Consequentialism and Being Rational

ToothyMaw

If one acts according to what is rational, even if what is rational to a given agent is not rational from other perspectives, does one truly have free will in a meaningful sense, given people are inclined to act according to supposedly rational rules and laws?

It seems to me that the act-utilitarian, for instance, always acts rationally when bringing about the best outcome - something I argued must always be attempted if one is to have good intentions - as the best outcome, which has the best consequences, is the only good outcome if all other outcomes have deficits of good consequences. So, the act-utilitarian must also relinquish their free will if they are to be a “good” consequentialist.

Alternatively, you might list deontology or rule-consequentialism as examples in which one can be rational by following rational, impartially defensible laws. But did you make those laws? Almost certainly not - and acting according to laws that do not result in optimal utility for you or anyone else is irrational given you hold somewhere in your head that consequences matter. Consider the following argument:

1. Consequences can matter, even if only as codified in specific laws
2. If consequences matter, one ought to act according to such laws concerning consequences such that they achieve optimal utility for the majority of people following these laws insofar as specific laws selected for are concerned
3. Certain laws are optimal for achieving optimal utility, if not universally
4. Choosing not to follow the appropriate optimal law(s) leads to a deficit of good consequences
5. If there is a deficit of good consequences when not following such an optimal law in the relevant context, then one ought to act according to this law, as it is the correct, maximizing law insofar as specific laws concerning a situation in which this law might apply arise
6. Therefore, there is always one best action dictated by specific laws that concern consequences
7. It is rational to carry out this best action with the best consequences because of (1) and (2).
8. Therefore, it is rational to exclusively follow certain specific laws that select for consequences depending upon circumstances, even if other laws do not

Given this argument holds, it appears that rule-consequentialism does indeed become more and more like act-utilitarianism as the laws get more specific, as premises (1) and (2) are granted by probably every rule consequentialist and some deontologists, too. So, if you want to make consequences matter, you have to grant that it is rational to only act in one very specific way - maximizing utility - in certain circumstances, and if you don’t like this, you have to deny premise (1), (2), or (1) and (2).

If the rule-consequentialist denies (2) (denying (1) would make them an idiot) I would say that they are no longer a consequentialist, as consequences could only have mattered, apparently, as some sort of vague potentiality when the rules were made, and no longer have any connection to the current consequences of following said laws once created; the value of consequences that gives rise to the creation of maximizing rules doesn't go away once the rules are created. So, it seems we either have deontology or we evaluate things on a case-by-case basis.

This relates to following rational laws, because if one claims they only follow rational, impartially defensible laws, and then have a law that clearly is intended to bring about certain consequences, they are compromising the claim that their laws are always different in such a way that they are defensible not just for their consequences in any given situation. In fact, it seems that granting (1) and (2) leads to the inevitable dissolving of any set of specific laws that are derived from potential consequences that apply in a certain circumstance into what is right as an act - which brings us back to the lack of choice inherent to act-utilitarianism.

T Clark

people are inclined to act according to supposedly rational rules and laws? — ToothyMaw

I don't think that is true at all, and it's especially not true in matters of morals. The essence of morality is human values, not truths.

ToothyMaw

↪T Clark

When I say rational, I mean that they make sense according to some sort of ethical reasoning, not that they are purely derived from reason, and are thus indisputable truths.

edit: not to mention, human values are treated as truths by many people, so the two things are entangled

edit 2: Otherwise, I mean rational in the traditional sense of being in accordance with reason or logic. Sorry for not making that clear in the OP.

Philosophim

When I say rational, I mean that they make sense according to some sort of ethical reasoning, not that they are purely derived from reason, and are thus indisputable truths. — ToothyMaw

I'm going to second T Clark here. This is twisting the idea of rationality into something its not. People are often not inclined to be rational at all. They'll smoke, they'll drink, etc. People rationalize, but that's not being rational. Many people don't even go that far.

