P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality. [p → !q]
P2: Qualities exist (e.g., conscious experience). [q]
C1: The world (which has such qualities) cannot be quantitative processes. [!p] (Modus Tollens) — Bob Ross

Modus tollens:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.

Therefore, not P.

I would like to share my formulation of an argument for the world being mind-dependent and qualitative; and see everyone's thoughts thereof. — Bob Ross

I don't disagree with the result of your arguments - the world is mind-dependent. I'm not so sure of some of the arguments themselves. That being said, what would a mind-independent world be? Is that just objective reality? Is it what was there before there were minds? Did nothing exist before there were minds? I don't think that is a ridiculous idea to propose.

Do you think that the entire world is mind-dependent, or just certain of its features?

I like this quote from phenomenologist philosopher Dan Zahavi:

“Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind -and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.”

In other words, you don't have to go as far as the idealism of Bishop Berkeley to posit a world created by our perceptions and cognitive apparatus.

Hello chiknsld,

Modus tollens:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.

Therefore, not P.

Correct. In my case, it also uses double negation and modus tollens—which I forgot to mention in the argument form:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.
C: Not P.

In my case, Q = ‘!T’, so it becomes:

1. If P, then !T (If P, then Q).
2. !!T (!Q).
C: Not P.

It’s the same form of inference: modus tollens. Granted it also assumes the law of double negation.

Hello T Clark,

That being said, what would a mind-independent world be? Is that just objective reality? Is it what was there before there were minds? Did nothing exist before there were minds? I don't think that is a ridiculous idea to propose.

I would say that objective reality is a mind-at-large, and our conscious experience is a survival-based dashboard of experience of mental events. Since you said you agree that the world is mind-dependent, what do you think that entails or implies?

Also, yes, I think that there was a world before our minds but, under my view, not of all minds.

In other words, you don't have to go as far as the idealism of Bishop Berkeley to posit a world created by our perceptions and cognitive apparatus. — Tom Storm

Exactly, but it seems some minds are not satisfied with anything that is not black or white. The world must be either completely mind-dependent or completely mind-independent; I just won't have it any other way!

Do you think that the entire world is mind-dependent, or just certain of its features? — charles ferraro

I like @Tom Storm's answer.

Do you think that the entire world is mind-dependent, or just certain of its features? — charles ferraro

Where would the line be drawn?

I would say that objective reality is a mind-at-large ... — Bob Ross

I don't grok your statement. Clarify what you mean by "objective reality" and/or "mind-at-large".

Also, if "the world is mind-dependent", then "mind" is world-independent (i.e. separate from the world, or disembodied), no? Evidence?

Hello Bob! As you are using specific vocabulary, it would help to make your point clearer by also defining exactly what each piece of the vocabulary means to you. What is a quantity by your view? What is quantitative vs qualitative to your view?

Logic only works when you have immutable properties that do not change or are open to interpretation. Definitions often times are immutable based on the internal definitions of the reader, as well as the context in which they can be placed accidently by the user.

Without very explicit terminology, I do not think the proposal can be evaluated.

I'm somewhat of an amateur fossil hunter. It would seem odd to me, that when I find fossils I am not holding the remnants of the bodies of animals that existed a long time ago, but am instead holding... ? I suppose under the 'all is quality' view, I am holding nothing more than mind-dependent qualities - the way the fossil looks, feels, it's texture. It only signifies the past to the degree that I build an explanatory narrative around my perceptions (i.e. there is nothing more to the past than this narrative). But I think what's missing from this account that reduces our existence to 'quality only' is our pre-theoretical lived experience as being human bodies.

When we speak of "quality" what we are really referring to is our bodies sensory perceptions - our visual field is predicated upon our eyes. The senses of taste and smell are bodily - one puts food in their mouth, or holds something to their nose. You cannot touch fossils without hands. It would seem incoherent to think both my hand and its touch are 'in my mind' - my body would be 'in my mind' yet my sensory perceptions are dependent upon my body? It appears nonsensical, especially considering my body will remain when I die, much like these creatures whose fossils I find. You have direct evidence of this every time you eat a chicken - a plate full of bones.

