Anti-natalism fulfils the first two better than any other policy. — unenlightened

True, but they weren't intended as targets, more measures.

I think perhaps one might better distinguish first violent from non-violent, and individual from national responses. — unenlightened

OK. But level of violence matters right? I mean I'm all in favour of the fact the governments need to be scared of their populace, there needs to at least be a credible threat of violence, but some bottles and bricks usually does the job. There's a very wide gap between a Molotov cocktail and a fleet of Hellfire-laden drones.

Though both are violent, I think the Molotov cocktail is closer to Gandhi than it is to the Hellfire.

As far as individual and national responses, in most cases, a national response is a request (demand in Ukraine's case) for individuals to act. Seeing it otherwise is how wars are sanitised. The national authority moves wooden pieces around on the map. The individual has his leg blown to bloody shreds by a land mine.

we have a prejudice in favor of situations where we perceive ourselves as free to act, or, better, that we filter out predictions that we interpret as curtailing our freedom to act. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I think that's right. It's a good way to express it. I think they system is designed to produce actions that minimise surprise, so everything is couched in terms action, that makes stories in which the action is determinate easier to model.

Maybe you're right that we prefer the one we think we understand to the one we're clueless about.

But I still think there's some prejudice for perceived agency, and maybe it's just that people think "poverty doesn't take my freedom" because they don't understand it. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think the two are opposed. We don't really understand lack of agency because it's not something we tend to make narratives for, because our narrative explain, predict and produce action.

But here there's obviously other elements at play. It's not so hard to see how poverty is more of a threat than political oppression, not is it so hard to see how not having enough money to pay for healthcare is as completely out of your control as having a riot policeman block your protest route. It's not intuitive perhaps, it's not our preferred narrative, but it's not out of reach either.

So we're looking for political and social reasons why people are so resistant to the idea in this instance. And when looking for political reasons, it makes sense to start with the group who make most money out of the situation. Here, that's arms traders and the 'reconstruction' industries, much as it was in Iraq.

I don't want to relitigate the wisdom or necessity of lockdowns — Srap Tasmaner

Ha! feels like that would be a walk in the park now compared to vitriol on this thread.

the deep resistance some people felt, the revulsion for having their freedom curtailed, was accompanied by this message that they had much less agency than they wanted to believe, that if they went about their regular lives they would get sick and make others sick and it would just happen, not up to you, not a matter of choice. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I think that's true. One of the triggers for anxiety disorders is loss of agency (you see a disproportionate amount centred around invisible things like germs, where there's no simple ability to identify the threat and remove it). Part of rejecting agency-less narratives might be a defence mechanism against that. Sometimes I think people with anxiety disorders have just admitted a truth that the rest of us are too scared to admit.

we know current score for Russia, Ukraine and, say, Belarus, and we know current scores for countries which are no longer in Russian sphere of influence. The difference in HFI is rather significant, which might motivate Ukrainians to leave it. — Jabberwock

Yes, we already agree that being less Russia-like yields an improvement on the HFI, I'm not sure why you're going down this path at all. No one is confused as to why Ukraine wants to be outside of Russia's sphere of influence.

The discussion is about the price it is worth paying relative to the likely degree of success in that venture. Ukraine will unlikely get as far as the Baltic states because it will have crippling debts which are themselves authoritarian, far more in debt than the Baltic states ever were, they have mega-companies like Black Rock involved now which was simply not an issue in the late 20th century, the power of these multinationals to control policy is exponentially higher than it was then, they're entering a fractured Europe in runaway recession cycles desperate for cheap labour and manufacturing facilities, and they're starting from a position of being a lot more Russia-like in the first place. Add to that a strong right-wing nationalist sentiment, the region's biggest black market in illegal arms recently flooded with untraceable weapons, virtually zero intact infrastructure, and some of the most important exports in the world up for grabs for whoever controls that economy...

Oh, and most of those Baltic states rank higher on the HFI than the US. So we should keep Ukraine out of the US's sphere of influence too, yes?

The difference is that at least some of the area might be deoccupied (and some already were), while your 'leaving them' would likely end in occupation of the whole Ukraine (and we have no idea when it might end). — Jabberwock

'Might' and 'Likely' are doing all the work there. some area's might be de-occupied, or more areas might be occupied. It might result in the whole of Ukraine being occupied, but might not. all you're expressing is that there's uncertainty. It doesn't support your argument.

As I've said before, these arguments are asymmetric because no one wants war. therefore to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance, to argue for war you have to show there's no reasonable alternative. they don't have an equal burden of proof because war is utterly horrific and we avoid it at all costs, anyone advocating it needs to show that those other options are ruled out. I don't need to show that war wouldn't work to advocate peaceful resolution, because it's what we'd prefer anyway.

The issue is that non-violent means, negotiations and agreement were already tried and they did not work. — Jabberwock

So never again? That's it for negotiations the world over now? It's just war? Funny how "we tried negotiations" get trotted out in defence of warmongering, but "we tried war" never does.

I've already provided you with the historical assessment. War has not worked. It has not yielded victory in the timescale which is usually decisive.

So you believe trade deficit is equally hurtful for major exporters and minor exporters? You believe month to month is a better indicator of export rise than year to year or 5Y to 5Y? — Jabberwock

I believe that there exist a wide range of indicators of economic strength, some of which I've cited. there's a reason why sites like tradingeconomics offer those metrics. Russian exports are picking up. that's indicative of a recovery. It was you who mentioned trade deficit. I've cited the figures we actually have that are closest to the measure you said were indicative of Russia's economic state, that's why they're directly underneath quotes from you. those are the measures you picked. If you now want to back track because you don't like the results, then pick some others.

Climate is less interesting because experts don't really disagree. — Isaac

Depends on what part. What, if anything, can/should be done is less clear.

Yes, we already agree that being less Russia-like yields an improvement on the HFI, I'm not sure why you're going down this path at all. No one is confused as to why Ukraine wants to be outside of Russia's sphere of influence.

The discussion is about the price it is worth paying relative to the likely degree of success in that venture. Ukraine will unlikely get as far as the Baltic states because it will have crippling debts which are themselves authoritarian, far more in debt than the Baltic states ever were, they have mega-companies like Black Rock involved now which was simply not an issue in the late 20th century, the power of these multinationals to control policy is exponentially higher than it was then, they're entering a fractured Europe in runaway recession cycles desperate for cheap labour and manufacturing facilities, and they're starting from a position of being a lot more Russia-like in the first place. Add to that a strong right-wing nationalist sentiment, the region's biggest black market in illegal arms recently flooded with untraceable weapons, virtually zero intact infrastructure, and some of the most important exports in the world up for grabs for whoever controls that economy... — Isaac

Poland had a substantial debt to the Western countries and then to IMF which was to large extent cancelled and restructured and yet it has much higher HFI than Russia. But if you belive that IMF cripples freddom, could you provide specific data how the IMF impacts the HFI?

Also, your whole thesis was that HFI can turn around just like that in a few years and we do not have to look at the internal factors at all, as shifts in the single chart are sufficient to support that thesis. So your claim was that Ukraine under Russian oppresion could easily increase its HFI in a relatively short period of time. When I have pointed out the internal factors in Russia, such as political oppression, which might prevent that, you simply dismissed them. And now you are saying Ukraine cannot improve its HFI, citing economic oppression AND internal factors, which are suddenly important.

Are you even serious?

Oh, and most of those Baltic states rank higher on the HFI than the US. So we should keep Ukraine out of the US's sphere of influence too, yes? — Isaac

So the countries in the US sphere of influence are perfectly capable of reaching HFIs so high that they outperform even the US... How does constitute an argument that Ukraine should not join them? I think you need to work on that argument a bit.

'Might' and 'Likely' are doing all the work there. some area's might be de-occupied, or more areas might be occupied. It might result in the whole of Ukraine being occupied, but might not. all you're expressing is that there's uncertainty. It doesn't support your argument. — Isaac

My support is that for the last year Russia has made very minor gains, while Ukraine had major gains. Ukraine has liberated half of the territory that Russia grabbed since 2022.

As I've said before, these arguments are asymmetric because no one wants war. therefore to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance, to argue for war you have to show there's no reasonable alternative. they don't have an equal burden of proof because war is utterly horrific and we avoid it at all costs, anyone advocating it needs to show that those other options are ruled out. I don't need to show that war wouldn't work to advocate peaceful resolution, because it's what we'd prefer anyway. — Isaac

I completely agree. To argue for peace you have to show there is a reasonable chance for an alternative. The very issue is that you refuse to do so.

So never again? That's it for negotiations the world over now? It's just war? Funny how "we tried negotiations" get trotted out in defence of warmongering, but "we tried war" never does.

I've already provided you with the historical assessment. War has not worked. It has not yielded victory in the timescale which is usually decisive. — Isaac

No, just crap negotiations are over, which you yourself acknowledge Minsk 1 and 2 were. As you said, we would have to do better. I do not how we are supposed to do that. You know, but will not tell.

I believe that there exist a wide range of indicators of economic strength, some of which I've cited. there's a reason why sites like tradingeconomics offer those metrics. Russian exports are picking up. that's indicative of a recovery. It was you who mentioned trade deficit. I've cited the figures we actually have that are closest to the measure you said were indicative of Russia's economic state, that's why they're directly underneath quotes from you. those are the measures you picked. If you now want to back track because you don't like the results, then pick some others. — Isaac

On the chart you have provided Russian exports are 'picking up' month to month, which means that they might have a good sale or two in one month (especially if the previous one was rather poor), but it is not indicator of recovery for the longer run. If you look at the 1Y, 5Y or 10Y graph, it always has smaller ups and downs (for every country), which is not indicative of the long-term trend. Yes, I might sound like a teacher now, but it is REALLY basic stuff. So I do like the results, that is why I gave them - they confirm what I wrote. I did not realize someone might have a problem with reading them though.

The fact is that Russian exports are overall lower than before the war and last year. This (and the trade deficit) is very impactful for the country which had 50% of its budget income financed directly from the said exports AND the country which had budget expenses increased by 40% since last year. Comparing that to the US is comparing apples and oranges. But sure, I might be wrong, if you can explain how the country that has apparently income at least 25% lower and expenses 40% higher year to year (or in any reasonable longer period) is doing great, I am all ears. You can also explain how a country that depends on the imports for a significant portion of its war effort can finance increased military spending when its currency is tumbling down. You might also tell me why Russia has classified most of its economic indicators, if it is doing well.

if you belive that IMF cripples freddom, could you provide specific data how the IMF impacts the HFI? — Jabberwock

Again, I'm not the best person to learn this from, there are far better resources online, unless you seriously think there isn't even an argument in that respect, then a few online resources aren't going to help.

When I have pointed out the internal factors in Russia, such as political oppression, which might prevent that, you simply dismissed them. And now you are saying Ukraine cannot improve its HFI, citing economic oppression AND internal factors, which are suddenly important.

