That is precisely the import of A J Ayer’s ‘Language, Truth and Logic’, the seminal text of logical positivism. It too is one of the expressions of the predicament of modern culture and society. — Quixodian

Yes, but logical positivism goes too far in ruling out metaphysical speculation as being totally useless. And it was precisely here that both Wittgenstein and Popper, for their different reasons, parted company with the positivists.

What is the "referent" for the term "noumenon"?
Can it have a referent? — jancanc

if it is a concept, is it not then an object of thought? but if the noumenon is not an object, then we have contradicted ourselves... — jancanc

When Carl Sagan claims the material universe has no origin, he takes us into an environment wherein the analytical-reasoning mind needs a foundation of support for its compulsive pattern-recognition activity. That foundation is the noumenal.

The analytical-reasoning mind shakes hands non-locally with the noumenal each time it discovers an exploitable axiom, real-world referent of the noumenon.

Demanding acceptance on their own-terms-without-terms is noumenal haughtiness kicking subject/object analytic narratives to the curb.

The axiom stands aloof from the parsing of analytical_reasoning. It deals in the currency of things-in-themselves as self-evident proofs.

The universes of cognition kept aloft by the axiom jugglers are unsearchable causes most closely approached as the epiphenomena of necessary axioms.

Example – the singularity that precedes the big-bang.

As regards the intuition of the colour red, which is procedural knowledge, the brain knows how to perceive the colour red when presented with a wavelength of 700nm. — RussellA

This makes no sense to me. There are many different shades of red, produced from many different combinations of wavelengths. We learn how to perceive the colour red by learning how to correctly apply the word "red". Without learning the word "red", we would perceive many different shades of colours without knowing any of them as "red". For example, the Japanese classify colours in a way completely different from us.

Kant was in a bind because his reason could not prove there was something besides appearance and his intuition was locked unto the empirical. — Gregory

But Kant posited something distinct from both reason and appearance, intuition.

Kant's contemporary Jacobi, in his famous Letters on Spinoza (1785), wrote: "Through faith we know we have a body, and that other bodies, and other thinking beings are present outside us." I believe he was in line with Kant except that he uses the word "faith" instead of "intuition". If they are distinct that would be too many faculties

There’s no sensible or empirical phenomenon as such; if that’s what you’re asking? Now, if it’s claimed to be defined, in any way, then it’s made up of all negatives; & yet Kant still contradicts himself on this point.

I've been consulting ChatGPT on Kant's conception of the phenomenal-noumenal distinction — Quixodian

What epistemic grounds can Kant have for the proof of such noumena that don't rely on presuppositions—on dogma? He can't have any empircal support for such things, by his own admission. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Kant was a Realist not an Idealist

The following is mainly taken from SEP - Kant's Transcendental Idealism

Kant is committed to Existence, Humility, Non-spatiality and Affection, where Affection is the principle that things-in-themselves causally affect us. Kant has the position that sensory content is not generated by the mind, but is generated by Affection with mind-independent objects, things-in-themselves.

Kant writes in A19 of CPR that cognition relates immediately to objects:
In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions; but they are thought through the understanding, and from it arise concepts. But all thought, whether straightaway (directe) or through a detour (indirecte), must ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us

Kant is not an Idealist. In the Prolegomena Kant wants to distinguish his view from Berkeley's Idealism. Kant reinforces that his view is not Idealism. The Critique constantly maintains that bodies exist in space and time, and maintains that we have immediate non-inferential knowledge of them.

Kant is not a strong phenomenalist, in that his position is that there are objects outside the mind.

Kant argues that his idealism is a formal idealism. It is only the form of the object that is due to our minds, not their matter. Kant makes the point that sensory content is not generated by the mind, but is generated by affection with mind-independent objects, things-in-themselves. Using such sensory content, we can then cognize about objects by synthesising intuition and concept in the unity of apperception. IE, non-sensible spatio-temporal intuitions and concepts logically structured by the a priori categories of quantity, quality, relation, modality.

