I know this may sound strange but even though I'm an atheist, I think if there was a 'God' I think his mentality would be mixture between George Carlin and 180 proof and there would be a slight possibility for him (or what 'God' is) forgiving me for arguing against Christianity. Although having a God that thinks this way would be good enough that I wouldn't be bothered that much if I wasn't forgiven. I wonder if any other atheist for the other forum members that know 180 proof can relate. I hope he is still ok, wherever he is. .


George Carlin - Matrix Architect Parody:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1ek1jwX4qo
(I like when she complains about why he has some many cameras watching her, he remarks about that is he is bored/lonely and has been stuck there for a very long time. I can also relate to how he is trying to use one of his fancy words and have to stop and resort to a dictionary/ thesaurus)

Bertrand Russell was once asked what he would say if he found himself standing before God on the judgement day and God asked him, "Why didn’t you believe in Me?". Russell replied, "I would say, ‘Not enough evidence, God! Not enough evidence!'".

Bertrand Russell was once asked what he would say if he found himself standing before God on the judgement day and God asked him, "Why didn’t you believe in Me?". Russell replied, "I would say, ‘Not enough evidence, God! Not enough evidence!'".
--Sapientia

It is funny but I have had my own personal "spiritual experiences" where it almost seemed like I could talk to 'God' (ie I would ask myself questions and the answers came from somewhere that didn't seem like they were derived from my usual conscience knowledge/experience but perhaps sub-conscience instead). I was also really,really drunk at the time which I think is worth noting in order for someone reading this to not think I'm crazy.

Since the 'God' I spoke to during this experience had a much different... viewpoint than the 'God' that is described by Christian or typical Abrahmic beliefs perhaps I could try to use the excuse that what the 'God' at the pearly gates expected me to believe is different than what 'God' told when I had my "spiritual experiences" and told me the how and why things are the way they are; which BTW didn't really have expectation of me living a certain way or having to follow any particular religion.

I'm sure it is plausible that my whole "spiritual experience" could have been some form of delusion from being too drunk or even an 'evil demon' trying to trick me; but I'm pretty sure the same thing could be said of any Christian when they have under gone such things.

If I was ever at the pearly gates and 'God' was upset at me for not following the right god / "God" (ie. would a 'good' God punish a person for not being able to reach 'God' because of their own limitations, or would he realize the moral dilemmas of such a catch-22?), I imagine it would be an interesting situation to be in even if my mortal soul was on the line. On the other hand since the real world (that 'God' supposedly created) is full of catch-22's, I shouldn't be that surprised if I have to deal with any type of SNAFU when I move on from this world to the next.

Why would the afterlife be any less crazy than this one. :D

Almost definitely (b) with a few reservations (I could be wrong) and possibly (a). With regards to the latter, one cannot have an experience of God if, upon analysis, this makes no sense or implies a contradiction. And with regards to the former, how could one know that the experience is an experience of God and not an experience of something else? I'm not convinced that one could. One could of course be certain that it's the former, but that doesn't say much. I might be certain that my experience the other day was of ghosts, when it could in fact turn out to be just of a dim, candle lit, shadowy hallway, when I was tired, and in a heightened emotional state. Of course, I'd need to justify that it was of ghosts, but how?

Why wouldn't I take someone at their word when they give a description of their experience that doesn't contain anything controversial, like it being of God or ghosts or whatnot? That's being charitable, and it goes back to what I said in relation to anecdotal evidence. We know that people can and do have experiences which are profound or shocking or which they find remarkable in some way. It's quite natural and ordinary for someone to have such an experience or even multiple experiences of this kind in their lifetime. We also know that people can and do jump to the wrong conclusions after having certain experiences. I can relate both of these to my own experience. — Sapientia

There are (at least) two layers here:
(1) is there a reliable and and an unreliable part of a person's report of their own experiences?
(2) if (1) is true, is it only the unreliable part that is interpreted, and subject to standards of justification?

It stands to reason that if you believe part of a person's report can be rejected, then at least part of their report is unreliable. Perhaps you will hold that nothing in a person's report of their own experience is reliable, but perhaps you will hold (1), that there is a reliable part and an unreliable part. Then you would need to show how you are making that distinction.

It might seem that the distinction in (2) automatically matches up with the distinction in (1), but that is not so. It may be that all of the report involves interpretation, but the reliable part is interpreted in a way that meets our standards of justification.