Reason also does not mean an indisputable truth. Reason simply means we have derived a conclusion from a set of premises that is certain or highly probable. It does not mean the premises used are true, and consequently, does not mean our conclusion results in an indisputable truth either.

ToothyMaw

↪T Clark

I'm going to second T Clark here. This is twisting the idea of rationality into something its not. People are often not inclined to be rational at all. They'll smoke, they'll drink, etc. People rationalize, but that's not being rational. Many people don't even go that far. — Philosophim

I think most coherent people provide reasoning for their beliefs and the laws and rules they want to follow and impose on others - even if that reasoning is garbage. If I were to believe you and T Clark, everyone is just directionless hippies and/or irresponsible pleasure-seekers with absolutely no designs on being ethical in any substantial way.

Reason also does not mean an indisputable truth. Reason simply means we have derived a conclusion from a set of premises that is certain or highly probable. It does not mean the premises used are true, and consequently, does not mean our conclusion results in an indisputable truth either. — Philosophim

Yes, you are correct - but this is a quibble. I was wrong; I should have said that the rules people try to follow often come with some sort of reasoning, even if that reasoning has logical flaws or faulty premises. And reason doesn't give us indisputable truths.

I didn't expect people to attack the assumption that people often try to justify the laws they want with some forms of reasoning.

Philosophim

I didn't expect people to attack the assumption that people often try to justify the laws they want with some forms of reasoning. — ToothyMaw

With philosophy your argument starts with the very first premise you put forth. Your entire thesis statement starts with this assumption. The only thing which should be assumed is that most people are not going to let assumptions pass by without asking you to prove them. You may want to see if this assumption is unnecessary for the rest of your OP and remove it if possible. If not, I would re-evaluate your entire OP.

T Clark

If I were to believe you and T Clark, everyone is just directionless hippies and/or irresponsible pleasure-seekers with absolutely no designs on being ethical in any substantial way. — ToothyMaw

It's important to me that I treat people honorably. Sometimes I don't live up to that aspiration. The source of that isn't some formal, codified, "rational" ethical code, it's empathy and fellow-feeling. How does that make me directionless or irresponsible?

I like sushi

↪ToothyMaw

Do we have to assume it holds or are we meant to pick at it?

ToothyMaw

↪I like sushi

I wouldn't put it up here if I didn't want it to be picked at.

edit: I see you genuinely wanted to know. The premise everyone is up in arms about is solved when you recall that people philosophize about ethics, and that there are even scientists that are appointed as ethical advisors by the government and corporations and such.

ToothyMaw

I'm going to second T Clark here. This is twisting the idea of rationality into something its not. People are often not inclined to be rational at all. They'll smoke, they'll drink, etc. People rationalize, but that's not being rational. Many people don't even go that far. — Philosophim

With philosophy your argument starts with the very first premise you put forth. Your entire thesis statement starts with this assumption. The only thing which should be assumed is that most people are not going to let assumptions pass by without asking you to prove them. You may want to see if this assumption is unnecessary for the rest of your OP and remove it if possible. If not, I would re-evaluate your entire OP. — Philosophim

Ethics as a school of philosophical thought exists. That's my proof. I suppose I could preface my OP with the caveat that this intense thinking about morality is directed at other people who desire to think about morality rigorously; I'm not saying that everyone always tries to act rationally, but I think that creating a system that allows us to act rationally according to some reasonable ethical principles is the ultimate goal of ethical philosophy, even if many or most people don't care about anything like that. If you disagree with that, then you aren't really interested in ethics.

It's important to me that I treat people honorably. Sometimes I don't live up to that aspiration. The source of that isn't some formal, codified, "rational" ethical code, it's empathy and fellow-feeling. How does that make me directionless or irresponsible? — T Clark

I could talk in vagaries about honor and "fellow-feeling", two things which I think should exist as concepts because they are useful, but I'm more interested in drilling down to find some more certain things. Also, I don't think you are directionless or irresponsible as my comment wasn't intended to be an aspersion on you.