Therefore, Kant's epistemic grounds for the understanding of things-in-themselves is Affection, the principle that things-in-themselves causally affect us.

Therefore, ChatGPT's comment that Kant's things-in-themselves are entirely beyond our capacity to experience or comprehend is incorrect for the same reason, that of Affection, the principle that things-in-themselves causally affect us.

This makes no sense to me. There are many different shades of red, produced from many different combinations of wavelengths. We learn how to perceive the colour red by learning how to correctly apply the word "red". Without learning the word "red", we would perceive many different shades of colours without knowing any of them as "red". — Metaphysician Undercover

When someone looks at an object emitting a wavelength of 700nm they perceive a particular colour.

The English speaking world has determined that not only is the wavelength of 700nm named "red", but also the wavelengths 620 to 750nm are also named "red".

It is not true that we learn how to perceive the colour of the wavelength 700nm by knowing its name. I don't need to know the name of the wavelength 700nm in order to perceive it.

Kant is not an Idealist. In the Prolegomena Kant wants to distinguish his view from Berkeley's Idealism. — RussellA

Kant called himself a 'transcendental idealist' and 'empirical realist', saying that the two perspectives were not in conflict:

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. (This is Kant's doctrine - Q). To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensiblity). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. — CPR, A369

Having distinguished between transcendental idealism and transcendental realism, Kant then goes on to introduce the concept of empirical realism:

The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito ergo sum. For because he allows this matter and even its inner possibility to be valid only for appearance– which, separated from our sensibility, is nothing – matter for him is only a species of representations (intuition), which are call external, not as if they related to objects that are external in themselves but because they relate perceptions to space, where all things are external to one another, but that space itself is in us. — A370

That concluding phrase ('that space itself is in us') should torpedo any suggestion that Kant was a realist tout courte.

He differentiated himself from Berkeley's idealism only after critics of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason accused him of setting forth the same basic doctrine. That was the source of his 'refutaton of idealism' which is discussed in SEP here.

ChatGPT's comment that Kant's things-in-themselves are entirely beyond our capacity to experience or comprehend is incorrect for the same reason — RussellA

I never would regard ChatGPT as an authoritative source. What it does very well is paraphrase and summarise, and I believe it did so adequately in this case. That things are not percieved as they are in themselves is fundamental in the Critique.

that is just what language is, whether "ordinary" lingo or mathematical or formal logical. — Janus

Ahhhh…..of course you’re quite right. I got stuck on language = ordinary lingo. (head explodes)
————



I agree, in principle, in that it is a legitimate criticism. Kant’s analysis generally concerns reason, which is internal to us and hence tacitly separates us from the world. “Entrapping us” is kinda harsh, but still true enough, beside the fact he pretty much admits to it, at A247/B303, insofar as…..paraphrased……“the proud name of ontology must give way to analysis”. And it is easy to see why this is so, given that the human system works exclusively with internal representations of things, but not external things in themselves.

I never would regard ChatGPT as an authoritative source. — Quixodian

WHEW!!! I regard you as perhaps the most well-read participant herein, so to see you reference a glorified typewriter…..well, ‘Nuff said.

:pray:

That concluding phrase ('that space itself is in us') should torpedo any suggestion that Kant was a realist tout courte. — Quixodian

As he writes in A370 of the CPR, "The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist", this suggests that the idea that Kant was a Realist cannot be torpedoed because of his belief in the a priori.

There is no contradiction in being an Indirect Realist, a belief that we perceive the world indirectly, and Innatism, a belief that the mind is born with certain ideas and knowledge.

As Innatism is the foundation to Indirect Realism, non-sensible intuition and the a priori categories are the foundation to Transcendental Idealism.

Note, however, that in the wake of the Feder-Garve review, Kant evidently felt that “transcendental” idealism may have been a poor choice of name. In the B Edition, Kant adds a footnote to his definition of transcendental idealism to remark that perhaps he should have called his position “critical idealism”.

That things are not percieved as they are in themselves is fundamental in the Critique — Quixodian

Totally agree, and also a position held by the Indirect Realists.