Can you reason from the justification end backwards to distinguish which part of the report is reliable? That is, can you say, if part of the report is justified, that part was reliable; if part of the report is unjustified, then that was the unreliable part? I don't think so. It could still be that no part of the report is reliable.

Intelligent, wise, challenging, but we expect nothing less from MU. Certainly the distinction between a real god and a concept of god is a distinction that makes a difference. And it is one I wish everyone would make. How much more insightful, fruitful, and fair would be theology/religion and all discussions flowing therefrom if only participants understood the difference, and that it makes a difference! — tim wood

I'll take the compliment any day. Thanks. That's better than what Sapientia says of me, that I'm just playing games and intentionally missing the point.

I happen to think the concept of god is uniquely valuable. When understood as a concept, I think much good results. Affirming a god in reality, on the other hand, has a uniquely evil history. — tim wood

This is an interesting point, but it alludes to an issue which needs to be addressed. Is it possible for a concept to be valuable, and not in some way be real? Take the concept of a circle for example, it's a very valuable concept because of its usefulness, but something about the irrational nature of pi indicates that the perfection expressed by the concept cannot exist in reality. So we could say, theoretically, that the circle is a very useful concept, but affirming that there are real circles, existing in the physical world is a falsity constituting a unique type of evil. Still, the concept is useful and that's what makes it valuable.

The point which needs to be made, is that what is described by the concept, through the defined terms, is not the same as the thing in the world which we use the word to refer to. So we see rain drops on the water, and say they make circles, or see a hula hoop, and call it a circle, but since these things do not have a precise centre, as is required by the concept, they are not "real" circles, in the sense of the perfect circle, described by the concept. In my last post, I described the inverse situation, when we re attempting to understand a thing or phenomenon, our concept of it is often deficient. So in some cases (the circle) our concept is prefect, while the things referred to are imperfect, while in other cases, the concept is deficient to meet the perfection of the thing (what I called misunderstanding).

You suggest a third option, that a concept might be produced as some sort of fictional figure. The fictional figure, like Santa Claus for instance, would be useful for some purpose, but have no reality behind it. This seems to be what you are suggesting for "god".

Two nitpicks: confusion over the two you call a misunderstanding. I suppose, if it really is a misunderstanding. What it really is, is error, and depending on the who and why, maybe a deeply vicious error. At any rate, history is so full violence based on this error, among others, that the possibility of error not due to misunderstanding needs accounting for. Second. "either X is Y or X is not Y" may be infelicitous in a discussion, but it's scarcely meaningless or nonsensical. If there is a real god, then he either is, or is not, as claimed. Whether or not anyone is capable of evaluating the claim is another question. — tim wood

I do not understand the distinction you are trying to make between error and misunderstanding. Aren't all errors misunderstandings, and all misunderstandings errors, making the two one and the same? What do you mean by an "error not due to misunderstanding"? If you are talking about intentional wrongdoing, then this is not error, and you are referring to a completely different class of actions. I can see that if you think that God is a fictional object, created like Santa Claus, then you might call this intentional wrongdoing rather than error. But you've said that the concept of god is valuable, therefore it is not wrongdoing, or error at all. How is the concept of "god" different from the concept of "circle", in the sense that nothing in the world can match the perfection required by the concept?

The concept is a useful fiction, but it is only useful so long as there is something real, in the world which is being referred to with the name. The day that there are no more presents on Christmas morning, is the day that "Santa Claus" loses its usefulness. So as much as "Santa Claus" is a fictional object, it still refers to something real, the presents, and that's what makes it useful. But now all we have is a simple misunderstanding, the presents on Christmas morning are associated with the concept of Santa Claus, and that's a misunderstanding. The concept does not match the phenomenon. Likewise, you might think that "god" is a useful, fictional figure. If it is useful, then there is something real which constitutes the usefulness, and associating that concept of god, with that real usefulness, is a simple misunderstanding. Like "Santa Claus", the utility might be accomplished in more honest ways.