Are you even serious? — Jabberwock

Quite serious yes. The former were historical figures, the net result of which were already included in the summary data, the latter are predictions about future effects, they obviously require consideration of factors.

If you want to bring in estimates for Russian occupied Donbas over the next 10 years, you'll have to explain why you're rejecting the data from Russian occupied Crimea, which provides what would seem to be an almost perfect data set for that prediction.

the countries in the US sphere of influence are perfectly capable of reaching HFIs so high that they outperform even the US... How does constitute an argument that Ukraine should not join them? — Jabberwock

You're suggesting that the US's net influence is to make other countries better than it can even manage of itself? Is the theory that it nobly sacrifices it's own people's freedoms to help improve those under it's sheltering wing?

I though this thread had reached a peak of US bootlicking sycophancy, but turns out there's whole new levels I hadn't expected.

My support is that for the last year Russia has made very minor gains, while Ukraine had major gains. Ukraine has liberated half of the territory that Russia grabbed since 2022. — Jabberwock

I assume the experts considering the situation have probably taken that into account. But if you think not... I've been taking my latest understanding of the situation from Samual Charap's excellent article in Foreign Affairs. He can be contacted at Samuel_Charapatranddotorg, I suggest you drop him a line and let him know he's missed something. I'm sure he'll be very grateful.

To argue for peace you have to show there is a reasonable chance for an alternative. The very issue is that you refuse to do so. — Jabberwock

Of course I refuse to do it. I also refuse to argue in favour of the many worlds interpretation of quantum physics. I refuse to argue for my own pet theory of economics, or some idea I had about how the digestive system of the bat might work... I'm not qualified to do so. I do, however, have preferred experts I turn to, and I'm more than happy to talk about and defend my choices there (something we're all experts on), I'm happy to talk about the ideology that guides those choices, even the epistemological commitments which frame that choice. What I'm not prepared to do is pretend that me pitting what my sources say against you paraphrasing what your sources say is going to actually yield anything other than two shoddy summaries of writing which is freely available in full, unadulterated form online.

No, just crap negotiations are over, which you yourself acknowledge Minsk 1 and 2 were. As you said, we would have to do better. I do not how we are supposed to do that. You know, but will not tell. — Jabberwock

I've linked the article on the factors which lead to strong armistices. That you didn't read it is not something I'm equipped to help with.

On the chart you have provided Russian exports are 'picking up' month to month, which means that they might have a good sale or two in one month (especially if the previous one was rather poor), but it is not indicator of recovery for the longer run. If you look at the 1Y, 5Y or 10Y graph, it always has smaller ups and downs (for every country), which is not indicative of the long-term trend. — Jabberwock

And? The 5yr graph shows a small drop to 2018 levels after what was an unprecedented high. The drop id less than that experienced by the US for example late 2020. So where's this economic collapse you're suggesting?

The fact is that Russian exports are overall lower than before the war and last year. — Jabberwock

As above. They're no lower than 2018 - it's on the chart. You know people can see these charts, right?

if you can explain how the country that has apparently income at least 25% lower and expenses 40% higher year to year (or in any reasonable longer period) is doing great, I am all ears. You can also explain how a country that depends on the imports for a significant portion of its war effort can finance increased military spending when its currency is tumbling down. You might also tell me why Russia has classified most of its economic indicators, if it is doing well. — Jabberwock

Gods! Why the fuck would I explain, I'm not an economist. You may consider yourself to be some kind of genius polymath able to wrangle with the greatest in economics, international relations, history, military strategy, and foreign affairs, but I'm afraid you've picked the wrong interlocutor for your Walter Mitty moment. Here's the articles - https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/05/07/russias-economy-is-back-on-its-feet and https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/04/23/russias-economy-can-withstand-a-long-war-but-not-a-more-intense-one ... As if you don't know how to use a search engine.

Again, I'm not the best person to learn this from, there are far better resources online, unless you seriously think there isn't even an argument in that respect, then a few online resources aren't going to help. — Isaac

I begin to see a pattern.

Quite serious yes. The former were historical figures, the net result of which were already included in the summary data, the latter are predictions about future effects, they obviously require consideration of factors.

If you want to bring in estimates for Russian occupied Donbas over the next 10 years, you'll have to explain why you're rejecting the data from Russian occupied Crimea, which provides what would seem to be an almost perfect data set for that prediction. — Isaac

No. You have made an argument that it is perfectly possible, if not likely, that occupied Ukraine will be able to increase HFI and you have repeatedly claimed that the HFI variations are absolutely sufficient to make that argument and that any external factors (such as the political situation in Russia) may be promptly dismissed.

Now you are making an argument that post-war Ukraine will NOT be able to increase its HFI, completely disregarding your previous argument and basing that prediction solely on the external factors.

Tu sum up: using just HFI is good, when it supports your argument, but should be disregarded, when it does not. On the other hand, external factors are irrelevant when they do not support your argument and essential when they do. Pretty interesting way of argumentation.

You're suggesting that the US's net influence is to make other countries better than it can even manage of itself? Is the theory that it nobly sacrifices it's own people's freedoms to help improve those under it's sheltering wing?

I though this thread had reached a peak of US bootlicking sycophancy, but turns out there's whole new levels I hadn't expected. — Isaac

No, I am just pointing out that the US influence does not seem to limit other countries' freedom. On the other hand, those who buy the theory of the U.S. oppression, must admit that Americans' oppression seems to make those countries less oppressed than Americans are themselves. Curious.

I assume the experts considering the situation have probably taken that into account. But if you think not... I've been taking my latest understanding of the situation from Samual Charap's excellent article in Foreign Affairs. He can be contacted at Samuel_Charapatranddotorg, I suggest you drop him a line and let him know he's missed something. I'm sure he'll be very grateful. — Isaac

No, i think experts considering the situation have taken different factors into account, that is why they have different opinions on the subject. I also assume that the Ukrainian command has taken into consideration even more factors, possibly even those not known to experts, when they started their counteroffensive. They could be wrong in their predictions, of course, but I doubt they were less informed than Charap.

Of course I refuse to do it. I also refuse to argue in favour of the many worlds interpretation of quantum physics. I refuse to argue for my own pet theory of economics, or some idea I had about how the digestive system of the bat might work... I'm not qualified to do so. I do, however, have preferred experts I turn to, and I'm more than happy to talk about and defend my choices there (something we're all experts on), I'm happy to talk about the ideology that guides those choices, even the epistemological commitments which frame that choice. What I'm not prepared to do is pretend that me pitting what my sources say against you paraphrasing what your sources say is going to actually yield anything other than two shoddy summaries of writing which is freely available in full, unadulterated form online. — Isaac

You have no qualms whatsoever criticizing one particular course of action, often describing it as inhumane and gladly taking a position of moral superiority, but when asked about the supposed existing reasonable alternative, you clam up. You are happy to talk about the ideology that guides choices, but only of others. You want to talk about epistemological commitments, but not yours.

I've linked the article on the factors which lead to strong armistices. That you didn't read it is not something I'm equipped to help with. — Isaac

I am not fond of creating an account to download a single article, besides the article from 2005 can apply to the current situation only in rather general terms. With those I have already agreed - yes, ceasefires can and do sometimes work. I still do not see what possible terms could be proposed to overcome this particular conflict, and you and your secret experts did nothing to help me.

And? The 5yr graph shows a small drop to 2018 levels after what was an unprecedented high. The drop id less than that experienced by the US for example late 2020. So where's this economic collapse you're suggesting? — Isaac

The trend is downward and all the factors that precipitated it are still in force, so it is reasonable to expect it will maintain that direction.

As above. They're no lower than 2018 - it's on the chart. You know people can see these charts, right? — Isaac

Yes, and the spending is much higher, by 40%.

Gods! Why the fuck would I explain, I'm not an economist. You may consider yourself to be some kind of genius polymath able to wrangle with the greatest in economics, international relations, history, military strategy, and foreign affairs, but I'm afraid you've picked the wrong interlocutor for your Walter Mitty moment — Isaac

No, I am no genius and my levels of understanding of economics, international relations, history, military strategy and foreign affairs are much lower than those of the greatest. However, I am not discussing with them, but with you, and here the proportions seem to be a bit different. And yes, it does seem that your way of shaping beliefs is just googling and running away with the first source you agree with, I just am not sure it is advisable methodology. Especially when the source you did google (i.e. the Economist) says such things about Russian economy:

The country's long-term prospects are dim, exacerbated further by unfavourable demographics.

which you do not seem to agree with. I cannot read the whole article you linked, as it is behind a paywall, but the very title says:

Russia’s economy can withstand a long war, but not a more intense one
Its defences against Western sanctions can only stretch so far

which is about what I was saying... Have you just read half of the title? Maybe google another one?

A resident of the Sumy region kept a T-80 trophy tank of the occupiers in his yard for more than a year :shrug:
The Prosecutor's Office transferred the tank to the needs of the Armed Forces. — Bratchuk Sergey · Jul 30, 2023

Probably need a driver's license for those things. :D


"According to Russia's Duma Defense Committee ..."

Vladimir Putin Putting Together Network of Private Armies All Over Russia
^{— Veuer via Dailymotion · Jul 31, 2023 · 1m:12s}

... Hmm.


The recent bombings on the Russian side of the border, including Moscow, seem unlikely to have much direct impact on the war. Though, after a year of bombing destruction killing throughout the Ukrainian side ("Sitting ducks with some repellent"), maybe it shouldn't come as a surprise. They're not using gear supplied directly by NATO members, and are reportedly working with Rheinmetall, Baykar, and others to set up production in Ukraine. Ukraine → Moscow is a fair distance (say, ≈ 850 km). Were the drones launched closer by? What were they (e.g. "homemade", snagged Iranian drones, something else)?

Elon Musk refused Ukraine's request for Starlink that would help it attack Russian ships with exploding sea drones, report says
^{— Sinéad Baker · Business Insider · Jul 31, 2023}

I begin to see a pattern. — Jabberwock

Good.

any external factors (such as the political situation in Russia) may be promptly dismissed. — Jabberwock

They are not external. They are in the HFI measurements.

Now you are making an argument that post-war Ukraine will NOT be able to increase its HFI, completely disregarding your previous argument and basing that prediction solely on the external factors. — Jabberwock

Degree of indebtedness is an external factor, as is predatory contracting by monopolies. Those are not already measured by the HFI, but rather are theorised to be potential causes of those measures.

For example, political arrests is a measure, IMF control might cause a measure to change (or not). One is already measured, the other isn't.

I am just pointing out that the US influence does not seem to limit other countries' freedom. — Jabberwock

All you have is the sum total, it doesn't tell you which factors pushed in which direction, only what the end result of those factors put together was.

Given that the US cannot even achieve a high HFI itself, it's unlikely that US influence was a positive factor.

Given, further, what we know about US's predatory trade, privatisation, and monopolising practices, it's most likely to have be a negative factor, simply overcome by more positive ones (such as the very profitable new trading opportunities opened up by no longer being in the soviet bloc).

