal agents should adopt for the purposes of acting autonomously. — Ian Hunter, Spirituality and Philosophy in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

Certainly how Kant tends to be viewed around here in my opinion.

For the most part, AngloAmerican commentary has viewed the Critique as a critique of metaphysics written in defence of empirical knowledge, rather than as a renovation of metaphysics designed to tether the empirical sciences to transcendental principles of intelligibility and morality. — Ian Hunter, Spirituality and Philosophy in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

I think that this is wrong as an understanding of the CPR, whose project was to determine the limits of pure reason. On the other hand, take into account the CPrR, and Kant's overall project can be understood to be aimed at determining the limits of pure reason to make way for faith (practical reason). We have no pure reason to believe in freedom Gid and immortality, but according to Kant we have practical reasons to believe in those things.

can you give me an example of anything that would be classed as noumenal? — Janus

Absolutely not. Humans have an intuitive sensibility, which makes explicit the necessity for real physical things external to us, conditioned by space and time. Intuition is the means by which objects are represented in us; it follows that non-intuitive intelligences for us are incomprehensible. But noumena are not represented in sensuous intuition, if they were they’d be phenomena, being nothing but conceptions belonging to understanding alone, hence there is nothing whatsoever represented from intuition by them, hence nothing for which understanding to conjoin its otherwise empirical conceptions, hence nothing to cognize as object. Thought without content is void, remember?

This is why the title of the chapter is the division of objects into phenomena and noumena. The former is for those intelligences that have a sensuous faculty of intuitive representation conditioned by space and time, the latter is for those intelligences the sensuous faculty of which is non-intuitive and for which there may not even be any pure intuitions at all.

The purpose of the Critique is to show the proper limits of reason. But if Kant says I can think whatever I wish so long as I don’t contradict myself…what limits my thinking such that I can’t contradict myself? That limit is the mere conception of noumena, in that I can think it as I wish, but I can do not the least damn thing with it, and if I try, I must contradict myself, insofar as I am attempting the impossible because I must use faculties I don’t even have, or….what’s worse….misuse the only ones I do have.

Thanks for your helpful answer Mww, I should point out that I edited the question from

can you give me an example of anything that would be classed as noumenal? — Janus

to read

can you give me an example of any kind of thing that would be classed as noumenal? — Janus

because I realized that it would not be possible to give an example of anything, but thought it may be possible to give an example of some kind of thing.

So, it seems noumena belong to an empty set, which cannot even be named or categorized?

So, it seems noumena belong to an empty set, which cannot even be named or categorized? — Janus

At the risk of over-simplifying and misrepresenting, noumena is what is there before there is anything - before there is anyone to conceptualize. Lao Tzu calls it naming. Naming brings the multiplicity of the world into being out of the unnamable Tao.

Does it follow that there is no multiplicity (difference) for animals?

Does it follow that there is no multiplicity (difference) for animals? — Janus

Good question. The answer is...

Kant says that intuition speaks of God but reason speaks of the world. "Wisdom is willing and unwilling to be called Zeus" (Heraclitus). Why should we assume there is something in reality, a noumena, tha we can not explore?

Good question. The answer is...

Who the fuck knows. — T Clark

I can relate to that. But if multiplicity depends on naming and cannot exist without it, then it would certainly seem to follow that, unless animals practice naming, there can be no multiplicity for them—then should we pity the poor impoverished fuckers?

Noumenon is only in the negative sense NOT the positive sense.

In simple terms there is no referent. That is basically the thrust of the point Kant was making in COPR.

I can relate to that. But if multiplicity depends on naming and cannot exist without it, then it would certainly seem to follow that, unless animals practice naming, there can be no multiplicity for them—then should we pity the poor impoverished fuckers? — Janus

Taoism is metaphysics, not science. It's not true, it's a useful way of looking at things.

So, it seems noumena belong to an empty set, which cannot even be named or categorized? — Janus

Pretty much spot on, I think. At least so by humans, iff our intelligence is properly described by transcendental speculative metaphysics. I mean, the one responsible for all this “…. ambiguity, which may easily occasion great misapprehension…..”, never once listed or gave an example of a proper noumenal object. In short because we are not equipped with the means for the experience of them. That doesn’t mean there are no such things as noumena, that noumena are impossible things, for we have no right to say what Nature provides, but only that experience of them is impossible for us, and strictly intuitive sensibilities in general.

…..it may be possible to give an example of some kind of thing. — Janus

So it should be clear now, it never was about kinds of things, but only about kinds of intellectual systems. Or maybe one could say, it isn’t about the kinds of things we can’t know, but only the kind of things we can, and THAT because of the kind of intellectual system we are supposed as possessing, and by which we know anything.

All this confusion simply because “…I can think whatever I wish…”,

……and I can think whatever I wish because…..

“… the understanding (…) is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere…”,

…..and it may just be that Kant painted himself into a corner, insofar as if he limits understanding he immediately falsifies the proposition that I can think whatever I wish, a contradiction because I can in fact do just that…..like, you know…..non-natural causality, a.k.a. freedom, and Planck scales and oh, yeah: noumena. In order to alleviate the conundrum, he made it so instead of limiting understanding, he limited the other faculties from being influenced by its contributions, antecedently making intuition strictly sensuous, thereby being undisturbed by intellectual infringements, and, by making reason the faculty of principles by which understanding is subsequently legislated a priori, in which case reason effectively blocks knowledge, which manifests in us as either the mistakes of a forced judgement, or the mere confusion of a judgement inconsistent with prior experience. Perfectly in order with overall Kantian dualism: intuitive perception on the one hand, logical judgement on the other and n’er the twain shall meet but work together they must for a common end, experience, or, which is the same thing, empirical knowledge.

Easy peasy. Plain as the nose on yer frontend skull covering.