Second. "either X is Y or X is not Y" may be infelicitous in a discussion, but it's scarcely meaningless or nonsensical. If there is a real god, then he either is, or is not, as claimed. Whether or not anyone is capable of evaluating the claim is another question. — tim wood

This situation is not as simple as you make it out to be. Consider the circle, and replace "god" with "circle" in the quoted passage. If there is a real circle, then either it is or is not as claimed. The circles in the world are not exactly as it is claimed that a circle is, so if these are "real" circles, then real circles are not as claimed. But some will say that the "real" circle is the concept, and therefore the real circle is as claimed, but the real circle is only conceptual, circles in the world are not real circles. So if the "real" god is conceptual, then god may be as claimed. But if the "real" God is the thing referred to in the world, which makes the concept useful (like the real Santa Clause is the reason for the presents under the tree), then the real God is not as claimed. And it all depends on your perspective of what "real" refers to.

There are (at least) two layers here:
(1) is there a reliable and and an unreliable part of a person's report of their own experiences?
(2) if (1) is true, is it only the unreliable part that is interpreted, and subject to standards of justification?

It stands to reason that if you believe part of a person's report can be rejected, then at least part of their report is unreliable. Perhaps you will hold that nothing in a person's report of their own experience is reliable, but perhaps you will hold (1), that there is a reliable part and an unreliable part. Then you would need to show how you are making that distinction.

It might seem that the distinction in (2) automatically matches up with the distinction in (1), but that is not so. It may be that all of the report involves interpretation, but the reliable part is interpreted in a way that meets our standards of justification.

Can you reason from the justification end backwards to distinguish which part of the report is reliable? That is, can you say, if part of the report is justified, that part was reliable; if part of the report is unjustified, then that was the unreliable part? I don't think so. It could still be that no part of the report is reliable. — Srap Tasmaner

Anecdotal evidence is evidence, and not proof, so it is not absolutely reliable. There's more reliable, less reliable, and unreliable. It makes sense to consider reliable that which has shown itself to be so, and to consider unreliable that which has shown itself to be so. We learn through repetition, through trial and error. If we encounter new or unfamiliar situations, it can be difficult to judge reliability, and, in such situations, it makes sense to proceed with caution. But, if we can make sense of something and relate it to our own experience, then that's at least a start. If, however, we can only relate to it through fantasy, then that goes against it.

That I had an experience a moment ago is not something that requires interpretation. It is self-evident. That it was an experience of this or that may require some interpretation. There are plenty of cases in which it does involve some degree of interpretation, and this is perhaps most evident when we get things wrong. We can be adamant that it was thus and such, when it was otherwise. Sometimes we realise our mistakes, other times we're oblivious. Justification is especially required if it's not a minor detail, but something hugely controversial.

It isn't necessary to reason backwards as you describe. What I describe is about reasoning forwards from accumulated experience.

I'll take the compliment any day. Thanks. That's better than what Sapientia says of me, that I'm just playing games and intentionally missing the point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Were you not? I wish it didn't have to be like that with you, but when you respond like that, what do you expect? There seems to be a recurring problem with you that distinguishes discussions I have with you from discussions I have with others. That wasn't the first time that I've concluded that it's better to cut it short and leave it be.

Anecdotal evidence is evidence, and not proof, so it is not absolutely reliable. — Sapientia

Sorry, I was unclear. I was thinking of "reliable" in a slightly different sense. A person might conceivably be mistaken, say, about being happy, but it seems unlikely; we might decide to treat candid reports of emotional states as reliable, in the sense that people are seldom wrong about their own emotional state. I'm not talking, yet, about how we treat their reports as evidence, but about how they describe their experience when they have the intent to describe it truthfully.

That I had an experience a moment ago is not something that requires interpretation. It is self-evident. That it was an experience of this or that may require some interpretation. There are plenty of cases in which it does involve some degree of interpretation, and this is perhaps most evident when we get things wrong. We can be adamant that it was thus and such, when it was otherwise. Sometimes we realise our mistakes, other times we're oblivious. Justification is especially required if it's not a minor detail, but something hugely controversial.

It isn't necessary to reason backwards as you describe. What I describe is about reasoning forwards from accumulated experience. — Sapientia

Are you saying that an individual learns how to judge her own descriptions of her own experience in a way similar to how someone else might? Maybe inductively, something like, almost every time in the past I've thought I was looking at a refrigerator, it turned out I was. Maybe there can be other guides too: I am having that feeling that people are staring at me, but I have learned from my therapist that's probably not true. Is this the idea?