No, i think experts considering the situation have taken different factors into account, that is why they have different opinions on the subject. — Jabberwock

Really? So you genuinely think Samual Charap, in researching his position for RAND just didn't think of looking to see what gains Ukraine had made when assessing how likely he considered further gains to be. Slipped his mind, perhaps? Again, if you think you've come up with some important factors to consider that he's missed he'd be delighted to hear from you, It's his job, after all, to make accurate predictions about these things. You'd be saving him face.

I also assume that the Ukrainian command has taken into consideration even more factors, possibly even those not known to experts, when they started their counteroffensive. — Jabberwock

No doubt, but having different political objectives means that a) we've no way of deriving their data from their subsequent actions, and b) they wouldn't tell us the truth unless it suited those objectives to do so.

So as a source for how well Ukraine are likely to do, Ukrainian generals are worse than useless.

You have no qualms whatsoever criticizing one particular course of action, often describing it as inhumane and gladly taking a position of moral superiority, — Jabberwock

That's right. We all are equals when it comes to discussing morality, there's no body of expertise to call on, it's a good topic for lay discussion.

when asked about the supposed existing reasonable alternative, you clam up. — Jabberwock

Exactly. If you seriously think there's no alternative then I can't help you. You can't expect to conduct a conversation on a topic like this one so woefully ill-informed. So read a little around the topic first. Having done that you will have become aware of the alternative opinions. Once aware of them, there's no need for me to point them out, simply say why you don't find their position convincing. Don't let's go through this rhetorical charade first.

If you know what the alternative opinions are, then address them directly. If you don't then I suggest you read more widely before engaging in such a complex topic as this with such strong views as you espouse.

You are happy to talk about the ideology that guides choices, but only of others. You want to talk about epistemological commitments, but not yours. — Jabberwock

Nope, more than happy to answer any questions or challenges regarding my ideology or epistemological commitments. Fire away.

ceasefires can and do sometimes work. I still do not see what possible terms could be proposed to overcome this particular conflict, and you and your secret experts did nothing to help me. — Jabberwock

The article I provided was a review of the book, I thought you might be able to access that. I'm not a miracle worker, I cannot provide both sources and somehow also give you academic access to them. I'm no fan of the way academic papers restrict viewing access to institutions, but that's the situation we are in. If you can't access the sources I use and don't trust me to summarize them accurately we are at an impasse.

This is the review summary, in lieu of mine...

the book argues along functionalist lines that cease-fires are most likely, and strongest when ex ante prospects for enduring peace are the most dim. To examine the plausibility of the Realist critique, Fortna first estimates the overall baseline prospects for the duration of peace with situational factors, using sophisticated hazard rate estimation. The next chapter shows in a very ingenious and insightful analysis that agreement strength goes up when the baseline difficulty of maintaining peace increases. (The United States are shown to prefer systematically stronger agreements. This should serve to bolster Fortna’s claims, since if any country enjoyed a favorable balance of power with its enemies, and therefore would be least likely according to Realist logic to require a strong agreement, it should be the
US.)
Detailed case studies of the Israeli–Syrian and Indian–Pakistani conflicts allow Fortna to argue forcefully and persuasively that cease-fires agreements are most likely when the baselines prospects for enduring peace are poor.

Fortna persuasively argues that agreements do increase the prospects for an enduring peace. Loosely speaking, the risk of renewed conflict in case of a moderately strong agreement is about one-third the risk of a renewed conflict after a weak agreement. Strong agreements produce about one-seventh the risk of failure of a weak agreement. The components of cease-fire agreements that are particularly effective in promoting the durability of peace are found to be withdrawal beyond the status quo ante, demilitarized zones, explicit third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, joint commissions for dispute resolution, and a clear and precise specification of the case-fire terms

It's quite clear on the matter. But I'm not going to be drawn into this make-believe notion that this is about weighing the evidence, I already regret the five minutes it took me to find and format those quotes from the PDF, as if evidence was going to have any effect.

The trend is downward and all the factors that precipitated it are still in force, so it is reasonable to expect it will maintain that direction. — Jabberwock

As it is with both the US and Europe. This is a comparative exercise. But again, if you don't think it's a reasonable conclusion take it up with the experts who conclude it, don't argue with me about it, I didn't work this stuff out myself by pouring over source economic data, why the hell would I when there are experts who are much better informed than I am who do that for me?

Ukraine would be on near-total economic and military life support from the West, which will eventually cause budgetary challenges for Western countries and readiness problems for their militaries. The global economic fallout of the war, including the volatility in grain and energy prices, would persist. The United States would be unable to focus its resources on other priorities, and Russian dependence on China would deepen. Although a long war would also further weaken Russia, that benefit does not outweigh these costs. — Charap

-

Russia’s economy can withstand a long war, but not a more intense one
Its defences against Western sanctions can only stretch so far


which is about what I was saying... — Jabberwock

It's the opposite of what you are saying. You said...

I did not say it will be short and decisive. — Jabberwock

It would be sufficient to maintain a simmering conflict, — Jabberwock

I have ackhowledged that the hostilities might simmer for a long time. — Jabberwock

We agreed that history tells us that wars of this nature are likely to persists for decades (a 'long' war), the kind of war the article says "Russia's economy can withstand". That's why I cited the article.

They are not external. They are in the HFI measurements. — Isaac

Your argument was that HFI can move significantly and positively without consideration of any particular factors (as they could be offset by other factors), therefore we are unable to predict whether it will not bounce when Ukraine is occupied by Russia. Do you retract that argument?

All you have is the sum total, it doesn't tell you which factors pushed in which direction, only what the end result of those factors put together was.

Given that the US cannot even achieve a high HFI itself, it's unlikely that US influence was a positive factor.

Given, further, what we know about US's predatory trade, privatisation, and monopolising practices, it's most likely to have be a negative factor, simply overcome by more positive ones (such as the very profitable new trading opportunities opened up by no longer being in the soviet bloc). — Isaac

The bottom line, however, is that the countries in the US sphere of influence are much less oppressed, according to the HFI, therefore we should expect that Ukraine will also be much less oppressed, when it joints them. There is no point citing debts, trade etc., because they are already included in the HFI. All the negative factors will be overcome by the greater positive factors, also included in the HFI.

Exactly. If you seriously think there's no alternative then I can't help you. You can't expect to conduct a conversation on a topic like this one so woefully ill-informed. So read a little around the topic first. Having done that you will have become aware of the alternative opinions. Once aware of them, there's no need for me to point them out, simply say why you don't find their position convincing. Don't let's go through this rhetorical charade first.

If you know what the alternative opinions are, then address them directly. If you don't then I suggest you read more widely before engaging in such a complex topic as this with such strong views as you espouse. — Isaac

I think you have pushed the expectations on conducting the conversation on this topic woefully ill-informed quite significantly.

I must remind you that you wrote that 'to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance'. You did not, on the contrary, you specifically refuse to do so. Saying 'look it up on the Internet' is not 'showing the alternative' under any reasonable interpretation. And given your tendency to drag in any googled random piece of information to support your claims, it would be somewhat odd if you knew the alternative and refused to share it for mysterious reasons. Thus the quite reasonable conclusion is that you do not know any such alternative, which is additionally supported by the fact you have entered this discussion claiming that you do not have to provide it. At least I have managed to change your mind on that, success, yay.

It's quite clear on the matter. But I'm not going to be drawn into this make-believe notion that this is about weighing the evidence, I already regret the five minutes it took me to find and format those quotes from the PDF, as if evidence was going to have any effect. — Isaac

But I agree with your source! Yes, those are quite strong factors to achieve peace. The issue I see is that you have not given any explanation how those factors could be applied in this particular case (and failed to provide sources that do). For example, the first point mentioned is withdrawal beyond the status quo ante. Which of your experts says Russia is likely to peacefully withdraw beyond pre-2014 borders, leaving Crimea, Donbas and all other annexed oblasts which are supposedly now part of Russia according to its constitution?

As it is with both the US and Europe. This is a comparative exercise. But again, if you don't think it's a reasonable conclusion take it up with the experts who conclude it, don't argue with me about it, I didn't work this stuff out myself by pouring over source economic data, why the hell would I when there are experts who are much better informed than I am who do that for me? — Isaac

My experts say that the US is spending 0.50% of its annual budget on military help for Ukraine (0.25% for other help). That exact same amount constitutes 15% of the Russian annual budget. My experts say that it is a greater burden for Russia. Do your experts disagree?

It's the opposite of what you are saying. You said... — Isaac

The Economist says Russia will be able to maintain a conflict of much lower intensity and I said that it will be able to maintain a simmering conflict. How is that opposlte?

We agreed that history tells us that wars of this nature are likely to persists for decades (a 'long' war), the kind of war the article says "Russia's economy can withstand". That's why I cited the article. — Isaac

Yes, and I have already argued that low-intensity (i.e. simmering) conflict will not allow Russia to prevent Ukraine leaving its sphere of influence.

Your argument was that HFI can move significantly and positively without consideration of any particular factors — Jabberwock

No. It wasn't. Please, if you're going to continue to try this "you argued that..." line of discussion (which frankly I'd rather you didn't), at least use the quote function to dispute what I've actually said, not what you'd like me to have said.

If you don't understand an aspect of my argument, then ask. Ask sarcastically if you like, but simply asserting I said something and then arguing against it isn't a discussion, I might as well not be here you can just do both parts.

The bottom line, however, is that the countries in the US sphere of influence are much less oppressed, according to the HFI, therefore we should expect that Ukraine will also be much less oppressed, when it joints them. — Jabberwock

It's not going to 'join them'. The 'them' you're referring to are 'countries recently freed from Soviet restrictions on trade and governance, entering a buoyant European economy with functioning, if underinvested infrastructure and a few billion in debts'. That is not the group Ukraine are proposing to join.

to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance'. You did not, on the contrary, you specifically refuse to do so. — Jabberwock

That a qualified expert in the field thinks peaceful solutions are possible is an argument in favour of peaceful solutions. It is, in fact, just about the strongest argument possible here, and not one I should even be engaged in among the relatively well informed.

You've stretched out to like ten pages of posts what should have taken half a paragraph. "Yes, its possible that peaceful negotiations might work because clearly some experts consider that to be the case... Here's why I think we shouldn't pursue that option nonetheless..." That's the discussion we should have been having. Not this truly bizarre exchange where you half pretend there's no expert disagreement, then half pretend there is, but your spectacular mental kung fu can work out who's right, if only some complete layman could summarise the argument for you.

the quite reasonable conclusion is that you do not know any such alternative — Jabberwock

This despite me citing those sources...?

withdrawal beyond the status quo ante. Which of your experts says Russia is likely to peacefully withdraw beyond pre-2014 borders, leaving Crimea, Donbas and all other annexed oblasts — Jabberwock

None. That criteria is unlikely to be met. Fortna is not suggesting that every single criteria need be met. Status quo ante bellum solutions are usually cited as plausible in cases of mutually disputed territory, so as Fortna puts it "neither side loses". This is clearly not an option here, but as is clear from the thesis, it's not that all factors need be present.