ToothyMaw

↪T Clark

↪Philosophim

Also: if the two of you would just read the formal argument you would realize I stipulate in (1) that only the subset of those laws that are formed by reasoning about consequences are relevant.

T Clark

I could talk in vagaries about honor and "fellow-feeling" — ToothyMaw

I don't see how honor or fellow-feeling are any more vague than judgments of utility and consequences. Those two supposedly more rational criteria are also based on human value rather than any objective basis.

ToothyMaw

↪T Clark

Utility is inextricably related to consequences, so I would say this: honor might evoke a certain universal meaning when used, but it cannot be quantified and measured like consequences, and thus the process of deciding what decision has maximum utility is often apparent when one considers consequences. Alternatively, you might say it is obvious when an action is honorable, but it is only honorable according to an existing code that varies from one person to another, and from one culture to another. There are undoubtedly some common threads, but predicating decisions to what is "honorable" is like saying you will make a decision based on some sort of maximizing calculus. Such calculi exist, but what are you maximizing?

ToothyMaw

↪T Clark

Furthermore, the quality of human pain doesn't affect, say, whether or not it is wrong to slap someone because one lacks empathy, except insofar as that pain is undesirable. There is nothing about pain or a lack of empathy that dictates that slapping someone is inherently wrong from a consequentialist perspective.

Philosophim

Also: if the two of you would just read the formal argument you would realize I stipulate in (1) that only the subset of those laws that are formed by reasoning about consequences are relevant. — ToothyMaw

When you have two people tell you the structure of your paper has problems, its not their problem, its your problem. Your OP's intro is poorly written. The main point of your paper is that rule-consequentialism becomes more like act-utilitarianism no? Your first statement should reflect that, and has nothing to do with whether people are assumed to think rationally while considering morality.

ToothyMaw

↪Philosophim

I still disagree. I specifically say:

If one acts according to what is rational, even if what is rational to a given agent is not rational from other perspectives — ToothyMaw

This is the act-utilitarian, essentially. If they want to be good act-utilitarians they must grant what I write later - even though most people don't agree with them. The same goes for rule-consequentialists.

The main point of your paper is that rule-consequentialism becomes more like act-utilitarianism no? — Philosophim

You didn't fully understand it. Not only does rule-consequentialism become more like act-utilitarianism, it has serious implications for supposedly impartially defensible laws that are actually based on consequences for anybody. But yes, I emphasized that angle because I consider rule-consequentialism to be a serious challenge to act-utilitarianism.

ToothyMaw

↪Philosophim

And I never said all rules and laws are rational, or that people think all rules or laws are rational. The ones they might claim are, are the ones I'm concerned with, however.

I like sushi

↪ToothyMaw

I have looked again and do not really understand the argument sadly.

I get the impression the premises are based on some proposed ideal of a consequentialist (whatever that may be).

ToothyMaw

↪I like sushi

Would you like me to try and explain it? What specifically didn't make sense? And yes, premise (2) is basically saying that if we form laws based on consequences, we ought to act according to those laws such that we gain maximum utility (in other words follow the appropriate law whenever it applies, something established in (6)), as the consequences mattering is crystalized in those laws. Even a deontologist might create a law that prioritizes consequences solely in order to bring about the desired consequences in the form of utility. If the law doesn't do that, then it is irrelevant to my argument.

Echarmion

If one acts according to what is rational, even if what is rational to a given agent is not rational from other perspectives, does one truly have free will in a meaningful sense, given people are inclined to act according to supposedly rational rules and laws? — ToothyMaw

The obvious counter-question to this is what "free will in a meaningful sense" is supposed to be. There are people that argue that the essence of free will is the capacity to act rationally.