Sorry, I was unclear. I was thinking of "reliable" in a slightly different sense. A person might conceivably be mistaken, say, about being happy, but it seems unlikely; we might decide to treat candid reports of emotional states as reliable, in the sense that people are seldom wrong about their own emotional state. I'm not talking, yet, about how we treat their reports as evidence, but about how they describe their experience when they have the intent to describe it truthfully. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay.

Are you saying that an individual learns how to judge her own descriptions of her own experience in a way similar to how someone else might? Maybe inductively, something like, almost every time in the past I've thought I was looking at a refrigerator, it turned out I was. Maybe there can be other guides too: I am having that feeling that people are staring at me, but I have learned from my therapist that's probably not true. Is this the idea? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. At least we can readily understand that feeling and understand what it would mean for it be true that people are staring at you. That is not generally the case when it comes to purported experiences of God. You get obscurity, you get confusion, you get speculation, you get descriptions of feelings. But feelings aren't God. Confusion isn't God. And what am I expected to do with obscurity and speculation?

Yes. At least we can readily understand that feeling and understand what it would mean for it be true that people are staring at you. That is not generally the case with when it comes to purported experiences of God. You get obscurity, you get confusion, you get speculation, you get descriptions of feelings. But feelings aren't God. — Sapientia

Suppose I candidly describe the experience I am having right now as the feeling that people are staring at me. That I am having some feeling, you would consider reliable, maybe even incorrigible. But do I also know that it is the kind of feeling that in the past has been correlated with people staring at me? It would be an additional step to say, because I'm having the feeling, people must be staring at me, but is there something you would call interpretation at the previous step, of identifying it as that sort of feeling? Do I interpret my feeling to be the one I think it is, and describe it as, or is this something I reliably, if imperfectly, know?

I'm still trying to figure out what part of a person's candid report of their experience they are expected to justify.

Were you not? I wish it didn't have to be like that with you, but when you respond like that, what do you expect? There seems to be a recurring problem with you that distinguishes discussions I have with you from discussions I have with others. That wasn't the first time that I've concluded that it's better to cut it short and leave it be. — Sapientia

Oh, I apologize. You have my sympathy, so I'll offer some advice. It appears communicating with me is just too complex for your simple mind. If you do not want to play language games with me, then let's not. But quitters are losers, so next time I attempt to engage you in such a game, you're best off not to even reply, as some other simple minded members do, so as not to be persuaded into a position where you will be inclined to quit.

Oh, I apologize. You have my sympathy, so I'll offer some advice. It appears communicating with me is just too complex for your simple mind. If you do not want to play language games with me, then let's not. But quitters are losers, so next time I attempt to engage you in such a game, you're best off not to even reply, as some other simple minded members do, so as not to be persuaded into a position where you will be inclined to quit. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, you're welcome to go back and give it another shot. You might be able to improve upon your last failed attempt. But I don't think you will - that is, give it another shot and, if you were to, be able to demonstrate signs of real improvement - which would mean we're at an impasse.

Suppose I candidly describe the experience I am having right now as the feeling that people are staring at me. That I am having some feeling, you would consider reliable, maybe even incorrigible. But do I also know that it is the kind of feeling that in the past has been correlated with people staring at me? — Srap Tasmaner

You tell me. I wouldn't be able to answer that question.

It would be an additional step to say, because I'm having the feeling, people must be staring at me, but is there something you would call interpretation at the previous step, of identifying it as that sort of feeling? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. It doesn't strike me as being quite like anger, for example, which is more instantaneous and recognisable. The feeling you describe seems to be fundamentally something more basic, a funny feeling, which is then interpreted to be something more specific, more complex.

Do I interpret my feeling to be the one I think it is, and describe it as, or is this something I reliably, if imperfectly, know? — Srap Tasmaner

It seems it requires some degree of interpretation and is less certain. How would I know whether you know? I can only attempt to assess that from an outside perspective which doesn't have access to everything you do.

There's the person reporting their experience, interested third parties judging that report, and then there's theory.

A person might very well distinguish, within their own thought, between a part that is reliable and a part that isn't: "I saw something, but it was hard to tell what at that distance, might've been a man." They might also distinguish between a part that requires justification and a part that doesn't: "He was standing right in front of me. I knew exactly who it was because I had just seen him at the diner and he had that same tie on." It might be a little harder to distinguish what is interpretive and what isn't, because language, but sometimes people will resort to a sort of homegrown phenomenalism: "I could see a patch of dark red on the carpet, it was shiny, and appeared to be spreading." That's interpretive insofar as it's English, but minimally so, I would say.