But again, this paper is cited, by Anatol Lieven at Quincy, if I recall correctly. If you think its inappropriate, then take it up with him. I'm just letting you know what the arguments are, since you asked. If you think you have the grasp and experience in this field to take them down, then you crack on, but I'm not the man you need to be going after.

My experts say that the US is spending 0.50% of its annual budget on military help for Ukraine (0.25% for other help). That exact same amount constitutes 15% of the Russian annual budget. My experts say that it is a greater burden for Russia. Do your experts disagree? — Jabberwock

No. I cited what my expert said.

that benefit [Russia's economic fragility] does not outweigh these costs [Europe's and America's]. — Charap

As I've pointed out before, your error appears to be looking at only one side and concluding what is actually a relative account from there.

The Economist says Russia will be able to maintain a conflict of much lower intensity and I said that it will be able to maintain a simmering conflict. How is that opposlte? — Jabberwock

Because your argument is about how Russia's economy will be damaged more than the West's such that it will be unable to keep up the artillery supply that the West could. If you're now saying that Russia's economy will survive a low intensity simmering war, then you have no grounds for your argument that...

low-intensity (i.e. simmering) conflict will not allow Russia to prevent Ukraine leaving its sphere of influence. — Jabberwock

...as that argument was based on deteriorating Russia's military capability which in turn was based on collapsing it's economy. This is all quite clearly detailed in the thread if you read back a few posts...

Remind me how decades of war gets them any more freedom, any more 'sovereignty'. Just your wild and unsubstantiated hope that somehow Russia will run out of artillery first? — Isaac


Well, at least we see Russia is running out of artillery, although slowly — Jabberwock

It needs to be sustained at the level higher than Russia, which hurts economically much more. — Jabberwock

what matters is their ability to replenish, and as the historical data I've presented shows, that ability is usually sufficient to maintain war for decades. That Russia will be the exception for some reason is wishful thinking. — Isaac


It would be sufficient to maintain a simmering conflict — Jabberwock

the main point is depleting Russia's potential to the point when it is no longer capable of threatening Ukraine. — Jabberwock

If, as you now agree, the war is likely to simmer for a long time, and, as you now agree, the Russian economy can quite easily sustain such a war, then on what grounds are you now supporting an argument that continued war will deplete Russia's military capabilities quicker than Ukraine's?

No. It wasn't. Please, if you're going to continue to try thus "you argued that..." line of discussion (which frankly I'd rather you didn't), at least use the quote function to dispute what I've actually said, not what you'd like me to have said.

If you don't understand an aspect of my argument, then ask. Ask sarcastically if you must, but simply asserting I said something and then arguing against it isn't a discussion, I might as well not be here you can just do both parts. — Isaac

That was your claim:

The simple fact is that, by some measures of freedom, it is perfectly possible for a nation to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now in the space of eight years. — Isaac

Additionally, you have flatly refused to consider aspects of the current Russian situation that would counter that claim, arguing that they are irrelevant, because HFI includes everything. Is that correct?

It's not going to 'join them'. The 'them' you're referring to are 'countries recently freed from Soviet restrictions on trade and governance, entering a buoyant European economy with functioning, if underinvested infrastructure and a few billion in debts'. That is not the group Ukraine are proposing to join. — Isaac

You have claimed that Ukraine was like Russia, because they had similar HFI, specifically refusing to consider their obvious differences, different paths they have taken and their history in general. You have specifically claimed that all you need for your prediction are HFI shifts. In that case, I can ignore the differences between the EE countries and current Ukraine and make the exact same prediction based on the exact same support: the simple fact is that, by some measures of freedom, it is perfectly possible for a nation to get from where Russia is now to where the EE countries are now in the space of sixteen years.

That a qualified expert in the field thinks peaceful solutions are possible is an argument in favour of peaceful solutions. It is, in fact, just about the strongest argument possible here, and not one I should even be engaged in among the relatively well informed.

You've stretched out to like ten pages of posts what should have taken half a paragraph. "Yes, its possible that peaceful negotiations might work because clearly some experts consider that be the case... Here's why I think we shouldn't pursue that option nonetheless..." That's the discussion we should have been having. Not this truly bizarre exchange where you half pretend there's no expert disagreement, then half pretend there is, but your spectacular mental kung fu can work out who's right, if only some complete layman could summarise the argument for you. — Isaac

Which qualified expert and what exact solution he proposes? It would not take ten pages if each request for support of your claim (which you admit now you need) was not met by 'I do not have to give you anything but HFI' and 'I know, but I will not tell'.

This despite me citing those sources...? — Isaac

Your source from 2005 does not contain proposals concerning the situation in 2022 or 2023. I have already agreed that ceasefire based on strong foundations is a great idea. The fact that it is theoretically possible says nothing about how it is applicable to the situation at hand.

But imagine your luck! I did find what Fortna (and other notable experts) think about the current situation! So there you have it, your own source, the renowned expert, on the current situation in Ukraine in the article titled 'The prospects for a negotiated peace in Ukraine are bleak'. So even assuming she still thinks negotiations work, she has many reasons to believe (and she lists them in detail, it is worth a read) why they do not apply to this particular situation.

None. That criteria is unlikely to be met. Fortna is not suggesting that every single criteria need be met. Status quo ante bellum solutions are usually cited as plausible in cases of mutually disputed territory, so as Fortna puts it "neither side loses". This is clearly not an option here, but as is clear from the thesis, it's not that all factors need be present. — Isaac

Sure, but it seems to be pretty important in this case. Most of the other criteria were part of the Minsk accords, which you considered 'crap'. The Fortna's article given above points out exactly the very issues I have mentioned.

But again, this paper is cited, by Anatol Lieven at Quincy, if I recall correctly. If you think its inappropriate, then take it up with him. I'm just letting you know what the arguments are, since you asked. If you think you have the grasp and experience in this field to take them down, then you crack on but I'm not the man you need to be going after. — Isaac

The only source I found is this article in which he opposes demilitarization of Crimea and Donbas, saying that it would worsen the situation. But demilitarization is the second of conditions of lasting peace given by Fortna. So it would seem (to a layman) that another strong foundation for a lasting peace would be taken out.

Note also that Lleven here does not give a proposal for a peaceful solution, only warns which solutions should be avoided. The search continues.

Because your argument is about how Russia's economy will be damaged more than the West's such that it will be unable to keep up the artillery supply that the West could. If you're now saying that Russia's economy will survive a low intensity simmering war, then you have no grounds for your argument that...

...as that argument was based on deteriorating Russia's military capability which in turn was based on collapsing it's economy. This is all quite clearly detailed in the thread if you read back a few posts...

If, as you now agree, the war is likely to simmer for a long time, and, as you now agree, the Russian economy can quite easily sustain such a war, then on what grounds are you now supporting an argument that continued war will deplete Russia's military capabilities quicker than Ukraine's? — Isaac

Because being capable only of lower intensity effort means that you are not capable of sustaining the current intensity effort? I am not sure how to put it in simpler terms... If Russia will be unable to sustain the current level, then its military capability WILL deteriorate, right? I said nothing about 'collapsing', I said that Russia is in a worse state economically (i.e spends proportionally on the war much more than the West), so it cannot keep up with the current level of spending, with which the Economist agrees.

Given that Ukraine's potential now increases (at the current level of support) and Russia's potential decreases, the gap will widen. It will do so even if the support for the war from the West decreases, as long as it is still higher than what Russia will be able to spend, which is exactly what I wrote.

Well. This is a lot more extensive than the response I thought you'd left me earlier...

That was your claim:

The simple fact is that, by some measures of freedom, it is perfectly possible for a nation to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now in the space of eight years. — Isaac — Jabberwock

In which it nowhere says anything about...

without consideration of any particular factors — Jabberwock

...

you have flatly refused to consider aspects of the current Russian situation that would counter that claim, arguing that they are irrelevant, because HFI includes everything. Is that correct? — Jabberwock

No. I've just explained that above. I'll just repeat...

Degree of indebtedness is an external factor, as is predatory contracting by monopolies. Those are not already measured by the HFI, but rather are theorised to be potential causes of those measures.

For example, political arrests is a measure, IMF control might cause a measure to change (or not). One is already measured, the other isn't. — Isaac

...

Which qualified expert and what exact solution he proposes? — Jabberwock

I told you near the beginning of all this...

I've been taking my latest understanding of the situation from Samual Charap's excellent article in Foreign Affairs. — Isaac

I've been citing the article for the last four days.

The United States and its allies thus face a choice about their future strategy. They could begin to try to steer the war toward a negotiated end in the coming months. Or they could do so years from now. If they decide to wait, the fundamentals of the conflict will likely be the same, but the costs of the war—human, financial, and otherwise—will have multiplied. An effective strategy for what has become the most consequential international crisis in at least a generation therefore requires the United States and its allies to shift their focus and start facilitating an endgame. — Samuel Charap

Is there anything not clear enough there?

So even assuming she still thinks negotiations work, she has many reasons to believe (and she lists them in detail, it is worth a read) why they do not apply to this particular situation. — Jabberwock

Look up the difference between 'armistice' and 'peace deal'. Fortna is giving reasons why an actual peace deal will be difficult. Charap agrees, but is talking about an armistice.

Either way, "carry on with the war until Russia runs out of bombs" is not on either experts wish list.

If Russia will be unable to sustain the current level, then its military capability WILL deteriorate, right? — Jabberwock

Yes.

Given that Ukraine's potential now increases (at the current level of support) — Jabberwock

It doesn't. As Charap points out. And even NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s admits that “the war in Ukraine is consuming an enormous amount of munitions and depleting allied stockpiles. The current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production. This puts our defense industries under strain.”

It will do so even if the support for the war from the West decreases, as long as it is still higher than what Russia will be able to spend, which is exactly what I wrote. — Jabberwock

I know what you wrote, but it does not support your argument that war is necessary, I've given reasonable alternative interpretations.

Again, the main thing you're missing here is that war is horrible, no one with a shred of human empathy actually wants war, so to argue for it you must show it is necessary, that no other option will work. To argue for more peaceful solutions I don't have anywhere near the same burden because we prefer them anyway, I only need to show that it is possible, from there it follows that ethically we ought try it.

Simply presenting people who think war will work, or (worse) coming up with your own scenarios in which war might work is not sufficient. We don't want war because it's goddam awful. So "It could work" is woefully inadequate. "It will most likely work" still doesn't cut it. You have to show that routes to peace are actually impossible (or so unlikely as to be not worth trying). If even a single expert in the field thinks it's worth a shot, then it's worth a shot because its the option that doesn't kill tens of thousands of people.

Degree of indebtedness is an external factor, as is predatory contracting by monopolies. Those are not already measured by the HFI, but rather are theorised to be potential causes of those measures. — Isaac

It seems you are still not familiar with how EE economies were restructured ('given away to the West', as some said) after the communism.