However, this is different to ChatGPT's quote that "For Kant, noumena are things-in-themselves that exist independently of human experience and cognition."

If that were true, then how can we be discussing them.

As Kant is committed to the principle of Affection, whereby things-in-themselves causally affect us, things-in-themselves don't exist independently of human experience and cognition.

Phenomena are objective, but Noumena are subjective. — Gnomon

Disagree. Going back to the pre-Kantian idea of noumena as ‘object of mind’, the noumenal might be understood as something nearer the original meaning of the idea, form or principle (bearing in mind that ‘form* *is nothing like* ‘shape’ :brow: ) The way that I interpret it (me, not Kant!) is in terms of principles that can only be grasped rationally, but which are independent of your or my particular mind. . . . . That’s why such principles are taken as subjective, or ‘in the mind’ - but they’re not in any individual mind. Bertrand Russell describes it exactly: ‘they are not thoughts, but when they are known they are objects of thought’. — Quixodian

Apparently you have a more nuanced definition of the terms "phenomena", noumena", "objective" and "subjective" than mine. As usual, you have a much greater mastery of philosophical literature than I do. My knowledge of Kant is superficial. So my usage of his terminology is more like common knowledge, and does not pretend to know the Mind of God. For me, "objective" is perceived Reality, while "subjective" is conceived Ideality.

So, when I classified Phenomena as objective, I merely meant that they are what we see (things or events out there) with our physical eyes : hence, Objective Percepts. But Noumena are what we know (in here) via our inner eye of reason (classification, categorization) : hence, Subjective Concepts. "Objective" is common knowledge ; "Subjective" is private knowledge.

Your interpretation of "noumenon" seems to be Platonic, in the sense of Eternal Transcendent Principles that are more real (ideal) than Temporal Physical Percepts (appearances). Mine was intended to be more down-to-earth and pragmatic.

Subjectively, I might think that my personal Ideas & Ideals are more perfect --- purged of the dross --- hence, closer to the true eternal essence (Form), than those of the common crowd. Others may disagree. :cool:


Percept : an impression of an object obtained by use of the senses
Concept : something conceived in the mind : thought, notion

What is objective vs subjective? :
Here's a trick to help you remember the difference between subjective and objective. Subjectivity is self-centered and based on speculations, sentiments, and experiences. Objectivity is outward-focused and based on observable facts and data that can be proven true.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/objective

Phenomenon synonyms : occurrence, event, happening, fact, experience, appearance, thing
Noumenon synonyms : concept, idea, essence, spirit, and substance. Other related terms include the metaphysical, the transcendent, and the ineffable.

Phenomena are the appearances, which constitute the our experience; noumena are the (presumed) things themselves, which constitute reality.
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5g.htm

Yes, all I meant by "inspiring" was something like "being a catalyst for new ideas and feelings — Janus

Yes - I think that's a good way of saying it.

Sure, that's the dominant modern interpretation of Kant today (at least in English), so it's no surprise that Chat GPT spits that out. What I'm pointing out is that it is unclear if the positions here:

The Critique constantly maintains that bodies exist in space and time, and maintains that we have immediate non-inferential knowledge of them.

Kant is not a strong phenomenalist, in that his position is that there are objects outside the mind.

...are incoherent or contradictory when paired with the rest of his philosophy. That it might be incoherent is a critique offered up by Kant's contemporaries. This is how Prichard, Strawson, Bennett, and Wolff can contend that Kant was a subjective idealist (although I think they are wrong here). "Kant was a Realist not an Idealist," is, of course, still debated, but my point is more about whether he has an opening to call himself a realist without resorting to dogma. I'll allow that I think he does want to be a realist.

So, Kant is an indirect realist of sorts. My question would be: "should he be? Can he justify that position and remain consistent?" I am not sure he can.