P3: If a view multiplies ontic categories without necessity, then it should not be accepted (Occam’s Razor). [p → q] — Bob Ross

Surely this leads to solipsism - why posit minds beyond your own? But I think applying Occam's Razor to ontology is a misapplication. There is no requirement for the ontology of the world itself to be as parsimonious as possible.

I think mind-dependence is misleading. Neither pure subjectivity nor pure objectivity can be conceived in isolation; each requires the other. Aligning with Kant, Cassirer says "the unity of the I does not come before that of the object, but rather is constituted only through it." The universe is dynamic, dynamism requires energy, and energy is the result of a tension between opposites. For a gradient to exist, there must be a high and a low, which are mutually determined. The most absolute opposition conceivable is that of subjectivity and objectivity. The quality of quantity; quantities of qualities.

I have been waiting my entire life for a simple tool like chatgpt...my entire life.

Hello chiknsld,

Modus tollens:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.

Therefore, not P.

Correct. In my case, it also uses double negation and modus tollens—which I forgot to mention in the argument form:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.
C: Not P.

In my case, Q = ‘!T’, so it becomes:

1. If P, then !T (If P, then Q).
2. !!T (!Q).
C: Not P.

It’s the same form of inference: modus tollens. Granted it also assumes the law of double negation. — Bob Ross

Hi Bob Ross, you cannot apply "double negation" in such a way to the modus tollens without fundamentally changing the structure of this rule of inference. I believe that is what I was trying to tell you, but I know that you will probably understand it better if it comes from another source right? ...hehe (chatgpt let's go!). I went ahead and did you the favor.

You are correct in your concern. Applying double negation in the way described does not align with the standard form of modus tollens and, in fact, changes the logical rule being used. Modus tollens is a valid form of inference, but it should not involve double negation in the manner shown in the argument.

The standard form of modus tollens is as follows:

If P, then Q.
Not Q.
C: Not P.

This form follows the classical rules of deductive logic. However, the argument presented by adding double negation:

If P, then ¬T (If P, then Q).
¬¬T (!Q).
C: Not P.

While this argument might still lead to the correct conclusion, it deviates from the standard modus tollens form and introduces the law of double negation in an unusual way. Double negation elimination is a valid law in classical logic, which states that if you have a double negation (¬¬P), you can eliminate both negations and arrive back at the original statement (P). However, in the context of modus tollens, it is not common to introduce double negation in the premises or conclusions.

To maintain clarity and adherence to standard logic, it's best to present the argument in the standard form of modus tollens without introducing unnecessary double negations. So, the correct form of the argument should be:

If P, then Q.
Not Q.
C: Not P.

In conclusion, the original argument you presented without double negation was valid modus tollens, but the modified version with double negation deviates from the standard form and may cause confusion or misunderstandings.

Hello 180 Proof,

I don't grok your statement. Clarify what you mean by "objective reality" and/or "mind-at-large".

By ‘objective’, I mean ‘that which is mind-independent’ and by ‘mind-at-large’ I mean that reality is fundamentally a mind. That mind, however, objectively exists; that is, it’s existence is mind-independent—i.e., it doesn’t manifest itself nor uphold its own existence.

Also, if "the world is mind-dependent", then "mind" is world-independent (i.e. separate from the world, or disembodied), no? Evidence?

The “world” is in that mind (under my view). It is disembodied in the sense that it doesn’t have an organic body if that is what you are asking; and, as for evidence, I would like to focus on the argument I gave in the OP for a mind-dependent, qualitative world.

Hello Philosophim!

As you are using specific vocabulary, it would help to make your point clearer by also defining exactly what each piece of the vocabulary means to you.

That is fair.

What is a quantity by your view? What is quantitative vs qualitative to your view?

A quantity is ‘an definite amount’ (e.g., 3 m/s^2, 1 meter, 4 newtons, 80 volts, etc.); and a quality is ‘a non-quantity’ (i.e., an indefinite amount)(e.g., the bitterness of an apple, feeling of pain, the redness of an apple, etc.).

Logic only works when you have immutable properties that do not change or are open to interpretation. Definitions often times are immutable based on the internal definitions of the reader, as well as the context in which they can be placed accidentally by the user.

Without very explicit terminology, I do not think the proposal can be evaluated.

True, please let me know if there are any other terms that need defining. I will also put those definitions in the OP. Thank you Philosophim!

Hello Inyenzi,

I'm somewhat of an amateur fossil hunter.