Is there anything not clear enough there? — Isaac

Everything is perfectly clear: in your quote Charap does not propose any solution, he just says it is needed. Can you see the difference? Fortna and co. specifically write:

But absent a major battlefield loss for Russia, or major domestic upheaval, in the near future an enduring negotiated settlement is unlikely. Instead, the war could drag on for years, with tens of thousands of casualties.

It takes more to end a war than a few sessions at the negotiation table — the challenge is reaching agreement about the likely eventual military outcome and terms of settlement that both sides will want to honor, as well as reaching an outcome that leaves leaders without fear of domestic political punishment.

Fortna specifically writes why any accord negotiated at this time would likely not bring enduring peace, so in effect any solution negotiated now would be Minsk 3 (while you agree that Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 were 'crap'). Nothing in your Charap's quote contradicts that.

Look up the difference between 'armistice' and 'peace deal'. Fortna is giving reasons why an actual peace deal will be difficult. Charap agrees, but is talking about an armistice.

Either way, "carry on with the war until Russia runs out of bombs" is not on either experts wish list. — Isaac

If Charap does not propose a solution that would end the war and Fortna argues that an enduring peace is not likely, then you still do not 'show there's a reasonable chance'.

It doesn't. As Charap points out. And even NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s admits that “the war in Ukraine is consuming an enormous amount of munitions and depleting allied stockpiles. The current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production. This puts our defense industries under strain. — Isaac

It does, it was already discussed that Ukraine has more military hardware (and much better) than it had in the beginning of the war. Soon it will have more modern planes, while Russia is losing them much faster than it can produce them. Does Charap deny that? Can you give the relevant quote?

And yes, Ukraine is using up artillery ammo quite quickly, quicker than the West can produce it, but of course Russia is also using up artillery ammo quite quickly, quicker than Russia (and Iran and North Korea) can produce it. The difference is that the West, due to its much greater economic potential, can ramp up production much more than Russia and its allies. It is happening already, it just takes time. Not to mention that when Stoltenberg made that comment, the decision on the DPICM stocks (about 3 mln pieces) was not yet made.

It seems you are still not familiar with how EE economies were restructured ('given away to the West', as some said) after the communism. — Jabberwock

Quite familiar, but I'm no historian. Perhaps rather than relying on vague attempts at condescending dismissal, you'd actually say what issue you think I've missed.

Everything is perfectly clear: in your quote Charap does not propose any solution, he just says it is needed. Can you see the difference? — Jabberwock

Fine, let's have an equal playing field then. You claim that continued fighting could release some more territory from occupation and deplete Russian stocks of artillery faster than Ukraine's. Which military operations exactly? What formations do you think will be successful and why (and don't give me any formations that have been tried before and ever failed because we know those don't work). What artillery supply deals will be struck? How will places like Germany fend off the rise of the far right whilst maintaining weapons supply? What budgetary mechanisms will the US and Europe put in place to avoid recession (and again, don't give me any that have failed in the past)? What policies will Ukraine put in place to maintain conscription? What economic policies will maintain the next decade of economic stability without any air access or port use?

And to be clear, in answering all of those questions don't ever supply a battle manoeuvre, policy, strategy or approach that's ever failed before because that means it will fail again. When you've provided all that data, backed up by expert testimony that it will work... then you're in a position to accuse the move to ceasefire of lacking in detail.

Fortna specifically writes why any accord negotiated at this time would likely not bring enduring peace, so in effect any solution negotiated now would be Minsk 3 (while you agree that Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 were 'crap'). Nothing in your Charap's quote contradicts that. — Jabberwock

No. And Fortna does not go on to say that another few decades of war will eventually prevent Russia from doing this again either. She's pretty pessimistic about any solution at all. Again, as I said above, if both solutions look bleak, we don't pick war because war is horrible.

If Charap does not propose a solution that would end the war — Jabberwock

He does...

Since talks will be needed but a settlement is out of the question, the most plausible ending is an armistice agreement. An armistice—essentially a durable cease-fire agreement that does not bridge political divides—would end the hot war between Russia and Ukraine but not their broader conflict. The archetypal case is the 1953 Korean armistice, which dealt exclusively with the mechanics of maintaining a cease-fire and left all political issues off the table. Although North and South Korea are still technically at war, and both claim the entirety of the peninsula as their sovereign territory, the armistice has largely held.

Soon it will have more modern planes, while Russia is losing them much faster than it can produce them. Does Charap deny that? Can you give the relevant quote? — Jabberwock

I already have given the relevant quote. You've asked this before and I supplied Charap's conclusions that the benefits of depleting Russia's capabilities do not outweigh the costs.

The difference is that the West, due to its much greater economic potential, can ramp up production much more than Russia and its allies. — Jabberwock

It's not just about economics, it's about the political ability to keep pouring money into Ukraine at the expense of other calls on that money during an economic recession. Of course if all the countries of the West put all their effort into arming Ukraine, their combined resources would be bigger than Russia's, that goes without saying. The point is that Russia is directly involved in this war and is a ruthless autocracy, so it can pretty much spend as much as it likes on military until it reaches a point of open revolt in the streets. The West are in no such position. The arms lobby are very powerful, but other lobbies are powerful too and they want a slice of the pie, plus they have to keep an electorate happy, and whilst a good media campaign can do that, people are fickle and have short attention spans, the 'Glorious War' will get boring soon and need replacing with another distraction. We've no skin in the game so haven't got the same capability to maintain investment. The troubles Germany are having right now are a good example of this.

Nearly 500 pages of this deep philosophical substantive thread. Hey, instead of discussing like a Ping-Pong game, we should discuss why this was never put in The Lounge.

we should discuss why this was never put in The Lounge — javi2541997

It’s in the category “Politics and Current Affairs” and it fits perfectly in it.

If you have more complaints about staff decisions, there’s a category for that too, called “Feedback”.

I understand. Thanks for your kindness, Jamal.

Quite familiar, but I'm no historian. Perhaps rather than relying on vague attempts at condescending dismissal, you'd actually say what issue you think I've missed. — Isaac

The issue you missed is that if we are to talk about the IMF and US economic capitalistic oppression, then the transformation of the former EE countries is the prime example of that, so their HFIs must reflect it.

Fine, let's have an equal playing filed then. You claim that continued fighting could release some more territory from occupation and deplete Russian stocks of artillery faster than Ukraine's; which military operations exactly? What formations do you think will be successful and why (and don't give me any formations that have been tried before and ever failed because we know those don't work). What artillery supply deals will be struck? How will places like Germany fend off the rise of the far right whilst maintaining weapons supply? What budgetary mechanisms will the US and Europe put in place to avoid recession (and again, don't give me any that have failed in the past)? What policies will Ukraine put in place to maintain conscription? What economic policies will maintain the next decade of economic stability without any air access or port use?

From the strategic level the most reasonable way is to cut off the land bridge to Crimea by splitting the Russian forces somewhere between Melitopol and Mariupol. That operation is underway, conducted by the Operational Command South, which was quite successful in liberating Kherson. The question about 'formations' is rather odd, frankly speaking, because operations are not typically conducted all the time with the same formations, as in order to mantain their battle readiness they must be rotated on a regular basis. The operation met with stronger resistance than expected, therefore Ukrainians (who are more conservative about their troop losses due to the accepted tactics) switched to attrition, which is more successful. The materiel losses of both sides are reported by Oryx, which is considered to be rather objective, as he was widely quoted even by Russians. The reports show that Russians are losing substantial amount of hardware, especially artillery, proportionally more that Ukrainians, which is atypical given that it is Ukraine that is on the offensive. The main reason for that is that Russians cannot have proper rear, given the terrain they have taken is only 100 km wide and completely in range of Ukrainian HIMARS and SCALPs. The problems with Russian supplies in Zaporozhia are widely reported by Russians: dismissed Popov, milbloggers Rybar, WarGonzo or Romanov. Partricular attention should be given to the blog of Andrej 'Murz' Morozov, who is a seasoned veteran of the war since 2014 and who (unlike e.g. Girkin) was not a doomsayer at all, even when he criticized the higher command. Recently he is very pessimistic about the fate of Russian forces in the South, particularly citing supply problems. This indicates that the situation may develop simiarly as in the Kherson oblast, where Russians were unable to support its troops. However, progress made this way is rather slow, so without significant breaks the land bridge is unlikely to be taken this year. However, if the operation is successful, it will enable Ukrainians to control all the land supply routes to Crimea (if they get to the Azov Sea the Kerch Bridge will not be defensible from medium range missiles). This will make Crimean forces quite difficult to maintain, which might prompt another withdrawal.

The details about funding the artillery production in the coming years can be found e.g. here and here.

I do not know what budgetary mechanisms will be applied, I think it is quite likely that they will fail. Politicians are not very good at stopping recession.

The problem with Ukrainian troops is not that it run out of men, but rather that, due its tactics, it must maintain a high quality of troops, not necessarily as numerous. They are not running meat attacks with mobiks, like Russia, so they have lower losses, but each soldier is more precious (as he is better trained and equipped). So it is not so much about conscription numbers but about training and equipping the force, which the West helps with a lot.

Air access in Ukraine is negligible for transportation of goods. Sea transportation will have to be replaced by land transport (mostly railway), which has about half of capacity. The railway network will have to be expanded (it has already gained 470 km of new and renewed tracks last year, despite the war). Poland has pledged significant expansion of its eastern network, which will be connected to its central communication hub. There are talks with Romania, which would strengthen its infrastructure to allow export of Ukrainian goods from its ports. Still, the throughput will be lower than the sea transportation, reaching at best two thirds of its volume (this figure might be incorrect, as I cannot recall the source for it, I will keep looking).

and to be clear, in answering all of those questions don't ever supply a battle manoeuvre, policy, strategy or approach that's ever failed before because that means it will fail again. When you've provided all that data, backed up by expert testimony that it will work... then you're in a position to accuse the move to ceasefire lacking in detail. — Isaac

Not really. Throughout the thread I have already provided much more facts and details to support my arguments than you did. The playing field was never even, but not the way you suggest.

The fact remains that you have failed to provide a proposal of a solution that would likely bring lasting peace, which, by your words, you are required to do. The ceasefire proposition does not do that.

No. And Fortna does not go on to say that another few decades of war will eventually prevent Russia from doing this gain either. She's pretty pessimistic about any solution at all. Again, as I said above, if both solutions look bleak, we don't pick war because war is horrible. — Isaac

Fortna pretty much argues that the war was inevitable in the long run. And it is not because she suddenly turned a blood-thirsty militarist, on the contrary, she still believes that negotiations and peace accords are the best way to achieve lasting peace. She just argues, in great detail, why at this particular point it is very unlikely. But many of those issues apply equally well to the situation before the war - the points she makes concerning Putin's situation pretty much align with what I was saying even before I found that article. Your chosen expert seems to to agree with my points, as painful as it might be for you.