How an interested third party would determine whether someone's report is credible might be very different from the process of making the report with the intent to be truthful. An individual may have sole access to their own experience, but there are things others can see clearly about a person that they can't. If I'm a confabulist, it could be everyone knows it but me. I could be doing it right now!

I think for the purpose of developing a theory of "eyewitness accounts" or of self-reported experience we want to be able to take in both the perspective of the one making the report and those interested parties who might judge its credibility, and we might draw the boundaries differently from either of them. We might, for instance, claim that everything about self-reported experience requires justification, but the part people often think doesn't is just the part for which they usually do have justification. ("He was standing right in front of me" could be taken either as needing no justification or as the sort of case where justification comes readily to hand.)

Back to our example. You said of the feeling that I am being stared at:

It doesn't strike me as being quite like anger, for example, which is more instantaneous and recognisable. The feeling you describe seems to be fundamentally something more basic, a funny feeling, which is then interpreted to be something more specific, more complex. — Sapientia

I'm going to say that "I felt like someone was staring at me" is as complete and honest a description of my experience as I can give. If you ask, "What does it feel like to have someone staring at you?" I will not know what to say; this is just what it feels like. I may know perfectly well that having this feeling is not evidence that someone is staring at me, but that doesn't matter. If I have a neurological condition and one of the symptoms is this feeling, which patients with this condition often report, then my neurologist doesn't care whether anyone was staring at me. He'll be satisfied by my report. If something I consider embarrassing just happened and I had this feeling, I would say that's why I had the feeling, but that doesn't affect my description of the feeling at all.

None of that is theory; that's just the data. How do you see the boundary here between what is interpretive and what is more basic, the inchoate funny feeling?

How do you see the boundary here between what is interpretive and what is more basic, the inchoate funny feeling? — Srap Tasmaner

Well, in the example that you gave of the feeling that people are staring at you, and in the example that I gave of the feeling of anger, there's a distinction between simple and complex, as well as between propositional content and nonpropositional content. Yours has an aboutness that mine lacks. It is a feeling that, whereas mine is just a feeling, which lacks propositional content. Anger has no truth value, but people are watching me does. Yours is compositional, and can be broken down into parts: people, are, watching, me. Mine isn't, and can't. It's just anger, just raw emotion.

So would you say that "I felt like someone was staring at me" contains more interpretation of the experience than "I felt angry"?

(minor edits for consistency with previous posts)

So would you say that "I felt like someone was watching me" contains more interpretation of the experience than "I felt angry"? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes.

Is it possible for a concept to be valuable, and not in some way be real?

The point which needs to be made, is that what is described by the concept, through the defined terms, is not the same as the thing in the world which we use the word to refer to. So in some cases (the circle) our concept is perfect, while the things referred to are imperfect, while in other cases, the concept is deficient to meet the perfection of the thing (what I called misunderstanding).

You suggest a third option, that a concept might be produced as some sort of fictional figure. The fictional figure, like Santa Claus for instance, would be useful for some purpose, but have no reality behind it. This seems to be what you are suggesting for "god". — MU

I say it's real in some sense (as opposed to not being real in any sense). But in a way that the name conceals. Santa Claus, for adults, I'm arguing, is simply an obscure way of demonstrating "good will towards men." So obscure that lots of folks don't get it. That is, underlying this aspect of Christmas is a set of ideas, anthropomorphized as a jolly fat man in a red suit who lives at the North Pole, and so on.

I believe this is the correct understanding of god, by whatever local name he goes by. In this sense, god is very real. That is, god is a concept, period. But a peculiarly powerful one. To use your earlier distinction between concepts and things, god is not any kind of thing. How do I know? In any absolute sense I do not know, but by that standard i don't know anything, nor does anyone else.

I think the interplay between the ideal/perfect and real/imperfect, as with circles, is off the point. We might even say that the real circle is perfect, allowing for imperfections. (As the engineers say, 2+2=5 for large values of 2!). Certainly by your argument if god were real, and as god, unknowable, then we could never talk about or pretend to have any knowledge at all of him/her, in this case because the perfection of the (unknowable) real is inaccessible through concepts!