(Also: being a realist does not preclude being an idealist. Not all idealism is subjective idealism. Hegel is definitely a realist, but also definitely an idealist. )

Hamann argued that Kant’s entire project labored under a mistaken abstraction, a vain attempt to liberate reason from history, experience, and language. Kant postulated a self-sufficient noumenal realm set apart from everything belonging to the phenomenal realm; one concept generated another, creating arbitrary dualisms: “Receptivity of language and spontaneity of concepts! From this double source of ambiguity, pure reason draws all the elements of its doctrinairism, doubt, and connoisseurship.” Hamann was sarcastic, but also penetrating. He protested that when Kant was finished abstracting, he was actually proud to have nothing but a purely formal transcendental subject, which Hamann called “a windy sough, a magic shadow play, at most.” Hamann countered that Kant’s object, a special faculty called reason, does not exist. What exists are rational ways of thinking and acting in specific languages and cultural contexts. Kant’s Platonism, however, stood in the way of dealing with anything real. This critique was not published until 1800, after Hamann had died; he was sensitive about offending Kant in public. But it had a significant subterranean influence, as Jacobi and Herder mined it for insights.99

Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit – Dorrien

And hence we have the rest of German idealism seeing itself as a way to "clean up" Kant's dualism problem here. My view would be that Kant absolutely did not want to fall into subjective idealism, and seems aware of his problems in his revisions.

But to explain the reality of the external world, one has to establish some kind of dualism between subject and object; otherwise objects are not really independent of our subjectivity. Kant’s rich, twisting, turgid, and conflicted wrestling with this problem yielded what Beiser aptly calls “a synthesis of subjectivism and objectivism in transcendental idealism” and a wide array of competing interpretations of what he said, yielding similar readings about the post-Kantian alternatives that succeeded him…

In both editions Kant described the noumenon as the idea of a thing-in-itself that is not an object of the senses and is not positive in any way. Essentially it signified the thought of something in general, in which one abstracts from everything belonging to sensible intuition. A noumenon is a thing so far as it is not an object of sensible intuition. But what kind of thing is that? How can it signify a true object by Kant’s principles? In the first edition, Kant reasoned that for a noumenon to signify a true object distinct from all phenomena, it is not enough to free one’s thought of all conditions of sensible intuition: “I must likewise have ground for assuming another kind of intuition, different from the sensible, in which such an object may be given. For otherwise my thought, while indeed without contradictions, is none the less empty.” Kant admitted that he could not prove that sensible intuition is the only possible kind of intuition. On the other hand, he also could not prove that another kind of intuition is possible: “Consequently, although our thought can abstract from all sensibility, it is still an open question whether the notion of a noumenon be not a mere form of a concept, and whether, when this separation has been made, any object whatsoever is left.”68

In the second edition he wrested more control over his most elusive concept by eliminating the transcendental object, at least in the most relevant sections. Any suggestion that the noumenon has a positive content or sense must be eliminated, he urged. To apply the categories to objects that are not appearances is to assume that some type of intellectual intuition exists. But sensible intuition is the only type that we know, and the Transcendental Analytic made no sense if the categories extended beyond objects of experience. Kant allowed that perhaps there are intelligible entities to which human sensible intuition has no relation. But since the concepts of understanding are forms corresponding to our sensible intuition, it is pointless to speculate on the subject; there is no knowledge. Kant realized that his critics would say the same thing about the thing-in-itself, but he needed the idea of the noumenon to account for the given manifold and the ground of moral freedom. The idea of a thing-in-itself that is not a thing of the senses is not contradictory, he assured. It is crucially important, wholly negative, and a thing of pure understanding.69

This idea cast a long, ironic shadow over modern theology. Kant conceived his unknowable Ding an sich as a brake on metaphysical speculation in philosophy and theology, which it did for Kantians. Yet his dualism of known and unknown worlds also sparked an explosion of high-flying metaphysical systems claiming that the world exists as the externalization of consciousness.

-Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit – Dorrien

The second problem is this: is Kant actually progressing critically and undogmatically as he claims? Fichte and Hegel thought not, and this is where they think the problem starts.