That is awesome!

It would seem odd to me, that when I find fossils I am not holding the remnants of the bodies of animals that existed a long time ago, but am instead holding... ?

That, indeed, would be odd; thankfully, objective idealism makes no such postulation: when you examine dead organisms, under objective idealism, you are examining a representation of them, of a real ‘dead organism’. The question becomes: what is the thing-in-itself of which I am representing? Is it a tangible, organic organism like I perceive? Objective idealism postulates that your representation of the organism is of fundamentally mental process; just like how the word document on your monitor is a representation of 0s and 1s. The physical world within our conscious experience is just a survival-based dashboard of representations.

I suppose under the 'all is quality' view, I am holding nothing more than mind-dependent qualities - the way the fossil looks, feels, it's texture. It only signifies the past to the degree that I build an explanatory narrative around my perceptions (i.e. there is nothing more to the past than this narrative).

So, in objective idealism, they are mind-dependent but NOT dependent on your mind. Of course, your representations of them are dependent on you, but they actually exist—just as ideas in a universal mind. You are in a fundamental, universal mind (in this view) and so is the dead organism you are inspecting. Ideas, I would argue, are also ontologically qualitative: there’s no definite beginning or ending to them, nor are they completely separable from one another within our minds. This universal mind doesn’t have a definite amount of ideas: it is a stream of ideas: an ‘idea’ is just a unit of measure we use to estimate it for descriptive purposes.

But I think what's missing from this account that reduces our existence to 'quality only' is our pre-theoretical lived experience as being human bodies.

If by ‘pre-theoretical lived experience’ you are referring to before we were ‘conscious’, then I would say that species are all conscious (to some degree) and human beings, throughout evolution, have been conscious. By conscious, I mean qualitatively experiencing; and not some higher-order emergent property of a brain. The brain, under my view, is an extrinsic representation of a higher order organ that has evolved slowly over time with more and more higher order capabilities (i.e., deliberation, cognition, introspection, etc.).

When we speak of "quality" what we are really referring to is our bodies sensory perceptions - our visual field is predicated upon our eyes.

I would partially be meaning that; but more broadly anything which has no definite amount.

It would seem incoherent to think both my hand and its touch are 'in my mind' - my body would be 'in my mind' yet my sensory perceptions are dependent upon my body?

You hand, a physical object within your conscious experience, is a dashboard representation of the hand-in-itself, which is an idea in the universal mind. The hand-as-a-physical-object doesn’t fundamentally exist, no differently than the word document application doesn’t fundamentally exist in the computer in that manner: it is a bunch of 0s and 1s.

It appears nonsensical, especially considering my body will remain when I die, much like these creatures whose fossils I find. You have direct evidence of this every time you eat a chicken - a plate full of bones.

Under objective idealism, the world is independent of our minds, but not of every mind. The eternal, metaphysically mind is where all of the world exists in (as ideas therein). So, your body will indeed still exist after you stop experiencing, and if I were to see your corpse it would be a dashboard representation of a perished mind.

Surely this leads to solipsism - why posit minds beyond your own? But I think applying Occam's Razor to ontology is a misapplication. There is no requirement for the ontology of the world itself to be as parsimonious as possible.

Good question: I would say that solipsism is not parsimonious. Yes, it says “this all here is just in my mind”, but upon close inspection the justification for it explodes into completely unfalsifiable nonense. For example, if your mind is the only thing that exists, then your mind must be eternal; but what about the fact that everyone seems to die? Oh, you are the exception to that rule? (:

Hello Pantagruel,

I think mind-dependence is misleading. Neither pure subjectivity nor pure objectivity can be conceived in isolation

Interesting: I am not quite following, but let me try to respond. What we know of immediatelly is subjectivity, and an ‘object’ in the sense of something tangible or mind-independent is only found from abstract reasoning about the subjectivity. So I would say, prima facie to your point here, that we can actually conceive of a world which is pure subjectivity in the sense that there are no mind-independent objects other than the universal mind itself.

"the unity of the I does not come before that of the object, but rather is constituted only through it."

I am not sure if I understood this correctly, but I would say that the ‘objects’ in the sense of something ‘without me’ is definitely necessary for conceiving of oneself as an ‘I’; but that is to use ‘object’ differently than previously mentioned.