But god as a regulative idea is altogether more reachable; one merely needs to think, and help from any source with the thinking is allowed! Perfection simply does not arise as a substantive issue.

"Error" and "misunderstanding" refer to different things. (One's a noun, the other's root is a verb, for starters.) But this isn't worth the candle.

If it is useful, then there is something real which constitutes the usefulness, and associating that concept of god, with that real usefulness, is a simple misunderstanding. Like "Santa Claus", the utility might be accomplished in more honest ways. — MU

I tried to save the candle. No, I think the association is error. Like this: "I misunderstand." The emphasis is on the actor, me. "I made an error, a mistake." Here "error" and "misunderstanding" overlap. "That is an error." This refers to a fact, the existential status of a something. My emphasis in using "error" is on the fact. Further, it is not the association that is the error - that's misunderstanding. The error is to aver that god is real, in the sense of a thing, perhaps even like a kind of human being, only with unlimited supernatural powers an abilities.

As to it's either being or not being a circle (or god), the question is not whether something is, or is not, something that it is not (as with, is this real circle a perfect ideal circle?) Rather, is this what we think it is, or not? (E.g., is this a circle or is it not a circle, as "circle" is understood in the context.)

Thanks for playing along here.

(1) Is there a candidate for a general rule here, that if the content is propositional, it involves more interpretation than candid reports that don't?

(2) What do we say now about the report "I felt like someone was staring at me"? We accept that there was some 'underlying' feeling, I take it. If the person who had the experience can think of no other way to describe it, are we forced to refer to it as "the feeling you describe as feeling like you are being stared at"? Is there anything else we can say?

(3) Do we require more justification for the description of the experience if it is more interpretive? Would we say any of the following? "That's not what you feel." "You feel something, but not that." "What you describe isn't a feeling." What kind of justification for describing the feeling in this way could someone conceivably provide?

I don't want to restrict this just to feelings, though. If I report that I am right now watching my brother eat the cake, that's propositional. Similarly if I report that I remember seeing him eat the cake. Is there any reason yet to think we need to treat reports of perceptions, memories, thoughts, and so on, differently from reports of feelings?

I believe this is the correct understanding of god, by whatever local name he goes by. In this sense, god is very real. That is, god is a concept, period. But a peculiarly powerful one. To use your earlier distinction between concepts and things, god is not any kind of thing. How do I know? In any absolute sense I do not know, but by that standard i don't know anything, nor does anyone else. — tim wood

What about God as the creator of things? Don't you think that there must be a reason why there are things instead of just randomness? What I mean by "things" here is something with temporal extension, so that a description of a state will remain valid for a period of time. For instance, "the chair is at the table" maintains its validity for a while, due to the temporal existence of these objects. Without the existence of objects, there would be random changes from one moment to the next, and a moment is a very short period of time.

How can we account for the cause of temporal stability without referring to God? The issues with quantum mechanics indicates that physicists are incapable of accounting for the temporal continuity of existence. And referring to God is not just a matter of attributing what is unknown (temporal continuity), to the Will of God. What metaphysicians, and theologians, know about the nature of the will as an immaterial cause, and the fact that it has been determined as necessary that an immaterial cause is required for material existence, leads one to the conclusion that a cause such as a final cause, similar to an act of will, is the cause of material existence. So there is good reason why the Will of God is designated as the cause of material existence. It is necessary that material existence has an immaterial cause, and the will is the only type of immaterial cause that we know of. So the immaterial cause, which creates material existence is designated as the Will of God.

The error is to aver that god is real, in the sense of a thing, perhaps even like a kind of human being, only with unlimited supernatural powers an abilities. — tim wood

I agree that this idea of God is a misunderstanding. God is never really described as a thing, as God is described as the creator of all things, not Himself a thing.

As to it's either being or not being a circle (or god), the question is not whether something is, or is not, something that it is not (as with, is this real circle a perfect ideal circle?) Rather, is this what we think it is, or not? (E.g., is this a circle or is it not a circle, as "circle" is understood in the context.) — tim wood

This skirts the issue. The issue is, "what is the real circle?". Is the real circle the concept of a circle, with it's perfectly irrational pi, or is the real circle an instance of a circle drawn on paper, or physically existing somewhere else? If the concept is real, then how would you deny that there is a real God when you allow that there is a real concept of God?