He does... — Isaac

An armistice without a settlement? So hostilities cease, Ukraine seeks Swedish-style informal cooperation with NATO with close integration of forces and of course arms itself to the teeth with the help of its newfound informal allies. It also seeks to join EU, with the democratic and economic improvements that entails. All this means that Ukraine practically and actively leaves the Russian sphere of influence. Can we at least take a guess how willing Putin would be to maintain ceasefire in such case? While doing that, we have to consider arguments of some people that claim that the very prospect of Ukraine in NATO practically pushed Putin to war AND the argument that Putin sees free and prosperous Ukraine as a grave danger.

I already have given the relevant quote. You've asked this already and I supplied the Charap's conclusions that the benefits of depleting Russia's capabilities do not outweigh the costs. — Isaac

Your claim was that Ukraine's military potential does not increase, so that quote does not support it.

It's not just about economics, it's about the political ability to keep pouring money into Ukraine at the expense of other calls on that money during an economic recession. Of course if all the countries of the West put all their effort into arming Ukraine, their combined resources would be bigger than Russia's, that goes without saying. The point is that Russia is directly involved in this war and is a ruthless autocracy, so it can pretty much spend as much as it likes on military until it reaches a point of open revolt in the streets. The west are in no such position. the arms lobby are very powerful, but other lobbies are powerful too and they want a slice of the pie, plus they have to keep an electorate happy and whilst a good media campaign can do that, people are fickle and have short attention spans, the 'Glorious War' will get boring soon and need replacing with another distraction. We've no skin in the game so haven't got the same capability to maintain investment. The troubles Germany are having right now are a good example of this. — Isaac

You seem to be fond of dramatic false alternatives. Maintaining the current level of support costs the US less than one percent of its annual budget and Russia already cannot keep up. So the West does not have to put 'all their effort', in fact, it is enough that it puts a rather modest effort, like it does right now. Most of the hardware that the West has given to Ukraine was either decommissoned or on its way to be replaced, so it is not that the West is losing some previous assets. And no, Russia cannot spend as much as it likes, it can only spend as much as it has, which is not much compared to the West, given its economy is twenty times smaller. When the West dials down the aid, which is to be expected, it will still outspend Russia rather easily.

The issue you missed is that if we are to talk about the IMF and US economic capitalistic oppression, then the transformation of the former EE countries is the prime example of that, so their HFIs must reflect it. — Jabberwock

They're not any more. They may be a prime example of how it worked in the late 90s, but they're not an example of how it works now. They're also, more to the point of the argument, not an example of the sort of 'club' Ukraine is looking to join became unlike Ukraine, they did not have such crippling debts, predatory monopolies like Black Rock, destroyed infrastructure, and huge globally important assets, nor were they entering into a fractured Europe in recession.

From the strategic level the most reasonable way is...

...This will make Crimean forces quite difficult to maintain, which might prompt another withdrawal. — Jabberwock

I wasn't questioning your ability to make stuff up. I was questioning the extent to which any of it can be demonstrated to be a viable solution.

You've not cited a single expert source, just come up with a load of wild speculation. You might as well have said "Ukraine will perform an incantation to summon demons who will fight off the Russians". A load of military acronyms doesn't stand in place of an argument here, which, in this context would be in the form "so-and-so states that...", preferably followed by a citation. Absent of that, we're in the same boat since all we have of specifics with actual expert basis, are the conclusions.

The details about funding the artillery production in the coming years can be found e.g. here and here. — Jabberwock

Neither article addresses the issues Charap raises, they both just give targets, not the means by which those targets will be met given political opposition. Nor do either of those sources give relative figures showing that the resultant production mentioned will be higher than Russia's.

I do not know what budgetary mechanisms will be applied, I think it is quite likely that they will fail. — Jabberwock

Well then. If they fail, how will the West sustain the expenditure reliant on them?

The problem with Ukrainian troops is not that it run out of men, but rather that, due its tactics, it must maintain a high quality of troops, not necessarily as numerous. They are not running meat attacks with mobiks, like Russia, so they have lower losses, but each soldier is more precious (as he is better trained and equipped). So it is not so much about conscription numbers but about training and equipping the force, which the West helps with a lot. — Jabberwock

Again, this is un-cited. I have no reason to believe you. Mearsheimer, for example says...

Who wins an attrition war is largely a function of three factors: the balance of resolve between the two sides; the population balance between them; and the casualty-exchange ratio. The Russians have a decisive advantage in population size and a marked advantage in the casualty-exchange ratio; the two sides are evenly matched in terms of resolve.

... and here's one of your lauded Ukrainian officials you claimed earlier had their fingers on the pulse quoted in the Washington Post...

One senior Ukrainian government official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to be candid, called the number of tanks promised by the West a “symbolic” amount. Others privately voiced pessimism that promised supplies would even reach the battlefield in time.

“If you have more resources, you more actively attack,” the senior official said. “If you have fewer resources, you defend more. We’re going to defend. That’s why if you ask me personally, I don’t believe in a big counteroffensive for us. I’d like to believe in it, but I’m looking at the resources and asking, ‘With what?’ Maybe we’ll have some localized breakthroughs.”

“We don’t have the people or weapons,” the senior official added. “And you know the ratio: When you’re on the offensive, you lose twice or three times as many people. We can’t afford to lose that many people.”

Air access in Ukraine is negligible for transportation of goods. Sea transportation will have to be replaced by land transport (mostly railway), which has about half of capacity. The railway network will have to be expanded (it has already gained 470 km of new and renewed tracks last year, despite the war). Poland has pledged significant expansion of its eastern network, which will be connected to its central communication hub. There are talks with Romania, which would strengthen its infrastructure to allow export of Ukrainian goods from its ports. Still, the throughput will be lower than the sea transportation, reaching at best two thirds of its volume — Jabberwock

So who is it claiming any of this will work? Charap said...

it is difficult to imagine how the Ukrainian economy can recover if its airspace remains closed, its ports remain largely blockaded, its cities under fire, its men of working age fighting at the front, and millions of refugees unwilling to return to the country.

...So who is it claiming Charap's conclusion here is nonsense?

Again, if it's not nonsense, if it's just one of the options, then we try peace, because war is horrible, we try it only if we absolutely have to, not on a preponderance of evidence.

Throughout the thread I have already provided much more facts and details to support my arguments than you did. — Jabberwock

Indeed you have. As I said, I've no interest in having the absurd discussion you're thinking of. The idea that us throwing our 'data' at each other results in anything other than the exact same positions we both started with is naive beyond reckoning. I'm asking here for something different. I'm asking for expert support for the notion that, for example, Charap's position is actually non-viable. Because if you can't show that, then you have no argument. If a peaceful solution is viable, then we ought try it.

Your chosen expert seems to to agree with my points, as painful as it might be for you. — Jabberwock

Nowhere does she say anything even approaching your points. She doesn't argue that Ukraine can win territory back, she doesn't argue that wearing Russia down will solve the problem in the long run, she doesn't argue that Russia are unlikely to improve their measures of freedom.

Can we at least take a guess how willing Putin would be to maintain ceasefire in such case? — Jabberwock

Yes. Clearly we can. Did you think Charap was joking? Had he temporarily lost his mind? Maybe had too much to drink? Obviously, if an expert in foreign relations thinks it is possible then it is clearly possible. You don't have to agree with him, but you (an unqualified layman) sneering at him (a qualified, experienced and respected strategist) just makes you look stupid.

Your claim was that Ukraine's military potential does not increase — Jabberwock

No, my claim is that it cannot increase faster than Russia's

Maintaining the current level of support costs the US less than one percent of its annual budget and Russia already cannot keep up. So the West does not have to put 'all their effort', in fact, it is enough that it puts a rather modest effort, like it does right now. — Jabberwock

Well then it must be the 'modest effort' that is proving hard to sustain mustn't it? Otherwise why would Charap (a fucking expert in these exact questions) say otherwise? It's patently absurd for you to think you can in any way dismiss his conclusion by just guessing how difficult it might be.

Basically, it comes down to this - several experts consider talks, ceasefires, and an end to military offensives is not only a viable, but a necessary strategy. Since that strategy kills fewer people (and results in far less collateral damage) - again, in the view of these same experts, it is a strategy we ought to follow in favour of more destructive ones. To argue against this, you have to show that these experts are not right. You personal opinion doesn't do that.

They're not any more. They may be a prime example of how it worked in the late 90s, but they're not an example of how it works now. They're also, more to the point of the argument, not an example of the sort of 'club' Ukraine is looking to join became unlike Ukraine, they did not have such crippling debts, predatory monopolies like Black Rock, destroyed infrastructure, and huge globally important assets, nor were they entering into a fractured Europe in recession. — Isaac

'Crippling' is rather subjective, but they did have debts, most of which were cancelled by the economic oppressors. Why think with Ukraine it would be different, given its strategic importance for the US? The infrastructure was not 'destroyed' as such, just completely obsolete (if I remember correctly, at some time in the 90s Poland had the most modern telephone infrastructure, as it was completely new - the old one was simply torn down and replaced). Western companies bought post-communist industries in bulk for spare change ('robbery privatization' was the term used). So while the situation was not similar, but certainly analogous. I am surprised you object, given you considered Russia's and Ukraine's situation ten years ago to be very similar, so your standards of similarity seem very broad. Now they have high HFIs, then so will Ukraine, as your argument went.

I wasn't questioning your ability to make stuff up. I was questioning the extent to which any of it can be demonstrated to be a viable solution.

You've not cited a single expert source, just come up with a load of wild speculation. You might as well have said "Ukraine will perform an incantation to summon demons who will fight off the Russians". A load of military acronyms doesn't stand in place of an argument here, which, in this context would be in the form "so-and-so states that...", preferably followed by a citation. Absent of that, we're in the same boat since all we have of specifics with actual expert basis, are the conclusions. — Isaac

How about Ben Hodges, ex-commanding general of the US forces in Europe? Is he expert enough for you or Is he also making wild speculations?

https://www.newsweek.com/how-ukraine-retake-crimea-us-general-ben-hodges-russia-counteroffensive-1796264

Does that mean I am alone in the boat now?

Neither article addresses the issues Charap raises, they both just give targets, not the means by which those targets will be met given political opposition. Nor do either of those sources give relative figures showing that the resultant production mentioned will be higher than Russia's. — Isaac

You have asked a very specific question:

What artillery supply deals will be struck? — Isaac

And you got very specific answer: now you are complaining it does not answer your other unasked questions? How sad.

Well then. If they fail, how will the West sustain the expenditure reliant on them? — Isaac

It will not. Which economies are more likely to fail: those of the West, which carry a relatively small economic burden and are not hindered by dozens of sanctions or the Russian one?

...So who is it claiming Charap's conclusion here is nonsense?

Again, if it's not nonsense, if it's just one of the options, then we try peace, because war is horrible, we try it only if we absolutely have to, not on a preponderance of evidence. — Isaac

How many times Putin has to attack Ukraine for you to consider that his promises of peace are not actually worth much? Fortna, the fucking expert on negotiations and agreements writes: 'No leader in the world can believe a promise by Russia to stop fighting'.