The universe is dynamic, dynamism requires energy, and energy is the result of a tension between opposites.

Are you saying that the universe is fundamentally energy? Is universe synonymous, to you, with reality?

The quality of quantity; quantities of qualities.

What is a ‘quality of a quantity’? That doesn’t seem possible to me. The latter makes sense, as we could give a quantitative estimate of something fundamentally non-quantitative.

Hello chiknsld,

I have been waiting my entire life for a simple tool like chatgpt...my entire life.

(:

I believe that is what I was trying to tell you, but I know that you will probably understand it better if it comes from another source right? ...hehe

I appreciate you sharing this with me, and I will address it as adequately as I can in a moment; but I wanted to disclaim that appeals to authority do not matter to me (in this context at least): if you demonstrate your point and I find it correct then I will gladly concede. I trust your points just as much as ChatGPT (;

Firstly, your quote from ChatGPT clearly concedes that it is not invalid but, rather, adds confusion (which I agree with):

It first says this:

Applying double negation in the way described does not align with the standard form of modus tollens and, in fact, changes the logical rule being used. Modus tollens is a valid form of inference, but it should not involve double negation in the manner shown in the argument.

But…:

In conclusion, the original argument you presented without double negation was valid modus tollens, but the modified version with double negation deviates from the standard form and may cause confusion or misunderstandings.

The point that I got from ChatGPT, and correct me if I am wrong, is that one cannot say they are merely using modus tollens if they also used double negation; for some logicians accept one but not the other. If one accepts double negation, then my argument clearly results in modus tollens. If they don’t accept it, then it won’t be modus tollens they are disagreeing with but, rather, my use of double negation to get to modus tollens. If that is what you are noting, then you are absolutely right.

I am going to modify my OP -> P2 to simply not use double negation, and it is now in its traditional form.

Minimally, to be a subject is to be a subject "of" something. I am a subject of perceptions, of ideas, of feelings. So while the "ordering principle" of objectivity is subjective (Kant) knowledge of objectivity arises with experience. Hence, the "synthetic a priori" which yokes the two.

For me, any attempt to conceptualize a pure subjectivity falls into the black hole of idealistic-solipsism. Everything that I "am" is in "relation to...." and anything that I stand in relation to must be other than what I am. This seems fairly self-evident (to me). Similarly, for objectivity, something is an object "for a subject".

Ontologically, I am speculating that perhaps the most fundamental characterization of reality is that of subjective and objective. We literally cannot think what a universe minus subjectivity would be because that would be a universe minus thought, which cannot be thought. Even if we tried to imagine it, that would still be an imagined universe. It is a variety of panpsychism for sure.

Reading your work is always a delight! Unique thinkers are what we need and I enjoy mulling over your work. With your initial definitions, I'm going to present a couple of potential questions and potential issues I see, but feel free to amend your definitions as we go into detail.

P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality — Bob Ross

Lets say I have 1 apple. The oneness denotes a quantity, but if I remove the 1 and just say, "apple", is this a quality? If so, then we can combine the quantitative and qualitative. If not, then what is "apple" in a non-quantitative sense?

Next, lets disregard whether "apple" is a quality or quantity, and just say I have 1 apple. I quantitatively add another apple to a "pile". What is a "pile"? Is that quantitative or qualitative? I could also call them a "pair" of apples now. Is the word pair quantitative or qualitative now? It seems to have the quality of "grouping", but the quantity of two.

Lets add one more apple to make 3 apples. Now I have a "few" apples? "Few" generally means more than 1 but not too many, or not a "lot". Is "few" a quantity, or a quality?

Finally, let us now add in the quality of "red". I add two red apples together. In my quantitative process did I not also produce the quality of 2 "red"? This refers back to my first point, so I'll let you answer before I continue with other thoughts.

My own common-sense, naive view prohibits me from following along with any of these arguments. I become stuck on what I find to be an unresolvable problems: the adjectives used here to describe the world— mind-dependent and qualitative—cannot be applied to anything in particular. If I were to apply them to anything in particular I’d have to find and point to things independent of my mind in order to do so.

What I mean is, If I were to ask the idealist to show me a mind-dependent and qualitative apple, and then observe his immediate actions, he could neither find nor produce one unless he went to a place where his mind was clearly absent, like the inside of a fridge or the fruit bowl in the kitchen. He’d need to go to places independent of his mind and find apples in order to prove their mind-dependence, which to me is contradictory.