Well, you're welcome to go back and give it another shot. You might be able to improve upon your last failed attempt. But I don't think you will - that is, give it another shot and, if you were to, be able to demonstrate signs of real improvement - which would mean we're at an impasse. — Sapientia

Uh, no, I think not. The quitter is the one who needs to try again.
I believe it was you who did not read my post, and said:

I think you're playing games, so I'm going to cut this short and read no further. — Sapientia

So I believe it is you who needs to give it another shot. The appearance of impasse is simply your refusal to try. Compromise requires effort from all sides. There will be no agreement if one of the parties refuses to try. And this clearly points to you.

Uh, no, I think not. The quitter is the one who needs to try again. — Metaphysician Undercover

We can't even agree on that. Quitting isn't a bad thing if something isn't worth the bother. If you give me something worth my time, I'll try again. Take it or leave it.

What about God as the creator of things? Don't you think that there must be a reason why there are things instead of just randomness? — MU

I can think what I like, and so can you, and so can the cat and the dog. Now show me why any of such thoughts matter (except in terms of self-interest).

How can we account for the cause of temporal stability without referring to God? The issues with quantum mechanics indicates that physicists are incapable of accounting for the temporal continuity of existence. And referring to God is not just a matter of attributing what is unknown (temporal continuity), to the Will of God. What metaphysicians, and theologians, know about the nature of the will as an immaterial cause, and the fact that it has been determined as necessary that an immaterial cause is required for material existence, leads one to the conclusion that a cause such as a final cause, similar to an act of will, is the cause of material existence. So there is good reason why the Will of God is designated as the cause of material existence. It is necessary that material existence has an immaterial cause, and the will is the only type of immaterial cause that we know of. So the immaterial cause, which creates material existence is designated as the Will of God. — MU

Whew! I hope folks will read your paragraph. So much wrong, so little time! If by "god" you simply mean an answer to a question not yet otherwise answerable, you're free to do so - and you're in excellent company if you do. If you want to build a story around that answer, again, you can. If you want to make claims about that story, again. But, if you represent it to be a fact, there you have a problem. Before you take that last step, you're entitled to respect, Once you take it, you're a greater or lesser danger.

To start: it is not clear to me that metaphysicians or theologians know anything at all in virtue of either their metaphysics or their theology. At best they spin out stories that have at least some internal consistency. And at best, these folks can be wise and their thoughts valuable. But knowledge!?

and the fact that it has been determined as necessary that an immaterial cause is required for material existence — MU

This is not something I am familiar with as a fact. Please make clear how it is a fact.

As to it's either being or not being a circle (or god), the question is not whether something is, or is not, something that it is not (as with, is this real circle a perfect ideal circle?) Rather, is this what we think it is, or not? (E.g., is this a circle or is it not a circle, as "circle" is understood in the context.) — timw

This skirts the issue. The issue is, "what is the real circle?". Is the real circle the concept of a circle, with it's perfectly irrational pi, or is the real circle an instance of a circle drawn on paper, or physically existing somewhere else? If the concept is real, then how would you deny that there is a real God when you allow that there is a real concept of God? — MU

Perhaps language confusion here? How do you get from the reality - the fact - of a concept, to affirming the real existence of what the concept is a concept of? Are you arguing that everything that can be conceived is real? Or just some things? Or, how about just that concepts are concepts, however valuable they may be, and reality is something else.

I can think what I like, and so can you, and so can the cat and the dog. Now show me why any of such thoughts matter (except in terms of self-interest). — tim wood

The human being has an innate desire to know, this is what defines philosophy. You can refer to this as "self-interest" if you like, but to dismiss it is to dismiss philosophy. Now you are starting to remind me of Sapientia.

If by "god" you simply mean an answer to a question not yet otherwise answerable, you're free to do so - and you're in excellent company if you do. — tim wood

No, that's not what I mean , and that's why I explicitly stated it's not what I mean:

And referring to God is not just a matter of attributing what is unknown (temporal continuity), to the Will of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not something I am familiar with as a fact. Please make clear how it is a fact. — tim wood

This is what I explained in the other thread, "'True' and 'Truth'". We can take it up here, or in the other thread, or both places if you like. It has been demonstrated by Plato and Aristotle, then taken up later by Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians, that material existence, as we know it, requires an immaterial cause. That this demonstration has been made is a fact, and I paraphrased the demonstration in the other thread. Whether you, or any other human being accepts this demonstration as a valid justification of the conclusion, is another issue.