It seems to me that the act-utilitarian, for instance, always acts rationally when bringing about the best outcome - something I argued must always be attempted if one is to have good intentions - as the best outcome, which has the best consequences, is the only good outcome if all other outcomes have deficits of good consequences. So, the act-utilitarian must also relinquish their free will if they are to be a “good” consequentialist. — ToothyMaw

This seems to be implying that free will must somehow involve you doing things at random, or for emotional, short sighted reasons which doesn't seem like an obvious premise.

Alternatively, you might list deontology or rule-consequentialism as examples in which one can be rational by following rational, impartially defensible laws. But did you make those laws? — ToothyMaw

I don't think anyone else but me can make the laws that are in my mind.

Given this argument holds, it appears that rule-consequentialism does indeed become more and more like act-utilitarianism as the laws get more specific, as premises (1) and (2) are granted by probably every rule consequentialist and some deontologists, too. So, if you want to make consequences matter, you have to grant that it is rational to only act in one very specific way - maximizing utility - in certain circumstances, and if you don’t like this, you have to deny premise (1), (2), or (1) and (2). — ToothyMaw

The problem is that utility isn't defined here, so while this kind of reasoning is useful if you have a given value you want to maximise for, it doesn't give you that value by itself.

So you're going to have to come up with that value from somewhere else. Perhaps that's the part where free will is relevant?

ToothyMaw

It seems to me that the act-utilitarian, for instance, always acts rationally when bringing about the best outcome - something I argued must always be attempted if one is to have good intentions - as the best outcome, which has the best consequences, is the only good outcome if all other outcomes have deficits of good consequences. So, the act-utilitarian must also relinquish their free will if they are to be a “good” consequentialist.
— ToothyMaw

This seems to be implying that free will must somehow involve you doing things at random, or for emotional, short sighted reasons which doesn't seem like an obvious premise. — Echarmion

Not what I'm saying. I'm saying that in terms of making choices about how to act in moral situations, one can only choose the decision with the best outcome if they want to be a good utilitarian. Choosing a second best outcome is not always emotional or short-sighted, although I do argue it is wrong.

If one acts according to what is rational, even if what is rational to a given agent is not rational from other perspectives, does one truly have free will in a meaningful sense, given people are inclined to act according to supposedly rational rules and laws?
— ToothyMaw

The obvious counter-question to this is what "free will in a meaningful sense" is supposed to be. There are people that argue that the essence of free will is the capacity to act rationally. — Echarmion

If freewill is acting rationally, and the act utilitarian has only one rational choice, would you still think that that is meaningful free will? I certainly don't.

Alternatively, you might list deontology or rule-consequentialism as examples in which one can be rational by following rational, impartially defensible laws. But did you make those laws?
— ToothyMaw

I don't think anyone else but me can make the laws that are in my mind. — Echarmion

You have no means of imposing those laws on anybody probably, so those laws don't matter much.

Given this argument holds, it appears that rule-consequentialism does indeed become more and more like act-utilitarianism as the laws get more specific, as premises (1) and (2) are granted by probably every rule consequentialist and some deontologists, too. So, if you want to make consequences matter, you have to grant that it is rational to only act in one very specific way - maximizing utility - in certain circumstances, and if you don’t like this, you have to deny premise (1), (2), or (1) and (2).
— ToothyMaw

The problem is that utility isn't defined here, so while this kind of reasoning is useful if you have a given value you want to maximise for, it doesn't give you that value by itself. — Echarmion

I intentionally didn't define exactly what utility is, as the thing being maximized might vary according to each relevant law. But for the rule consequentialist utility would probably equate to welfare most of the time, and that is most relevant for that portion of the OP.

I like sushi

↪ToothyMaw

Well, I have issue with saying that laws can be only based on consequences because no one knows the full consequences of their actions.

So it seems like I have to assume there is some hypothetical law that can be seen as unquestionably ‘the best’ law. If so then why would anyone question it. Point being rules are questioned and the kind of ‘laws’ I believe you have in mind are not ever brought into examination they are just accepted.