So the very act of finding qualitative and mind-dependent objects proves their mind-independence, according to my common sense view. Ask the idealist to point to a mind-dependent sun, for instance. Why does he point away from his mind and towards something else? Is mind up there too, then? Doesn’t the fact that idealist points away from his mind and towards something else betray his own argument?

Since you said you agree that the world is mind-dependent, what do you think that entails or implies? — Bob Ross

I think it's a metaphysical statement - a way of thinking about things or a point of view - not a fact. I like the way @Janus said it in a different discussion - It's a catalyst for new ideas and feelings. In a sense I think it's a meta-metaphysical statement. It demonstrates that our fundamental understanding of reality is human, I guess you would say subjective. That tells us not to be too arrogant about how universal our beliefs are.

I would say that objective reality is a mind-at-large, and our conscious experience is a survival-based dashboard of experience of mental events. Since you said you agree that the world is mind-dependent, what do you think that entails or implies? — Bob Ross

Is this some sort of Analytic Idealism?

Doesn’t the fact that idealist points away from his mind and towards something else betray his own argument? — NOS4A2

Idealism doesn't necessitate the belief that the world is wholly "in one's mind". For example Kastrup (and to a degree Schopenhauer's) ontological idealism necessitates the world is mental process "all the way down". Thus, objects are the appearance, and mental process the reality. This is a bit different than say, Kantian Idealism which posits an epistemological idealism whereby there's no direct knowledge of the objects/world, only the appearance as shaped by cognitive faculties. The world "in itself" would be an "undefined error" (like 1/0). The presumption is, if there are not things like time/space/qualities/shape/quantities, etc. what is the world? It would seem that those categories necessitate (or at least are defined by) immediate experience or abstracted observation and reflection.

Thus there is not a denial of a "there" there in terms of the outside, by many idealist approaches to metaphysics and epistemology. The one that comes closest to the idea that there is absoutely no "there" there, is Berekely's Subjective Idealism. However, not all idealisms are the same. The things they have in common is the belief that the nature of reality can never really be extricated from mentality. It either has to have a subject to (metaphorically and literally) "take shape", or reality in some way, is comprised itself of mentality in its very nature.

I get the explanation, but my naive and common-sense understanding of the world prohibits me from following the arguments. I don’t know if I lack the brain power, or what, but I am unable to afford any reality to any one of the objects, substances, and things in their ontology. It may not be the case that they are arguing that world is wholly in their mind, but every object or substance they claim constitutes reality cannot be found anywhere else, which is suspiciously convenient.

It may not be the case that they are arguing that world is wholly in their mind, but every object or substance they claim constitutes reality cannot be found anywhere else, which is suspiciously convenient. — NOS4A2

I think you overshot their arguments and went right to incredulity. Implicitly direct realism presumes animals like humans have a god-like (near) perfect view of reality. Too many problems arise from this.

I think you overshot their arguments and went right to incredulity. Implicitly direct realism presumes animals like humans have a god-like (near) perfect view of reality. Too many problems arise from this.

I've read their arguments but they cannot show me a single mind-dependent object. Hence my incredulity. Are you able to point to one without pointing to your own forehead?

A better explanation for me is that the idealist holds a naive view of his own biology (he cannot see his optical nerve, for instance), and so assumes that the observable parameters of biological arrangements cannot explain mental phenomenon.

I've read their arguments but they cannot show me a single mind-dependent object. Hence my incredulity. Are you able to point to one without pointing to your own forehead?

A better explanation for me is that the idealist holds a naive view of his own biology (he cannot see his optical nerve, for instance), and so assumes that the observable parameters of biological arrangements cannot explain mental phenomenon. — NOS4A2

Your response indicates to me you might not get the idealist arguments then. The “mind-dependent object” is everything the mind is comprehending. No object is not comprehended otherwise a contradiction, this there isn’t anything that is not mind-dependent.

I do not get them, and I don’t know how one could. If mind-dependent objects are everything the mind is comprehending, then it is comprehending itself. It’s too circular for my own tastes. It perpetually raises the question: what is it the mind is comprehending? Again, no one could produce such an object.