On the surface Hegel’s charge that Kant simply assumes that understanding is judgment appears to be too hasty. But closer examination of Kant’s position in the Critique of Pure Reason proves Hegel to be right. Indeed, one of Kant’s strongest advocates, Reinhard Brandt, confirms Hegel’s view. In the First Critique, Brandt writes, “it is assumed as obvious that the understanding is a faculty of knowledge through concepts, [and] that concepts can be used to obtain knowledge only through judgments.”8 Hegel is also right to claim that Kant simply takes over the various kinds of judgment with which he is familiar from formal logic and does not derive them from the nature of understanding itself. Indeed, Kant states explicitly that such a derivation is impossible to provide:

...for the peculiarity of our understanding, that it is able to bring about the unity of apperception a priori only by means of the categories and only through precisely this kind and number of them, a further ground may be offered just as little as one can be offered for why we have precisely these and no other functions for judgment or for why space and time are the sole forms of our possible intuition. (CPR 254/159 [B145–6])

All Kant can say, therefore, is that “if we abstract from all content of a judgment . . . , we find (finden) that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles” (CPR 206/110 , my emphasis)…

So far I have suggested that what motivates Hegel in the Logic is the desire for necessity. Like Fichte, Hegel wants to find out how basic categories have to be understood, not just how they have in fact been understood. This can only be discovered, he believes, if we demonstrate which categories are inherent in thought as such, and we can only do this if we allow pure thought to determine itself—and so to generate its own determinations—“before our very eyes” (to use Fichte’s expression).

-Houlgate - The Opening of Hegel's Logic

Fichte maintains that Kant himself “does not derive the presumed laws of the intellect from the very nature of the intellect,” but abstracts these laws from our empirical experience of objects, albeit via a “detour through logic” (which itself abstracts its laws from our experience of objects).16 In Fichte’s view, therefore, Kant may assert that the categories and laws of thought have their source in the spontaneity of the intellect, but—because of the way he proceeds—“he has no way to confirm that the laws of thought he postulates actually are laws of thought and that they are really nothing else but the immanent laws of the intellect.” The only way to confirm this, Fichte tells us, would be to start from the simple premise that the intellect acts—that the intellect is “a kind of doing and absolutely nothing more”—and to show how the laws of thought can be derived from this premise alone.

-Houlgate - The Opening of Hegel's Logic

What is objective vs subjective? :
Here's a trick to help you remember the difference between subjective and objective. Subjectivity is self-centered and based on speculations, sentiments, and experiences. Objectivity is outward-focused and based on observable facts and data that can be proven true. — Gnomon

Wow! Thanks for sharing, Gnomon. That’s the definition of objective and subjective I urgently need.
I am currently having a debate on this matter with @Bob Ross and we are trying to find out a definition of both concepts. Your post made it clearer and helped me to have a more precise comprehension. :up:

That’s some good stuff right there, and thank you for it.

….is Kant actually progressing critically and undogmatically as he claims? — Count Timothy von Icarus

“…. This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles à priori—but to dogmatism, that is, to the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions, according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing—without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these principles….”

It seems to me, that given the three listed “problems of pure reason”, for which no conclusions are to be obtained, he proves it is not possible to make any progress with at least some pure cognitions. On the other hand, while stipulating what those “sure principles a priori” actually are, he doesn’t say how reason comes into possession of them. Reason being the faculty of principles, I suppose we’re left with a rather loose end.

Which is why, in the end, metaphysics can never be a proper science.

It's depressing, just how labyrinthine German philosophy became after Kant. You could assemble a roomful of renowned experts in the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, and they would all differ vociferously on what it all meant (and take hours and hours of labourious arguments to do so). No wonder Russell and Moore had no trouble dispatching it.

A lot of the difficulties stem from trying to work out what Kant meant by that 'unknown something'. I still see that in online discussions about Kant (and I know Kant is an exceedingly difficult philosopher to understand.) There's this impulse to peek behind the curtain, so to speak, to understand what the dickens is the ding an sich. As if by understanding what it really is, we will have dispelled the mystery of existence.