Indeed you have. As I said, I've no interest in having the absurd discussion you're thinking of. The idea that us throwing our 'data' at each other results in anything other than the exact same positions we both started with is naive beyond reckoning. I'm asking here for something different. I'm asking for expert support for the notion that, for example, Charap's position is actually non-viable. Because if you can't show that, then you have no argument. If a peaceful solution is viable, then we ought try it. — Isaac

I have already given you one: Fortna says achieving lasting peace with Putin is non-viable.

Nowhere does she say anything even approaching your points. She doesn't argue that Ukraine can win territory back, she doesn't argue that wearing Russia down will solve the problem in the long run, she doesn't argue that Russia are unlikely to improve their measures of freedom. — Isaac

I did not say ALL of my points. I just meant those where I have pointed out that negotiating agreement with Putin is unlikely to bring lasting peace.

Yes. Clearly we can. Did you think Charap was joking? Had he temporarily lost his mind? Maybe had too much to drink? Obviously, if an expert in foreign relations thinks it is possible then it is clearly possible. You don't have to agree with him, but you (an unqualified layman) sneering at him (a qualified, experienced and respected strategist) just makes you look stupid. — Isaac

Charap thinks it is possible, he just has no idea now:

Devising measures to make the cease-fire stick will be a thorny but critical task, and Washington should ensure that it is ready to assist Kyiv in that effort. Serious work should begin now on how to avoid what Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, describe derisively as “Minsk 3,” a reference to the two failed cease-fire deals that were brokered with Russia in the Belarusian capital in 2014 and 2015, after its earlier invasions. These agreements failed to durably end the violence and included no effective mechanisms for ensuring the parties’ compliance.

He then suggests mechanisms mentioned by Fortna. The only issue is that Fortna herself gives a very specific argument why those measures will not work in this case. Charap does not address any of the issues she mentions at all.

No, my claim is that it cannot increase faster than Russia's — Isaac

Your own source (the Economist) claims that Russia's military will decrease.

Well then it must be the 'modest effort' that is proving hard to sustain mustn't it? Otherwise why would Charap (a fucking expert in these exact questions) say otherwise? It's patently absurd for you to think you can in any way dismiss his conclusion by just guessing how difficult it might be. — Isaac

Your fucking expert writes:

Ukraine would be on near-total economic and military life support from the West, which will eventually cause budgetary challenges for Western countries and readiness problems for their militaries.

Note 'eventually'. On the other hand Russia is facing 'budgetary challenges' right now.

Basically, it comes down to this - several experts consider talks, ceasefires, and an end to military offensives is not only a viable, but a necessary strategy. Since that strategy kills fewer people (and results in far less collateral damage) - again, in the view of these same experts, it is a strategy we ought to follow in favour of more destructive ones. To argue against this, you have to show that these experts are not right. You personal opinion doesn't do that. — Isaac

So far you mentioned one expert, Charap, who proposes opening diplomatic channels for future negotiations, while maintaining fighting and other means of pressure on Russia (he specifically mentions that diplomacy cannot come at the expense of coercion). So yes, possibly once Russia is weakened enough such talks might be started. The issue is that it would undermine Putin's regime, so he is unlikely to enter such agreements. The other issue, mentioned both by Charap and Fortna, is that the means to assure his compliance are very limited.

Poland busts another Russian spy network, this time around unveiling plans to attack Ukraine-bound trains. Lukashenko + Putin "mention" that Wagner would like to hit Poland (on more than one occasion). Wagner mercs train close to Polish border; Poland + Baltics nervous. Poland enacts controversial law to deal with Russian influence. Belarusian choppers enter Poland airspace. Russia posts about Poland taking over Western Ukraine. EU ready to close Belarus borders.

There's more to the story of course, yet seems to follow an old playbook.

Nyberg writes up some political history:

Russia, Ukraine, and Poland: The End of a Tragic Triangle
^{— René Nyberg · Carnegie · Jul 28, 2023}

(... also check the crɘeǝpy TASS post above)

Bit of a contrast in terms of Russia here:

Niger coup (reports from Jul 31, 2023): CNN, Forbes (Russian flags)
Georgian protests (reports from Aug 1, 2023): BBC, Business Insider (simmering Kremlin-hate)

Maybe they should get together? :D

Anyway, while going over all this...stuff, I sure hope Putin hasn't had more warring in mind all along.

Hard at work to "recruit" here:

Russia Takes Its Ukraine Information War Into Video Games
^{— Steven Lee Myers, Steven Lee Myers · The New York Times · Jul 30, 2023}
Minecraft and Roblox are being used to spread Russian propaganda to kids
^{— Michael Beckwith · Metro News · Jul 31, 2023}
Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda had made its way into ‘Minecraft’
^{— news.com.au · Aug 2, 2023 · 2m:24s}

I predict it'll work, though to a limited extent.

Sorry, messed up the reply, see above.

Poland busts another Russian spy network, this time around unveiling plans to attack Ukraine-bound trains. Lukashenko + Putin "mention" that Wagner would like to hit Poland (on more than one occasion). Wagner mercs train close to Polish border; Poland + Baltics nervous. Poland enacts controversial law to deal with Russian influence. Belarusian choppers enter Poland airspace. Russia posts about Poland taking over Western Ukraine. EU ready to close Belarus borders. — jorndoe

Today Belarussian choppers violated Polish airspace.

I suppose that's one way to snag up cannon fodder:

Russia is forcing Ukrainians from occupied Crimea and Donbas to fight in its invasion of Ukraine
^{— Halya Coynash · Human Rights in Ukraine · Mar 7, 2022}
Russia turns to Donbas conscripts to fill front lines
^{— Polina Ivanova · Financial Times · Jun 11, 2022}
Russia Pressing Men In Occupied Areas Of Ukraine Into Fight Against Ukrainian Forces
^{— RFE/RL · Sep 26, 2022}
Russia "officially" annexes Donbas on Sep 30, 2022
^{— Wikipedia}
Russia engaged in extensive effort to force Ukrainians in Russian-occupied territories to accept Russian citizenship, report says
^{— Jennifer Hansler · CNN · Aug 2, 2023}

Furthermore, unfortunate people are trapped between Russian and Ukrainian law:

Russia forced them to fight. Ukraine tried them for treason
^{— Kateryna Farbar · openDemocracy · Nov 16, 2022}

I'm guessing (conjecture on my part) that Ukraine / Ukrainian law is more amenable to un-trap those people. Ukraine also has an interest in acceptance into organizations that would look favorable on such amendments. Maybe the resident legal experts know something?

, right.

By the way, if mercenaries (not a national army) attack Poland in some way, can NATO then identify a nation to hold accountable? I guess so.

Wagner Attack On Poland Will Be Treated As Russian Attack On NATO: US Ambassador To UN
^{— Parth Satam · The EurAsian Times · Aug 1, 2023}

Well, if they were deployed from Belarus (who hasn't exactly kept their presence/status a secret)...

Apart from spying and destabilization and such efforts, it seems unlikely that Belarus (or Russia) would attack Poland.

There seems to be no conceivable motivation to attack Poland. So this must be posturing.

The question is who the addressee of this posturing is. Probably not Poland or the West, this would be a very clumsy attempt at ramping up the war scare.

The domestic russian/ belarus audience? Not sure what that would be intended to communicate, I don't think there's any appetite in either country for widening the conflict.

So the remaining possibility seems to be that this related to the internal politics between Russia and Belarus. Is Lukashenko demonstrating that he is capable of independent foreign policy moves?

Now they have high HFIs, then so will Ukraine, as your argument went. — Jabberwock

I'm comparing Ukraine and Russia in similar global economic and political circumstances (both ten years ago and both now). You're comparing completely different circumstances (the collapse of communism and rise of Europe). The world has changed fundamentally since then, the rise of globalism, the take over of the financial industry, the move from national government control to multinational companies... We're in a different world. And figures from 30 years ago are not necessary. We have modern day examples.

How about Ben Hodges, ex-commanding general of the US forces in Europe? Is he expert enough for you or Is he also making wild speculations? — Jabberwock

You mean the Ben Hodges who held the chair at CEPA, funded by the arms industry? The guy who has, throughout his advisory career advocated a stronger NATO and has politically endorsed Joe Biden? That Ben Hodges?

Funny how when Sachs was mentioned you spent several pages on how unreliable he was as a source because of his political leanings and history of advocacy for a particular policy...

But sure, he'll do.

So where does he say that negative assessments of Ukraine's chances are all nonsense? Because, as seems to be stubbornly difficult to get across, we hate war. We choose war as a last resort, when all.other options are spent. So to support war you have to show all other options are spent. Your experts need to show, not just the.possibility that Ukraine might win, but the near impossibility that they would lose. They need to show, not just the possibility that Ukraine could outgun Russia in the long run, but the near impossibility that they would not...

You're not accepting, not even addressing, the asymmetry here. We don't want war. It's horrific. It needs a very strong argument in favour of it.

We do not go to war on a preponderance of evidence in favour.

Well then. If they fail, how will the West sustain the expenditure reliant on them? — Isaac


It will not. Which economies are more likely to fail: those of the West, which carry a relatively small economic burden and are not hindered by dozens of sanctions or the Russian one? — Jabberwock

Russia. But Russia will spend as much of it's income as it possibly can on the military first and has a single objective - Ukraine. The West has a million other objectives, and political opponents opposed to spending anything at all on Ukraine. So it will take a collapse for Russia to stop spending, a mere dip into deeper recession will be enough to cause the West to question its commitment.

Comparing the economies alone is ridiculous. As if spending were merely an accounting issue and not a political one.

How many times Putin has to attack Ukraine for you to consider that his promises of peace are not actually worth much? — Jabberwock

He's attacked Ukraine once so far. Not much to go on.

I have already given you one: Fortna says achieving lasting peace with Putin is non-viable. — Jabberwock

She doesn't. She's pessimistic about the chances, but that's only relevant to this discussion if she were more optimistic about the chances of a long war bringing about peace and she isn't.

To use Fortna to support your argument you'd have to select out her opinion on negotiations and ignore her opinion on war.

I did not say ALL of my points. I just meant those where I have pointed out that negotiating agreement with Putin is unlikely to bring lasting peace. — Jabberwock

Exactly. But we can agree on the low chances of negotiation succeeding. Where we disagree is that war has a higher chance (and enough higher to justify the massive costs). Fortna is equally pessimistic on that matter.

No, my claim is that it cannot increase faster than Russia's — Isaac


Your own source (the Economist) claims that Russia's military will decrease. — Jabberwock

And? Is Ukraine going to store up all the weapons it gets and not use them then?

Ukraine would be on near-total economic and military life support from the West, which will eventually cause budgetary challenges for Western countries and readiness problems for their militaries.