Perhaps language confusion here? How do you get from the reality - the fact - of a concept, to affirming the real existence of what the concept is a concept of? Are you arguing that everything that can be conceived is real? Or just some things? Or, how about just that concepts are concepts, however valuable they may be, and reality is something else. — tim wood

I was not arguing for the real existence of what the concept is a concept of, I was arguing for the real existence of the concept. Perhaps you've forgotten, or did not notice, that I distinguish two distinct relationships between human concepts and material objects. In some situations, we are trying to understand a material object, and we produce a concept as a representation of the material object. In other cases, such as in the case of the circle, we produce a concept, then we make material representations of that concept in our creative endeavours. You seem to have a desire to conflate these two, such that the only valid relationship between concept and material object is the former, in which the concept is meant to represent a material object. So you would ask, "what the concept is a concept of", even of the concept of "circle", when it is quite clear that the concept being discussed is the concept "of" a circle, and this is not a representation of a material thing, it is a concept, the concept of a circle.

We can't even agree on that. Quitting isn't a bad thing if something isn't worth the bother. If you give me something worth my time, I'll try again. Take it or leave it. — Sapientia

As you demonstrated, nothing I give you will be determined by you to be worth your time, because you refused to even read it, citing that because it was from me, you knew it was not worth your time. So even if, perchance, something I gave you was actually worth your time, you would never know this, assuming that it was not worth your time, and not bothering to take the time to understand it. That is the classic effect of prejudice. Remember the boy who cried wolf? You treat me as if I am that boy. But I never cried wolf, you just misunderstood, being deficient in interpretive skills.

I think for now, contrary to my last post, we'll have to focus after all just on reports of emotional experience, just to keep this manageable.

I have a few more thoughts. I think it may be difficult to sustain the distinction between propositional and non-propositional reports or to assign priority to one over the other. For one thing, explanation can go either way:

"How did you feel?"
"I felt angry."
"What does that mean?"
"I felt like hitting someone."

"How did you feel?"
"I felt like someone was staring at me."
"What does that mean?"
"I felt nervous, uncomfortable."

I'm not sure there's a clear choice here. It's at least intelligible to look at either the propositional or the non-propositional as more descriptive or explanatory.

I'm not sure raw emotions are separable. Anger is very often anger at someone and/or about something. It's my understanding that people who suffer from PTSD may experience rage that they cannot understand at all, that is unconnected with people and events around them. That might provide some reason to think that you can distill the raw emotion of anger present in an episode of being angry at someone about something.

But can you say that the anger is something we have direct access to while the rest was interpretive? That in such a report the reliable part is only that you were angry, not that you were angry about something or at someone? I don't think that would match most people's experience. What's more, it's not hard to find a psychologist who would tell you that when you think you were angry at me for not calling, you were actually hurt that I didn't call. So it's at least intelligible to claim that even applying a label like "anger" is an interpretive step.

Note, I'm not saying you said it wasn't. We're still just trying to sort out what part of a report of an emotional experience-- originally the experience of the presence of God-- is interpretive, and requiring justification, and which part isn't. It's still not clear to me.

A man can not reason his way to God. There is more likelyhood that what happened in the gospels in fact happened for real than People think. I would say it is even probable. Believing God to to be incarnated is still in a sense absurd though. For me, the unsolveable problem with christianity isnt God's existence, but rather the idea of eternal hell. Now this might sound weird, but I am almost certain that one of the following two men were right about human existence: Jesus Christ or Nietzsche. Darwin and the rest are boring.

Sorry, I should be spending more time on your posts and less time bickering with a certain someone. I need to take in what you've said and contemplate. Then maybe I'll respond.

Cool. We're not on the clock here.

A man can not reason his way to God. — Beebert

Speak for yourself on this. I was atheist from my upbringing, and started practising philosophy as an atheist. It took many years of reasoning before I was convinced of God. God is logically necessary, as the creator of material existence. The cosmological argument is particularly forceful logically. But there are complicated metaphysical concepts involved, such as "potential" and "actual", and the argument will not be accepted unless these concepts are understood in the right way. Therefore the logic will not be accepted without the appropriate education.