For comparisons sake, we do not question whether or not a ball will drop if released, we bring this inot question only when experience shows otherwise (ie. in outer space). Obviously we are talking about ethics here so there is far more to question here when it comes to human biases and subjective opinions soak with human emotions.

Echarmion

If freewill is acting rationally, and the act utilitarian has only one rational choice, would you still think that that is meaningful free will? I certainly don't. — ToothyMaw

Well, my observation is that in any debate about free will, it's easy to list things that free will is not about.

It's much harder to communicate what it actually is. In that sense, often the core question is not whether it actually exists or can be reconciled with some other concept, but whether one can actually conceive of it "in a meaningful way".

Fundamentally, the whole debate rests on an impression of being in control that we all have. That impression isn't trivial, since at the core of any action we choose. If we, in our heads, have a debate about what the morally correct and most optimal course of action is, then I'd say that's meaningful. We can only have such a debate with ourselves in the first place via the impression of free will.

I intentionally didn't define exactly what utility is, as the thing being maximized might vary according to each relevant law. But for the rule consequentialist utility would probably equate to welfare most of the time, and that is most relevant for that portion of the OP. — ToothyMaw

And so my question would be, are you "choosing" to use welfare here or is this value somehow pressed on you by externalities?

ToothyMaw

Well, I have issue with saying that laws can be only based on consequences because no one knows the full consequences of their actions. — I like sushi

You might not know the full consequences of your actions, but one might know that following a certain law when it applies will generally maximize the consequences the law is shooting for.

it seems like I have to assume there is some hypothetical law that can be seen as unquestionably ‘the best’ law. If so then why would anyone question it. Point being rules are questioned and the kind of ‘laws’ I believe you have in mind are not ever brought into examination they are just accepted. — I like sushi

I'm saying that if a law selects for consequences, and you grant (2), you end up with the conclusion that you must follow certain laws exclusively. You can question those laws, but the intent behind those laws remains, and, thus, they are prone to this extrapolation. They could be changed like any other law, however, and not all laws are obviously based on consequences, so my argument is somewhat specific in this regard.

For comparisons sake, we do not question whether or not a ball will drop if released, we bring this inot question only when experience shows otherwise (ie. in outer space). Obviously we are talking about ethics here so there is far more to question here when it comes to human biases and subjective opinions soak with human emotions. — I like sushi

Why not question a law - even if it is one of the laws I mention? Certainly, the outcome of following any law would be less certain than dropping a ball near the surface of the Earth.

ToothyMaw

We can only have such a debate with ourselves in the first place via the impression of free will. — Echarmion

I hate it when people say this. Perhaps a paranoid person has an impression they are being watched. Does this impression grant any weight to her assumption that there is a conspiracy against her? Certainly not, and that goes for free will too - even if this impression is almost universal.

I intentionally didn't define exactly what utility is, as the thing being maximized might vary according to each relevant law. But for the rule consequentialist utility would probably equate to welfare most of the time, and that is most relevant for that portion of the OP.
— ToothyMaw

And so my question would be, are you "choosing" to use welfare here or is this value somehow pressed on you by externalities? — Echarmion

This is pressed on me by the assumptions most consequentialists make. I do not particularly think we should only take into account welfare, as there might be other meaningful things worth maximizing.

Echarmion

I hate it when people say this. Perhaps a paranoid person has an impression they are being watched. Does this impression grant any weight to her assumption that there is a conspiracy against her? Certainly not, and that goes for free will too - even if this impression is almost universal. — ToothyMaw

It could be easily dismissed if it wasn't for the fact that you constantly assume that you have free will whenever you act - even when you're just thinking and deciding.

Your argument is that making a decision with a definite outcome doesn't involve free will. IMHO, you're not considering that the decision still involves first the setting of a goal and then deliberation on how to achieve that goal, which you're conducting as an actor.