But Kant only introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to the world as it is independently of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble (Emrys Westacott). And I think if it is understood in that spirit, it is still a perfectly understandable principle. "We do not see things as they truly are, but only as they appear to us".

Ahhhh…..of course you’re quite right. I got stuck on language = ordinary lingo. (head explodes) — Mww

I actually agree with you in disliking OLP: they are like anally retentive thought police who reject the creativity involved in the idea that words can possess novel and interesting associations to be discovered, associations which may yield fresh insight.

The idea of meaning as use also begs the question: "whose use"?

Yes - I think that's a good way of saying it. — T Clark

Cheers, mate...

And I think if it is understood in that spirit, it is still a perfectly understandable principle. "We do not see things as they truly are, but only as they appear to us". — Quixodian

That's right and it is not merely that we do not see things as they truly are, but that we cannot see things as they truly are, a corrective to the human tendency to intellectual hubris.

Kant's contemporary Jacobi, in his famous Letters on Spinoza (1785), wrote: "Through faith we know we have a body, and that other bodies, and other thinking beings are present outside us." I believe he was in line with Kant except that he uses the word "faith" instead of "intuition". If they are distinct that would be too many faculties — Gregory

But look, it's said "Through faith we know...". This implies that faith is the cause of that knowledge. Faith is not the knowledge itself. So we still have the question of how faith or intuition can cause knowledge.

The English speaking world has determined that not only is the wavelength of 700nm named "red", but also the wavelengths 620 to 750nm are also named "red". — RussellA

But all sorts of combinations of wavelengths are also correctly called "red"

.

It is not true that we learn how to perceive the colour of the wavelength 700nm by knowing its name. I don't need to know the name of the wavelength 700nm in order to perceive it. — RussellA

We're not talking about perceiving the colour of the wavelength 700nm, which is just one specific instance of red, we are talking about perceiving the colour red, in the general sense. "Red" in the general sense cannot be reduced 700nm, nor 620 to 750nm. Your examples are just an attempt to avoid the issue because explaining what it means to perceive one specific type of red does not explain how we perceive red in the general sense.

Your examples are just an attempt to avoid the issue because explaining what it means to perceive one specific type of red does not explain how we perceive red in the general sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the same problem as to how we are able to perceive any concept, such as triangles, the colour red, mountains, love, giraffes, tables, apples, democracy, etc. Things that exist only the mind and not outside the mind, unless one believes in Plato' Forms.

If I could explain how the brain processes concepts I would be well on the way to solving some of the deepest problems in philosophy today, including the mystery of consciousness.

However, it seems a sensible evolutionary advantage to have limit our concepts of colour to seven: red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet. If the human could only distinguish one colour, they couldn't distinguish between an edible green apple and a rotten brown apple. If the human could distinguish 1,000 colours, this would probably give the brain too much information to satisfactorily process. Therefore, the concept of 7 colours seems a good, middle-of-the-road evolutionary solution.

On the other hand, while stipulating what those “sure principles a priori” actually are, he doesn’t say how reason comes into possession of them. — Mww

Kant (1724 to 1804) unfortunately didn't have the advantage of Darwin's book On the Origin of Species 1859, so couldn't include the theory of evolution in his philosophy.

Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble (Emrys Westacott). And I think if it is understood in that spirit, it is still a perfectly understandable principle. "We do not see things as they truly are, but only as they appear to us". — Quixodian

As an Indirect Realist, something I definitely agree with.

Indirect Realism is the view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework, as opposed to Direct Realism, the view that conscious subjects view the world directly.

As Indirect realism was popular with several early modern philosophers, including Descartes (1596 - 1650), Locke (1632 - 1704), Leibniz (1646 - 1716) and Hume (1711 - 1776), each born before Kant (1724 - 1804), Kant would have been familiar with the concept.

Do you think space and time are real independently of the mind?

Catastrophically irrelevant.

Kant (1724 to 1804) unfortunately didn't have the advantage of Darwin's book On the Origin of Species 1859, so couldn't include the theory of evolution in his philosophy. — RussellA

How would that have mattered?

