If, however, I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali),then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia). — RussellA
A noumena is an unknown something that causes an appearance. Therefore, the referent of a noumena is the unknown something that causes such an appearance.
Kant — Quixodian
Alternatively, the referent of the noumena is simply a thought structure of a person who buys into the idea that phenomena are caused by things we can know nothing about. That is, one solution to Kant's implicit dualism is to simply say that the person thinking of noumenal is simply referring to their own delusions — Count Timothy von Icarus
The issue here is the type of "intuition" which could receive the noumena — Metaphysician Undercover
Here’s a good example from Descartes. If I tell you a chilliagon is a thousand-sided polygon you will be able to grasp the idea easily. But you could neither create an accurate mental image of one, nor visually identify an example of one, at least without counting the sides. The idea of a chilliagon is thus something which can be grasped by reason - an ‘object of mind’ - even though as a phenomenal object they may be extremely difficult to discern. — Quixodian
Lao Tzu would say you can experience the Tao. You just can't conceptualize it or speak about it. — T Clark
I can create a more or less accurate mental image of a chilliagon — T Clark
The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers indicated as φαινόμενα [phainomena] and νοούμενα [nooumena]; the opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the scholastics, in the conflict between nominalism and realism. This latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in the opposed tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms φαινομένα and νοούμενα were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearances. — Schopenhauer
Alternatively, the referent of the noumena is simply a thought structure of a person who buys into the idea that phenomena are caused by things we can know nothing about. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So Kant's understanding of the phenomena-noumena distinction is very different from Aristotelian dualism, which maps 'phenomena' against 'sensible appearance' and 'noumena' against 'the form or idea' - would that be correct?
ChatGPT: Yes, you are correct. Kant's understanding of the phenomena-noumena distinction is indeed very different from the Aristotelian dualism that maps 'phenomena' against 'sensible appearance' and 'noumena' against 'the form or idea.'
In Aristotelian metaphysics, phenomena are associated with the sensory world, the empirical realm of our experience. Phenomena are the objects of perception and the material substances we encounter in the world. On the other hand, noumena (sometimes called "Forms" or "Ideas") are considered to be the abstract, intelligible essences or universal properties that ground and determine the characteristics of phenomena. They are the immutable, perfect forms that give things their identity and properties.
Aristotle's noumena are still linked to the realm of sensible appearances because they are seen as the essence or form behind the changing and imperfect phenomena. The phenomena we perceive are said to derive their existence and nature from these ideal forms, which exist independently of human cognition.
On the contrary, Kant's noumena are quite different in nature. For Kant, noumena are things-in-themselves that exist independently of human experience and cognition. They are not intelligible forms that underlie sensible appearances, but rather they are entirely beyond our capacity to experience or comprehend through the usual faculties of sensibility and understanding. Kant argues that while we can think about noumena conceptually as a necessary limitation of our sensibility, we cannot know anything positive about them, nor can we apply our categories (conceptual tools) to them without intuition.
The key distinction here is that Aristotelian noumena are still connected to the world of phenomena and provide an explanatory role for the properties of things, whereas Kantian noumena are unknowable things-in-themselves that are entirely beyond our experience and understanding. Kant's noumena do not serve as explanatory principles for phenomena but rather as a limitation on the scope of human cognition.
So, do you think abstract reasoning is possible without language? — Janus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.