This is pressed on me by the assumptions most consequentialists make — ToothyMaw

Assumptions are not external though. Fundamentally they're only in your head.

ToothyMaw

It could be easily dismissed if it wasn't for the fact that you constantly assume that you have free will whenever you act - even when you're just thinking and deciding. — Echarmion

I actually don't, really. I make decisions but I don't think that I truly have free choice. That I act like I'm making decisions and setting goals freely does not necessarily presuppose that I have free will.

You might argue that it is absurd to believe that I don't have free will because it looks like I do in every regard.

Your argument is that making a decision with a definite outcome doesn't involve free will. — Echarmion

No, it is that if you want to be a rational rule consequentialist, or perhaps even deontologist, you must abdicate your ability to choose because of the very nature of some of the laws in place, along with premise (2). You don't have any meaningful choices sometimes if you fall into the same trap as the good-intentioned act-utilitarian.

Assumptions are not external though. Fundamentally they're only in your head. — Echarmion

These particular assumptions did not originate in my head. I don't even know why you are going there, unless it is to make the point that the laws I make up don't matter because I said something like that about your made up laws earlier.

Echarmion

I actually don't, really. I make decisions but I don't think that I truly have free choice. That I act like I'm making decisions and setting goals freely does not necessarily presuppose that I have free will.

You might argue that it is absurd to believe that I don't have free will because it looks like I do in every regard. — ToothyMaw

I would argue that sounds like a performative contradiction. You say you believe one thing, but you act like you believe another. Which I guess is not entirely fair, since you're not acting intentionally, but you still cannot escape acting like it.

I think these kind of contradictions are at the root at a number of thorny problems. It's much the same with Solipism - you can't formally disprove it, but people can only claim to believe it, they can't act like they do.

No, it is that if you want to be a rational rule consequentialist, or perhaps even deontologist, you must abdicate your ability to choose because of the very nature of some of the laws in place, along with premise (2). You don't have any meaningful choices sometimes if you fall into the same trap as the good-intentioned act-utilitarian. — ToothyMaw

The problem is that you can't abdicate that ability. And furthermore, there's the problem of setting and evaluating goals. Even if you have a perfect utilitarian algorithm, it can't set and evaluate goals.

These particular assumptions did not originate in my head. — ToothyMaw

Technically they did. Of course they may be inspired by what someone said or wrote, but taking an argument from someone else still involves understanding and interpretation, and what results is always your take.

ToothyMaw

I would argue that sounds like a performative contradiction. You say you believe one thing, but you act like you believe another. — Echarmion

I just act. I don't act like a I have free will, or anything like it. You seem to think that acting and setting goals indicates free will. I don't. I say it is just biology and environmental stimuli. But even if I don't have free choice I still have choice. All of this is entirely coherent. The contradictions come in when you consider the legal system.

The problem is that you can't abdicate that ability. — Echarmion

Give me a counter-argument that says one always has the freedom to choose even in the presence of constraints that allow for only one choice given you want to maintain some ongoing condition.

furthermore, there's the problem of setting and evaluating goals. Even if you have a perfect utilitarian algorithm, it can't set and evaluate goals. — Echarmion

Maybe not, but can we not generally seek to maximize the fulfilment of preferences, or maximize happiness, or minimize suffering? Doesn't such an algorithm presuppose such a goal? Couldn't this general goal guide us to create and evaluate more specific goals? Maybe it wouldn't be as clear as a deontological sense of justice or something, but it could give rise to such efforts.

Technically they did. Of course they may be inspired by what someone said or wrote, but taking an argument from someone else still involves understanding and interpretation, and what results is always your take. — Echarmion

There is usually a clear, intended meaning in philosophy - despite what you might think from reading some of the stuff on this forum. This isn't literary interpretation. And this meaning originates outside my mind, presumably on a computer screen or a piece of paper.

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