Do you think space and time are real independently of the mind? — Quixodian

As an Indirect Realist, yes. I believe that space and time existed independently of the human mind for at least the 10 billion years before life began on Earth.

How would that have mattered? — Quixodian

It has been said about Kant that he is dogmatic about us having a priori pure intuitions and categories of concepts, yet without explaining where they came from.

It seems clear with with hindsight, in part the debate between Innatism and Behaviourism, that a suitable candidate from their origin in the human mind is that a priori knowledge offers evolutionary advantages.

Catastrophically irrelevant. — Mww

In what way is pointing out that Kant didn't have the advantage of knowing about evolution irrelevant to when it comes to finding a solution to the problem of infinite regression as laid out in the quote by Stephen Houlgate in his book The Opening of Hegel's Logic.

Fichte maintains that Kant himself “does not derive the presumed laws of the intellect from the very nature of the intellect,” but abstracts these laws from our empirical experience of objects, albeit via a “detour through logic” (which itself abstracts its laws from our experience of objects). In Fichte’s view, therefore, Kant may assert that the categories and laws of thought have their source in the spontaneity of the intellect, but—because of the way he proceeds—“he has no way to confirm that the laws of thought he postulates actually are laws of thought and that they are really nothing else but the immanent laws of the intellect.” The only way to confirm this, Fichte tells us, would be to start from the simple premise that the intellect acts—that the intellect is “a kind of doing and absolutely nothing more”—and to show how the laws of thought can be derived from this premise alone.

How can the question as to the source of our a priori non-sensible intuitions and categories of concepts be properly answered without reference to a modern understanding of Innatism ?

We are not living in 1781 when the Critique of Pure Reason was first published.

When what's being discussed is far from clear, we should withhold trying to find a reference relation until we have a better idea of what kind of thing we are talking about.

Do we have in mind noumenon in a negative sense or in a positive sense? Are we to think of noumena in singular or in plural? Are we to think of them as grounding relations or mere epistemic postulates about the limits of reason?

All of these are hard questions, which merit discussion and clarification. Absent this, we may be acting somewhat prematurely in attempting to find a reference relation.

Also: being a realist does not preclude being an idealist — Count Timothy von Icarus

It depends what is being meant by realism and idealism. It comes down to definition, which are difficult to pin down, especially when there was even a thread on the Forum titled "Definitions have no place in philosophy". The SEP articles on Idealism and Realism are a start.
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Dorrien: Kant postulated a self-sufficient noumenal realm set apart from everything belonging to the phenomenal realm — Count Timothy von Icarus

A sensible acknowledgement that for the 10 billion years before life began on Earth, there was possibly no phenomenal realm.
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Dorrien: Kant’s Platonism, however, stood in the way of dealing with anything real — Count Timothy von Icarus

In another passage Hamann attacks Kant for elevating Reason into a universal Platonic ideal rather than being something grounded in a specific language and cultural context. An unwarranted criticism, in that a philosopher should not to be forced to make judgements unduly swayed by short term pressures from the particular society that they happen to live in.
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Kant realized that his critics would say the same thing about the thing-in-itself, but he needed the idea of the noumenon to account for the given manifold and the ground of moral freedom. The idea of a thing-in-itself that is not a thing of the senses is not contradictory, he assured — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is still a problem that Indirect and Direct Realism grapples with 200 years after Kant's death.
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Like Fichte, Hegel wants to find out how basic categories have to be understood, not just how they have in fact been understood. This can only be discovered, he believes, if we demonstrate which categories are inherent in thought as such, and we can only do this if we allow pure thought to determine itself—and so to generate its own determinations—“before our very eyes” — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is no problem of self-reference in Kant. It is not the case that thoughts can only be about thoughts.

For Kant, we think about objects of sensible intuition using the categories. The category doesn't determine what particular object is being thought about, although it is true that the categories limit what particular objects can be thought about.

It is true that the fact that I have the ability to see the colours red and green but not the colour ultra-violet does limit me in which colours I can see, but it does allow me to distinguish between the colours (of sensible intuition) that I am able to see.