Note 'eventually'. On the other hand Russia is facing 'budgetary challenges' right now. — Jabberwock

You're reaching. If your argument hangs on the use of 'eventually' you're really clutching at straws. What matters is not the terminology, it's the conclusion. Charap concludes that winning a long war is not likely enough to justify the cost, so whatever he meant, it must lead to that conclusion. If what he meant was that the West would run into problems way down the line, but Russia would do so first, then it wouldn't lead to the conclusion he reached would it? So that cannot be what he meant. It's really the bare minimum of charitable interpretation to assume the reasons back the conclusion.

So far you mentioned one expert, Charap, who proposes opening diplomatic channels for future negotiations, while maintaining fighting and other means of pressure on Russia (he specifically mentions that diplomacy cannot come at the expense of coercion). So yes, possibly once Russia is weakened enough such talks might be started. — Jabberwock

No, that's not what Charap is suggesting. He's suggesting such talks right now. Not 'once Russia is weakened enough. His argument is the exact opposite, that waiting for Russia to be more weakened is not worth the cost.

it is now time that the United States develop a vision for how the war ends. Fifteen months of fighting has made clear that neither side has the capacity—even with external help—to achieve a decisive military victory over the other. Regardless of how much territory Ukrainian forces can liberate, Russia will maintain the capability to pose a permanent threat to Ukraine. The Ukrainian military will also have the capacity to hold at risk any areas of the country occupied by Russian forces—and to impose costs on military and civilian targets within Russia itself.
These factors could lead to a devastating, years-long conflict that does not produce a definitive outcome. The United States and its allies thus face a choice about their future strategy. They could begin to try to steer the war toward a negotiated end in the coming months. Or they could do so years from now. If they decide to wait, the fundamentals of the conflict will likely be the same, but the costs of the war—human, financial, and otherwise—will have multiplied.

We do not go to war on a preponderance of evidence in favour. — Isaac

Who is the "we" here? Are you talking about what conditions for support the US or EU population might find acceptable?

He's attacked Ukraine once so far. Not much to go on. — Isaac

Three times. He attacked Crimea in early 2014. Then in late 2014 regular russian forces crossed the border and attacked AFU formations in the Donbas as they were about to mop up the separatists there.

Russia has repeatedly attacked across the border into Donbas whenever the situation of the separatists seemed endangered, so we could run the tally higher if we wanted to.

it is now time that the United States develop a vision for how the war ends. Fifteen months of fighting has made clear that neither side has the capacity—even with external help—to achieve a decisive military victory over the other. Regardless of how much territory Ukrainian forces can liberate, Russia will maintain the capability to pose a permanent threat to Ukraine. The Ukrainian military will also have the capacity to hold at risk any areas of the country occupied by Russian forces—and to impose costs on military and civilian targets within Russia itself.
These factors could lead to a devastating, years-long conflict that does not produce a definitive outcome. The United States and its allies thus face a choice about their future strategy. They could begin to try to steer the war toward a negotiated end in the coming months. Or they could do so years from now. If they decide to wait, the fundamentals of the conflict will likely be the same, but the costs of the war—human, financial, and otherwise—will have multiplied.

It's difficult to disagree with the broad strokes of the analysis, but it's also not at all clear to me what one is supposed to take away from that.

Anyone with even a rudimentary understanding of the strategic situation realises that neither side can achieve a decisive victory that would enable them to dictate peace terms.

Which obviously means that the parties involved need to continuously evaluate how they could end the conflict. I'm sure this is already happening all the time, though obviously behind closed doors.

But again this is merely the basic understanding of the situation. It does not include any actionable suggestions. It doesn't even really offer any useful framework to develop such a plan.

The crux of the issue is not that people don't want to negotiate. The crux is that both sides have vital interests in play which they are unable to align, and thus the outcome is continued fighting. As a rule, humans are willing to accept a lot of suffering to defend their interests. Pointing out the suffering won't help.

I'm comparing Ukraine and Russia in similar global economic and political circumstances (both ten years ago and both now). You're comparing completely different circumstances (the collapse of communism and rise of Europe). The world has changed fundamentally since then, the rise of globalism, the take over of the financial industry, the move from national government control to multinational companies... We're in a different world. And figures from 30 years ago are not necessary. We have modern day examples. — Isaac

You have given no examples how those factors affect HFI. As we have seen, there are factors which barely change the indicator (like rising authoritarian rule in Russia), so we cannot predict whether what you write will do. The fact is that the very countries that had very similar problems that you mention now have stellar HFIs.

You mean the Ben Hodges who held the chair at CEPA, funded by the arms industry? The guy who has, throughout his advisory career advocated a stronger NATO and has politically endorsed Joe Biden? That Ben Hodges?

Funny how when Sachs was mentioned you spent several pages on how unreliable he was as a source because of his political leanings and history of advocacy for a particular policy...

But sure, he'll do. — Isaac

You mean he is biased? Of course he is. Does that mean that he makes wild speculations? Rather unlikely, it would be rather damaging to his reputation if he made military predictions completely divorced from reality.

So where does he say that negative assessments of Ukraine's chances are all nonsense? Because, as seems to be stubbornly difficult to get across, we hate war. We choose war as a last resort, when all.other options are spent. So to support war you have to show all other options are spent. Your experts need to show, not just the.possibility that Ukraine might win, but the near impossibility that they would lose. They need to show, not just the possibility that Ukraine could outgun Russia in the long run, but the near impossibility that they would not...

You're not accepting, not even addressing, the asymmetry here. We don't want war. It's horrific. It needs a very strong argument in favour of it. — Isaac

No, we choose war when other options are unlikely to bring lasting peace and bear negative consequences. You yourself called Minsk accords 'crap'. But that was the exact option you advocate for: bad, but supposedly meant to bring peace. That was the best non-war option all could come up with. Was it a good one? Did it have positive consequences? Did bring lasting peace?

Also, which of your experts you mentioned said that all options must be spent, no matter how likely or with what consequences? Charap writes about the US policy at the beginning of the war:

This approach made sense in the initial months of the conflict. The trajectory of the war was far from clear at that point. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was still talking about his readiness to meet his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and the West had yet to supply Kyiv with sophisticated ground-based rocket systems, let alone tanks and long-range missiles as it does today. Plus, it will always be difficult for the United States to speak about its view on the objective of a war that its forces are not fighting. The Ukrainians are the ones dying for their country, so they ultimately get to decide when to stop—regardless of what Washington might want.

so definitely he does not advise the approach of 'no war no matter the cost'. He also, as I have already mentioned, advises to maintain the military pressure on Russia to make it more likely to enter negotiations, which includes the counteroffensive, even it is not absolutely certain it will succeed (on the contrary, he admits that the result is pretty much unpredictable, yet he still supports it, unlike you).

Fortna specifically writes that negotations are very unlikely to bring about the expected results, so she is not for 'spending all the options' either.

Russia. But Russia will spend as much of it's income as it possibly can on the military first and has a single objective - Ukraine. The West has a million other objectives, and political opponents opposed to spending anything at all on Ukraine. So it will take a collapse for Russia to stop spending, a mere dip into deeper recession will be enough to cause the West to question its commitment.

Comparing the economies alone is ridiculous. As if spending were merely an accounting issue and not a political one. — Isaac

For Russia it will not take collapse to limit the spending, as has been already pointed out in your own source (a dramatic false alternative again). In the West it is very likely that the spending will be limited as well, as I have already acknowledged. Comparing the economies is important to show the scale - even if the West cuts its assistance by half, it will still be a significant burden on Russia which it will be unlikely to meet. Spending as much of its income as it possibly can will still not be enough. And politics in Russia should not be disregarded either, given that it already had a coup attempt. It is not that Putin can completely ignore domestic dissent.

He's attacked Ukraine once so far. Not much to go on. — Isaac

He took Crimea in 2014, the forces he supported broke the Minsk accords in 2015, he started a full-scale hostilities in 2022. Are you considering this as a single attack?

She doesn't. She's pessimistic about the chances, but that's only relevant to this discussion if she were more optimistic about the chances of a long war bringing about peace and she isn't.

To use Fortna to support your argument you'd have to select out her opinion on negotiations and ignore her opinion on war. — Isaac

She writes that achieving lasting peace with Putin through negotiations is very unlikely, which is the very thing you propose. How is it irrelevant to the discussion?

Exactly. But we can agree on the low chances of negotiation succeeding. Where we disagree is that war has a higher chance (and enough higher to justify the massive costs). Fortna is equally pessimistic on that matter. — Isaac

Ukrainians want to leave the Russian sphere of influence. Russia (and Putin in particular) are willing to use force to stop them. That is the underlying conflict here. For that reason negotiations will not bring lasting peace, because Putin will never agree to that. The only way to resolve the conflict is to facilitate that transition the best that we can. It is regrettable that it must be done in the conditions of war, but as Fortna points out, Putin would not have it any other way.

And? Is Ukraine going to store up all the weapons it gets and not use them then? — Isaac

No, it will use them, but their depletion rate is lower than the acquisition rate at this point. Of course, the deliveries will eventually stop, as the West does not have unlimited supply of surplus hardware, but most of it has not even been delivered (e.g. Ukraine got about 20% of promised tanks).

You're reaching. If your argument hangs on the use of 'eventually' you're really clutching at straws. What matters is not the terminology, it's the conclusion. Charap concludes that winning a long war is not likely enough to justify the cost, so whatever he meant, it must lead to that conclusion. If what he meant was that the West would run into problems way down the line, but Russia would do so first, then it wouldn't lead to the conclusion he reached would it? So that cannot be what he meant. It's really the bare minimum of charitable interpretation to assume the reasons back the conclusion. — Isaac

Charap concludes that a decisive victory is not likely and that the conflict will last for a long time. We have also discussed that the conflict will lose its intensity (the West will be willing to dial down the assistance, Russia will be forced to limit its spending), so there will be a long, low-intensity conflict. That is what all cited experts agree on.

No, that's not what Charap is suggesting. He's suggesting such talks right now. Not 'once Russia is weakened enough. His argument is the exact opposite, that waiting for Russia to be more weakened is not worth the cost. — Isaac

Yes, he suggests that the diplomatic channel should be opened now. But he is saying that it should be done in parallel with supplementing the counteroffensive, which is the opposite of what you suggest:

In the short term, that means both continuing to help Kyiv with the counteroffensive and beginning parallel discussions with allies and Ukraine about the endgame. In principle, opening a negotiation track with Russia should complement, not contradict, the push on the battlefield. If Ukraine’s gains make the Kremlin more willing to compromise, the only way to know that would be through a functioning diplomatic channel. Setting up such a channel should not cause either Ukraine or its Western partners to let up the pressure on Russia. An effective strategy will require both coercion and diplomacy. One cannot come at the expense of the other.

He clearly advocates helping Kyiv with the counteroffensive and the 'push on the battlefield'. That would mean that we should supply Kyiv with as much military hardware, ammunition and other resources as we can to improve its negotiating position, right?